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A bstract
Although international involvement in police-building and reform is increasingly common, 
success has been elusive. Much o f the policy and academic literature is process-oriented 
and technical in nature. However, the critical literature recognises that police-building is a 
political as well as technical undertaking, emphasising the imperative o f “paying attention 
to the local context” , as well as ensuring “local ownership”. I argue that in practice paying 
attention to the local context rarely occurs, and that the concept o f local ownership is 
poorly theorised. Further, I argue there has been little exploration o f how the relationship 
between the capacity builders and the recipients o f that process conditions the outcom e of 
the exercise.
This thesis is a case study o f the construction and reconstruction o f a post-conflict police 
force under international and national direction from 1999 to 2009. The Policia Nacional 
Timor-Leste (PNTL) was initially developed under the auspices o f a United Nations 
transitional administration (UNTAET), and subsequently managed by the sovereign East 
Timorese government. A violent political and security crisis in 2006 saw the nation’s police 
and military unravel, resulting in a request for foreign security assistance and a new United 
Nations mission (UNM IT). U N M IT was mandated, among other things, to assist the 
sovereign government to reconstruct the PNTL. In essence the United Nations has been 
involved in constructing, or reconstructing, the PN TL on two occasions.
I examine the way that the concepts o f local ownership and local context are used in the 
narrative about police building in East Timor, recognising that international police builders 
bring their own individual and institutional contexts with them which influence, and 
interact with, other local contexts. I interrogate the contest between international and 
national security' actors over ownership or sovereignty o f East T im or’s police and military, 
as well as the associated contest over the reform process. In addition I examine a 
manifestation o f  local ownership that relies on innovations in the maintenance o f order in a 
situation where the effective reach o f state law and justice mechanisms is limited.
The lacks o f international and national capacity, as well as a reciprocal failure to develop 
crucial working relationships, are also central to the failure to build a sustainable state 
police institution in East Timor. More importance has been placed on appearing to 
reconstruct the PN TL than actually doing it, most apparent in the 2009 ‘hand over’ o f 
policing responsibilities from U N PO L to PNTL, while PN TL remains largely
unreconstructed. I argue the handover is an example o f regulatory ritualism, characterised 
by multi-layered fictive qualities; contributing to the continuing institutional fragility o f the 
PNTL. I explore the general proposition that external post-conflict police building must be 
predicated on how the relationship between insiders and outsiders informs the complexities 
and opacities o f local ownership.
The ritualism present in current police reform and security sector review efforts has 
opened the door to the substance o f Carl Schmitt’s exceptionalism. There are grounds for 
the fear that the exception o f the present, infused with authoritarianisms from external and 
internal colonialism o f the recent past could become the pattern o f the future. 
Alternatively, that prospect could be headed off by a UN and a national democratic 
leadership not itself ritualistic about rule o f law.
Smoke and mirrors in the title o f the thesis refers to a deception or trickery in a political 
context. I argue the reconstruction o f the East Timorese police has been more focussed on 
form than substance. Smoke also seems an apt m etaphor for a police force developed out 
o f the ashes o f the 1999 violence, and then reconstructed after the crisis o f 2006. ‘Mirrors’ 
refers to the observed phenom ena o f international police builders wishing to develop a 
police force ‘in their own image’. It also refers to the authoritarian legacies o f East T im or’s 
history which are mirrored in the trajectories the police force is currently following.
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Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction
This thesis examines the development o f East T im or’s1 police force, the Policia Nacional 
Timor-Leste (PNTL),2 under international and national auspices, between 1999 and 2009. 
Although the police force was not inaugurated until 2000, I have chosen to begin the story 
at the commencement o f the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Tim or 
(UNTAET) mission. The account ends in 2009 when I made my final fieldwork trip to 
East Timor. This was a time when policing responsibilities were in the early stages o f a 
district-by-district, and unit-by-unit, handover from the United Nations Police (UNPOL)3 
to PNTL, but before responsibility for executive policing4 is handed back from U N PO L to 
the PNTL. This will occur at a time yet to be determined.
The thesis is the first full length study o f the construction and reconstruction o f the East 
Timorese Police. It provides a case-study o f a post-conflict police force that has been 
(re)constructed by the UN, in the same place, on two occasions. This offers an opportunity 
to determine the responsiveness o f the UN to the things that have been, or should have 
been, learnt. The UN (and other international organisations) is increasingly called upon to 
construct or reform police forces in post-conflict situations and determining the 
organisational responsiveness to lessons learnt, or not learnt, can illuminate an assessment
1 What is now the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste has been known by a number of names throughout 
its history and the names used have depended on the perspective of those using them. This presents difficult 
choices for an author when examining a period that encompasses pre-contact history, Portuguese colonial 
rule, Indonesian occupation, the UN interregnum, and the post-independence period. In this thesis I refer 
to the Republica Democrätica de Timor-Leste (in Portuguese) as ‘East Timor’, rather than by the now official 
name ‘Timor-Leste’. This is a pragmatic, rather than political decision. It is equivalent to referring to the 
Federal Republic o f Germany as ‘Germany’ rather than by its official name Bundesrepublik Deutschland’. The 
term East Timor is common in English language usage and allows consistency for the periods of time prior 
to, and following, the restoration of independence on 20 May 2002. If referring to the Portuguese colonial 
period I use ‘Portuguese Timor’. I continue to use ‘Timor-Leste’ if it forms part of the name of an 
organisation e.g. Policia Nacional Timor-Leste (PNTL) or Timor-Leste Police Development Program 
(TLPDP).
2 The East Timorese Police underwent a series of name changes. It was formed as the Timor Lorosa’e Police 
Service in 2000 (United Nations 2000b), became the East Timor Police Service (ETPS) in 2001 (United 
Nations 2001c: 3), appears to briefly have been the Timor-Leste Police Service in 2002 (United Nations 
2002c: 5), and by 2003 had become the Policia Nacional Timor Leste (PNTL) (Amnesty International 2003: 
1). Not surprisingly, there were periods of inconsistency in the names used.
3 The term CIVPOL (Civilian Police) was used formally by the United Nations until 2005 when it was 
changed to UNPOL (United Nations Police). However a number of United Nations missions were using the 
term UNPOL prior to that time (Pers. Comm. Gordon Peake 19 June 2009.). In this thesis I use the term 
CIVPOL until the handover to East Timorese authorities occurred in 2004, then I use UNPOL.
4 Executive policing refers to control over the functions of state policing. This function was fulfilled by 
United Nations police under the UNTAET mandate and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
mandate. See Dwan (2002) for a discussion of executive policing in peace operations. UNPOL executive 
policing was reinstated during the UNMIT mandate. See chapter 6 for a discussion of the legal ambiguity 
surrounding this matter.
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of police-building in contexts broader than just East Timor. The issues explored are also of 
importance in understanding the broader challenges, and limited successes, of post-conflict 
institution and state-building.
There is a further reason this study is of particular importance to understanding attempts at 
post-conflict police-building more broadly. East Timor, despite its historical and 
contemporary complexities and specificities, and legacies of violence, is arguably one of the 
most benign environments in which to attempt to construct or reconstruct a police force. 
The population of East Timor is small — only a little over a million people. Following the 
1999 referendum the occupying force withdrew completely, and there was no significant 
external threat to the country’s security. From 1999 the UN had an unrivalled mandate to 
carry out its state-building work, with a high degree of sustained international support. In 
addition, when the UN first arrived in East Timor there was almost universal domestic 
support for their presence. Despite ongoing low-level violence and periodic surges in civil 
unrest East Timor has a comparatively uncomplicated security situation. The same cannot 
be said for many of the places where post-conflict police-building is attempted such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Democratic Republic of Congo. This thesis demonstrates the 
great difficulties encountered in police-building in East Timor. I suggest this does not auger 
well for attempts in considerably less benign environments.
Yet international police-building in East Timor has been challenging and the successes 
have been limited. Before exploring the reasons why this undertaking has been so difficult I 
survey a number of literatures (Section 1.2) that explore the challenges of state-building and 
police-building more generally. Much of the former recites an international imperative to 
participate in state-building of states deemed — using a variety of nomenclature - to be 
weak, and assumed therefore to pose threats to other members of the international state 
system, as well as their own citizens. A core feature of this state-building is held to include 
the development of state institutions, including state-based police forces. The practice of 
state-building, and police-building, has however proved fraught and with decidedly mixed 
outcomes. This has led to a search for ‘lessons learnt’. These have principally been of a 
technical or process nature. It has also led to critiques in the academic and policy literature 
of the inherent assumptions and ideological underpinnings of the desirability and 
practicality of international state- and police- building. This questioning had been 
particularly pronounced in relation to places where the modern state, for a variety of 
reasons, has historically had little reach and little ‘traction’. Both those authors searching 
for ‘lessons learnt’ and those questioning the ideological underpinnings and practical 
possibility or desirability of current state- and police-building interventions reference the
need to pay attention to the ‘local context’, and espouse the purported centrality o f ‘local 
ownership’ to improved outcomes for such ventures. However, an examination o f the 
literature indicates that ‘local context’ is rarely apprehended and the term ‘local ownership’ 
is inadequately thought through, in particular for the unintended outcomes that may 
accompany its application. A notable omission from the literature is any examination o f 
how relationships between international and national actors condition the outcomes o f an 
internationally managed police construction and reconstruction process. The thesis 
interrogates these relationships, demonstrating how discourse on local ownership, 
combined with failure to apprehend critically influential local context, moulds and 
conditions the outcomes o f the police-building exercise. The thesis shows, however, that 
the context as experienced by international actors means they are organisationally 
constrained in apprehending these issues. Although the thesis focuses on the specificities o f 
East Timorese context it is likely that these issues o f relationship are also im portant in 
other post-conflict police-building, or even broader state-building, contexts.
Using the lens o f local context 1 examine how East T im or’s socio-political structures, and 
histories o f colonisation and occupation, influence both reception of, and resistance to, the 
introduction o f a new police institution. I investigate how these factors influence 
relationships between international and national actors involved in this process and 
condition the outcomes o f the exercise. I conclude that different but congruent agendas 
lead to a mutually reinforcing ritual o f police development more focused on form than 
substance. This in turn provides a receptive environment for the development o f 
exceptionalism in relation to East Tim or’s security forces.
The bulk o f this chapter explores the background literature relevant to the post-conflict 
development o f police forces by external actors (1.2). I then state the central research 
questions (1.3), describe my fieldwork and m ethod (1.4) and the structure o f the thesis 
(1.5).
1.2 Background literature: the international experience
In this section I survey overlapping literatures that, read together, provide a background to 
the business o f developing national police forces under international auspices. Although 
there is a very uneven record o f transplanting policing models from one context to another 
(Ellison 2007; Murphy 2007: 208) a large industry involving the United Nations (UN), 
bilateral donors, private contractors and N on-G overnm ent Organisations (NGOs) is 
increasingly active in doing just that.
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The state-building literature (1.2.1) is concerned with processes o f  state-building and the 
developm ent o f institutions o f state, including the police. The literature that concentrates 
on police reform and police-building (1.2.2) is generally narrative and process-based. The 
literature that focuses on the changing role o f  civilian police in peace operations (1.2.3) 
details how  the mandates and requirements o f international police have evolved in the face 
o f changing circumstances and expectations. The literature that explores the particularities 
o f state-building in ‘stateless’ or ‘new subsistence’ societies (1.2.4), analyses how introduced 
institutions o f  state interact with and transform  older an d /o r sub-national institutions. An 
examination o f the literature and discourse on ‘local ownership’ and ‘local context’ (1.2.5) 
provides an analysis o f  the evolution o f the concepts, and challenges in their application.
1.2.1 State-Building
The state-building literature surveyed in this section includes UN documents and academic 
literature. The literature tends to be broad in scope with only limited attention to police­
building.
Following the end o f the Cold War, and the associated collapse o f polarised security 
positions arranged around the interests o f  the Superpowers, there was an emergence o f 
forms o f  conflict characterised by their intra-state nature rather than the previously more 
com m on conflicts between states. Authors such as Kaldor (1999) and Duffield (2001) refer 
to these conflicts as “ the new wars” .s Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace 
(United Nations 1992), and its supplement (United Nations 1995), heralded a recognition 
that the increase in intrastate conflicts presented the UN with challenges not encountered 
since the early 1960s in the Congo. A critical feature was the collapse o f state institutions. 
The R eport o f  the UN Panel on Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) (United Nations 
2000a) anticipated a significantly greater role for the UN in building peace following 
conflict, through the practice o f ‘peace-building’, which it defined as follows:
includ[es] but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian 
society, strengthening the rule o f law (for example, through training and 
restructuring o f local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving 
respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and 
investigation o f past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for 
democratic developm ent (including electoral assistance and support for free 
media); and prom oting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques 
(United Nations 2000a: 3).
1 New wars are also seen as creations of globalisation that tend to feature conflicts over identity rather than 
territory, the use of guerrilla rather than conventional warfare, and the use of global financing networks 
including organised crime.
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Using the term state-building (rather than peace-building) Chesterman (2004: 5) notes that 
it tends to feature
extended international involvement (primarily, though not exclusively, 
through the United Nations) that goes beyond traditional peacekeeping and 
peace-building mandates, ... directed at constructing or reconstructing 
institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and 
economic security. This includes quasi-governmental activities such as 
electoral assistance, human rights and rule of law technical assistance, 
security sector reform, and certain forms of development assistance.
An extensive literature on state-building has emerged (Milliken 2002; Pei and Kasper 2003; 
Chesterman 2004; Krasner 2004; Rotberg 2004; Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur 2005; 
Fukuyama 2005; Paris and Sisk 2009a), with no small part of the literature devoted to the 
experience of state-building in East Timor (Chopra 2000; Beauvais 2001; Chesterman 2002; 
Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005; Sahin 2007; Moxham 2008; Brown 2009).
Externally-led state-building has become broadly accepted across the political spectrum and 
is evident both in the approaches and strategy of the UN, and in the foreign policy 
positions and development strategies of donor nations. A variety of typologies of 
peacekeeping generations are used, with overlapping definitions and classifications of 
peacekeeping missions.6 Various authors use different terminology to distinguish between 
‘first-generation peacekeeping’, which contemplated no involvement in state-building per 
se, and subsequent generations of peacekeeping where this involvement developed. 
Depending on the author’s typology, state-building involvement is claimed to have started 
during ‘second-generation’, ‘third-generation’ or ‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping, as well as 
in the bilateral initiatives aimed at strengthening or reconstructing state institutions.
Paris (Paris 2004), and Paris and Sisk (Paris and Sisk 2009b), argue that building and 
strengthening state institutions is central to creating a successful transition from war to 
peace and that this was often not recognised in early state-building efforts. Paris (2004: 7-8) 
argues it is necessary to have “institutionalization before liberalization”. Other promoters
6 See e.g. Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998), Doyle (2001), Thakur and Schnabel (2001), Lipson (2007), 
Mingst and Karns (2007). For example ‘first generation peacekeeping’, also referred to as classical or 
traditional peacekeeping, and seen as originating after World War Two (WWII) is characterised bv Doyle as 
the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed personnel from a number of nations under UN auspices, usually 
following a negotiated setdement such as a truce or ceasefire. Authors variously refer to ‘Second generation 
peacekeeping’ as being characterised by UN involvement in negotiating outcomes to conflicts between states, 
and/or overseeing early stages of political transitions including elections. Some authors refer to ‘third 
generation peacekeeping’ as the UN becoming increasingly involved in the deployment of peacekeeping 
forces in intrastate conflicts, while others such as Doyle consider ‘third generation peacekeeping’ occurs when 
involvement does not require the consent of the parties to the conflict.
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of this institutionalist perspective include Fukuyama (2005), Chesterman (2004), and 
Krasner (2004). This perspective of inadequately built institutions being a driver of 
instability was also evident in assessments of the 2006 crisis in East Timor (Brady and D.G. 
Timberman 2006: 1, 5, 7-11; Kingsbury 2007: 24). Critiques of the institutionalist 
perspective include that there is a confusion between the tasks of state-building and nation- 
building (Dinnen 2008: 5),7 and inadequate consideration of how state/society dynamics 
condition the effective reach of the state (Migdal 1988: 33-41; Lemay-Hebert 2009: 22-23).
A large part of the state-building literature has generated a search for readily accessible ‘best 
practice’ lessons and can be characterised as problem-solving literature. In trying to 
understand why this ‘lessons learned’ approach does not produce successful state-building, 
it is useful to examine some of the critical literature on state-building. This literature does 
not, in general, consider the state-building ‘project’ a success, with Pei and Kasper (2003: 1) 
noting that “historically, nation-building attempts by outside powers are notable mainly for 
their bitter disappointments, not their triumphs”. Morgan and McLeod (2006: 413) 
contend that those examples of state-building that are deemed to be successful tend to be 
measured by externally imposed criteria.
Some question our understanding of peacekeeping and state-building as value-neutral 
exercises (Duffield 2001; Pugh 2004; Chandler 2006). These authors explore the interests 
and ideological underpinnings of the activities of peacekeeping and its modern corollary of 
state-building. Pugh (2004: 41) concludes that “modern versions of peace keeping can be 
considered as forms of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold 
the liberal peace”.
Chandler (2006: 1) argues that state-building practices constitute highly invasive forms of 
external regulation, yet he contends that this cannot be understood merely as promotion of 
the self-interests of Western actors. He proposes, rather, that state-building forms of 
regulation act to deny the power wielded and evade accountability for the exercise. 
Chandler (2006: 5) notes the language used about state-building is focused on capacity- 
building and empowerment with reference to
7 Although the terms ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ are sometimes used interchangeably Paris and Sisk 
(2009b: 15) make the following distinction: “State-building is not synonymous with nation-building. Although 
the two concepts are related, state-building focuses primarily on public institutions — the machinery of the 
state, from courts and legislatures to laws and bureaucrats — whereas nation-building refers to the 
strengthening of a national population’s collective identity, including its sense of national distinctiveness and 
unity”.
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preparedness, early intervention, strategic planning, international 
coordination, the importance of the rule of law, the integration of military 
and civic agencies, the problems of relying overly on 
elections.. .demobilisation etc.
He highlights the highly depoliticised and functionalised nature of the language. Chandler 
(2006: 51, 165-66) argues that sovereignty is recast as primarily to do with capacity, and that 
the states that are being created are largely sovereign in name only. He contends that 
production of sound administrative and governance processes, without connection to 
political process, hinders attempts at cohesion in post-conflict environments and obscures 
the need to address social and political divisions.
Chandler’s (2006: 9-10, 47) central theme of ‘empire in denial’ is explained as the formal 
separation of Western-dominated policy processes from the political processes within non- 
Western states, leading to a disembodied and ‘fetishised’ state. He argues that this new 
form of empire works to prevent the establishment of strong links between non-Western 
states and their societies and results in the phenomena of ‘phantom states’ whose 
institutions lack social or political legitimacy. Chandler goes on to argue that it is not the 
universalisation of the state form that is most problematic but the concealing of its 
disintegration.
Following the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the use of state-building 
as a tool in the ‘war on terror’ signalled a change in previous U.S. government derision of 
the task of nation-building (Chesterman 2004: 4). These attacks also mark a turning point 
in an increasingly securitised development discourse (Dinnen 2004; Kabutaulaka 2004). 
Similarly, Australia’s foreign policy imperatives, together with its development strategy, 
were also informed by the war on terror.8 Weak, failing or failed states were perceived as 
havens for terrorism and transnational crime, and as a consequence a danger to the security 
of their neighbours and the international community (see e.g. AusAID 2006). Morgan and 
McLeod, following Douglas, argue that this ‘securitisation of development’ has at its core 
an idealised form of state structure and functioning and, more problematically, includes 
“assumptions about ideal relationships between individuals, civil society and particular state 
institutions” (Morgan and McLeod 2006: 413).
This understanding of Australia’s position in a neighbourhood deemed to be increasingly 
dangerous finds an expression in the notion of an ‘arc of instability’ that, as initially
8 The change of government that occurred in Australia in December 2007 and the United States in January 
2009 lead to abandoning the ‘war on terror’ rhetoric that was so comprehensively associated with the Bush 
and the Howard administrations. Whether that immediately leads to a decreased conflation of security and 
development is less likely.
conceived, included a “balkaniscd Indonesia, a broken-backed Papua New Guinea and a 
weak New Zealand” (Dibb, Hale, and Prince 1999: 18). Dobell (2004: 244) argued the term 
became “ a polite way o f talking about Indonesia” . Curiously, the concept as adopted by 
the Australian government changed the geographical definition to exclude Indonesia as 
explained by the Australian Defence Minister, Brendan Nelson, in 2006:
We cannot afford to have failing states in our region. The so-called 'arc o f 
instability', which basically goes from East Tim or through to the south-west 
Pacific states, means that not only does Australia have a responsibility in 
preventing and indeed assisting with humanitarian and disaster relief, but 
also that we cannot allow any o f these countries to become havens for 
transnational crime, nor indeed havens for terrorism (ABC Correspondent's 
Report. 2006).
For many, such as Fukuyama (2005: xvii), the dangers o f weak states and the concomitant 
imperative for state-building interventions is obvious: “ .. because weak or failed states are 
the source o f many o f the world’s most serious problems, from poverty to AIDS to drugs 
to terrorism” . This argument is challenged by Chandler (2006: 189-90): “it is the stuff o f 
fiction to believe that the problems o f drugs, crime, terrorism, etc are manufactured in 
some strange exotic location and then exported to the West”.
Terms such as ‘weak’, ‘tailed’, ‘failing’ etc appear to have gained a particular traction in the 
literature that addresses state function and state-building in the Melanesian region.4 
Although some authors such as Wainwright (2003) use these terms in a self-evident 
manner, others have sought to place this in a historical context or question the utility o f the 
descriptions (see e.g. Douglas 2000; D innen 2001; Kabutaulaka 2002). Nelson (2006) notes 
that this collection o f terms, used to describe various Pacific Island states, have antecedents 
dating back over forty years. He contends that
the most significant failure o f these labels is that while they attem pt to 
describe a stage reached in a process, they say nothing about what that 
process is, what causes it and what forces might accelerate it, slow it down 
or reverse it (Nelson 2006: 1).
He argues that the convenience o f the terms obscures the nature o f the states as they are. 
By using his knowledge o f the functioning o f the state throughout Melanesia, in particular 
Papua New Guinea, Nelson puts forward some observations, grouped under ten categories 
that offer more useful descriptions o f how the state operates (Nelson 2006).'" Morgan and
9 The term ‘state failure’ is also widely used in relation to post-colonial African state function. See e.g. Olowu 
and Wunsch (1995) and Hyden (2006).
10 By way of example one of Nelson’s categories is ‘the optional state’ where a village is essentially beyond the 
reach of the state, not necessarily through any geographic difficulty, but rather the services that might
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McLeod criticise Wainwright’s description of the Solomon Islands as a failed state, posing 
the question of whether it is rather Australia that has ‘failed’ its neighbour (Wainwright 
2003; Morgan and McLeod 2006: 414).
Australia’s decision to become involved in a police-led law and order restoration exercise in 
July 2003, followed by an ambitious state-building exercise in the Solomon Islands marked 
a turning point in Australian foreign policy imperatives that were increasingly informed by 
the weak states thesis. The notion of a state-building exercise with a focus on police is 
predicated on the idea that development is dependent on establishing security, and similarly 
that security will be improved by development. Failure to apprehend this connection is 
frequently referred to as a ‘conflict trap’. This link between security and development is 
promoted in any number of academic articles and policy documents (DFID 2002; Collier et 
al. 2003; AusAID 2004). Duffield (2007: viii-ix) argues, however, that development is not 
what it appears. Rather than “a benign and practical act of helping others, development is a 
technology of security [which]... functions to contain and manage underdevelopment’s 
destabilizing effects”. Previously Duffield (2001: 2, 5, 13, 26-30) has argued that as the 
global South" is increasingly excluded from the conventional global economy, new 
frameworks for understanding security have emerged that construct those excluded 
countries and their underdevelopment as dangerous and liable to create instability, 
terrorism and conflict. This places global South governments in the position of having to 
demonstrate themselves as fit for inclusion by meeting defined standards of ‘good 
governance’.
In Section 1.2.4 I examine the particular challenges of applying models of state-building 
developed in Western contexts in places such as East Timor and Melanesia.
1.2.2 Police-building
The police-building literature tends to examine the police reform or (re)construction task in 
isolation. This literature is generally narrative and process-based, and is characterised by 
accounts of post-conflict police-building in country or region specific locations, with a 
tendency to focus on operational issues (Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg 1998; Holm and
normally be provided by a state no longer are (or never were). It is optional in that residents of the village can 
go and visit ‘the state’ in a centralised location should they require something particular but it in no way 
functions in the way that a Westernised state is held to.
11 The terms global South and global North derive from development theory explanations of world inequality 
and world poverty, where the global South represents developing countries and the global North represents 
developed countries. A range of competing analytical frameworks have emerged and the utility of the term 
has been questioned (Therien 1999). The terms, however, are still in contemporary usage See e.g. Clapp 
(2009).
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Eide 2000); or by attempts to elucidate a best-practice approach through distilling generic 
lessons (Mobekk 2003; Jones et al. 2005; Marenin 2005; Mobekk 2005; O'Neill 2005; 
Bayley 2006).
Assessing whether externally assisted police development has been successful is a complex 
undertaking, with Bayley (2006: 126) observing an unfortunate tendency to measure 
‘outputs’ rather than ‘outcomes’, noting that “it is much easier for agencies to audit their 
own activities, especially the expenditure of money, than to collect information happening 
outside their control” (2006: 123). A further difficulty in determining success is that the 
reform process is in a sense never finished (Fleming and Rhodes 2005: 192). Stenning and 
Shearing (2005: 174, 177) argue that reform processes continue to influence the way in 
which policing takes place after the specific reforms are no longer an explicit focus. Each 
reform process will produce unintended as well as intended consequences, with subsequent 
reform efforts needing to ‘align’ or correct earlier endeavours (Stenning and Shearing 2005: 
174).
Additionally, the success of any such process will depend as much, or probably more, on 
the broader nation-building ‘project’ as well as the success in addressing key economic and 
social issues and underlying political divisions. Separating out the effect of a specific police­
building project and determining whether the success was due to, or even in spite of, 
external assistance remains a monitoring and evaluation challenge (Bayley 2005: 209).
Hills (2009a: 64) is critical of the “ambitious claims [that] are made about police reform” 
and the way in which it is assumed it will resolve issues as complex as conflict and poverty 
reduction. Hinton and Newburn (2009: 1) similarly note the plethora of “unrealistic police 
reform proposals” and the accompanying “inflated expectations” of what police reform 
can achieve. They also emphasise (2009: 24)that “international police reform efforts cannot 
create the requisite domestic political and cultural conditions for reform”. Despite making 
a case for the specificity of each context they argue (2009: 6) that there is a range of 
intractable problems that, to a greater or lesser extent, characterise the ‘developing 
democracies’ in which police-building typically occurs. The problems identified include 
“weak democratic institutions, corruption and weak rule of law, significant levels of poverty 
and inequality, high crime and societal instability and poorly institutionalized channels of 
police accountability and responsiveness”. All of these factors have a major impact on the 
prospects for police-building.
Police reforms are integrally connected to the need for reform  in other parts o f 
governance, consequently many authors situate themselves within either a ‘rule o f law’ 
approach or a security sector reform (SSR) approach (Mobckk 2005: 3; O E C D  2005), 
though the two approaches can be seen as overlapping or congruent. A rule o f law 
approach advocates that police reforms must be accompanied by development o f other 
related arms o f government such as the courts, the prosecution service, the prisons and 
even the relevant ministries and the parliament. An SSR approach, on the other hand, 
maintains that one needs to appreciate all the actors responsible for protecting the state and 
those communities within it. These include core security actors such as police and military, 
security management and oversight bodies such as ministries and the parliament, justice 
and law enforcement institutions such as the judiciary and customary justice systems and 
non-statutory forces such as liberation armies and political party militias (Stanley 2000; 
O E C D  2005; Rees 2006).
There is scant critical attention in the literature to what principles, models or approaches 
underpin police-building assistance. O f  particular relevance to UN assistance to post­
conflict police-building is Sheptycki’s (2007) optimistic notion o f a transnational 
‘constabulary ethic’. Sheptycki, while noting immense obstacles, argues for the possibility o f 
fostering a fundamentally ‘good’ and common style o f policing, something that we will 
implicitly know when we see it. Hills (2009b) tests this neo-liberal assumption against the 
practice o f UN policing operations, concluding that the cultural specificity and context o f 
policing will trump the indeterminate, albeit Western, nature o f a presumed constabulary 
ethic.
Much international police assistance is packaged under the rubric o f ‘community policing’. 
Similar to the principles o f the constabulary' ethic the principles o f community policing are 
not well articulated. Fleming (2009: 38) while noting that “defining community policing has 
generated much conceptual confusion”, argues that there is general agreement that 
“community policing is about partnerships, consultation, and building trust in 
com m unities.. .designed to reduce and prevent crime by increasing interaction and 
cooperation between local law enforcement agencies and the public— generally involves 
decentralization and proactive localized initiatives” . Both Fleming and Ellison note the 
widely differing ways that the concept is interpreted and implemented in different 
jurisdictions (Ellison 2007: 204; Fleming 2009: 38). Mobekk argues that, given the widely 
disparate understandings o f the concept among both U N PO L officers and recipient 
governments, the concept should not be prom oted (Mobekk 2005: 6-7). Criticisms o f the 
community policing concept include how community consultation and mobilisation can
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become little more than intelligence gathering activities, of arguable benefit to the 
community (Bayley 2005: 208).
The literature increasingly pays attention to the foreigners who are charged with carrying 
out the reform or the assistance, and how their prior experiences and cultural frameworks 
are challenged in a new environment (Dupont and Tanner 2009; Goldsmith 2009a; 
McLeod 2009). The tendency for rapid turnover of international advisers, trainers and 
mentors means that there is no development of relationships and trust in the field, and that 
the foreigners never gain an adequate appreciation of the local context (Call 2003: 10; 
Mobekk 2005: 20-21). The difficulty of getting foreigners to think beyond replicating what 
they know from Washington, Sydney, Lisbon or Suva remains a challenge.
The lack of regular debriefing of personnel upon return from overseas means that donor 
organisations are not demonstrating a commitment to learning as they go (Bayley 2005: 
211). The need for better briefing, training and preparation of staff to be deployed 
overseas, and the need to have a section of deploying organisations devoted to this matter, 
or to have staff dedicated to this task, has begun to be appreciated both internationally and 
in Australia (United Nations 2000a; Wainwright 2004: 7-10). However, it is still the case 
that the planning and implementation of these programs will be undertaken by many who 
lack experience either in the particular country or region, or in the principles of 
development assistance (Dinnen 2004: 4). It is increasingly argued that police reform is far 
too important to be left to police alone, but must involve area specialists, social scientists 
and historians, as well as indigenous, women and youth leaders with time allocated for 
collection and analysis of information about the traditions and practices of the police as 
well as about society more broadly (Call 2002: 9; O'Neill 2005: 4; Peake 2008a: 154).
In relatively stable and developed countries it is increasingly recognised that security is 
provided by multiple, and networked, security providers. This is sometimes called plural 
policing, (Jones and Newburn 2006; Wood and Shearing 2007). Similarly, there are now a 
small number of academic studies of multi-choice policing in developing or post-conflict 
countries (Baker 2005a, 2005b, 2008), as well as an increasing number of proponents of 
multi-layered approaches to security provision, and security sector reform (Baker and 
Scheye 2007; Scheye and Andersen 2007). In a review completed for the OECD Scheye 
argues for an approach to security sector reform that is
highly context specific, targeting donor assistance to those providers — state 
and nonstate actors simultaneously — at the multiple points at which actual 
day-to-day sendee delivery occurs...the primary objective is to develop and
strengthen the relationship between service providers (state and non-state) 
and the users of those sendees in the marketplaces where they work, in the 
neighbourhoods where they live and on the roads they travel. The intention 
is to reinforce the already existing range of choice that users have in fragile 
states, while developing providers’ sendee delivery to make it more 
effective, fair, accessible, accountable and rights respecting. At the same 
time a multi-layered approach seeks to strengthen governance, 
organizational structures and systems at the local, provincial and national 
levels (OECD 2007b: 7).
I argue that although in academic discourse there appears to be a growing recognition of 
the multiple actors involved in policing in developed countries, there is not the same level 
of awareness, or willingness to incorporate this understanding, by international police- 
builders working on police development in post-conflict scenarios. This is of particular 
importance in the ‘stateless’ or ‘new subsistence states’ discussed above, where state-centric 
provision of policing does not necessarily accord with people’s lived experience. Of 
particular note for this thesis is Hinton and Newburn’s (2009: 15) contention that “in many 
developing democracies the police are typically subject to the control of patronage of 
individual politicians rather than to institutionalized forms of accountability”. Peake 
questions whether the current model of police-building practised by the UN and bilateral 
donors can be considered tenable, an approach that
attempts to replicate the formal model of policing that is fashioned in 
developed, or donor, countries and which, oddly, privileges the ‘formal’ in a 
way dissonant to the actual plurality of policing sendee provision (Peake 
2008a: 143).
Amongst the ‘lessons learnt’ of police-building, the importance of ‘paying attention to the 
local context’ is frequently listed as of paramount concern. McLeod (2009: 159) suggests 
that this now de rigeur prescription must be more closely interrogated:
In the event that we fail to acknowledge the realities of aid, including 
unequal power relations and the imposition of foreign values, the notion of 
adapting foreign assistance to police will simply remain a moral dictum. 
Alternatively, deconstructing exactly what can and cannot be adapted to 
local conditions will provide tangible guidance to those seeking to influence 
policing organisations in a manner that is locally meaningful.
Bayley emphasises how critical it is to understand that local police agencies are not clean 
slates and criticises many police-building programs for being ahistonc in that they do not 
pay attention to the pre-existing cultures of the police and the history of the society more 
broadly (Bayley 2006: 130). Both Rees and Stanley emphasise the difficulty in changing 
organisational culture and practice if recycling police from previous security institutions, as
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well as the political ramifications of selecting police from too narrow a section of the 
community (Stanley 2000: 119-20, 126; Rees 2004a: 52-54).
Paying attention to consultation and collaboration with local stakeholders is seen as critical 
to establishing legitimacy of local police in the eyes of the population (Bayley 2006).Various 
authors stress the importance o f ‘local ownership’ of the process, understanding the history 
of the conflict, paying attention to the balance of ethnic groups in the current or proposed 
police force, ensuring that structures will be economically sustainable or advocating a 
‘country specific approach’ (Sismanidis 1997; Bayley 2005; Mobekk 2005; OECD 2005).
Although many authors cite the importance of paying attention to the local context, there 
is little evidence that an appreciation of the historical antecedents or the cultural context of 
recipients of police-building are adequately factored into planning or implementing such 
exercises. The difficulty in imagining beyond transplanted models is exacerbated by the 
current framing of security concerns in what are conceived as weak states, as well as a lack 
of appreciation of the limited reach of the state beyond the national capital.
1.2.3 The ch an gin g  role o f  civilian p o lice  in p ea c e  operations
During the Cold War peacekeeping was primarily military in its structure, tasked with 
observing ceasefires after intcr-State wars, and it tended to occur under the auspices of the 
UN. Since then it has been recognised that the military, due to training and doctrinal 
differences, are unsuited to carrying out police work. This has influenced an evolving 
model of peacekeeping (Serafino 2004). Peacekeeping now occurs under a much wider 
array of auspices, contains both military and civilian elements (including police), it is much 
more likely to be focused on intra-State conflict and to be undertaken in combination with 
peace-building activities and proactive attempts to resolve conflict (Findlay 1996; United 
Nations 2000a).12
The Brahimi report (United Nations 2000a: ix) marked a turning point for the UN when it 
recommended a “doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police in United Nations peace 
operations, to focus primarily on the reform and restructuring ot local police forces in 
addition to traditional advisory, training and monitoring tasks”. The report also
12 Peace-building is defined by the Brahimi report (United Nations 2000a) as those activities that are 
“undertaken on the far side o f conflict to reassemble the foundations o f  peace and provide the tools for 
building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence o f  war. Thus, peace-building 
includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule o f  
law (for example, through training and restructuring o f local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving 
respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation o f past and existing abuses; 
providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free 
media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques”.
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recommended changes in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) within the 
UN to reflect the anticipated enhanced profile of civilian police in peacekeeping, namely 
the creation of a Civilian Police Division (2000a: xiii). It also recognised that without 
simultaneous attention to judicial and penal institutions it would be impossible for police to 
carry out their work effectively. The report proposed the establishment of a unit with the 
purpose of providing advice to the Civilian Police Advisers office on those rule of law 
issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in peace operations (2000a: 38). 
The difficulties that Member States have in drawing on their existing domestic police 
forces, both in terms of numbers and configuration, led to the Brahimi report calling upon 
states to establish pools of serving police officers, potentially augmented by those who had 
recently retired, who would be ready to deploy to UN peace operations (2000a: 20-21). It is 
of note, however, just how few of Brahimi’s recommendations have been implemented, ten 
years after the fact.
Early literature that addressed the changing role of civilian police in peace operations13 did 
so as a footnote to accounts of the evolution of peace operations more broadly. It is only 
from 1998 that a literature specifically addressing the role of civilian police in peace 
operations emerged (Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg 1998; Holm and Eide 2000; Hansen 
2002). A number of authors chart the development of police roles in UN peace operations 
through the changing involvement in monitoring, advising, training, broader reform and 
finally executive policing (Sismanidis 1997; Schmidl 1998; Hansen 2002; Serafino 2004). 
This does not, however, mean that the police role in UN missions has inexorably moved in 
the direction of executive policing. To date it is only in East Timor (UNTAET, 
UNMISET, UNMIT) and Kosovo (UNMIK) where executive policing has been 
undertaken from the commencement of the mission, although in Cambodia (UNTAC), 
Haiti (MINUSTAH), and El Salvador (ONUSAL) executive policing developed, on an ad 
hoc basis as a result of ‘mission creep’ (Mobekk 2005: 12; Greener 2009: 234).14 Older style 
monitoring missions continued to be deployed at the same time as newer and more 
complex missions.
More recent literature on civilian policing has grappled with the difficulty that the UN has 
in recruiting and deploying sufficient numbers of UN civilian police, noting a rapid increase 
in calls for their employment (Hansen 2002: 48-50; Smith, Holt, and Durch 2007: xiii).
13 Peace operations, according to the Brahimi report, can include three principal activities: conflict prevention 
and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building (United Natrons 2000a).
14 ‘Mission creep’ is the phenomena of mission engagement changing either as a result of poorly defined 
initial mandates, or in response to changing circumstances.
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Additionally, 'boilerplate’ observations abound on the inadequate calibre oi police 
deployed, the insufficiency of their pre-deployment training, and the inappropriateness of 
their skills for the tasks they are mandated for (Hartz 2000: 38-39; Hansen 2002: 48-63; 
Mobekk 2005: 19-20; Linden, Last, and Murphy 2007: 162-164; Smith, Holt, and Durch 
2007: xvi). Rapid personnel turnover in the mission environment contributes to poor 
understanding of the local context by UN civilian police (Mobekk 2005: 20-21; Funaki 
2009: 9). In particular the repeated failure to recruit police with training and mentoring 
skills contributes to a failure to fulfill mandated responsibilities (International Crisis Group 
2008: 8). Hansen notes the importance of international police understanding the history 
and context within which they are working e.g. that it is not unusual for there to be 
significant association between political leaders and criminal networks, that there may have 
been a history of security forces being used by political leaders to consolidate power, and 
that corrupt police officers may be unwilling to curb their own previous access to resources 
and power (Hansen 2002: 79-84, 90-93).
Transfer of responsibility for policing from an executive mission to indigenous authorities 
requires planning on this matter from the inception of the mission, with particular issues 
when building police forces in the context of ongoing peacekeeping missions. Rees (2005: 
223, 227; 2006: 10) highlights the poor record of the UN in this respect. He identifies 
problems with viewing development of local security forces as an endpoint, or exit strategy, 
rather than something to be integrated into a peacekeeping mission from the outset, the 
rapid transfer from foreign to indigenous public security management, and inadequate 
attention to overarching security policy, management and oversight structures as key 
obstacles to success.
1.2.4 S ta te-bu ild in g  in ‘s ta te le ss’ a n d  ‘n ew  su b sis ten ce ’ soc ie ties
The current global enthusiasm tor external state-building is also evident in East Timor and 
the nations of Melanesia. The difficulties in transplanting institutions of state to foreign 
contexts have some particularities when considering these locations. All of the states of this 
region are of recent construction and emerge from a colonial past that has shaped their 
external and provincial boundaries with apparently little regard for more indigenous 
groupings and language boundaries (Douglas 2000: 3-4). The nation-building project within 
these countries, as opposed to the state-building project, is therefore of comparatively 
recent origin. Nation creation in these countries remains a highly contested area, often 
influenced by local and regional issues, in opposition to an as yet comparatively unformed
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sense o f national unity.1" The introduced Western institutions o f  state, therefore, have a 
different relationship to societies than that understood in their places o f origin.
Authors such as Lawrence (1969), Megarty et al. (2004), and Kabutaulaka (2005) explore 
the difficulties o f importing state institutions into societies that are either considered to be 
‘stateless’ or, as conceptualised by Nixon, ‘new subsistence societies’. Nixon (2008: xiv) 
argues that
The defining features o f the New Subsistence State include (1) an 
overwhelmingly subsistence economy corresponding to little or no 
historical experience o f the generation and administration o f large 
surpluses, (2) minimal workforce stratification and labour specialisation, (3) 
the predominance, especially in rural areas, o f traditional authority relations, 
and (4) the realisation o f statehood as a result o f either the adoption or 
bestowal o f the state model, rather than the autochthonous development o f 
the state form.
In either case the centralised state and its abstractions o f legal order have, in pre- 
independence times as well as the present, often had little relevance to the population.
Lawrence (1969) used the example o f the introduction o f the Australian legal system into 
the Territory o f Papua and New Guinea to dem onstrate this point. Against the backdrop o f 
impending independence, Lawrence argued that the entirely different social architecture o f 
Australian and New Guinean society meant that attempts to impose Australian law faced 
radical difficulty. He explains the different mechanisms o f social organisation in each 
society. Australian society is typified as secular, with separate economic, religious, and 
political-legal aspects, and a further divided or segregated legal system through the doctrine 
o f separation o f powers. The focus, therefore, is on the ‘citizen-isolate’ in relation to the 
state. N ew  Guinean societies, on the other hand, are characterised as generalised systems 
that do not separate the religious aspects o f life from the other equally interconnected 
aspects. Control is exerted through complex kinship, marriage and descent networks rather 
than through the notion o f a disembodied legal system, unrelated to its subjects. O ne’s 
obligations to others are not universal but particular and relative. As the loci o f control are 
not situated in any particular authoritative entity but rather depend on one’s relations, 
Lawrence typifies New Guinean societies as ‘stateless’. Additionally Lawrence emphasises 
the difference between the use o f various mechanisms o f ‘self help’ to resolve issues and 
disputes in the Papua New Guinean context as against the use o f Western legal ‘remedy’.
I" This would be more so in the cases where independence is a matter of bestowal rather than, for example in 
East Timor, where there does exist some sense of national unity created by the struggle for independence. 
This is offset however by deeply localised identities. See Traube (2007) for a description of how even 
nationalist discourses in East Timor are reworked according to local constructions.
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Contradicting the evolutionary thesis o f  Maine that “ the m ovement o f progressive societies 
has been from status to contract” (Maine 1861: 170) Lawrence details societies that — rather 
than carrying out an assimilation o f the practice and enculturated values o f an imposed 
legal system — selectively choose and modify what are deemed to be the useful parts 
(Lawrence 1969: 36-37).
This theme is taken up by D innen and Braithwaite (2009) in their advocacy to reconsider 
the benefits o f  the colonial kiap, or patrol ofhcer, in Papua New Guinea (PNG). The kiap, 
as it evolved, represented an institution notable for its hybridising o f im ported and local 
concerns. This is contrasted to the Western urban model o f policing that has more recently 
been transplanted into predominantly rural communities in PN G . These newer models 
separate fighting crime from other regulatory concerns, in communities which do not have 
access to the regulatory mechanisms o f the metropolis. The integrated nature o f the kiap is 
proposed as preferable in this context.
The unexpected consequences o f  introducing ‘unreconstructed’ state-centric systems o f law 
into ‘stateless’ or ‘new subsistence’ societies is often elucidated in more anthropological 
approaches to the problem (Lawrence 1969; Dinnen 2000; Hohe 2003; Hohe and Nixon 
2003; N ixon 2006). Kabutaulaka (2005) notes that there are limitations to what such an 
exercise can achieve:
Foreign intervention, while useful in the short term, does not offer an easy 
solution to internal problems. It might create a quasi-functioning state that 
is able to restore order and serve the interests o f the intervening forces, but 
it often does not address the underlying causes o f civil unrest, nor can it 
build long-term peace (2005: 302-3).
Almost invariably such external interventions do not acknowledge the realities o f existence 
outside the national capital and can be characterised by a failure to engage with nonstate or 
subnational actors (Dinnen 2003; Kabutaulaka 2005). Consequently the social foundations 
o f such new institutions are markedly absent, with serious consequences for the 
sustainability, legitimacy and effectiveness o f those organisations.
Similarly Hills notes in another post-conflict arena that
Parallel forms o f order emerge as local powerbrokers fight turf wars and 
international officials apply Western institutional templates. But there is 
never doubt as to which is the most resilient, for order is founded on 
agreement and predictability, which are primarily influenced by indigenous 
norms, cultural undercurrents and legacy issues (Hills 2009a: 120).
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Gidden’s (2000: 19-20) notion o f ‘shell institutions’, with a corollary in Chandler’s 
‘phantom  states’, helps explain why in places like East Tim or or the Solomon Islands state 
institutions such as the police can collapse so readily. Shell institutions might appear as 
recognisable institutions, but in fact they are not the same, they are without the assumed 
links to the societies they are designed to serve. In considering these shell institutions, 
developing an understanding o f the philosophical underpinnings and motivations o f 
institution builders is only part o f the story. It is also necessary to examine what it is about 
societies that are the recipients o f state-building exercises that make transplantation o f 
Western institutions o f state seemingly so difficult.
It becomes apparent that models o f  state-building developed in ‘the W est’ and transplanted 
to countries such as East Tim or or Melanesia, where the state does not traditionally have 
the same relevance or traction, experience particular challenges. The suitability o f 
transmitting and transferring these ‘one-size-fits-all’ models as ‘the’ model has not been 
adequately examined by state- and police-builders. It is also only examined by a small part 
o f the academy, the majority being content with the self-evident desirability o f an 
institutionalist model.
1.2.5 Enter local ownership
The debates surrounding local ownership are central to this thesis. As well as exhortation 
to pay attention to the local context the literature on state-building more broadly and 
police-building more specifically frequently cites the importance o f local ownership. The 
term local ownership emerged originally in a development context in response to poor 
development outcomes that had been premised on the superiority o f western technical 
inputs. It also reflects a fundamental ideological commitment that people should have 
agency related to decisions, policies and programmes that affect them. The concept is now 
considered mainstream. Saxby (2003: 245-247) notes that by 1996 the Developm ent 
Assistance Committee (DAC) o f the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) was asserting that
sustainable development “must be locally owned”, and that development 
co-operation has to be shifted to a partnership model, where donors’ 
programs and activities operate within locally-owned development 
strategies. Donors should “respect and encourage strong local commitment, 
participation, capacity development and ownership” .
Discussion on local ownership was preceded by several decades by a debate on the need 
for citizen ‘participation’. The foundational work o f Arnstein (1969) was critical in 
interrogating the multiple meanings o f participation, arguing that “ there is a critical
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difference between going through the empty ritual o f participation and having the real 
power needed to affect the outcom e o f the process” (Arnstein 1969: 216). N oting that the 
term was often used rhetorically and without coherent meaning, Arnstein devised a ‘ladder 
o f citizen participation’ which mapped the extent o f  citizen power in determining 
outcomes o f government programmes. His eight-level typology o f participation and non­
participation is as follows:
the bottom  rungs o f the ladder are (1) Manipulation and (2) Therapy. These 
two rungs describe levels o f “non-participation” that have been contrived 
by some to substitute for genuine participation. Their real objective is not 
to enable people to participate in planning or conducting programs, but to 
enable powerholders to “educate” or “ cure” the participants. Rungs 3 and 4 
progress to levels o f  “ tokenism” that allow the havenots to hear and to 
have a voice: (3) Inform ing and (4) Consultation. When they are proffered 
by powerholders as the total extent o f participation, citizens may indeed 
hear and be heard. But under these conditions they lack the power to insure 
that their views will be heeded by the powerful. When participation is 
restricted to these levels, there is no follow through, no “muscle,” hence no 
assurance o f changing the status quo. Rung (5) Placation, is simply a higher 
level tokenism because the ground rules allow have-nots to advise, but 
retain for the powerholders the continued right to decide. Further up the 
ladder are levels o f citizen power with increasing degrees o f  decision­
making clout. Citizens can enter into a (6) Partnership that enables them to 
negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional powerholders. At the 
topm ost rungs, (7) Delegated Power and (8) Citizen Control, have-not 
citizens obtain the majority o f decision-making seats, or full managerial 
power (Arnstein 1969: 217).
Although Arnstein’s work received much attention from urban planners and sociologists, it 
appears unknown to those now grappling with the inchoate meaning o f local ownership. 
And yet many o f the rungs o f ‘participation’ are evident at different stages in the 
implementation o f ideas about local ownership in police development in East Timor.
Increasingly the vocabulary o f local ownership16 has entered the discourse o f state-, nation- 
and peace-building more broadly, and ‘rule o f law’ and ‘security sector’ programming more 
specifically. It is cited in reports o f the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) in relation to the 
rule o f law and transitional justice (United Nations 2004a, 2008d) as well as SSR (United 
Nations 2008b), the UN ‘Capstone D octrine’ (United Nations 2008c),17 policy and practice 
guides (O ECD  2005; Hansen and Wiharta 2007a; Hansen et al. 2007b) and the academic 
literature (Ebnöther and Flun 2005; Scheye and Peake 2005; Chesterman 2007; Banal and
16 Some authors use the alternative terms ‘national ownership’ or ‘domestic ownership’.
17 The ‘Capstone Doctrine’ or United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines defines 
the “nature, scope and core business of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations”. All other 
DPKO “directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and training materials” are subject to 
the Capstone Doctrine (United Nations 2008c).
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Scherrer 2008; Donais 2008a; Giustozzi 2008; Narten 2008; Nathan 2008; Scheye 2008; 
Donais 2009; Sending 2009). There is an emerging consensus that lack o f local ownership 
will doom  a project or program to failure — indeed it has become mandatory to cite the 
imperative o f local ownership.
Although the term implies varying degrees o f control and is seen to have an inherent 
connection with democracy, there is an absence o f agreement on what local ownership 
means in either theory or practice (Chesterman 2007: 3, 9, 20; Donais 2009: 3). Critics o f 
the concept have argued that, in any event, it is often used rhetorically rather than literally 
and rarely makes the transition from policy to practice. Scheye and Peake (2005: 245-7). 
contend that the term local ownership is more aspirational than applied, with apparent 
commitment to the idea abandoned or subverted in the process o f implementation o f 
programmes. I argue that the way the expression is conceived occurs on a continuum, not 
dissimilar to that proposed by Arnstein. O n one end o f the continuum is an argument to 
inform, and perhaps consult. By way o f example Gizelis and Kosek (2005) argue that 
increased local participation will increase the success o f humanitarian interventions. 
Moving along the spectrum Narten (2008) represents a view that can be described as the 
necessity for ‘sign on’ to ‘legitimate’ externally led programmes, arguing that
the later significant local ownership is achieved and external authority 
transferred to local representatives, the more local actors tend to challenge 
the legitimacy o f the peace-building agenda and engage in confrontation 
with international actors (Narten 2008: 369).
Similarly, McFate (2008) speaks o f  the necessity to ‘engage’ host governments and their 
citizens. Hansen and Wiharta (2007a: xv) advocate that the “maximum authority possible- 
in accordance with local capacity, context and levels o f accountability — should lie with 
local stakeholders at any given time”, arguing that as “ the local population is the end-user 
o f justice and security system s.. .[they] must have confidence in the rule o f law in order for 
them to work effectively and equitably”. Hansen and Wiharta’s position on local ownership 
is arguably circumscribed by judgments on ‘willingness’ and ‘capacity’ o f  local stakeholders 
to engage with what some would argue is a predetermined donor process. Finally, Nathan 
represents a departure from the previous positions and can be considered to be occupying 
the other end o f the continuum  regarding the meaning o f local ownership. He argues that 
“ the reform o f security policies, institutions, and activities in a given country must be 
designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors” . He 
further contends that
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The principle is misconstrued if it is understood to mean that there must be 
a high level o f domestic support for donor activities. What is required is not 
local support for donor programmes and projects but rather donor support 
for programmes and projects initiated by local actors. The question for 
donor governments is not “how can we undertake SSR in partner 
countries?” but “how can we support local actors who want to undertake 
SSR in partner countries?” (Nathan 2007a: 4).
In addition to the difficulties o f pinning down the meaning o f local ownership there are a 
num ber o f inherent contradictions and difficulties in applying the term, whether in post­
conflict peacekeeping operations broadly or security sector activities specifically. First, it 
has been argued that local ownership is problematic because external intervention has 
usually been required precisely because an existing government or regime has been 
malevolent or unable to sustain the functioning o f their governance responsibilities. This 
holds a tension with the widely held assertion that without local ownership reform will not 
succeed (Call 2003: 4; Scheye and Peake 2005: 235; Chesterman 2007: 4).
Second, there are critical neo-liberal assumptions in any intervention about how 
democracy, economic liberalisation, accountability, transparency and the rule o f law will 
transform the ‘pathological’ recipient state into a functioning liberal state. These 
assumptions are actually not negotiable by recipients, thereby potentially diminishing or 
negating the meaning o f local ownership (Donais 2009: 5-9).
Third, it is a matter o f record that sections o f existing government or security services (or 
indeed a wide cross section o f the political elite) may have a vested interest in not 
reforming or democratising their security forces, or in keeping formal structures 
deliberately contradictory or vague. In addition to a logic o f resistance there may also be 
institutional inertia, with the organisational culture o f security institutions being notorious 
for their intractability (Call and Barnett 2000: 45-6, 58; Marenin 2000: 94; Marks 2005: 2-6; 
Scheye and Peake 2005: 236-237). However, recipients o f such international assistance 
often do not unequivocally oppose the liberal democratic model on offer; rather there may 
be competing agendas present even within a small group o f local actors. For example 
Giustozzi (2008: 215-216) notes in relation to SSR in Afghanistan that
divergence o f [local] interests.. .did not result in an outright rejection o f the 
need for external resources to support the security apparatus. Instead it 
resulted in a complex compromise where a reform effort based on 
international standards was carried out on the surface, leaving patrimonial 
and patronage relations to dominate the core ot the security establishment.
In this sense it is possible to talk o f  a facade of reform, where m ost Afghan 
actors paid only lip service to international demands, and o f shadow
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ownership of the security sector where those same actors seized control of 
the most substantial aspects of the reform effort and subverted them.
The difference between what recipients will agree to formally and what they will be willing 
to implement in practice can be both confusing and alienating for interveners.
Fourth, even where citizens of the recipient country are involved in designing the process 
or program they will inevitably turn to foreign models and experiences. This is problematic 
as there are relatively few successful models of SSR/ police-building to refer to. 
Furthermore, the models with which recipient countries are most familiar will more than 
likely be those of a former colonising power or authoritarian regime. Frequently these will 
not be underpinned by a commitment to human rights or citizen sendee (Call 2003: 4) and 
may not comply with the international norms required by donor agencies .
The fifth issue concerns the question of ‘which locals’ we are referring to. Scheye and 
Peake (2005: 238-40) contend that in relation to SSR we must know who the ‘customer’ is, 
or who the reform is for. This is a prerequisite for determining which of a multiplicity of 
owners, with different and conflicting needs and wants, we should be engaging with. A 
simple example is that the needs of parents with children in violent neighborhoods will be 
different from those of ex-combatants from former liberation armies. There is a tendency 
in development work, just as in security sector programming, to engage with the political 
elite rather than with the needs of ordinary citizens (Martin and Wilson 2008: 84). Even at 
an elite and centralised level there is a danger of being ‘captured’ by a particular faction 
during early attempts to understand a complex situation (Rees 2002: 152, 154). Whereas 
Arnstein was specific in advocating rearrangements of power to enable participation of 
individual citizens, much of the literature advocating local ownership in peace-building and 
state-building is very unclear on exactly who they envisage exercising that local ownership. 
In most cases it appears to be a disembodied ‘state’ rather than the citizens that comprise 
the state. Chambers (2008: 25-48) outlines a variety of biases in development inquiry that 
are equally applicable to the question of which locals are chosen as interlocutors for 
determining security needs. These include elite bias, spatial bias — that is the tendency to 
talk to someone in a city or at least next to the main road, gender bias, and user bias — 
arising from the fact that those who currently use sendees are more likely to have an 
opinion about them There are many factors that militate against interveners engaging with 
the wide diversity of those that comprise the ‘local’. Responding to competing needs and 
interests can prove an even more fraught undertaking.
Sixth, there appears to be a belief that local ownership is something that can be 
‘implemented’ by external actors, or ‘bestowed’ upon local people by benevolent and 
enlightened peace-builders McFate (2008: 8). criticises the O EC D -D A C  Handbook on 
Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice for reciting rhetoric about 
local ownership but still “portrayfing] SSR as something that gets done to developing 
countries, not something that they decide to do — and drive and shape — in partnership with 
donors” . When recipients o f  external assistance are not impressed by this largesse this leads 
to fractures in what may already be a weak relationship between insiders and outsiders.
Seventh, in cases where the operating environment an d /o r relationships have deteriorated, 
the term can be used by international actors to absolve themselves o f responsibility for 
poor outcomes. As Belloni (2007: 107) has noted in relation to nation-building, “when 
delays, obstacles, and drawbacks cannot be ignored any longer, they are blamed on the 
local actors”.
This dynamic between international and national actors involved in police development in 
East Timor is central to this thesis, as is an exploration o f competing narratives about local 
ownership. It is not my argument that the local ownership baby should be thrown out with 
its dirty and problematic bathwater, but rather that some o f the contradictions involved in 
local ownership form part o f the inchoate ‘local context’ in which development is 
undertaken. In chapter 8 I argue that a different approach to local ownership, one focused 
on a more concrete geographical ‘local’, may provide one alternative to only developing 
state-centric policing institutions.
Examination o f the above literature relevant to post-conflict police-building suggests that 
exhortations to pay attention to local context are rarely apprehended, and the way local 
ownership discourse is deployed requires further investigation. Similarly, the primarily 
process-oriented literature on the lessons learned in police-building fails to adequately 
address the question o f how relationships between those implementing and those receiving 
police assistance condition outcomes. Although the UN has experienced significant 
expansion in it’s responsibilities for post-conflict police forces, the question o f whether the 
organisation is able to respond to these challenges can usefully be examined by examining a 
case o f constructing and reconstructing a police force in the same location. These 
considerations are taken up in the following section.
1.3 Central research questions
In this thesis I ask four interrelated questions:
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a) In w hat ways does *local co n tex t’ feature in the d eve lo p m en t a n d  ou tcom es o f  
p o lice-b u ild in g  under in ternational auspices?
The police-building literature, like the broader state-building and development literature, 
stresses the importance o f paying attention to the local context. Comparatively little detail 
is provided on what this might entail. In this thesis, I first identify a num ber o f ‘contexts’, 
both historical and contemporary, that influence the development o f the police institution 
in East Timor. I then question to what extent it is possible for a police development 
program underwritten by international norms and assumptions to attend to, and 
incorporate, these factors.
b) W hat notions o f  ‘loca l ow n ersh ip’ are d ep lo yed  b y  in ternational an d  national 
actors in the d eve lo p m en t o f  a p o st-co n flic t p o lic e  force, an d  h ow  do these notions  
m anifest?
Similar to the articulated need to ‘pay attention to the local context’ the literature stresses 
the importance o f ‘local ownership’ in relation to state-building, security sector reform and 
police-building. The literature outlines different conceptions or degrees o f ‘local ownership’ 
and outlines a num ber o f paradoxes present in the idea. While ‘local ownership’ has long­
standing antecedents present in the ‘participation’ literature from the 1960s, the idea did 
not feature significantly in the narrative about police development during the U N TA ET 
period. It was used extensively, both implicitly and explicitly, by both international actors 
and national actors during the U N M IT mandate. I examine the discourses in UN and 
government documents, legislation, press reports, and accounts o f significant political and 
security developments during the reconstruction o f the PN TL to identify what nodons o f 
local ownership have been deployed by international and national security actors. I 
elaborate on the purposes for which the concept is used, and describe two unanticipated 
manifestations o f the idea.
c) In w hat w ays do  relationships betw een  in ternational a n d  national security  actors 
condition  the ou tcom es o f  p o s t-co n flic t po lice-bu ild in g?
The ‘lessons learned’ in the police-building literature are primarily process-oriented. A 
critical literature exhorts us to realise that state-building or police-building is a political as 
well as technical matter. In the thesis, I examine how technical failures can become political 
issues, as well as how both political and technical factors inform the relationships that 
develop between international and national actors involved in police construction and 
(re)construction. These relationships have been under examined, with Barnett and Zürcher 
(2009) arguing that “ the strategic interactions that unfold between the interveners and the 
intervened upon is an important but neglected explanation for the relative success and 
failures o f contem porary peace-building operations” (2009: 29). I apply two related
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frameworks to examine how these relationships condition the outcomes o f the police­
building exercise. The first is Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite’s (2007) framework o f 
'regulatory ritualism’, originally elaborated in the context o f  aged care, which interrogates 
how pressures to demonstrate that one is 'doing som ething’ about an identified problem 
can lead to a variety o f rituals o f verification, in preference to concrete outcomes. Secondly, 
Barnett and Ziircher’s (2009) idea o f a ‘peacebuilders contract’ examines how conflicting 
peace-building agendas between insiders and outsiders are resolved, often in ways that 
produce 'com prom ised’ outcomes that are not really satisfactory to either party. Applied 
together these two frameworks are able to illuminate the modalities o f how relationships 
condition outcomes.
d) What can we conclude ab o u t the capacity  o f  the U N  to con stru ct or reconstru ct 
po st-co n flic t p o lice  forces?
The UN is increasingly involved in the construction or reform o f post-conflict police 
forces, often preceded by (or at the. same time as) a period o f peacekeeping an d /o r 
executive policing. A significant ‘lessons learned’ literature addresses these undertakings. 
For this thesis, the East Timorese situation offers a unique opportunity to compare and 
contrast two attempts at institution building in the same country by the same institutional 
actors. It also allows a further testing o f the applicability o f Sheptycki’s (2007) constabulary 
ethic in a specific case o f transnational police development. What can we surmise about the 
responsiveness of the UN to their country specific and global experiences in these 
undertakings?
1.4 Fieldwork and m ethod
During 2007 1 made two fieldwork trips to East Timor, from 11 to 24 June and from 28 
October to 14 November. I made a further trip from 4 to 20 July 2009. The first o f these 
trips was to the capital Dili, the second trip to Dili and the district o f Oecussi, and the third 
to Dili and the districts o f  Baucau, Lautem and Liquica. These trips were opportunities to 
interview key informants involved in the reconstruction o f the PN T L  but were also an 
invaluable opportunity to collect documents that are not available in Australia.
Additionally, in June/July 2008 I undertook a two week consultancy in East Tim or for the 
World Bank which was coordinating a review o f the East Timorese G overnm ent’s National 
Priorities Program (NPP). I was responsible for m onitoring progress against agreed 
objectives in the area o f ‘Public Safety and Security’ which encompassed PNTL, F-FDTL 
(FALINTIL-Forfas Dejesa de Timor-Leste — the East Timorese Defence Force) and the 
veterans o f the resistance. In Novem ber 2008, from Canberra, I completed a briefing paper
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on the 2008 states of exception and the Joint military police Command for the Conflict 
Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF) of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in 
New York. Following my third fieldwork trip I produced another paper for CPPF in 
October 2009 on the handover of policing responsibilities from UNPOL to PNTL. This 
was completed together with my friend and former colleague Nelson Belo, Director of 
Fundasaun Mahein. All of these opportunities have contributed to the work of this thesis.
The choice of Oecussi as a research site on my second trip was made for three reasons — a 
determination to look beyond what was happening in the national capital, and examine 
police development in a district that was most distant from, and arguably least affected by, 
the metropolis; a calculation that my established networks there would to some degree 
compensate for the limited time I had available, and the ready use and acceptance of 
Indonesian language — which I speak — in the district. On advice from friends and other 
researchers I abandoned my intention to compare Oecussi with the district of Viqueque, 
due to logistical and political reasons. On my third visit I concentrated on the early-stage 
‘handover’ of policing from UNPOL to PNTL. On this trip time was once again limited. 
Lautem was selected as the first district to experience ‘handover’. Baucau was selected both 
for being ‘on the way’ between Dili and Lautem and for having received unfavourable 
reports in assessments of readiness for handover. Liquica was similarly selected for having 
been deemed not ready for handover.
I was fortunate that prior experience in East Timor provided me with grounding in the 
ethnographic dynamics and cultural habitus of East Timorese society. This meant that 
upon return I was able to use my networks from previous employment to gain access to 
people willing to be interviewed, and to talk with friends and former colleagues to try to 
make sense of a complex and unfolding situation. In January 2000 I made my first trip to 
East Timor to carry out a review of Oxfam Community Aid Abroad’s (later Oxfam 
Australia) emergency response. I then lived and worked in East Timor for a total of four 
years between 2000 and 2004, both in Dili and in the enclave district of Oecussi. During 
this time I worked for UNTAET on two occasions — in the Headquarters of the Land and 
Property Unit, and in the District Administration of Oecussi. I later worked as the Director 
of judicial System Monitoring Programme and as Country' Director of Caritas Australia 
which had a significant Human Rights, Law and justice Programme.
The periods of fieldwork for my thesis research were frustratingly short but family 
commitments set the parameters. Interviews were conducted primarily in English, but also 
in Indonesian. Working in Tetum would have been preferable. Not only is it one of the
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national languages but it has also become much preferred to the use o f other languages. 
However, the use o f Tetum  in Oecussi is still limited and I knew that it would be easy to 
work in Bahasa Indonesia.
A variety o f methods have been used in the conduct o f this thesis. I have analysed a range 
o f published and internet material, as well as unpublished, and sometimes unofficial, 
government and UN documents that were provided to me. A variety o f techniques 
including discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews were used in order to derive a 
more complex picture. In chapter 3, on the hrst construction o f the police force, I relied 
more substantially on primary and secondary documentary materials, as few people 
involved in the first construction of the police force were available for interview in East 
Tim or during the times I was visiting. I made greater use o f interviews, in addition to 
documentary sources, to examine the reconstruction o f the police force detailed in chapter 
6. Chapter 2 has relied principally on analysing secondary documentary materials to argue 
that a particular set o f historical legacies is present in East Timor, whereas chapters 4 and 5 
examine a range o f contemporary developments through the lens o f these legacies. Open- 
ended, semi-structured interviews were carried out with members o f the East Timorese 
G overnm ent including the Secretary o f State for Security, members o f the Provedor’s 
Office including the Deputy Provedor, members o f the District Administration in Oecussi, 
parliamentarians across the political spectrum, and members o f the PN TL including the 
Interim  General-Commander in Dili and the Interim  Commander in Oecussi. Within the 
U N M IT mission I interviewed or informally met with international and national staff o f  
the U N M IT Legal Office, UNM IT Political Affairs Office (PAO), UNM IT Human Rights 
Unit (HRU) (later Hum an Rights and Transitional justice Section — HRTJS), UNM IT 
Rebuilding, Reconstruction and Reform (RRR) Unit, the UNM IT Security Sector Support 
Unit (SSSU), and members o f U N PO L including two successive Commissioners. I also 
met with members o f  the Timor-Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP), 
Australian Embassy officials and the Norwegian Charge d’Affaires, staff o f  international 
and national N G O ’s including those providing legal aid, and those concerned with justice 
and security development in East Timor, traditional leaders and members o f religious 
orders. I also took the opportunity to meet with other international and Timorese 
researchers when our paths would cross in Dili, Darwin or Canberra. Most interviews were 
carried out in East Tim or but a number o f  interviews were also carried out in Canberra and 
Melbourne.
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1.5 Thesis structure
Chapter 2 explores East Tim or’s history from the premise that local contexts and histories 
are significant for understanding why East T im or’s police and broader security sector have 
developed in the ways that they have. I discuss indigenous socio-political organisation, 
aspects o f the history o f the Portuguese colonial period and approach to governance, as 
well as specific elements o f introduced political organisation and control during the 
Indonesian occupation. The chapter also briefly examines the way that the East Timorese 
resistance movement organised itself at home and abroad during the Indonesian 
occupation. I contend that pre-existing indigenous social structures continue to shape 
contemporary political organisation, and that previous authoritarian regimes have enduring 
legacies that are discernible in some o f the trajectories that policing has taken in East 
Timor.
Chapter 3 discusses the specific case o f the development o f a post-conflict police force, the 
PN TL, through international and bilateral assistance. The time frame is from the inception 
o f the PN TL in 2000 up until the ‘crisis’ o f early 2006, which included the collapse o f the 
police force in Dili and at the national headquarters. It is an account o f the early history o f 
the institution’s development and through the staged handover o f districts and 
management to East Timorese government control. It is also the story o f institutional 
development within its historical, political, social and cultural context. I argue that the ways 
in which the early development o f the PNTL occurred contributed to its eventual fragility.
Chapter 4 picks up the theme o f local context by situating the development o f the PN TL 
in the larger rule o f law context in East Tim or between 1999 and 2009. I review the 
internationally organised rule o f law ‘project’ which in East Tim or has principally consisted 
o f  the introduction and establishment o f formal legal institutions, including the police, and 
the development o f legislation. I also analyse the way that ‘the law’ and the ‘rule o f law 
project’ is perceived and responded to in East Timor, noting the continuing influence o f 
historical legacies identified in chapter 2 as well as the prevalence and influence o f 
significant legal pluralism. I conclude that the political leadership in East Tim or is deeply 
ambivalent about the rule o f law and often prefers to address problems through 
personalised rather than institutionalised means, with consequences for the development o f 
a centralised state police force.
Chapter 5 explores another aspect of local context, the development o f the PN TL in the 
context o f the broader security sector in East Timor. I review the global SSR ‘project’, 
which, like the rule o f law project, is widely regarded as one o f the pillars o f post-conflict
state-building. I also discuss how security in East Tim or is provided by a complex o f state 
and nonstate actors with mobile and overlapping fealties and memberships, noting that the 
distinction between those who provide security and those who provide insecurity is 
dynamic and context-dependent. This analysis is in direct contrast to a predominant 
conception amongst international actors that nation states, by definition, conform to a 
Weberian model o f a state with a monopoly on the legitimate control o f  violence. This 
idealised model also assumes a clear distinction between the roles o f the police and military 
and a state with the capacity and willingness to carry out democratic control and oversight 
functions. However, these assumptions are not empirically demonstrable in East Timor. 
This has significant implications for the way in which policing has developed in East 
Timor.
Chapter 6 commences with a description o f the ‘crisis’ o f 2006, including the unravelling of 
East Tim or’s security forces, which resulted in the East Timorese government calling in 
foreign forces to re-establish law and order and the establishment o f the United Nations 
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). I analyse the consequent (re)construction o f 
the PN TL through an examination o f two UNM IT-m andated processes: the reform, 
reconstruction and rebuilding (RRR) o f the PNTL, and the review o f the security sector. I 
consider how these two processes, intended to be cooperative ventures between the UN 
and the East Timorese government, have experienced contests over sovereignty, problems 
o f capacity and poorly functioning relationships between members o f the relevant 
international and East Timorese organisations. I briefly examine the role o f the 
subcontracted bilateral contributions o f the Australian-led Timor-Leste Police 
Development Program (TLPDP) to this process. The problems identified are informed by 
the contextual issues identified in chapters 2, 4 and 5, as well as the legacy o f the first 
attem pt to produce a police force detailed in chapter 3. I analyse how the UN and the East 
Timorese government have both concealed the lack o f genuine progress being made in this 
process. I argue that this complex o f factors has served to produce a police institution 
notable for its now institutionalised fragility.
Chapter 7 analyses the ‘states o f exception’ and creation o f a Joint military police 
Command, both o f which were declared in response to attacks on the President and Prime 
Minister o f  East Tim or in February 2008. I argue these events were a critical juncture in the 
emergence o f rearranged relationships between international and national actors involved 
in policing and broader security sector development in East Timor. I contend this was a 
manifestation o f local ownership not anticipated by the UN. I also argue that these events
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resulted in rearranged relationships between the PN TL and the F-FDTL, creating a 
template for a modified division o f responsibilities in the future.
In chapter 8 I conclude that a complex o f factors has led to the development o f a police 
force which, despite extensive allocation o f international resources, remains weak, 
conflicted and struggles for relevance and legitimacy. I question whether the UN in its 
present form o f organisation has the capacity and ability to carry' out this kind o f police 
development work. The case study o f the development o f the PN TL has highlighted some 
o f the great difficulties o f developing police forces under international auspices. This 
difficulty is accentuated if the enduring legacy o f political histories and organisation in that 
country are not apprehended by those seeking to build new institutions. I pick up on 
themes o f innovations developed by a range o f actors to address the limited reach, 
effectiveness and acceptability o f state-centric policing and justice in East Timor. I argue 
that the way that these innovations are developing in an organic fashion, often with 
members o f the PN TL as significant participants, offers another way o f thinking about the 
concept o f  local ownership.
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C h ap te r 2
H isto ry  an d  its reso nances
2.1 Introduction
In chapter 1 I noted that recent literature examining post-conflict police-building under 
international auspices recites the importance o f paying attention to the local context. 
However, it is much more common for the literature to focus on the technical or process 
aspects o f what external police-builders might do differently. It is rare for the local context 
to actually be elaborated. The purpose o f this chapter is to provide the background to how 
‘local context’ informs police-building in East Timor. I do this through examining aspects 
o f East T im or’s history from pre-contact times, and through Portuguese and Indonesian 
rule. I then analyse the legacies o f these histories that are discernible in trajectories policing 
has taken in East Timor. I demonstrate how these legacies have produced a contemporary 
situation where political parties and factions place high importance on gaining control, 
sometimes by force, o f the post-independence uniformed forces and their weapons. It has 
also meant that many Timorese, including members o f the political leadership, are doubtful 
about the possibility o f impartial security sector institutions.
An additional layer o f East Tim or’s history and context are contributed by UN missions18 
and the broader international presence from 1999. This also influenced the process o f the 
construction and reconstruction of the police force, and is discussed in chapters 3 and 6 
which examine the first and second attempts to build a police force under international 
auspices.
In this chapter I commence with a brief examination o f the nature o f authority and socio­
political organisation in the autochthonous societies o f East Timor. I also examine how the 
lived experience o f Portuguese colonisation and the Indonesian occupation engaged with 
the mores o f autochthonous society. The second part o f the chapter provides a brief 
account o f some interconnected legacies o f Timorese history. I discuss the limited 
penetration o f the state, the enduring nature o f local dispute resolution, a martial heritage 
that informs a contemporary lack o f monopoly on the control o f violence, the propensity 
for personalised exercise o f power, and the enduring impacts o f violent histories and 
associated trauma that reinforce longstanding societal fault lines.
18 UNAMET 11 June 1999-25 October 1999; UNTAET 25 October 1999-20 May 2002; UNMISET 20 May 
2002-20 May 2005; UNOTIL 20 May 2005-25 August 2006; UNMIT 25 August 2006 -  present.
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The way that ‘law and order’ is managed and reproduced and adjudication takes place in 
East Timorese society is o f particular interest for this thesis. As will be discussed in later 
chapters, there are many aspects o f the ordering o f pre-contact Timorese society which 
endure and are identifiable to the present day. The way in which these forms o f ordering 
reinforced other forms o f authority during the Portuguese colonial period, the Indonesian 
occupation, the U N T A E T  interregnum and the ‘m odern’ and ‘democratic’ institutions o f 
the new independent state provides a sustained theme throughout this thesis. In particular I 
focus on how these continuities o f ordering manifest in ways relevant to the current 
development o f policing and the security sector in East Timor.
2.2 Autochthonous social organisation and m aintenance o f order
Flying over the island o f Tim or one is struck by the way that small and isolated hamlets dot 
the rugged and mountainous country. Authors such as Fox (1988: 261-262, 278) and Nixon 
(2008: 54-55, 58-59) have noted the primary influence o f the geography o f Tim or on the 
nature o f Tim orese social organisation. Tim or is characterised by steep slopes, poor soils, 
unreliable rain and a natural aquifer system given to drying up as irregular sheets o f  clay are 
affected by earth tremors. All o f these factors ensure that settlements are scattered and 
agricultural production is low and primarily o f a subsistence nature, generating little surplus 
structure. Fox has argued that
under these conditions the majority o f mountain Tim orese are too close to 
bare subsistence to be able to take risks and have so far been unable to 
develop indigenous social institutions that would facilitate cooperation 
among larger units o f the population (Fox 1988: 278).
Similarly Nixon (Nixon 2008: 59) contends that the generation o f a surplus and the need to 
manage that surplus produced the more complex administrative and organisational 
processes that are found elsewhere in the archipelago in places such as Java, which are 
absent in Timor. Arguably the different biogeography found on the eastern side o f the 
Wallace line19 is also reflected in the different social organisation in that area.
It is difficult to ascertain the nature o f Timorese social organisation at first contact, given 
the absence o f documentary evidence and a reliance on mythic histories and oral testimony. 
Most contemporary researchers generalise from the reports o f D utch and Portuguese 
colonial administrators, D utch and British naturalists, missionaries, and explorers as well as 
the writings o f a num ber o f waves o f anthropologists who have been able to record 
Timorese oral accounts directly. However, anthropologist H.G. Schulte N ordholt, while
19 The Wallace line refers to an imaginary line that runs between Bali and Lombok that separates two distinct 
biological zones. The thesis was developed by Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) (van Oosterzee 1997).
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noting a wealth of early material, expresses frustration with earlier reports that he describes 
variously as “romanticized” or “lackfing] the description of reality” (Schulte Nordholt 
1971: 327).
Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, Timor comprised two large 
kingdoms in the western part of the island and a number of small unstable micro-kingdoms 
in the eastern part of the island. These kingdoms, which appear to have been mentioned in 
Chinese travel accounts (Ptak 1999: 37) as long ago as the fourteenth century, were usually 
controlled by a central ruler or liurai (Tetum) who received tribute from peripheral 
associated clans. The kingdoms were subject to shifting patterns of alliances, entailing both 
the federation of small kingdoms into bigger units and also the breaking off of peripheral 
tribute providers to form their own ‘centres’ which in turn demanded their own tribute 
(McWilliam 1996: 128-129).
Warfare was common, with liurai being able to call up troops in the tens of thousands 
when required (Jolliffe 1978: 29). This kind of warfare was, according to Davidson, 
“stylised and contained within accepted limitations” being preceded by rituals and 
sustaining few casualties (Davidson 1994:12). War was generally concluded through peace 
agreements, many of which involved the use of blood oath or juramentu, although 
somewhat different ceremonies are described by H.G. Schulte Nordholt in relation to 
peacemaking by Atom (Schulte Nordholt 1971: 326-327; McWilliam 1996: 129; Ospina and 
Hohe 2001: 22-23; Trindade and Castro 2007: 2; Nixon 2008: 60).2(1
Day-to-day allegiance for most people in Timor rested with the clan or lineage group, 
rather than with the liurai, and within this context the most relevant source of authority was 
the chefe de suco (Davidson 1994: 11). Within local areas East Timorese political and social 
institutions are primarily based on the extended family unit or ‘House’ with members 
descended from a putative common ancestor. The ‘House’ is both literal in that it refers to 
the uma lulic or sacred house which houses ancient and sacred items, but is also functionally 
descriptive in that it refers to the hierarchically ordered sets of extended families that 
comprise a House (Hohe 2002a: 571; McWilliam 2005: 28). The most senior House is the 
family that asserts founder settler status and that has ritual ownership of the area’s fertility. 
"The responsibilities of other Houses follow. Some of the Houses have particular
211 Atom is an ethnic group present both in Indonesian West Timor and the East Timorese enclave of 
Oecussi. The language spoken by Atom is variously referred to as Meto (self-reference), Dawan and Baikenu 
Causes of warfare amongst Atom cited by H.G. Schulte Nordholt include “border-land disputes which in 
turn were the consequences of claims being asserted by certain groups to sandal-trees, trees with bees’ nests 
or areca palms [betel]”. He goes on to cite cattle-raids as an important cause of war and failure to provide 
harvest tribute to a ruler as a common cause of head hunting raids (Schulte Nordholt 1971).
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ceremonial responsibilities, another House has responsibility for ‘political authority’ (as 
opposed to ‘ritual authority’),21 and others have responsibilities for issues such as water or 
security (Hohe 2002a: 572; Repüblica Democratica Timor-Leste 2003: 23).
Ospina and Hohe (2001: 28) describe the fundamental concept o f  dualism present in 
Timorese cosmology and social structure. It is found in the binary categories o f Wife 
G ivers/W ife "fakers, female values/m ale values, newcomer houses/indigenous houses, 
outside/inside and ritual authority/political authority The division between, and 
interactions among, ritual and political authorities remain im portant even in contemporary 
discourse regarding sources and resolution o f conflict (Trindade 2008: 179-186). A variety 
o f  roles responsible for maintaining order/security and resolving conflict can be found in 
Timorese society. Trindade and Castro explain political leadership as being held by the 
liurai, and ritual leadership as the responsibility' o f  the dato, who makes decisions based 
upon, and through communication with, the ancestors and has the duty to select liurai from 
the ‘correct’ house. They describe the position o f lia nain as one o f mediator, negotiator and 
arbiter based upon their role as ‘owner o f w ords’, referring to their specialist knowledge o f 
ancestral tradition (Trindade and Castro 2007: 21). Although these structures are fairly 
typical throughout Timor, regional differences in structure have been detailed by a num ber 
o f anthropologists (Schulte N ordholt 1971, 1980; Clamagirand 1980; Form an 1980; Fox 
1980a, 1980b; Traube 1986; Ospina and Hohe 2001).
For example, within Atoni society more broadly, and the district o f  Oecussi more 
specifically, there are a range o f political and ritual roles that are responsible for different 
aspects o f  societal order including the usij who corresponds to a liurai or king, the naijuf who 
is a political authority and the tobe who is a customary' ritual leader with authority over land, 
forests, and water (Meitzner Yoder 2005: xiii-xiv, 112-123, 146-151). In addition there is 
the position o f the traditional warrior or head hunter called meo. Aleo means ‘cat’ in Meto, 
but also means a warrior who has taken at least one head (McWilliam 1996: 132). The meo 
have a leading role in defending borders in times o f crisis and can also be considered akin 
to ‘security guards’ (Meitzner Yoder 2005: 160). H.G. Schulte N ordholt elaborates a range 
o f  ‘Tim orese’ (meaning in this case Atoni) adjudicative actions including those akin to a
21 The House responsible for the political arena was the provider of kings and other political leaders who had 
responsibility for “defining the borders of the land, for relations with other kingdoms, for conflict resolution, 
and all other political issues such as conducting wars”. Political leaders are dependent on ritual leaders for 
legitimation (Hohe 2002: 572-573).
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trial, auguring,22 and trial by ordeal. All o f these could result in the requirement for 
com pensation, fines or the death penalty (Schulte N ordholt 1971: 361-367).
The phenom ena described above is not however static and unchanging in the face o f 
external influences. Anthropologists have characterised Timorese societies, together with 
other societies throughout Eastern Indonesia, as having a particular capacity and propensity' 
to integrate new occurrences, ideas and forms ot authority into their existing socio-cosmic 
frameworks (Ospina and Hohe 2001: 28). In later parts o f this chapter I describe how these 
social structures both endured and accom m odated the experiences o f occupation and 
invasion.
2.3 Portuguese colonial occupation  
2.3.1 Early contact until 1926
In this section I examine aspects o f early colonial history that demonstrates how the 
comparatively limited reach o f the Portuguese state in East Tim or was always 
accompanied by parallel forms o f order, a situation that has resonances to the present day . 
I also discuss the phenom ena o f the use o f auxiliaries by the Portuguese colonisers to 
bolster their limited control. This drew on a longer history o f liurai ‘temporary armies’ as 
described in Section 2.2. The significance o f this phenom ena is that it continued to be 
evident in the way that Indonesian occupiers developed temporary, and essentially 
disposable, militias as auxiliaries to their military efforts. It is also evident contemporarily in 
the way that non-state security groups are utilised by members o f the political leadership to 
produce particular political outcomes, and the way that sections o f the East Timorese 
police and military are sporadically used in the same way.
East Timorese societies experienced late, limited and variable penetration by Dutch and 
Portuguese colonial administrations. Early colonial attempts to exert control over the 
indigenous inhabitants o f  Tim or and the immigrants known as topasses23 were o f limited
22 Auguring is the use o f signs and omens to predict the future and outcomes o f courses o f action.
22 Topasses or ‘Black Portuguese’ were descendents o f Portuguese and local inhabitants from the island o f 
Solor and later Larantuka in eastern Flores. The word ‘topasses’ is derived form the Dravidian word ‘tupassi’ 
meaning interpreter (Boxer 1960: 351).
37
success.24 A variety o f authors describe mid- to late nineteenth-century Portuguese rule as 
desultory, noting also the limited developmental efforts o f the colonisers.2’
The Portuguese landed in Lifau (in the present day district o f  Oecussi) in 1515 but did not 
establish permanent settlements until well into the seventeenth century. Following many 
years o f struggle against rival topasses, a beleaguered Portuguese G overnor finally moved to 
Dili in 1769. Despite repeated armed attempts to subdue the local population it was not 
until late in the nineteenth century that any power was exerted over the interior o f  the 
island (Boxer 1960: 355; Fox 1996). The Portuguese used /////»/-associated troops, known as 
moradores or airaias, who were called upon as trusted allies to undertake punitive expeditions 
against recalcitrant political communities. In the early eighteenth century it was estimated 
that the liurai o f the eastern half o f Tim or could muster 40 000 troops (Robinson 2006: 
275). Although the literal meaning o f moradore is ‘citizen’, Timorese regarded it as having 
connotations o f ‘warrior’ (Nixon 2008: 67). The Portuguese first used moradores in 1642 to 
subdue the im portant ritual kingdom o f Wehale in what is now Indonesian West Tim or 
(CAVR 2005: Part III, 9), in 1911 in border disputes with the D utch (Farram 2004: 102), in 
1912 in putting down the Manufahi rebellion (Davidson 1994: 20), in the lead up to WWII 
(Callinan 1953: 154-155), and in the Viqueque rebellion in 1959 (Gunn n.d.). Finally, in 
Ainaro some liurai still had control o f private armies until 1975 (Jolliffe 1978: 134-135).26
Fox (1996: 9) maintains that “ for m ost o f the colonial period, control was a m atter of 
pretence and veneer” . He highlights the irony o f the protracted negotiations over a period 
o f seventy years between the Dutch and the Portuguese regarding the division o f Tim or 
when in reality “neither colonial power controlled the territories over which they were 
deliberating” (Fox 1996: 10). The assessment o f the Portuguese G overnor o f  Dili, Affonso 
de Castro, in 1860 during these negotiations with the D utch is enlightening: “our empire 
on this island is nothing but a fiction” (quoted in Fox 1996: 10).
24 'Y h e  Topasses w m  rat*lcr mort‘ successful than the Portuguese in extending their sphere of influence in Timor. '’p b e y  b e c a m e  m a j o r  
Sandalwood traders attacked and burned ct‘nlrts two Timorese kingdoms (Sonba’ I and We hah) and in term arri^J with indigenous
Timorese, giving rise to a couple o f present day Timorese dynasties that continue to contest the position o f 
‘king’ in the district o f Oecussi. See e.g. Fox (1996).
2’ Visiting Dili in 1861 the British naturalist, Alfred Wallace, noted that “The Portuguese governm ent in 
Tim or is a most miserable one. Nobody seems to care the least about the im provem ent o f  the country, and at 
this time, after three hundred years o f occupation, there has not been a mile o f road made beyond the town, 
and there is not a solitary European resident anywhere in the interior. All the G overnm ent officials oppress 
and rob the natives as much as they can, and yet there is no care taken to render the town defensible should 
the Timorese attempt to attack it” (Wallace 2000 [1869]).
26 For more on the role o f the moradores see Pelissier (1996).
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Portuguese T im or was the most far flung and least economically im portant o f all Portugal’s 
colonies and saw little in the way o f economic or other development. In the nineteenth and 
twentieth century the Portuguese introduced militarily-enforced compulsory labour for 
cultivation o f cash crops such as coffee and for the building o f roads and replaced the 
previous tribute system with an onerous head tax on adult males. What had been limited 
resistance from the liurai developed into a revolt in 1861 and subsequent smaller rebellions 
after this (CAVR 2005: Part III, 9). Davidson contends that each rebellion contributed to 
the outbreak o f the succeeding conflict with an escalating armed response from the 
Portuguese (Davidson 1994: 14). Eventually Portugal opted to discard its policy o f indirect 
rule and to assume direct administrative and military control o f the colony.
The m ost famous o f the anti-colonial wars was the Manufahi rebellion o f 1911, sparked by 
the assassination and beheading o f the Portuguese Com mander Lieutenant, Luis Alvares da 
Silva, by Tim orese warriors (Davidson 1994: 1). The ensuing rebellion by liurai united 
under Dorn Boaventura, liurai o f Manufahi, involved a blood oath to kill all Europeans and 
the subsequent attacking o f all things Portuguese. The Portuguese made significant use o f 
Timorese auxiliaries in putting down the rebellion and were also required to call on 
assistance from their other colonies in a war that lasted for almost a year. Many view the 
Manufahi rebellion as the beginnings o f nationalism with Dorn Boaventura accorded the 
title ‘the father o f nationalism’. However, Davidson argues that, although the Manufahi 
rebellion was a significant event in the development o f resistance to increased colonial 
domination, it did not yet carry- evidence o f the beginnings o f nationalism. She maintains, 
rather, that other contemporaneous factors, such as the changing basis o f the Timorese 
economy accompanied by a move for greater Portuguese political control and the 
expanded power o f the military in the civilian bureaucracy, are more im portant in 
understanding the rebellion. At this time many o f the lower ranking Portuguese military 
had been sent to Portuguese Timor as punishm ent for military crime and were notable for 
their authoritarianism, abuses o f power and corruption (Davidson 1994: 2, 5-6).
In the hnal century o f Portuguese administration the Portuguese co-opted local political 
powers such as the liurai, but left lower levels o f social and political power intact as it 
placed less burden on the colonial administration (Nixon 2006: 92). In contrast to the 
picture o f ongoing anti-Portuguese rebellion, a num ber o f anthropologists describe how 
Portuguese rule not only conform ed to Timorese ideas about the appropriate role o f the 
liurai who was ordained by the ritual powers to deal with ‘outside’ powers (Hohe 2002a: 
574) Portuguese rule was also conceptually integrated into local authority structures 
through an understanding o f the Portuguese as a younger brother who originated in Timor,
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went away overseas, and later returned bringing back political values as epitomised by ‘the 
book and pen’. In this paradigm the role o f the Portuguese was to solve violent conflict 
between warring kingdoms (Traube 1986: 55; Hohe 2001).27
Following the quelling o f the Manufahi rebellion, the Portuguese formally abolished local 
kingdoms and the traditional position o f liurai. Portuguese approval or confirmation was 
required for the position o f suco leader, and two new levels o f administration, the posto and 
concelbo, were instituted.28 Some liurai were made subdistrict chiefs in the Portuguese 
administration and maintained their power in this way; others were replaced with a ‘behind 
the scenes’ legitimation bv traditional authorities to regularise an unwanted situation, and 
others maintained their power through an ongoing recognition o f their role by the 
community. Providing the person in the position could be found to have a link to a ‘royal’ 
family, there were mechanisms to pass on ritually the requisite political authority. In this 
way the new Portuguese administrative system was incorporated and integrated into the 
existing system (Hohe 2002a: 574-575).
From  the early eighteenth century until the end o f colonial rule the Portuguese also 
symbolically integrated the Timorese that they deemed compliant into their own military 
hierarchy. This was done by bestowing military titles such as koronel (colonel) on traditional 
leaders and also included titles such as capitäo (captain) and tenente (lieutenant) for traditional 
leaders o f lower rank (Nixon 2008: 81-82).
In this section I have detailed how during the early Portuguese colonial occupation the 
effective reach o f the colonial state was limited. In order for the Portuguese to extend their 
administrative and military control it was necessary for them to supplem ent their own 
resources by enlisting Timorese forces allied with sympathetic liurais, in the process 
exploiting and reintorcing existing divisions among Timorese liurai. The East Timorese 
polity adapted to the Portuguese presence with a mix o f resistance and opportunistic 
alliance formation, as well as by being co-opted into the Portuguese administrative order. 
The Tim orese martial heritage and associated ways o f organising violence were both 
reinforced and aggravated by the Portuguese occupation. This situation contributed to a 
legacy o f  lack o f m onopoly on the control o f violence, including the use o f non-state
27 See also Henley (2004: 87) on the phenomena of the ‘stranger-lung’ in eastern Indonesia, regarding “the 
widespread appreciation for the-usefulness of foreign authority as a way of controlling indigenous conflict 
and violence through various combinations of third-party mediation, impartial adjudication, and legal 
enforcement”.
28 “A group of sucos comprised a posto and these posto were grouped into a concelbo. The concelbo controlled the 
postos through Portuguese administration” (Molnar 2005).
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militias by state forces. In turn this contributed to a legacy o f  the use o f personal rather 
than institutional power. It also laid the foundation for some o f  the serious societal fault 
lines that are still discernible in East Tim or today.
2.3.2 The Portuguese administrative order 1926-1975
In 1926 there was a military coup in Portugal, and from 1932-1968 Portugal was governed 
by the authoritarian regime o f Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, with implications for all the 
Portuguese colonies including Timor. Salazar suffered a stroke in 1968 and became 
incapacitated, the regime continued under Marcelo Caetano (Lewis 2002: 162).
The final stage o f Portuguese colonialism in East Tim or was interrupted by Japanese 
occupation during World War Two (WWII). As many as 60 000 Timorese are thought to 
have lost their lives, and torture, sexual slavery and arbitrary killing was widespread. 
Testimony to the CAVR29 hearing on the Internal Political Conflict o f  1974-75 heard that 
long standing divisions emerged between those who supported the Japanese and those who 
supported the Australians during this time (CAVR 2005: Part III, 10).
Following WWII the Portuguese ‘reoccupied’ East Tim or with an expeditionary force o f 
troops sent from Mozambique, who were greeted on arrival by a guard o f honour 
comprising rnoradores from Bacau and Manatuto (Bessa 1992: 142-159). A professional army 
was maintained including Portuguese soldiers and African recruits, with the police also 
coming under the armed forces (CAVR 2005: Part IV, 18). D uring  the latter decades o f 
Portuguese rule Timorese experienced forced labour and palmatdtia (severe beatings), 
although it was often Timorese who had been conscripted as overseers (Jolliffe 1978: 43, 
47-48). A system ot Timorese paramilitary police called tipaio (or sipao) was established and 
continued until the positions were replaced with guardas auxiliares. Although the cipaio 
system was last budgeted for in 1961 it was not phased out until the early 1970s.3"
From 1959 East Timorese were subject to the Pol/tia International e de Defesa do Eistado 
(PIDE) or Portuguese Secret Police (Gunn 1999: 261). Jolliffe describes the P ID E  as “ the 
secret police organisation which, through the use o f terror, censorship and a web o f paid 
informers, existed as a state within a state” (Jolliffe 1978: 43).
The extent o f P ID E ’s interests was very broad and included
29 The Commissdo de Acolbimento, \ erdade e Keconcdiacäo or Commission on Reception Truth and Reconciliation 
(CAVR) was established by UNTAET Regulation 2001/10 with a mandate to establish a truth commission, 
conduct community reconciliation and make recommendations on the promotion of human rights.The 
CAVR was able to consider human rights violations between 25 April 1974 and 25 October 1999.
30 Pers. Comm. Ernie Chamberlain 5 October 2009
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Timorese at home ...also  Timorese in Angola, as well as such unlikely 
threats as the Tim or Oil company, Australian trade union organisations, 
anti-apartheid campaigners, and even liberals, part o f a global monitoring 
effort to shore up the dictatorship at home and the challenges posed by 
maintaining a sprawling colonial empire in the age o f decolonization (Gunn 
1999: 261)
P ID E  operatives were also responsible for the assassinations o f Mozambican FRELIM O 
(Frente de Uberttyäo de Mocambique or Liberation Front o f Mozambique) leader, Eduardo 
Mondlane, in 1969, and Guinea-Bissau liberation leader, Amilcar Cabral, in 1973 (Gallagher 
1979: 388).
Ironically, it was the actions o f the P ID E  that introduced a group o f Timorese men to the 
as yet unknown anti-colonial struggles in the Portuguese colonies o f Africa. Following the 
1959 rebellion in Viqueque sixty eight men were sent to prison in Angola where they were 
able to witness the early stages o f decolonisation, become politicised and also learnt 
Indonesian from other prisoners before returning to "Timor (Gunter 2007: 34).
When the Catholic newspaper supplement SEARA, which enjoyed the contributions o f a 
plethora o f future leaders including Nicolau Lobato, Jose Ramos-Horta, Man Alkatiri, 
Francisco Xavier do Amaral and Manuel Carrascalao, was finally shut by the P ID E  in 1973 
it closed o ff one o f  the last publication opportunities for an emergent nationalist 
movement (Gunn 1999: 264).31
During the final period o f Portuguese rule a num ber o f significant members o f the future 
Timorese leadership were members o f the Portuguese colonial army. These included 
Nicolau Lobato, his brother Rogerio Lobato, Francisco Lopez da Cruz and Roque 
Rodrigues, the latter two having served in this capacity" in Mozambique (Nixon 2008: 107- 
109, 133).
In 1960 East T im or was listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory with the UN 
Decolonisation Committee but little progress towards decolonisation was made. Following 
the left-wing military coup in Lisbon in April 1974, Colonel Mario Lemos Pires arrived in 
Portuguese Tim or in N ovem ber o f the same year. Fie assumed the position o f G overnor 
with the hope o f  developing a decolonisation policy, preparing Timorese for independence 
and addressing a demoralised military. In an interview with CAVR he spoke o f his tears 
before even leaving Portugal that support from the Portuguese government would be 
neither focussed nor particularly forthcoming, a fear that was realised upon his arrival.
31 Although Gunn refers to the PIDE as being responsible for the closing of SEARA by this time the PIDE 
had been renamed the DGS (Direccdo Gerat de Seguranca).
42
Fires’ requests for additional Portuguese troops were rejected with a resultant decrease in 
Portuguese influence in the colony (CAVR 2005: Part III, 29-30).
Colonel Pires formed the Timor Commission for Self-Determination which encouraged 
the establishment of civil associations, although it would appear that the Portuguese 
administration did not believe independence was realistic (CAVR 2005: Part III, 13). Active 
political parties had not existed until this time. Very quickly three major parties emerged 
including the Timorese Democratic Union (Uniäo Democratica Timorense, UDT), which 
advocated progressive autonomy under Portugal and later supported federation with 
Portugal and ultimate independence; the Timorese Social Democratic Association 
(Associacao Social Democratica Timorense, ASDT), which supported independence and had an 
explicitly anti-colonial and nationalist stance and later became FRETILIN; and the 
Timorese Popular Democratic Association ( /Xssociacao Popular Democratica Timorense, 
APODETI), which favoured integration with Indonesia. In 1975 the East Timorese party 
political world was a very small one. Leaders of the parties knew each other well and were 
sometimes related, they usually had a privileged background — either coming from a liurai 
family or mixed race family, had landholdings, and an education and often experience in 
the public sendee. Given no history of Western-style political participation, membership of 
a particular party tended to be based on localised affiliations rather than ideological 
considerations (CAVR 2005: Part III, 26). People were often compelled to carry and 
produce party identity cards with violence ensuing if the wrong cards were provided, with 
party campaigning akin to a battle over physical as well as human territory (CAVR 2005: 
Part III, 29).
During this time Indonesia increased its intelligence and destabilisation activities in 
Portuguese Timor, which included disinformation campaigns broadcast from Kupang. It 
was also involved in training APODETI forces in West Timor. This added to the tension 
between political parties and fuelled a pervasive suspicion (CAVR 2005: Part III, 33).
All the political parties rapidly developed martial wings which included competing for 
support amongst the East Timorese members of the Portuguese colonial army (CAVR 
2005: Part III, 26). Nicolau Lobato was given responsibility for developing the martial wing 
of ASDT, which he organised to be personally loyal to him rather than to the party (Nicol 
1978: 101). Nicol notes that the People’s Security Organisation, as it was called, had 
“activities including organising Timorese warriors to use strong-arm tactics on some people 
who were not doing what Fretilin wanted” (1978: 101). All political parties proceeded to 
use martial force in order to try and gain political control (Nixon 2008: 148-149).
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A short-lived coalition between U D T and ASDT broke down and tensions escalated until 
U D T launched a coordinated attack on 11 August 1975 throughout Portuguese Timor. 
Political parties proceeded to compete to control and enlist support o f the Portuguese 
police and military. U D T quickly captured the police headquarters, along with its 
commander and its stock o f weapons and other key installations. While detaining the 
Portuguese police chief, U D T managed to win his support together with many o f the East 
Timorese police serving under him, as well as parts o f the military. FRETILIN  demanded 
that the Portuguese administration disarm U D T and make East Timorese soldiers, rather 
than the police, responsible for security. The Portuguese sent Rogerio Lobato, one o f the 
highest ranking East Timorese in the Portuguese military, for discussions with FRETILIN  
but instead this resulted in the majority o f the East Timorese soldiers deciding to support 
FRETILIN. On 20 August FRETILIN  launched their counter-coup by taking control o f 
the army headquarters in Taibessi and detaining the Portuguese troops (CAVR 2005:Part 
III p 42). This action was co-led by Rogerio Lobato and Plermenegildo Alves, a pro- 
FRETILIN  soldier Qolliffe 1978: 132-133; Nixon 2008: 125). In the battles that ensued 
weapons were handed out indiscriminately by all sides and political parties allied with each 
other in every possible combination (CAVR 2005: Part III, 42).
During this time shifting alliances were displayed both by the members o f the police and 
military and by the political parties. Additionally conflicts that erupted in the districts saw 
long-standing grievances about other matters fuelled by party-based divisions. It has been 
estimated that between 1 500 and 3 000 people were killed, both by U D T and FRETILIN  
supporters, during this conflict, which came to be known as ‘the civil war’ or simply ‘74-75’ 
(CAVR 2005: Part III, 42). The CAVR report notes that “East Timorese, and some 
Portuguese, members o f the military and police did not stand outside this conflict”. Both 
FRETILIN and U D T took and killed prisoners during this time (CAVR 2005: Part III, 43).
The Portuguese administration, unable to exert control over the conflict, withdrew to the 
island o f Atauro in the early hours o f 27 August 1975 Qolliffe 1978: 140). U D T withdrew 
initially to the airport, ultimately crossing the border into West Tim or in early September 
1975. U D T members and their allies from other small parties were placed under increasing, 
and eventually successful, pressure from Indonesia to sign a request for the integration o f 
Portuguese Tim or with Indonesia (CAVR 2005: Part III, 43-44).
In this section I have briefly examined the influence o f the Portuguese administrative 
regime in Tim or from 1926 onwards, a period that can be characterised as authoritarian 
and militarised, with limited opportunities for genuine Timorese participation in the
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Portuguese administration. It appears colonial police had a paramilitary orientation, a 
model that was later repeated during Indonesian occupation and one that still has some 
support in post-independence East Timor. I have also discussed the events of the 1974-75 
internal armed conflict in East Timor. This conflict was particularly violent and atrocities 
were frequent, leaving a legacy of division and trauma on the Timorese political leadership, 
something frequently attested to in evidence given to the CAVR. The struggles of nascent 
Timorese political parties, described above, to gain the support of Portuguese colonial 
police and military forces, as well as their personnel and resources, have contributed to a 
situation where political parties and factions place high importance on gaining control, 
sometimes by force, of the post-independence uniformed forces and their weapons. It has 
also meant that many Timorese, including members of the political leadership, are doubtful 
about the possibility of impartial security sector institutions.
Similarly, in 1974-75 the way that the martial wings of the new political parties tended to be 
controlled by individuals has resonances with both the earlier //»/^/-controlled armies and 
the way that figures such as Rogerio Lobato developed special forces within the PNTL that 
were personally loyal to him. It is also evident in the way that units of both the PNTL and 
the F-FDTL are seen as being ‘owned’ either by their Commander or in some cases one of 
the political leadership, rather than being part of a unified institution. This is discussed 
further in chapter 5 and 6. The legacy of 1974-75 has also resulted in a particular aversion 
by much of the political leadership to ‘opening up’ discussion of conflicts, as to do so is 
seen as opening a ‘Pandora’s box’ of unresolved and still labile conflicts.12 It has arguably 
also resulted in failures to investigate or prosecute crimes associated with the 1999 or 2006 
conflicts. This is discussed further in chapter 4.
2.4 Indonesian occupation
The Indonesian invasion of East Timor commenced as a covert campaign with border 
incursions from West Timor. Following the declaration of independence by FRETILIN on 
28 November 1975 Indonesia launched a simultaneous air, sea and land invasion less than 
two weeks later on 7 December. Encountering far greater resistance than anticipated, 
Indonesia conducted extensive military operations in East Timor, including aerial
32 The anxiety present around discussing the events of 1974-75 was evident in the delays to the CAYR 
hearings on the internal conflict. On the day that the public hearings commenced in December 2003 I 
returned to my office late morning to discover all staff had stopped work to watch the event televised on 
national television, such was the level of interest in what people would say. One of the international staff 
involved in the hearing at the time commented to me that they felt there had been inadequate preparation of 
the Timorese leadership when compared with the preparation afforded senior members of the ANC in South 
Africa before they testified to their Truth and Reconciliation Commission, something that they believed was 
contributing to anxiety about the event.
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bom bardm ent and the use o f forcible resettlement and internm ent in order to better 
manage non-compliant parts o f the population. By 1980 it was estimated that over a third 
o f the pre-invasion population o f 700 000 had died from widespread famine, disease and to 
a lesser extent through military operations.
Understanding the effect o f  the occupation in East Tim or hinges on understanding the 
pervasive power o f the Indonesian military in every day life. Although the occupation was 
also administered by civilian governm ent and the police, their role was largely determined 
by, and subordinate to, the military- From  the assumption o f power by President Suharto in 
Indonesia in 1965, the New O rder was characterised by an expansion o f military power 
into all aspects o f government and the economy, with an attendant marginalisation o f 
civilian authority. Robinson (2003: 15) describes the accompanying preoccupation with 
national unity, security and the controlling o f dissent. He explains that the Indonesian 
military, from its inception, was obsessive about internal security. This was manifest in its 
doctrine o f ‘total people’s defence’ which involved the extensive use o f covert operations 
and militias under military direction to ensure control o f the population.
The Indonesian armed forces (ABRI — Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) were founded 
on 5 O ctober 1945. The Indonesian police (POLRI — Polisi Republik Indonesia) was 
founded in the same year. In 1959 POLRI was put under the coordination o f the Minister 
of Defence, and in 1961 President Sukarno declared the police a branch of the armed 
forces. They remained under Presidential control until 1967 when the police were merged 
into the armed forces, albeit as a junior partner (Lowry 1996: 82; Kingsbury 2003: 134). In 
April 1999 ABRI was divided into separate commands — the military (TNI) and the police 
(POLRI). W hether in its ABRI or T N I incarnation, the Indonesian military was the most 
powerful institution in Indonesia and initially saw only cosmetic diminution o f its power 
following the fall o f Suharto in May 1998. From its inception it was an intensely political 
organisation and cannot be regarded as being under civilian control. Rather, ABRI saw 
itself as the progenitor o f the Indonesian state, due to its role in the war o f independence 
against the Dutch between 1945 and 1949 (Vatikiotis 2004: 29-30).
Both the structure and mode o f operation o f the Indonesian military was transported to 
East Tim or upon invasion. Jolliffe details how the Indonesian landing parties arriving in 
Tim or in December 1975 brought with them a range o f torture equipment, based no doubt 
on its standard use against dissent in Indonesia (Jolliffe 2008: 11). The Indonesian military 
was arranged through a structure o f ‘territorial military com m and’ which saw T N I forces
present and shadowing Indonesian civilian officials all the way down to the village level 
(Robinson 2003: 27):
The Korem Commander shadowed the Governor; the 13 Kodim 
Commanders looked over the shoulders of the 13 District Heads (Bupati); 
the 62 Koramil Commanders supervised the 62 SubDistrict Heads (Camat); 
and the 442 Babinsas operated alongside an equal number of Village Heads 
(Kepala Desa). In this way, the territorial military command effectively 
ensured military involvement in, and dominance over, the formulation and 
implementation of policy at every level. Thus, even if civilian authorities 
such as the Governor and the Bupatis were formally in charge, in the final 
analysis military officers within the territorial command exercised greater 
power (Robinson 2003: 27).
In addition to the everyday territorial command presence, extensive operations were 
undertaken against separatist activists. Special powers were conferred on the agencies 
Kopkamtib and Bakorstanas” and military personnel were seconded to most government 
agencies and departments. In these positions they performed a pervasive intelligence role, 
as well as ensuring that the military had priority access to available contracts and payoffs 
(International Crisis Group 2004: 3).
In addition to shadowing civilian officials with military ones, Indonesian authorities 
ensured civilian administration compliance at the local level. The authorities used a variety 
of mechanisms to establish control including direct appointment of pro-Indonesian 
Timorese officials and ‘democratic election’. In the case of democratic election Timorese 
people often found a way to select the ‘right’ person after all, i.e. one who originated from 
a political authority-holding ‘royal’ House, in the same way that they did during the 
Portuguese era. When the ‘wrong’ people ended up in positions they could be ritually 
legitimised, given a proxy authority to rule, or attempts would be made to trace their royal 
ancestry. It appears that as a last resort they could be considered ‘transitional’ (Hohe 2002a: 
575-579). Although many East Timorese eventually occupied the more visible positions of 
bupati and camat in the districts, they did not generally achieve senior positions in the civil 
sendee. These positions were usually held by immigrants from other parts of Indonesia. 
Consequently experience gained in public administration was minimal. Nixon argues that 
not only did this result in insufficient administrative capacity once independence was 
achieved, it also led to a lack of development of a sense of state legitimacy more broadly 
and simultaneously reinforced prevailing traditional authorities (Nixon 2008: 183-184).
11 Neither Kopkamtib (Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) nor Bakorstanas (National 
Stability Coordinating Agency) are any longer in existence.
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Although Indonesian nationalist rhetoric regarding the importance o f development also 
applied to the province o f East Tim or, development initiatives were often irustrated by the 
tightly controlled internal security environment. The expansion o f provision o f basic 
education and junior secondary schooling between 1976 and 1997 was significant when 
compared with the Portuguese era. Nixon uses the 1995 Indonesian intercensal survey to 
illustrate how East Tim or continued to rate poorly, when compared with other Indonesian 
provinces, on a range o f developm ent indicators. At this time only 49% o f people were 
literate and nearly 70% o f over-tens had either never attended school or not yet completed 
primary school. Similarly tertiary education was marked by a lack o f resources, poor quality 
and low completion rates (Nixon 2008: 174-180).
In a surprise announcem ent in January 1999 President Habibie outlined the process for a 
referendum in the Province o f East Tim or that would determine whether East Tim or 
would opt for autonomy within the unitary state o f Indonesia or not. According to the 5 
May agreements between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN, POLRI was solely responsible 
for the maintenance o f law and order during the process o f the referendum (United 
Nations 1999i: Art. 3). The Indonesian authorities did not comply with their 
responsibilities, with POLRI repeatedly failing to respond to militia violence. Indeed they 
would not only ignore but facilitate attacks by militia. Based on field observations during 
this period, Robinson argues that with the militias backed by the TN I, and the POLRI 
under political and operational com m and o f the TN I, there was little prospect o f  POLRI 
seeking to control the militias. Robinson further concludes that this inaction and violence 
brokering was not only a matter o f the POLRI knowing their place but was also a m atter o f 
‘policy’ designed at least at the provincial (Polda) level and in some cases as far away as 
Jakarta. He argues that the rather m ore sporadic and direct violence committed by Brimob 
m embers14 can be attributed to an institutional culture shared between Brimob and the T N I 
(Robinson 2002: 263-265).
East Timorese militia trained by Indonesia were used extensively to create fear and distrust. 
They were also used to create a fiction that the violence in East Tim or was merely a civil
34 Brimob is an abbreviation o f ‘Brigade Mobil’ or Mobile Brigade. It is the ‘anti-riot’ 
branch o f the Indonesian National Police which deals with special operations. It is a 
paramilitary organisation that conventionally operates under a Joint military command in 
places such as Papua, until 2005 in Aceh and until 1999 in East Timor. Brim ob’s training 
and equipment is almost identical to that o f TNI. During the Indonesian occupation o f 
East Timor, large numbers o f Brimob were deployed and are known to have carried out 
indiscriminate killings, house burnings, and torture (ETAN 2008).
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war between quarrelsome Timorese, rather than something designed and implemented by 
Indonesian forces.
During the lead up to the referendum on 30 August 1999 and after the announcem ent o f 
its results, Indonesian military, police and pro-Indonesian local militia went on an 
orchestrated rampage through the length and breadth o f East Timor. In a period o f a few 
weeks the population o f East Timor experienced widespread killing, looting, and 
destruction o f housing stock and critical infrastructure. It also resulted in the temporary 
displacement o f 400 000 people (Robinson 2009: 1).
2.5 The resistance at home and abroad
It was not only the conduct o f the Indonesian occupation that influenced future 
developments in East Timor. The way that the Timorese armed and clandestine resistance 
organised itself during the Indonesian occupation, both within East Tim or and in exile, 
also had implications for longer term security sector development.
The threat o f Indonesian invasion o f Portuguese Tim or was present for several months 
before it actually occurred. While FRETILIN  was planning its countercoup against UDT, 
Falintil was established on 20 August 1975 with Rogerio Lobato as Commander (CAVR 
2005: Part V, 7). Following the withdrawal o f UDT to West Tim or and the Portuguese 
administration to Atauro (CAVR 2005: Part III, 44), FRETILIN established an interim 
administration while continuing to recognise Portuguese sovereignty and repeatedly 
requesting them to return and complete the decolonisation process. These requests 
continued as Indonesian incursions escalated. The FRETILIN  interim administration is 
credited with organising food distributions and maintaining order, but there were also 
instances o f forced labour, torture and execution. During this time they held up to 2 000 
prisoners, but reports from independent sources indicate prisoners were well treated 
(CAVR 2005: Part III, 46-51).
As Indonesian incursions increased and Portuguese authorities ignored requests to return, 
FRETILIN  felt compelled to unilaterally declare independence on 28 Novem ber 1975. The 
following day the FRETILIN  Central Committee appointed Francisco Xavier do Amaral as 
President, Rogerio Lobato as Minister o f Defence, Mari Alkatiri as Minister o f Economic 
and Political Affairs, and Jose R am osTIorta as Minister o f Foreign Relations and 
Information. In the lead up to the declaration 'FR ETILIN  had been fully aware o f the 
likelihood o f Indonesian invasion and had begun to store arms and food, and Falintil had 
begun to equip and train militia (CAVR 2005: Part III, 53-55). Once Indonesia invaded
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there were many arbitrary as well as targeted killings o f East Timorese, many ABRI 
members also lost their lives (CAVR 2005: Part III, 62).
The governance o f  the resistance took place in adverse circumstances and addressed itself 
to improving agricultural production, health and education for the community as well as 
providing support to Falintil. During the resistance FRETILIN  also created a justice 
system that included a restorative aspect involving ‘self criticism’ for more minor 
infractions which would attract ‘corrective justice’ such as gathering firewood and carrying 
water. The justice system also included a retributive aspect for more serious crimes, with 
FRETILIN  Military commanders laying charges and a crowd deciding guilt or innocence 
through a ‘popular justice’ process. Punishments ranged from death to ‘rehabilitation’ in a 
Renal or Rehabilitatew National which could either be an enclosure above ground or a hole in 
the ground covered with wooden bars or panels. Evidence was provided to CAVR o f the 
m istreatment and trauma associated with some o f these more authoritarian modes o f 
FR E T IL IN ’s administration o f justice (CAVR 2005: Part V, 12 ).35
The structures o f  the resistance underwent continuous and contested development 
determined both by the exigencies o f war and through differences o f ideology and strategy. 
An extensive account o f the different stages and composition o f the military and 
clandestine resistance is provided in Part V o f the Chega! Report (CAVR 2005). In 1981 
Xanana G usm äo was transform ed from being a junior Falintil commander without 
significant profile to Com mander in Chief. Recognising the limitations o f a struggle allied 
purely to one political party, Xanana was instrumental in brokering a temporary ceasefire 
with the Indonesian army that enabled him to travel for about six months in 1983, 
campaigning for a national unity approach to resistance. This was a controversial move, 
opposed by many in Falintil and in FRETILIN. It culminated in 1987 in the severing o f the 
connection between Falintil and FRETILIN , with Falintil becoming the armed wing o f the 
National Council o f Manbere Resistance (Conselho National da Resistencia Maubere, or CNRM), 
a newly created umbrella resistance group. Extreme distrust between Xanana, some o f the 
former Falintil commanders who are still politically significant, and some members o f 
FRETILIN  dates back to this time. These enmities manifest in contemporary personalised 
struggles regarding who will exert control over the armed forces and the police as well as 
questions o f perceived legitimacy (Rees 2004a: 37-44). These processes left traumatic 
legacies and divisions. It is arguable that the necessity o f secrecy and on some occasions the
3"’ Rees (2004b) also mentions FRETILIN’s propensity for ‘rehabilitation’ in relation to Rogerio Lobato’s 
incarceration in prison in Angola, for offences described below. He was reputedly visited in prison by Roque 
Rodrigues who read him Marxist treatises to facilitate his rehabilitation.
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necessity for people to work as ‘double agents’ both for the Indonesian occupation and the 
resistance has also left a deep legacy o f suspicion.
Although the militarised and authoritarian aspects o f Indonesian governm ent reached 
down to the village level, its effective reach was attenuated by a parallel clandestine 
resistance network known as nucleos resistencia populer or nurep. The leadership o f the nurep 
shadowed the village head or kepala desa, coordinated the selular communicacao (selcom) or 
village level clandestine network, and reported upwards to the district and subdistrict level. 
Significant traces o f these organisational structures are still evident at a localised level in 
East Tim or (McWilliam 2008: 132-133).
In addition to those members o f the resistance and the clandestine m ovem ent that were 
active within East Tim or during the Indonesian occupation, there were also significant 
numbers o f the political leadership who spent time in exile in Australia, Portugal and the 
former Portuguese colonies o f Angola, Mozambique, Macau and Guinea-Bissau. Rogerio 
Lobato, Jose Ramos-Horta and Mari Alkatiri left East Tim or to seek international support 
on 4 December 1975, three days ahead o f the Indonesian invasion, and remained in exile 
for the entire period o f the occupation (Scott 2005: 25-27). Their experiences in their 
places o f exile, and the way that their relationships were conducted, continues to influence 
the contemporary political landscape in East Timor. O f  note is the role that Rogerio 
Lobato, former Minister of Defence in 1975 and future Minister o f the Interior in East 
Timor, played during this time. His capacity for erratic behaviour was dem onstrated as 
early as 1978 when he took members o f the East Timorese resistance including Jose 
Ramos-Horta, Mari Alkatiri and Ana Pessoa hostage in M aputo for an extended period o f 
time, thought to be weeks or m onths, before Ramos-Horta was able to finally convince 
Mozambiquan authorities to intervene. Lobato is believed to have spent time with the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (Rees 2004b) and was later sentenced to prison in 1983 for 
several years in Angola for diamond-smuggling, abusing Angolan diplomatic privileges and 
procuring prostitutes (Shoesmith 2003:238 ; Rees 2004b).
A further consequence o f having a resistance that was situated both within East Tim or and 
abroad is a socio-political fault line, dependent on where people spent the occupation.36 
Many o f those exiled abroad benefitted from educational opportunities that were not 
available within East Tim or and became proficient in the Portuguese instead o f the
36 Evidence of these divisions is found in derogatory references to the ‘Maputo clique’ which includes people 
such as Man Alkatiri and Ana Pessoa. Alkatiri, on the other hand, referred to Indonesian-educated graduates 
as ‘sarjana SUpermt or ‘instant noodle scholars’ (International Crisis Group 2007: 1, n3).
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Indonesian language.17 This aflects contemporary participation in all aspects o f 
government.
2.6 L egacies o f history
The idea that the political and social form and practices o f a nation are influenced by what 
has occurred in its history is not new. However, using legacies as a conceptual framework, 
particularly in relation to violent and chaotic pasts, has been criticised. Multiple, accreting 
layers o f history make causation difficult to ‘prove’. Cesarini and Hite (2004: 324) caution 
against overstretching the idea o f  legacies in a way that is vague or generalised. Colombijn 
and Lindblad (2002: 9) advise prudence in the search for historical roots, warning o f the 
danger o f descending into cultural determinism; a similar theme is taken up by Steedlv 
(1999: 445) advising against ‘primordialising’ the construction o f violence in Southeast 
Asia.
A renewal o f interest in the way that the legacies o f the past play out in post-authoritarian 
regimes has been analysed through a num ber o f case studies as well as the development o f 
more general conceptual frameworks (Hite and Cesarini 2004). Similarly, conflict analyses 
use multidisciplinary approaches that encompass history, anthropology, psychology and 
theories o f  a path-dependence to search for the ‘roots’ o f conflict, which in some cases 
may be obscured by the passage o f time. This is apparent in Colombijn and Lindblad’s 
(2002) edited volume on the roots o f violence in Indonesia and judith Bennett’s (2002) 
paper on the roots o f  conflict in the Solomon Islands.
In relation to authoritarian legacies, Cesarini and Hite (2004: 2) note that some authors 
argue for only examining the immediately preceding regime when seeking explanations for 
contem porary manifestations, as incorporating the distant past can be too unwieldy and 
imprecise. O thers are more comfortable taking a longer view, such as Henk Schulte 
N ordholt who argues for a ‘genealogy o f violence’, or Robinson who, in relation to East 
Timor, proposes the notion o f ‘reservoirs o f violence’ and, in another context examines 
both the colonial and pre-colonial past for clues as to the character o f  the militias o f 1999 
(Schulte N ordholt 2002; Robinson 2002, 2006).
Henk Schulte N ordholt contends that
17 The prom otion o f Portuguese language often took on an absurdist feel such as when former Vice Minister 
o f Justice Manual Abrantes addressed a border meeting o f  the residents o f Oecussi and neighbouring 
Indonesian Nusa Tenggara Timur in 2004. Although Abrantes spoke fluent Indonesian and none o f the 
meeting attendees spoke Portuguese he lectured the group at length in highly ‘Portuguese styled’ Tetum  that 
most Tetum  speakers were unable to comprehend. He would correct the interpreting to Indonesian in 
English, further confusing the situation and amusing the Indonesian officials in attendance. Pers. Comm. 
Ingvar x\nda 15 June 2009.
52
In general, post-colonial states have inherited more from their predecessors 
than their nationalist rhetoric would suggest. As such they retain an intense 
distrust towards their own subjects, as well as a strong concentration o f 
power in the centre because o f the fear that the delegation o f power could 
lead to disloyalty and separatism (Schulte Nordholt 2002:42 ).
Similarly, Hills argues:
Despite what donors would wish, order depends on what went before. In 
other words order is a reconfigured complex o f interlocking structures, 
processes and relationships that are composed o f old elements and habits, 
only some o f which will be revised and reoriented by new pressures and 
new or modified contexts. It depends on rules, behaviour and predictability7, 
and is managed by coercion, adaptation, accommodation and negotiation 
(Hills 2009a: 203-204).
In a prescient analysis George Aditjondro, an Indonesian sociologist, speaks o f the 
potential for Indonesian state terror to be reproduced in a [at the time o f writing] future 
independent East Tim or by East Timorese police, noting the num ber o f  studies that 
illustrate the way in which practices o f torture and its effects ‘infect’ post-revolutionary 
societies (Aditjondro 2000: 160).
To the extent possible in this chapter, I follow an analysis that includes the longer view of 
the influences o f history on the local context within which contem porary security sector 
building and reform occurs in East Timor. The discussion below is not however an 
exhaustive survey o f the inchoate legacies o f East Timorese history that shape the 
development o f the security sector.
2.6.1 L im ite d  pen etra tion  o f  the sta te  an d  enduring lo ca l d isp u te  resolu tion
There are a num ber o f demographic factors in contemporary East Tim or that affect the 
issue o f the development o f the state, the extent of its penetration, how  the state operates 
at the periphery, and ultimately the development o f a national police force. East Tim or is 
ranked 162 in the Human Development Index (UNDP 2009b), has a very high birth rate 
and a very young population with the problems associated with a ‘youth bulge’ in 
developing countries. The largest employment sector is in subsistence agriculture and this 
contributes to the population retaining a highly localised sense o f identity. This identity is 
also underwritten by the large number o f languages spoken in Timor. Tetum  and 
Portuguese are the official languages and thus they are what the central G overnm ent uses 
to communicate with the population. However, in some subdistricts less than twenty 
percent o f the population can speak, read or write Tetum, similarly in other districts less 
than five percent can speak, read or write Portuguese. The 2004 census in East Tim or 
found that 54.2 per cent o f  the population was illiterate. This is not evenly distributed
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throughout the country, but even within Dili district 25.8 per cent o f  the population is 
illiterate. This is more prevalent in rural areas, reaching 71.1 per cent in Ermera. Thirty 
three point eight per cent (33.8%) have graduated from high school in Dili, down to four 
point three per cent (4.3 %) in Bobonaro (National Statistics Directorate 2006).
During the Indonesian occupation the state and its military supervision were present down 
to the village level. Unlike the countries o f Melanesia, where it has been argued that the 
state was never properly built or functioning in the first place (Dinnen 2003: 6), East Tim or 
experienced a strong state under Indonesian occupation. However the legitimacy o f the 
state, in particular its policing and judicial functions, was limited amongst the Timorese 
population and broad developm ent outcomes were poor. In relation to everyday 
maintenance o f law and order and dispute resolution traditional authority structures 
retained supremacy for most Timorese, reinforced by strongly localised identities.
The extensive destruction o f physical infrastructure and the withdrawal o f higher echelon 
Indonesian public servants in 1999 provided a particular challenge for establishing a 
tangible reach o f the new state. Both the U N T A E T  interregnum and the subsequent 
independent state were highly centralised, the civil service was only one third o f that 
present during Indonesian times and the administrative experience and education o f the 
civil sendee was low. District administrations found it hard to successfully access state 
resources.58 T he functioning o f policing and judicial services was somewhere between poor 
and non-existent. The state in East Timor, at any distance from the centre, became highly 
dependent on the enduring function o f traditional authority structures. This meant that the 
state at a district level was not exactly absent but looked somewhat different, a point made 
more generally by Das and Poole (2004: 3). People had negative experiences o f the state 
during occupation and the penetration o f the state form post-independence is limited.
It should not however be thought that the state is entirely ‘absent’ but rather that it 
functions in a somewhat different m anner to that intended at the centre o f government, 
with a distinct syncretism between old and new forms o f authority' in evidence. Post­
independence, higher level governmental positions, as in previous eras, are more likely to 
be held by traditional authority' holders. Hohe contends that although former Falintil 
fighters continue to be honoured for their resistance era contributions they are not as likely
58 Much of my time as a Planning and Coordination Officer in Oecussi in the last five months of the 
UNTAET mission was spent trying to assist the District Administration to extract resources or funds already 
promised to them from Dili. My contact with members of the Oecussi District Administration after 20 May 
2002 made it clear that this situation did not readily improve under sovereign administration.
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to become political leaders as those from royal households. This indicates an important 
continuity and integrity of the pre-existing authority systems (Hohe 2002a: 575-578).
In relation to Oecussi both Meitzner Yoder (2005) and Nixon (2008: 331) detail how 
people holding traditional ritual and political positions will often also hold positions in the 
contemporary administrative structure. They also explain the way in which state and 
traditional dispute resolution processes overlap or are influenced by one another’s authority 
Post-independence there have been ongoing limitations to the devolution of resources 
from the capital to the districts, with attendant diminution of the authority of district 
officials. This factor serves to increase the reliance of state-based authority holders on 
traditional authorities for legitimacy.
In addition to a limited penetration of the state, people in East Timor have no particular 
experience of anything resembling a Western model of policing. Surveys indicating people’s 
belief that community and traditional leaders, rather than the police, are responsible for law 
and order will be discussed in chapter 3. The limited capacity and reach of the East 
Timorese judicial system currently means that most dispute resolution can only happen 
through non-formal mechanisms. Mcarns notes that
People arc keenly aware that the government cannot yet solve most of their 
problems but they also know that a distant government of Dili based 
politicians is unlikely ever to understand the importance of their local 
concerns or be able to resolve them in a timely manner. There was a general 
feeling among the local people outside the capital that the village system of 
justice remained and would remain the most immediate, relevant and 
effective form of resolving disputes and punishing petty crimes (Mearns 
2002: 40).
This would seem to support Dauvergne’s (1998: 4) contention that in reality people expect 
little of the state. However, the ways in which people understand the relationship between 
the formal and localised systems of justice, and to where they will turn to seek access to 
justice is fluid, and subject to change. Although local systems have many shortcomings, 
they remain the choice and reality for the greater part of the population. While significant 
efforts have been expended on building rule of law institutions such as courts and police in 
East Timor, a rule of law culture remains elusive. This is discussed in chapter 4.
2.6.2 Martial heritage and unstable alliances
In Western countries Weber’s (1991: 48) concept that a state is actually defined by having a 
monopoly on the (legitimate) control of violence is widely accepted. Throughout East 
Timor’s history, however, this kind of monopoly on violence has not been evident, instead
an accompanying martial heritage with unstable alliances has historical continuities to the 
present day.
The pre-colonial island of Timor was characterised as a fragile patchwork of warring 
micro-kingdoms, with a constantly shifting dynamic of alliances between the liurais or rulers 
of the kingdoms. The pre-existing Timorese martial heritage was exploited until the end of 
the colonial period by the Portuguese in order to consolidate their authority, but in the 
process the practice also served to consolidate and extend the Timorese warrior tradition. 
The bestowal of Portuguese military ranks on Timorese warriors, discussed above, was part 
of this process (Nixon 2008: 81). Nixon also draws on the work of Farram to argue that
Portuguese encouragement of the Timorese martial heritage ensured that an 
association between the ability to command an armed force and the ability 
to advance one’s political fortune remained current through to the very 
conclusion of the Portuguese period (Nixon 2008: 81).
Similarly, in Indonesia it has been noted that “violence has never been a legitimate 
monopoly of the state in twentieth century Indonesia” (Anderson 2001: 18). There is also a 
long-standing tradition in Indonesia of the state utilising and fostering paramilitary, 
vigilante, criminal and militia groups (Colombijn and Lindblad 2002: 19-20; Robinson 
2006; Wilson 2006: 265). Wilson (2006: 265) argues that this has occurred in such a way as 
to blur the line between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ use of violence, noting that the 
Indonesian military itself was drawn from such organisations. The New Order regime often 
utilised criminal and paramilitary groups as proxies as part of a strategy" of political control 
such as in the anti-communist pogroms of 1965 when they utilised ‘private’ youth groups 
to carry out intimidation and killings (Anderson 2001: 13).
The long history of using auxiliaries or militias in Indonesia continued in East Timor 
following the Indonesian occupation (Robinson 2006: 269). Robinson notes that the 
militias that were in evidence from late 1998 in East Timor were “mobilised, trained, 
supplied and backed” by Indonesian military, police and civilian authorities with a special 
catalysing role often attributed to General Prabowo Subianto, the son-in-law of former 
President Suharto (Robinson 2006: 272-274).,9 Robinson contends that the militias that 
were heavily supported as auxiliaries of the Indonesian army in 1999 were however not 
merely a creation of the Indonesian military but drew instead on identifiable models from 
both colonial and pre-colonial history in East Timor, as well as similarly recognisable 
models in Indonesia. He suggests:
v) Prabowo Subianto was also an unsuccessful vice-presidential candidate in the 2009 Indonesian Presidential 
elections.
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It seems possible that these features of the militias were not simply the 
product of a TNI plan but also the result of historical learning, and 
rekindled memory, through which a range of techniques of violence spread, 
albeit with official encouragement. In this view a certain script or historical 
memory, encompassing a shared repertoire of violence, might already have 
been in the minds of many East Timorese, ready to be enacted when the 
occasion arose, or when the signal was given by authorities (Robinson 2006:
274).
Robinson notes tactics employed by pro-Indonesian militias in 1999, such as bombarding 
enemies with a hail of rocks4" and burning down their houses drew on old traditions of 
warfare. He does not, however, propose this as evidence for an immutable ‘Timorese 
tradition’ but rather argues that “the very existence of local auxiliaries, as well as their 
weaponry and behaviour, were shaped by the presence, and sponsorship, of Portuguese, 
Dutch and other outside powers” (Robinson 2006: 276).
In post-independence East Timor it is clear that the practice of using auxiliaries 
undermines any attempt to establish a state monopoly on the legitimate control of violence. 
During the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, gangs were used by political 
parties as violent proxies, with violence being turned on and off as required. Many gangs 
count even high-ranking police officers in their membership, providing a clear conflict of 
interest (Myrttinen 2007: 13; 2008; Scambary 2009a: l).41 Although it is sometimes claimed 
that a particular gang is affiliated with a particular political party this tends to be 
opportunistic, with shifting patterns of alliances predominant.42 Further detail is provided 
in chapter 5 on the shifting alliances apparent in the conflicts that emerged in 2006 and 
2007.
In the early days of the UNTAET administration and into independence a variety of non­
state security groups emerged including the CPD-RDTL (Popular Council for the Defence 
of the Democratic Republic of East Timor), Colimau 2000, the Isolados and Sagrada 
Familia which were formed by disaffected veterans and members of the former clandestine 
movement. These groups provided a direct challenge to the formation of the new armed 
forces and, in the case of CPD-RDTL, to the government overall. Some were engaged 
directly in intimidation and violence. Others were reputed to maintain links to militia
4,1 In personal discussions with Father Richard Daschbach, a long time priest in Timor, he has recounted how 
he and the local children of Cutete fought off the militias attempting to take their hilltop position in 1999 
with spears, slingshots and rocks.
41 The high level of ‘gang tattoos’ amongst PNTL in Baucau was noted in discussion in July 2009 by a 
member of the Joint Field Assessment Team carrying out assessments of readiness for handover from 
UNPOL to PNTL.
42 Pers. Comm. James Scambary 5 March 2009
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leaders in Indonesia an d /o r political figures in East Timor. Some o f the groups utilised 
registration procedures and the issuing o f identity cards reminiscent o f the practices o f the 
nascent Timorese political parties during the civil war.
In situations where penetration o f the state is limited it allows the emergence o f 
‘entrepreneurs in violence’ (Schulte N ordholt 2002: 40). Such entrepreneurs o f violence can 
exist either within or outside formal state structures or in a shadowy world in between. The 
former Minister o f the Interior Rogerio Lobato is just such an entrepreneur. Later in this 
chapter I describe how he played a complex double-agent role: ostensibly representing the 
Portuguese military while martialling East Timorese members o f the Portuguese military to 
support FRETILIN  in 1975. In chapter 4 I describe how he used disgruntled veterans o f 
the resistance to conjure up a threat o f violence which resulted in his securing a formal role 
as Minister o f the Interior. In this position he devised special police forces that were 
personally loyal to him rather than the state.43 He was subsequently convicted o f 
distributing weapons to civilians with the intention o f eliminating leaders o f opposing 
political parties and petitioners who had deserted the military.
Major Alfredo Reinado, head o f the military police in East Tim or until 2006, can similarly 
be considered an entrepreneur o f  violence and one who occupied a position informed by 
East T im or’s martial heritage. Nixon argues that the pattern o f shifting alliances that 
characterised the pre-pacihcation era of the Portuguese colonial period was still being 
played out in the defection o f a Border Patrol Unit to join Reinado’s gang during the crisis 
o f  2006 (Nixon 2008: 289). Reinado was on the run for almost two years from prison, 
variously negotiating with, and being pursued by, agents o f the state. During this time 
rumours spread that Reinado had been endowed with the supernatural powers o f the late 
Dorn Boaventura in a secret ritual ceremony. Dorn Boaventura led the proto-nationalist 
Manufahi rebellion in 1911 and is considered in many parts o f the country, more 
specifically in western districts, to be the archetypal Timorese warrior who among other 
things united previously divided liurai in revolt against the Portuguese (Sengstock 2008). It 
is arguable that Reinado had an overinflated sense o f his own legacy, but nonetheless his 
use o f the image o f the warrior clearly has a contemporary cultural power in East Timor.
The occupation o f a place located in between cultural belief and Western ideas o f reality by 
torm er East Timorese resistance fighters was not unique to Reinado. In the burnt out ruins 
o f public buildings throughout East Tim or in 2000 I photographed a range o f graffiti, with
43 This has continuities with the actions of Rogeno’s brother Nicolau Lobato who organised the martial wing 
of FRETILIN to be personally loyal to him rather than the party (Nicol 1978: 101-102).
58
charcoal depictions o f the guerrilla Xanana Gusm äo one o f the most common. These 
depictions o f Xanana were part Jesus Christ, part angel (complete with wings) and part Che 
Guevara. A sense o f identity that draws a lineage from the fighters o f the resistance to the 
earlier warrior kings is not infrequently made. N iner (2007: 113) notes that “many o f East 
T im or’s resistance fighters against Indonesian occupation claimed descent from the warrior 
tradition o f their ancestors by readopting their indigenous names and casting aside their 
colonial ones”. This highlights the lack o f an institutional basis for the expression and 
control o f violence and a seeming preference for much more personalised loyalties, 
something resonant with older cultural practices o f headhunting and raiding.
It is empirically demonstrable that the East Timorese government has no Weberian 
monopoly over the control o f violence. This is complicated further by the lack o f clarity 
regarding the respective roles o f the police and the military. This can be expressed in 
another way as there being no monopoly on policing. During m ost o f  the Indonesian 
occupation the POLRI were subsumed as part o f  ABRI. Previously, following WWII the 
Portuguese police were part o f the military. This historical model o f military over police 
may provide a clue as to why there is a contem porary affinity with this model, no doubt 
bolstered by the role that Falintil played in the resistance to Indonesian rule and a 
comfortable fit with narrative about Tim or’s warrior tradition. The Timorese police do not 
have a similar story to draw upon. My research indicates a widespread belief that an 
impartial police force, although theoretically desirable, is not considered possible and that it 
is rather a matter o f who controls the force and its resources.
2.6.3 P ersonalised exercise o f  p o w er
In the earlier discussion o f East Tim or’s martial heritage, shifting alliances and lack o f 
monopoly on the control o f violence, a num ber o f  examples o f how political leaders use 
their personal, rather than institutional, power were highlighted. This is one o f the 
characteristics o f the way that power is enacted, and governance conducted, in East Tim or 
in the post-independence period and has consequences for the development o f the security 
sector and similarly the rule o f law. It should be noted, however, that frequently those 
occupying key roles in the independence movem ent and subsequent post-independence 
government were originally from high ranking liurai families. For example Nicolau and 
Rogeno Lobato’s father was the liurai o f Leorama suco in Bazartete subdistrict in Liquica 
(Nixon 2008: 131). This means that leaders are oiten able to draw on their traditional 
sources o f authority and the accompanying social capital such as educational and 
employment opportunities, as well as the resources that are inherent in a formal 
institutional position. The tendency, though, is to exercise that complex o f power in a
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personal rather than institutional fashion. This is evident in how problem-solving of major 
security issues is conducted, such as when Major Alfredo Reinado was on the run or 
following the dismissal of petitioning soldiers in 2006. This problem-solving is approached 
serially by various members of the political elite operating in an almost unofficial capacity, 
and with complete disregard for any legal or other formal processes that may also be 
underway. The newness of the state and its limited geographical and functional reach has 
left a much greater role for the personalised exercise of power in East Timor. However, 
this patrimonial approach has its antecedents within the patron-client relations of the 
autochthonous social organisation as outlined earlier in the chapter. Patrimonialism, and its 
neo-patrimonial manifestations, is of course not confined solely to East Timor. Brown 
notes that
communitarian norms of Southeast Asian cultures coexist with the 
personalization of political practice. Even in those countries where the 
forms of institutionalized democracy have become established, the 
patrimonial politics of patron-client linkages remain a central feature of 
political life. Patrimonial elites do indeed vary significantly in their 
responses to their clienteles, but in all variants, the politics of 
patrimonialism involve and promote inequalities of status (Brown 2002:
564).
The legacies of the highly personalised East Timorese approaches to power have 
resonances with, and arguably were bolstered by, Indonesian approaches to governance. In 
a general sense Suharto’s rule during the New Order was characterised by webs of 
patronage that traversed business, civilian administration and the military, with elite 
competition more focused upon the division of spoils than matters of policy (Crouch 1979: 
577-578). Gunn and Huang (2006: 123) cite legacies of Jakarta’s occupation as including 
“nepotism, favouritism, corruption, and bureaucratic inertia”. Similarly the functioning of 
the Indonesian bureaucracy has been described as operating through the phenomenon of 
bapakism, which Pye describes as
consisting of a father figure, the bapak, and a circle of loyal followers called 
anak buab, or children — is the cohesive glue which holds the most intimate 
groupings in the bureaucracy. The bapak-anak buab relationship is pervasive 
in giving structure to what is formally designated as bureaus or offices. It 
may also be a factor in linking together different principal figures along 
lines which may or may not follow the formal hierarchy of the bureaucracy 
(Pye 1985: 306).
Crouch has identified how these strongly patrimonial characteristics co-exist in Indonesia 
alongside more ‘modern’ or ‘Western’ non-patrimonial approaches (Crouch 1979: 587). A 
similar pattern can be said to occur in East Timor with Gunn and I luang drawing on the
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notion o f bapakism to coin the term liurai-ism to describe patron-client relationships in East 
Tim or that may or may not involve actual liurai or their descendants (Gunn and Huang 2006: 
123). Nixon also argues that the political party leaders who emerged in 1974 “would have 
understood the rationale o f using personal armed forces for the pursuit o f political 
objectives” drawing upon their own liurai heritage (Nixon 2008: 124). The point has also 
been made by Aderito de Jesus Soares that the prevailing ‘culture o f com m and’ that 
developed during the resistance period is now a problematic characteristic o f contemporary 
political life in East Tim or (quoted in Chesterman 2007: 212).
During the course o f this thesis I provide a num ber o f examples o f how this patrimonial 
legacy plays out in the development o f both the police and the military in East Timor. 
Earlier in this chapter I describe how, in the early stages o f the resistance to Indonesian 
occupation, Nicolau Lobato established the martial wing o f FRETILIN  in such a way as to 
be personally loyal to him rather than to the party. Similarly, in chapter 4 I examine how in 
the post-independence period the Minister o f Interior Rogerio Lobato (brother o f Nicolau) 
developed special forces within the PN TL who were considered to be at his personal 
behest. In chapter 6 I discuss how the Dili Task Force, a special unit formed within the 
PNTL, is considered to be ‘owned’ by the PN TL Dili District Commander.
However, not only docs power tend to be exercised in a personalised rather than 
institutional form, it is also moulded by the histories of particular personal relationships of 
members o f the political elite. In order to understand state and more generally elite 
dynamics it is im portant to appreciate that it is the history o f the relationships o f the 
specific members o f the elite that is formative in the kind o f  security sector presently 
developing in East Tim or and conflicts that have accompanied that process. In discussing 
the underlying causes o f the 2006 crisis in Timor, the International Crisis G roup notes that 
“ the entire crisis, its origins and solutions, revolve around less than ten people, who have a 
shared history going back 30 years” (International Crisis G roup 2006: i).
During N ovem ber 2008 Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General o f the UN Office o f 
Rule o f Law and Security Institutions, visited East Tim or to assess the work o f the rule o f 
law and security sector com ponents within UNM IT, as well as the cooperation and 
coordination between stakeholders in this sector, fie  concluded that future stability in East 
Tim or was dependent on what he referred to as the “political chemistry” between 
President Ramos-Horta, Prime Minister Gusmäo, Opposition Leader Mari Alkatiri and 
Brigadier-General Ruak (Titov 2008).
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Although it is the historically constituted Dili-level political elite and their personal exercise 
o f power that figure in many o f the narratives regarding development o f the security sector, 
it is equally im portant to remem ber that those elite also often draw on specialised localised 
constituencies depending on where they and their families come from. In any particular 
locale there will also be im portant power holders who are not known in the capital but will 
also carry significant weight at the level o f localised security considerations.
2.6.4 F ault lines, suspicion , traum a an d  violence
East T im or’s turbulent past has resulted in a num ber o f fault lines present in the 
community. These tensions manifest as conflicts between particular groups and may flare 
up or become dorm ant again, depending on other prevailing factors. These conflicts 
inform debates about security in East Tim or and are also threaded through some o f the 
conflicts within and between the security forces, most notable in the crisis o f 2006.
There are many different fault lines in East Timor, some with long antecedents. For 
example Scambary (2006: 2) notes ethnic divisions around market rivalries subsequent to 
migrations into Dili after WWII and again in 1999. Additional divisions date back to the 
1975 civil war between FRETILIN  and U DT, yet others relate to the resistance era splits. 
The 2006 crisis discussed in chapter 6 was marked by conflict between those from the east 
[loro sa’e or firakii) and those trom  the west (loro motiu or kaladi).u There are divisions 
between those w ho spent the Indonesian occupation overseas and those who remained in 
country; similarly there are generational differences often marked by a preference for using 
Indonesian or Tetum  over Portuguese.
During the life o f a conflict the ostensible reasons for the conflict are often transformed. 
Myrttinen (2008) provides the example o f long-standing land disputes in Baucau and 
Viqueque that are now construed as a division between AMP and FRETILIN . Similarly he 
notes that gang violence between rival gangs may have its origins in “longer-standing land 
issues, private issues or political conflicts, though some seem to be purely about group A 
fighting group B” .
The UN Special Commission o f  Inquiry (Col) into the crisis o f  2006 noted that “political 
competition within East Tim or has been historically settled through violence” (United 
Nations 2006a: 16), and there is no doubt that Tim or has been subject to a violent history.
44 The E ast/W est division is variously regarded as a phenom enon that emerged o f its own accord in 2006, as 
representing a belief by easterners that they were the ones who suffered the m ost under Indonesian 
occupation (whereas westerners benefitted from or were collaborators with the Indonesians), and as the result 
o f a divide and rule strategy of the Portuguese colonial era. This is discussed further in chapter 6.
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The Indonesian occupation was a brutal experience for the majority of East Timorese. 
However, what Robinson refers to as reservoirs of violence are more complex and of 
earlier antecedents than just the legacies produced by the Indonesian military.
Earlier in this chapter I noted the concept of a genealogy of violence in relation to 
Indonesia. Some of Timor’s family tree of violence shares the same roots as Indonesia’s; it 
also reflects the Portuguese colonising experience and aspects are distinctly home-grown. It 
has been argued that reservoirs of violence occur in Southeast Asian conflicts more 
broadly, persisting across times of relative peace. This is evidenced by continuities in 
modes of organisation, use of weapons and repertoires of violence of colonial militias in 
East Timor from the Portuguese period to independence (Hack 2004: 20; Robinson 2006). 
In her study on enduring violence in East Timor, Dewhurst concludes that
violence is broadly accepted in the home; at school; in response to major 
and minor disputes; in revenge for past offences; as a means of upholding 
the status, values, property or reputations of families, communities or 
gangs;[sic] or individuals’ status within these groups. Violent actions are 
also normalized as part of the political landscape in the country and are 
used to gain influence, power, or respect (Dewhurst 2008: 89).
She argues that a ‘culture of violence’ as described by Steenkamp (2005), in large part 
derived from prolonged exposure to the violence of occupation, exists in East Timor. It 
includes a societal permissiveness to violence and this is influential in “the perpetuation of 
individual, collective, and state-level violence which has occurred during the independence 
era in Timor-Leste” (Dewhurst 2008:89 ). She cautions however, that a culture of violence 
is only one of a wreb of factors that contribute to the causation of violence (2008: 89-91).
Whatever the historical propensity for violence, the levels of trauma experienced by the 
population during the civil war, the Indonesian occupation and in ongoing multifaceted 
post-independence conflicts are significant. A randomised study carried out in East Timor 
in 2000 by the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT) found that 
thirty four percent of respondents could be classified as having post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) and fifty seven percent had experienced at least one of the six forms of 
torture included in IRCT’s study instrument (IRCT 2000). Jolliffe (2008: 10) argues that 
“sustainable democracy will remain a distant goal, with unrest and civil strife continuing to 
haunt the new nation, until the important factor of untreated and widespread psychosocial 
trauma is addressed”. The historical contours of violence in East Timor continue to 
manifest in people’s perceptions of security and what expectations they have of their 
security forces.
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2.7 C onclusion
In this chapter I have drawn out a num ber o f related threads that are discernible as legacies 
from Timorese history. Demographic issues such as lack o f education, lack o f formal 
employment opportunities, a ‘youth bulge’ and a highly dispersed and primarily agrarian 
society contribute to the nature o f  Timorese society and its security sector today. I explore 
how the limited reach o f the state has continued to provide a role for more traditional 
forms o f governance and exertions o f power that tend to be personal rather than 
institutional. The continuities o f martial heritage, and a proclivity for formation o f unstable 
political alliances, throughout Tim orese history are still present in much o f the instability 
that both forms and affects the m odern security sector. A history o f violence, much o f it 
extreme, is associated with this martial heritage and has provided many o f the traumatic 
legacies o f violence that affect the majority o f the population, manifesting both as 
individual and collective trauma.
The exercise o f power in East T im or in a personalised rather than institutionalised manner 
has major implications for international police-builders who are operating primarily from 
the assumptions inherent in an institutionalist paradigm. The patrimonial nature o f East 
Timorese society more generally, and the security forces more specifically, has meant that 
very few o f the Timorese political elite consider that an impartial police force is a 
possibility, and that it is merely a matter o f who owns which bits o f  it. It is arguable that 
contemporary distrust o f PN TL by FRETILIN  is underwritten not only by more recent 
clashes between PN T L  and F-FD TL and the experience o f Indonesian policing under the 
occupation but also by the siding o f  the Portuguese police (which included East Timorese) 
with U D T during the early stages o f the civil war, something that resulted in FRETILIN  
demanding that East Timorese soldiers assume responsibility for security rather than the ill- 
trusted police.
Similarly, experience o f the state and policing during both the Portuguese colonial era and 
the Indonesian occupation underpin contemporary expectations o f the role and function o f 
the police and confound international attempts to introduce more democratic and 
accountable policing styles. This is apparent both in the conduct and performance o f the 
PN TL themselves as well as how the broader population, the political leadership and the 
military perceive the legitimacy o f  the PNTL. These expectations have a profound effect 
on the police-building endeavours o f external parties such as the UN and other bilateral 
contributors.
Chapter 3
The building of a fragile institution 1999-2006
3.1. Introduction
This chapter traces the development o f the PN TL from its creation in 2000 until the ‘crisis’ 
o f early 2006, which included the collapse o f  the police force in Dili and at the national 
headquarters. It is an account o f the early history o f the institution’s developm ent under 
UN and bilateral auspices and through the staged handover o f districts and management to 
East Tim or government control. It is also a story o f institutional developm ent within its 
historical, political, social and cultural context.
The chapter commences by examining the role o f the UN in the developm ent o f a police 
sendee for East Timor. It provides an account o f U N  executive policing during the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Tim or (UNTAET) mandate, and UN efforts 
to build a police force from scratch. The chapter also describes how, during the process o f 
transferring policing responsibility from U N T A E T  to the independent East Timorese 
government, weaknesses in the structure and function o f the police force started to become 
apparent. These weaknesses became more pronounced as the PN T L  passed to East 
Timorese government control. It became apparent that the way the police force was 
developing was underwritten by a variety o f East T im or’s historical experiences, including 
the conduct of policing by colonial and occupying forces and civil war- and resistance-era 
struggles over the control o f  armed force. Finally, it became clear that poorly functioning 
justice institutions, coupled with a poorly regarded police institution, reinforced a tendency 
to draw on older and more localised forms o f dispute resolution. This often resulted in 
hybrid innovations, initiated by both international and Timorese actors, for addressing 
security and justice issues.
In this chapter I argue that both the manner o f  creation and the subsequent mode o f 
development o f the East Tim or police force influenced the performance, legitimacy, and 
viability o f the institution. I also argue that the technical failures in the developm ent o f the 
East Timorese police force were so manifest that they obscured the equally im portant 
question o f the historical and cultural context in which international forces, bilateral 
agencies and an independent government were attem pting to build a new institution. All 
these factors have affected the overall sustainability o f the police force.
3.2 UN Policing
3.2.1 A nticipating a new  police force
On 30 August 1999 a referendum was held for the territory o f East Timor. The United 
Nations Mission in East Tim or (UNAM ET) had been mandated to
organize and conduct a popular consultation, scheduled for 8 August 
1999,45 on the basis o f a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to 
ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept the proposed 
constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Tim or 
within the unitary Republic o f Indonesia or reject the proposed special 
autonom y for East Tim or, leading to East Tim or’s separation from 
Indonesia (United Nations 1999f: 2)
By early August the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) foresaw that in the period between the 
referendum and the implementation o f its result “ the situation in East Tim or will be rather 
delicate” (United Nations 1999f: 2). The scale o f destruction and violence that followed the 
announcem ent o f  the results o f  the referendum on 4 September showed this to be an 
understatem ent (see e.g. Nevins 2002: 623-624).
Estimates o f the num ber o f people who lost their lives range from 1 200 to over 2 000 
(Robinson 2003: 1; Nevins 2002: 623; Post-CAVR Secretariat and Benetech 2008). By 15 
September 1999 UN Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999) had authorised the creation 
o f a multinational force to restore peace and security. The Australian-led International 
Force for East Tim or (IN TERFET) force landed in Dili in East Tim or on 20 September 
1999 and was able to extend its influence as far as the enclave district o f Oecussi bv 22 
October. At its peak IN T E R FE T  included 9 900 troops from 22 nations and civilian police 
who carried out m onitoring and advisory duties (Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
2000; Australian G overnm ent 2001; Bano and Rees 2002).
U N TA ET assumed responsibility for the administration o f East Tim or on 25 October 
1999. It was immediately placed in the unique position o f having full legislative and 
executive powers, a form o f sovereignty previously unknown in UN missions. U N TA ET 
took over responsibility for security7 from IN T E R FE T  in February 2000, deploying both 
military and police. The circumstances were challenging and the capacity o f the UN to 
meet those challenges was severely tested. The U N TA ET mandate did not explicitly make 
reference to the requirem ent to develop a new police force but this was implicit in the full 
legislative and executive powers bestowed by the mandate.
4:1 This date was later revised to 30 August 1999.
The development o f a new East Timorese police force had been foreshadowed in the 
constitutional framework for the Special Autonom ous Region o f East Tim or (SARET) in 
‘the 5 May agreements’.46 Articles 32-35 o f the Constitutional Framework o f the SARET 
provided for the establishment o f a SARET police force in the event that the autonomy 
option was accepted. It was agreed that, if autonomy was rejected, the government o f 
Indonesia would take the constitutional steps to terminate its links with East Timor, and 
the governments o f Indonesia and Portugal, together with the UN, would agree on a 
“peaceful and orderly transfer o f authority in East Tim or to the United Nations” (United 
Nations 1999a).
In either case a new police force was anticipated to replace the Indonesian POLRI. The 
UNSG, in outlining post-referendum scenarios, had foreseen that following the ballot it 
would be necessary to increase the UN police com ponent from the 275 (UNAM ET 1999) 
deployed in the lead up to the referendum to 460. This would enable the police to operate 
in all thirteen districts, and would also include a small team o f about fifty personnel to 
recruit and train a new East Timorese police force (United Nations 1999f: 3). The Security 
Council made this expectation more explicit in Security Council Resolution 1262 on 27 
August 1999 (three days before the referendum), when it extended the UNA M ET 
mandate.47
3.2.2 A n execu tive p o lic in g  role for the U N
Included within U N T A E T ’s broad mandate to administer the territory was the explicit 
requirement to provide securitv and executive policing. The scale and breadth o f 
U N T A E T ’s task meant that a much larger police presence than initially anticipated was 
required, with the Security Council authorising a maximum 1 640 police.48 Initially the UN 
had difficulty in deploying the numbers o f CIVPOL required. Only four months previously 
the Security Council had established the United Nations Interim  Administration in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), also including an executive policing function and with an explicit mandate to
46 These agreements between the governments o f Indonesia and Portugal authorised the referendum on 
special autonomy for East Timor within the Republic o f Indonesia and requested the UNSG to establish a 
United Nations mission to earn? out the referendum. The agreements also outlined the procedures to be 
followed in the event that the proposed autonomous status o f East Timor was accepted, or in the alternative, 
rejected (United Nations 1999a).
47 The Security Council Resolution states that the mission is extended “ ...until 30 November 1999, and 
endorses the proposal o f the Secretary-General that in the interim phase UNAMETshould incorporate the 
following components: (a) an electoral unit as set out in the report of the Secretary-General, (b) a civilian 
police component o f up to 460 personnel to continue to advise the Indonesian police and to prepare for the 
recruitment and training o f the new East Timorese police force (United Nations 1999f: 2)
48 Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999).
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establish a police force.4'1 The particular nature ot these two missions, while not entirely 
unprecedented, marked a new developm ent in the demands on CIVPOL, which previously 
had been much more likely to be deployed in monitoring, training and reform o f existing 
police forces. In relation to both U N TA ET and UNM IK, the UNSG was regularly 
reporting difficulties in fulfilling the mandated deployment o f civilian police.50
In East Tim or the slowness o f recruitm ent o f international police officers meant an initial 
inability to deploy many police officers outside Dili. Although by January 2000, when 
U N TA ET assumed responsibility for law and order, 400 CIVPOL from twenty nine 
countries had been deployed in all 13 districts, the majority o f  these were in the district 
capitals (United Nations 2000c: 12). The lack o f a full complement o f CIVPOL meant that 
they needed to rely on IN T E R FE T , and later the military peacekeepers (PKF), for back up. 
The international police shortage, and their lack o f familiarity with local conditions, also 
resulted in a decision by CIV PO L to bolster their numbers by establishing a police 
assistance group (PAG) comprising East Timorese who had formerly served as part o f 
POLRI. Ultimately many o f these former Indonesian police were recruited into the new 
East Tim or Police Service.51
As security had been normalised fairly quickly following the arrival o f IN T ER FET, the 
initial preoccupations o f C IV PO L were with a rising crime rate attributed to “ the large 
numbers o f unemployed and the re-emergence of longstanding conflicts within society” 
(United Nations 2000c: 4), and the safe return and processing o f refugees. CIVPOL was 
also legally empowered to investigate the crimes against humanity that occurred during 
1999 but were not trained in the specifics o f this kind o f investigation till late June 2000, 
tending to treat each case as homicide “with no attention to the role o f the Indonesian state 
or to the links among the different crimes” (Human Rights Watch 2001: 191). Initially 
CIVPOL was unarmed, but on 30 April 2002 a serious fight between rival youth groups at 
Dili stadium spread to the nearby central market and resulted in four injured and eighteen 
arrests. Following this incident police were authorised to carry side arms (United Nations 
2000b: 6). The PK F meanwhile were largely involved in a range o f border incidents with 
militia (United Nations 2000c : 5-6, 14).
44 Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). What was referred to as a ‘police force’ in the original UNMIK 
Security Council resolution was, by the time of the first Report of the Secretary-General on the mission, 
being referred to as a “credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service” [emphasis added] (United 
Nations 1999a: 12).
1,1 In relation to UNMIK see Security Council Resolution 177 (2000).
',l Similar pressures in Kosovo resulted in recruitment of significant numbers o f former Kosovo police 
service officers who had been expelled from the force in 1989 and 1990 as well as ex-Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) members (United Nations 1999e: 15).
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As well as having trouble getting the numbers of CIVPOL required, there were significant 
problems with the quality of police recruited. The Commander of the Canadian CIVPOL 
contingent from May 2001 to March 2002, Inspector Rick Taylor, noted the lack of 
knowledge, skills, and abilities of civilian police officers from some contributing countries 
“in the area of police tactics, investigational techniques, major case management principles, 
processes, informant handling and analytical skills”. Some of those recruited were not even 
police. Many contributing nations sent personnel such as police car-washers, clerks, drivers, 
administration support and even a postal officer to work as police. Consequently they were 
unable to fulfil the policing role (Taylor 2003: 2; Goldsmith and Harris 2009: 197).52
There was little accountability within the UN mission for the behaviour of individual 
CIVPOL officers. Taylor (2003: 3) claims that CIVPOL in East Timor was engaged in 
prostitution, the black market and the sale or purchase of contraband, and that some 
CIVPOL officers were mistreating local citizens with “verbal abuse and a condescending 
attitude in their daily interactions”. The problem of CIVPOL accountability was not 
confined to the UNTAET mission and has emerged as a major issue in other missions 
including in Bosnia, Cambodia, Kosovo and Democratic Republic of Congo (Call and 
Barnett 2000: 51; Murray 2002-3: 503-506; Murphy 2007: 230; Smith, Holt, and Durch 
2007: x). Although UN military peacekeepers are provided immunity from local 
prosecution and remain under the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of their own national 
authorities, the situation with UN civilian personnel, including civilian police, is a little 
different. CIVPOL are provided with functional immunity if carrying out the performance 
of their duties. Anything that falls outside this definition becomes a matter for local 
prosecution. However, the frequent lack of a fully functioning judicial system in places 
where CIVPOL is likely to be working frustrates accountability and promotes impunity 
(The Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping 2004: 2).
During the UNTAET mission in East Timor, over forty nations contributed police 
personnel. Managing such a multinational force, with different backgrounds, policing styles 
and competencies, was a particular challenge."3 There have been calls for UN policy 
requiring geographic balance within each peace operation to be reinterpreted as a balance
"2 Goldsmith and Harris, in their interviews with Australian police who served as part of integrated missions 
in East Timor, also discuss the perception that a misreading of the situation in East Timor had resulted in 
some national contingents sending police who were not ‘appropriate’ for the situation, citing in particular the 
deployment of riot police when the mission was promoting a community policing ethos (Goldsmith and 
Harris 2009:197).
13 See also Goldsmith and Harris (2009) for a discussion of cultural and operational issues affecting 
interoperability between different national contingents of UNPOL in East Timor.
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across all peace operations, so that with any one peace operation recruitment would be o f 
police from appropriate cultural or linguistic backgrounds to the mission country (King's 
College 2003: par. 8 2).44
The operational capacity o f CIVPOL was hampered by logistical problems due to lack o f 
buildings, equipment and transport. This capacity was also hindered by the virtual absence 
o f other pillars o f  rule o f law architecture. The lack o f a functioning judicial system and, in 
most areas, the lack o f  any detention facilities greatly affected the ability o f the police to 
conduct their work. At one point during 2000 CIVPOL had to stop carrying out arrests as 
there was no where to place arrestees. The only detention centre in the country had 
exceeded capacity and the prison in Becora was not rehabilitated until May 2000 (Human 
Rights Watch 2001: 191).
The difficult operational environm ent combined with little direction from Dili meant that 
police in the districts developed a range o f ad hoc mechanisms for carrying out their work. 
International police in the districts were not familiar with the Indonesian legal system and 
did not have English translations o f  the applicable laws. As a result they were observed to 
apply their own national legislation and criminal procedures (Human Rights Watch 2001: 
191).
CIV PO L officers were also constrained by lack o f understanding o f local language and 
cultural issues, confusion about applicable law, and confusion about the meaning o f 
community policing. The continued understaffing o f CIVPOL below the authorised 
strength coupled with little direction from the top can in part explain the not insubstantial 
improvisation undertaken by international police.
Although from the beginning o f the mission the UN held that a community policing model 
was being followed, no interpretation o f what that might mean was provided to police on 
the ground. In 2000 the UNSG noted that “U N TA ET follows a community-based 
approach to policing, participating in local problem solving meetings and other community- 
activities. Traditional mechanisms o f conflict resolution are commonly used” (United 
Nations 2000b: 7). In 2001 he continued on this theme, noting that
systems o f traditional justice play an im portant role in preventing or settling 
minor crimes in districts through the establishment o f a law and order
14 Noting these difficulties, UNTAET undertook an experiment in 2001in Baucau, East Timor’s second 
largest citv, with deploying a single nationality of police (from the Philippines), but it is unknown whether this 
process was ever evaluated.
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committee composed o f the head o f the village, a priest, representatives o f 
local organisations and a civilian police officer (United Nations 2001a: 5).
However, on the ground in East Tim or there were up to forty different nationalities 
applying their own concepts o f community policing with little direction, resulting in widely 
differing interpretations. Mobekk, who conducted interviews with CIVPOL officers in East 
Tim or in 2001, found that police officers thought that it meant “anything from getting 
closer to the community to letting the community police themselves with limited 
involvement by the police force” (Mobekk 2005: 7). The great variety o f ideas on what 
community policing might encompass made consistent implementation difficult and 
evaluation almost impossible.
Many people relied on informal systems o f policing and justice during UN executive 
administration. This was a continuation o f a long tradition o f using non-state based 
policing and justice systems, but it also occurred within the context o f  a lack o f capacity o f 
the UN to provide formal systems. This also affected U N PO L  and U N TA ET officers in 
the districts who implemented a variety o f short term innovations that harnessed 
cooperation between police and community leaders. This is discussed later in the chapter. 
Although a range o f traditional mechanisms were relied upon by international police, 
informal security forces were used that were o f more recent provenance. These included 
those set up by the Conselho National de Kcsistentia Timore use (CNRT) and Falintil. The lack o f 
capacity o f CIVPOL to carry out policing also extended to a lack o f capacity to m onitor or 
control these informal groups. Human Rights Watch provides accounts o f one returning 
militia m ember in Liquica who was beaten and stabbed by an ‘investigation unit’ o f  CNRT; 
as well as another suspected militia member who was kicked to death in Tibar, near Dili, 
after being held in an illegal detention facility. Although the suspected perpetrators were 
taken into custody by CIVPOL the ‘screening’ process was allowed to continue. Similarly, 
there was no significant interference with Falintil’s detention and re-education camps 
(Human Rights Watch 2001). Many o f the same difficulties experienced by C IV PO L in 
carrying out their executive policing function continued to be evident as they set about 
torming a new police force.
3.2.3 Creation o f  the national po lice
From January 2000 East Timorese were able to apply to become police trainees and the 
National Police College opened in March 2000. O n 11 July 2000 the first group o f  cadets 
o f the new Tim or Lorosa’e Police Service (TLPS) graduated. Classes o f fifty trainees at a 
time were provided with three months basic training that was to be followed by up to six 
months o f field training. Three hundred and seventy East Timorese who had served in the
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Indonesian police were also recruited, undergoing an intensive training course, which 
included democratic policing, ethics, human rights and community policing (United 
Nations 2001a: 5; King's College 2003: par. 89). Training was carried out by CIVPOL 
instructors, with instruction primarily in Portuguese and English. Portuguese and English 
were not languages spoken by the majority of trainees so interpreters were required who 
were in short supply and of variable skill and experience levels. Specialised training in 
police management, crowd control and civil disaster management was provided by the U.S. 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). The emphasis 
on rapid deployment of TLPS meant that it was not until the first police had been already 
been deployed that UNTAET realised the new police had no equipment, prompting a 
request for an emergency allocation from unspent UNPOL Mission Subsistence Allowance 
(MSA) (King's College 2003: par. 91). By 30 September 2001 1 068 officers had graduated 
and 126 had been placed in command positions. On 15 October a former POLRI officer, 
Paulo Fatima Martins, was appointed Commissioner (United Nations 2001c: 3-4). .
In October 2001, as UNTAET started to prepare for a successor mission that would 
provide support following restoration of independence, most UN reports were upbeat 
about the capacity of the Timorese police force. However the UN did note that
the East Timorese Police Sendee has only a rudimentary infrastructure, no 
logistical or administrative framework, and it continues to be reliant on 
UNTAET resources for transport, communication and administration 
(United Nations 2001c: 9).
Despite this harsh assessment, just four months later the UN was confident that
the East Timor Police Service would be able to provide all basic police 
functions, including crime prevention and detection, traffic police, crowd 
management and community policing, and to attend to the special needs of 
vulnerable persons and victims of domestic violence in particular (United 
Nations 2002b: 13).
The UN attributed the slow pace of building police capacity to a lack of funding in the 
current budget (United Nations 2000b: 7; West 2007: 322). Other commentators have 
noted, however, that the assignment of all UN police personnel to executive functions and 
none to the task of police development activities severely limited the capacity to develop a 
new police force. Similarly, inexperience in the areas of strategic planning and institution­
building both within the UN Secretariat and within UNTAET meant that CIVPOL 
addressed itself to training at the expense of any institutional development and without 
view to the process through which handover would be accomplished. (King's College 2003: 
par. 86, 88). In relation to field training Hood (2006a: 150) concluded that “there was no
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coherent, structured strategy, no comprehensive pedagogy, and no uniform, measurable 
methods o f testing the skills learned by the Timorese police, let alone cogent agreement on 
what those professional skills were in any substantive sense”.
It was anticipated that a process o f certification o f individuals and accreditation o f 
specialised units or districts would occur and lay the foundation for the gradual transfer o f 
executive responsibility. This handover was to commence in May 2002 and be completed 
by January 2004, accompanied by a gradual drawdown o f international police until only one 
hundred remained with purely advisory functions. The East Timorese Police Force was 
expected to achieve its full strength o f 2 830 by June 2003 (United Nations 2002b: 4).
Given the avalanche o f concerns regarding the East Timorese police from late 2002, it is 
remarkable that the reports o f the UNSG up to the time o f independence in May 2002 
contain no hint o f problems in their training and development. In these reports the brief 
sections on the police indicate a well-oiled training machine running to schedule, providing 
reassurance o f management training for command positions, the training and handover to 
Timorese command o f specialised units, reviews o f performance and the provision o f 
additional training where required. The only limitations alluded to from 2001 were that 
additional donor support would be necessary for construction o f essential facilities, 
equipment, transport and communications as well as recurring costs for maintenance o f 
vehicles, weapons and other equipment (United Nations 2001b: 5; 2001c: 3-4; 2002a: 4).
During this time CIVPOL created the East Tim or Police Sendee Development Plan, which 
was completed in January 2002. West has argued that this planning was taking place at a 
time that “ traditional political and social cleavages” had begun to surface but that 
“CIVPOL lacked an appreciation o f the environment in which it was both planning for a 
new police force and acting as a transitional agency” (West 2007: 322).
3.3. Post-independence developm ent o f P N T L  under international control 
3.3.1 Responsibilities and Relationships
Following the restoration o f independence on 20 May 2002, a new UN Mission, the United 
Nations Mission in Support o f East Tim or (UNM ISET),55 assumed a role o f supporting the 
new government, with the mandate making particular reference to providing interim law 
enforcement and public security and assisting in the development o f the East Tim or Police 
Sendee. This meant that CIVPOL maintained executive policing authority until a handover
Security Council Resolution 1410 (2002).
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to PN T L  was completed on 20 May 2004. Up until this time police development was 
principally carried out by CIVPOL.56
UNM ISET was initially mandated for twelve m onths but was ultimately extended until 20 
May 2005. At the completion o f the UNM ISET mission a new political mission, United 
Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), commenced and was in operation until 2006. 
The U N O TIL  mandate made particular reference to supporting the iurther development 
o f the police and Border Patrol Unit (Unidade de Patrulbamento de Yronteira — UP I*).17
The downsizing o f CIVPOL after independence was done to retain and, where necessary, 
recruit those officers who had specialised skills for m entoring and training. This was the 
first time that the need for specialised skills was mentioned. Although there had previously 
been statements regarding the need for better resources, it was only then realised that
the lack o f transportation, communication, and other equipment, in 
particular, keeps them [ the PNTL] from gaining the confidence and respect 
o f the communities in which they serve. If  this situation persists, it could 
undermine the morale o f the Service and its capacity to maintain law and 
order (United Nations 2002c: 7).
Confusion about lines o f responsibility between UNM ISET and the PNTL proved to be 
problematic during this period o f time. U N M ISET continued to maintain executive 
policing responsibility. Although an East Timorese Police Commissioner had been 
appointed, he reported both to the CIVPOL com m ander and to the Minister for Internal 
Administration. It has been argued that the resultant lack o f real power o f the Police 
Commissioner undermined his standing and authority. Executive and operational 
command o f the police remained with UNM ISET. However, after 20 May 2002 the 
Minister for Internal Administration became responsible for ‘general policy’, although a 
lack o f clarity on this matter resulted in disagreements between the Minister and 
UNM ISET (King's College 2003: 103-104, 109).
According to Taylor, there was not always an easy relationship between members o f 
CIVPOL and the PNTL:
some arrogant CIVPOL officers mistreated members o f the new East 
Tim or Police Sendee with verbal abuse and a condescending attitude, 
ordering them around and forcing them to do menial and belittling tasks.
16 Minor training programmes and equipment were also provided by Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, the USA and the UK, as well as the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Fund for 
Women (UNIFEM) (Hood 2006b: 76, n29).
>7 Securin' Council Resolution 1599 (2005).
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The resultant impacts were animosity from ETPS officers, with lost 
opportunities for intelligence gathering, relationship building and effective 
partnerships (Taylor 2003: 3).
As detailed above, until 20 May 2004 U N PO L and the PN TL had joint responsibility for 
maintenance o f law and order but with a unified chain o f command under the CIVPOL 
Commander."8 After this date U N PO L maintained a small advisory unit to assist in the 
development o f PN TL (U.S. Departm ent o f State 2005). By Novem ber 2002 CIVPOL had 
handed over responsibility in the districts o f Manatuto, Aileu, Manufahi and Ainaro, and 
this was reported as proceeding without any major incidents (United Nations 2002c: 6). 
Shortly after this time the riots in Baucau and Dili detailed below required the devising o f a 
new handover schedule, with the UNSG noting that a further period o f development o f 
the PN TL for a year would be necessary. He argued in relation to PN TL responsibility for 
security7 matters that
their premature engagement in such activities runs the risk o f weakening . 
them and o f lowering their public standing. Furthermore, if the police are 
seen to be ineffective, there will be increasing political pressure to involve 
Falintil-FDTL in activities for which it is not mandated, trained or equipped 
and which could undermine its own essential development process (United 
Nations 2003a: 3-4).
Bowles and Chopra note the shortcomings o f the handover:
O n the whole, the UN police did not prioritize helping Timorese 
counterparts to build the PN TL into an institution appropriate to Timorese 
social and fiscal realities. Instead UN police carried out their duties as the 
territory’s police force and then “handed over” districts to PNTL. The 
notion o f handing over disregarded the enormous differences in policing 
skills, management capacity, funding, and equipment resources between the 
PN TL and the UN Police (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 295).
3.3 .2  Concerns sta rt to em erge
Towards the end o f 2002 three reports were prepared that examined the development o f 
the East Timorese Police Force. The three reports were the Joint Assessment Mission Jor the 
Timor-Leste Police Service (hereafter ]AM) (JAM 2003),59 A  Review of Peace Operations: A  Case for
"8 The gradual handover of executive authority from UNPOL to the TLPS was mandated by the 
Supplemental Agreement between the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor and the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on the transfer of Police Responsibilities to the 
Timor-Leste Police Service (UNMISET and Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 20 
May 2002).
•"9 The JAM was carried out by the East Timorese government, UNMISET, the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and development partner countries in the second half of November 2002, and the report 
was published in Januar}7 2003. It was required to: (a) assess the handover of executive authority to the TLPS 
in relevant districts; (b) assess progress against timetable for the development of the TLPS; (c) assess current 
TLPS capacity; (d) recommend strategies to address the TLPS’s needs; and (e) develop a TLPS capacity 
building programme (JAM 2003: 7).
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Change: Hast Timor (hereafter King’s College Review) (King's College 2003)WI and Amnesty 
International A  New Police Service — A  New Beginning (hereafter Amnesty report) (Amnesty 
International 2003).61
These reports raised serious issues about the way that the police had been recruited and 
trained and the lack of accompanying institutional, legislative and oversight development. 
The reports noted not only the low capacity of the PNTL, but also the lack of capacity of 
the UN to provide interim law enforcement and to build the PNTL (Amnesty International 
2003: 19-22, 24-39; JAM 2003: 15-28, 30-31; King's College 2003: par. 73-119). The JAM 
report emphasised that gaps in service delivery could provide an enabling environment for 
human rights violations, crime and public insecurity (JAM 2003: 11).
The JAM report was initiated by the international donor community and UNDP in 
response to what flood describes as “mounting concern over the PNTL’s lack of progress” 
(Hood 2006b: 66). The review did not at first have the agreement of UNMISET or DPKO 
(Hood 2006a: 153). Although by the time of the JAM mission the CIVPOL Commissioner 
was ostensibly one of the co-leaders of the mission, Hood claims that the Commissioner 
spent no time with the mission and did not appear to want to cooperate with the team 
members (Hood 2006a: 161n49). This resulted in other mission members having to take 
control of the planning, analysis and ultimate writing of the report.62
The JAM and King’s College reports identified a failure to plan for the UNTAET mission 
and subsequently for the PNTL. Hood attributes this to a lack of institution-building 
expertise within DPKO at UN headquarters and the failure of UNTAET to set up a police 
development unit in East Timor for the first nine months of the mission (Hood 2006b: 68- 
69). The JAM and King’s College reports noted that the TLPS, unlike other government 
agencies, did not engage in the planning and budgetary processes through the National
60 The King’s College Review was conducted by the Conflict Security & Development Group o f King’s 
College, London. The scope o f the report was “the planning for and work o f  the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Tim or (UNTAET)” and focused on possibilities for improving practice. The King’s 
College Review examined the planning for and work o f U NTAET in relation to its “mandate, structure, 
strategy design and implementation, as well as its impact on the people and the governance o f the newly 
independent East T im or” (King's College 2003: par. i) .The research was conducted from August 2002 to 
January 2003, with the bulk o f field work taking place in September 2002. The report was published in March 
2003.
61 Amnesty International’s mission to East Tim or on policing and human rights was conducted between 30 
September and 16 O ctober 2002 and was published in July 2003. The purpose o f the Amnesty mission was 
“to assess the extent to which human rights standards are being integrated within the development process 
and operations o f the new National Police o f  Timor-Leste (Pollcia Nacional de Timor-Leste, PN TL)” 
(Amnesty International 2003: 1).
62 Due to the non-participation of the team leaders the report ended up being drafted by team members 
including H ood together with John Tyynella from the Human Rights Unit and Bernice Masterson, a Police 
Advisor . Interview with Bernice Masterson, 13 April 2007 in Melbourne.
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Development Plan. This was exacerbated by the Ministry for Internal Administration, who 
had nominal responsibility for the TLPS, having no capacity to provide support with these 
matters (JAM 2003: 20; King's College 2003: par. 102). A comprehensive developm ent plan 
for the TLPS was not completed by CIVPOL until late 2001, with the King’s College 
report believing this delay could be attributed to a failure o f  CIVPOL to assign any o f their 
personnel to the police development function in the original mission design, resulting in a 
focus on training rather than institutional development The development plan was never 
translated into any language accessible to their Timorese counterparts (King's College 2003: 
par. 79, nl06, par. 96),63.
The JAM and King’s College reports also noted significant failure to develop operational 
and management structures, lines o f reporting and oversight mechanisms. Although there 
was a reporting line to the East Timorese Police Commissioner, there was no apparent 
chain o f command underneath him. The resulting confusion meant District Com manders 
either continued to rely on CIVPOL, particularly for high priority incidents, or would go 
straight to the Commissioner. The JAM report was significant in highlighting that a culture 
o f personal rather than institutional authority was developing in the PN TL through this 
ambiguity o f management arrangements (JAM 2003: 23). The JAM report also raised 
concerns about political interference from politicians directing arbitrary action, lack o f 
external oversight mechanisms and the need for particular oversight o f the special police 
units (JAM 2003: 23). CIVPOL and U N T A E T  more broadly failed to develop operational 
and management structures, believing what they doing was ‘training’ without appreciating 
that the establishment o f a public service institution is a significantly m ore complex 
undertaking.
The King’s College report raised a num ber o f significant concerns about C IV PO L officers 
deployed to East Timor. Many CIVPOL members did not have high levels o f  policing 
skills, and a num ber had to be repatriated due to not meeting minimum language, driving 
or firearms requirements (King's College 2003: par. 75, 81). This was exacerbated by 
insufficient pre- and in-mission training for CIVPOL, with King’s College also judging that 
the training was o f poor quality (King's College 2003: par. 76). The report identified that 
those deployed had law enforcement skills, rather than institutional strengthening and 
organisational development experience, and therefore had difficulty fulfilling their assigned 
roles. This led to CIVPOL officers tending to “police themselves rather than teach East 
Timorese officers how to police” (King's College 2003: par. 100). As C IV PO L officers
63 Pers. Comm. Edward Rees 16 September 2009. Rees arranged translation in 2003 in his role with the NGO 
National Democratic Institute but confirmed that it was never translated by CIVPOL.
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were deployed on short rotations o f usually six, or sometimes twelve, months they had 
limited opportunity to develop personal experience or institutional memory. This 
phenom enon was made worse as outgoing and incoming officers had no opportunity to do 
‘handovers, and departing CIVPOL sometimes removed com puter records when they left 
QAM 2003: 22).
The JAM and Amnesty reports found that although large numbers o f East Timorese police 
passed through the Police College, the three months training was too short, did not 
correspond to job requirements, and was o f poor quality. They found that an imperative to 
achieve a target num ber o f police officers, which would enable a rapid handover o f 
policing from CIVPOL to the East Timorese government, contributed to these 
shortcomings (Amnesty International 2003: 25; JAM 2003: 24; Hood 2006a: 149-150). 
Former POLRI members received a separate and abridged training o f only thirty days. The 
JAM report raised concerns that this “may have hindered their integration and acceptance 
within the TLPS and elements o f the wider community’ QAM 2003: 43).Simonsen argues 
that (2006: 589) resentment toward former POLRI may also have been exacerbated when 
they were fast tracked through a U.S. provided police training programme (ICITAP) and 
then placed at a higher rank than those completing the standard course.
The quality7 o f field training was variable; with the type o f policing taught dependent on the 
police officers’ country o f origin (King's College 2003: par. 100). Although a field training 
programme o f three m onths was supposed to occur it did not proceed according to plan, 
something partly attributable to CIV PO L officers being unclear as to the applicable law 
and the lack o f standard operating procedures across the districts (JAM 2003: 21). Hood 
describes the field training programme:
[It had] no coherent structured strategy7, no comprehensive pedagogy, and 
no uniform, measurable methods o f testing the skills learned by the 
Timorese police, let alone cogent agreement on what those professional 
skills were in any substantive sense (Hood 2006a: 150).
Rather, CIVPOL officers would tend to implement practices and procedures from their 
home country. When they left no handover was undertaken and the new CIVPOL would 
start again with the practices and procedures o f their particular country7. In the 
circumstances it would appear unlikely that the confusion o f CIVPOL was going to 
translate to anything better than confusion for the East Timorese police. However, the 
JAM report cautioned that until the government made decisions on the nature o f the police 
sendee they were building it made no sense to start developing standard operating 
procedures (JAM 2003: 22).
78
The Amnesty report identified emerging human rights problems, a lack o f clarity on the use 
o f force, firearms, arrest and detention procedures and the selection o f security equipment. 
The report concluded that
despite significant progress, the PN T L  remains a fragile and 
underdeveloped institution which is not yet adequately prepared, equipped 
or sufficiently well supported, for the task o f maintaining law and order in a 
manner which is consistent with international human rights law and 
standards (Amnesty International 2003: 1).
Following its mission in East Timor, but prior to the publication o f its report, Amnesty 
International was able to illustrate its findings by incorporating observations on PN T L ’s 
capacity to respond to riots in Dili on 4 Decem ber 2002 (discussed below). Amnesty noted 
in relation to the events o f that day:
PN TL officers shot some 18 people, two fatally. Around 80 people were 
arrested during the day and there are credible reports that some were beaten 
by PN TL officers during arrest and when in custody. Although details o f 
the day’s events remain sketchy, it is clear that command and control 
rapidly broke down and that, in the absence o f procedures, effective 
training and access to non-lethal alternatives to firearms, the PN TL was 
unable to respond appropriately. Failures in discipline among PNTL 
officers were also evident (Amnesty International 2003: 1-2).
The Amnesty report was also significant because it was one o f the first reports to identify 
that the P N T L  were not only being undermined by their own actions and lack of capacity 
but also by the political leadership and elements o f the military who were clearly seeing the 
F-FD TL as a suitable alternative provider o f internal security (Amnesty International 2003: 
2).
It has already been noted that CIVPOL were confused about what community policing was 
supposed to entail. This was also evident in relation to East Timorese police. The JAM 
report notes that whereas community policing was “ostensibly intended to improve police 
community relationships some also saw it as a means o f gathering ‘inform ation’ from 
communities or an informer network” (JAM 2003: 27). This perception would have been 
consistent with the experience o f policing during both the Portuguese colonial period and 
the Indonesian occupation.
A critical issue identified by the reports was the need for Timorese ownership o f the police 
development process. The JAM recommendations tended to be forward looking — stressing 
that “as the TLPS moves closer to taking formal control o f  its functions it is critical that it 
has ownership o f its planning and future developm ent” (JAM 2003: 34). The King’s 
College report argued that the status and standing o f  the PNTL would have improved if
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there had been greater opportunities for consultation and participation by East Timorese 
counterparts, in particular in relation to selection and training o f recruits. A reading o f the 
report also makes it apparent that any U N T A E T  understanding o f Timorese ownership o f 
the process was confined to getting agreement to pre-determined courses o f action, with 
attendant reluctance to relinquish control:
While the ETPS development plan, which laid out the transitional structure 
for joint U N PO L—ETPS policing, was presented and agreed to by the East 
Timorese Chief Minister in January 2002, consultation on it was less 
substantive than symbolic. Negotiations on the Supplemental Arrangement 
on the Transfer o f  Police Responsibilities to the East Tim or Police Sendee 
took place during the last weeks before independence, and government 
authority over the police was only relinquished after considerable pressure 
from the UN Secretariat (King's College 2003: par. 358).
These criticisms were located in a broader criticism of
[the U N TA ET mission’s] failure to specify at the start what sort o f 
mechanisms should be introduced for East Timorese participation, for its 
reluctance to Timorise political and administrative structures and for its 
slowness in developing a timetable for the political transition (King's 
College 2003: par. 295).
H ood’s assessment (Hood 2006a: 151) o f the failure to address ownership issues was 
excoriating. Like the King’s College report, he noted the proclivity for form over 
substance: “ the scant dialogue that did take place was essentially confined to ad hoc 
rubber-stamping by the senior Timorese leadership” .
The three reports regarding the development o f the East Tim or Police Sendee all came to 
similar conclusions regarding both the process and outcom e o f police development. Both 
the King’s College Review and the JAM report were influential in driving new approaches 
intended to address many o f the most serious shortcomings o f the U N ’s approach to 
police-building in East Tim or, including the development o f the Australian-led Timor- 
Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP).64
64 The TLPDP is funded by Australia and the United Kingdom and was initially delivered jointly by the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) and an AusAID-appointed Australian Managing Contractor, Hassall and 
Associates. The early focus of the TLPDP was on crime prevention and community safety, investigations and 
operations, training and development, administration, oversight and strategy including financial, human 
resource and logistics and asset management. The TLPDP designed a new curriculum for the Police Academy 
mainstreaming human rights throughout the program. Although the UN continued to be involved in 
development of the PNTL and a number of other countries provided specific targeted courses, it was the 
TLPDP that provided the great bulk of training from its inception in July 2004 until it suspended its program 
following unrest in Dili in April and May 2006. The contrnued role of the TLPDP following the crisis in 2006 
is discussed in chapter 6.
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The response o f the UN to the reports was tepid. The JAM report had recommended that 
an institutional strengthening working group be formed and emphasised the importance of 
Timorese government ownership and involvement in the process. Hood details the tasking 
o f the Deputy Special Representative o f the Secretary General (DSRSG) with devising a list 
o f people to comprise a high level Institution and Capacity Building Committee. The list 
included ten CIVPOL officers and only one Timorese police officer. The problem 
apparently had to be rectified with input from U N D P so that the three relevant East 
Timorese ministries and representatives o f civil society were included. In any event Hood 
notes that
the process proved to be an outright failure and collapsed within six 
months. The reasons for this included the setting o f politically motivated 
deadlines to coincide with U N M ISET’s expected termination in May 2004, 
the lack o f ownership by PN TL and Timor-Leste government officials; 
micromanagement by UNM ISET staff, none o f whom  possessed 
institution-building or organisational development knowledge; and the 
immense pressure put on senior and mid-level PN TL officers who were 
already trying to cope with an ill-conceived process o f change (Hood 2006a:
154).
During the follow-on UNM ISET and U N O TIL  missions training continued to be 
provided, usually at the district and subdistrict level, by U N PO L who were not trainers.
3.3.3 Critical incidents
In addition to the findings o f the reports detailed above a num ber o f critical incidents 
further illustrate problems with the development o f the East Timorese police institution, in 
particular in relation to their training, experience and tendency to excessive use o f force. 
The incidents highlight the associated failure to distinguish the roles o f the military and the 
police. These incidents are the riots in Baucau and Dili in Novem ber and Decem ber 2002 
and the attacks in the villages o f Atsabe and Atabae in early 2003.
N ovem ber/D ecem ber 2002 riots in Baucau and Dili
The authority o f PNTL in Baucau had been subject to challenge for some time but reached 
a critical juncture in the second half o f Novem ber 2002. O n 18 Novem ber police 
attempted to remove an illegal roadblock set up by villagers to collect tolls. In the ensuing 
clash a PN TL officer was severely injured with a machete, his firearm was stolen, the 
alleged attacker was shot and injured and over 160 shots were fired by the police. Some of 
those arrested were held considerably longer than the seventy two hours allowed by law 
before being brought before a judge. O n 25 Novem ber several hundred people attacked 
the Baucau Police Headquarters to protest against police recruitment procedures. Warning
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shots were fired and a protester injured by a shot fired by a PN TL officer later died in 
hospital (Amnesty International 2003: 12-13; United Nations 2003c: 6-7).
In Dili on 3 Decem ber 2002 a twenty year old was arrested during the exam period at 
school and, according to witnesses, the PN TL used excessive force. The following day 
protests by students and their teachers at the National Parliament gave way to broader 
protest that spilled over into looting and arson throughout the city. As well as attacks on 
the Parliament building, there were attacks on Police Headquarters and the mosque, and 
the house o f the Prime Minister was destroyed. Allegations have been made o f key political 
figures ‘winding up’ crowds, criticising the PNTL, and o f other people coordinating and 
directing targeted attacks. The PN TL response alternated between inaction and use o f 
excessive force. There are reports that at the height o f  the violence PN TL officers were 
seen hiding in the principal governm ent offices, the Palacio Govemo, where they were 
attempting to dispose o f their uniforms so that they could not be identified as police. O n 
the other hand, hundreds o f  rounds o f live ammunition were fired, two people were shot 
and killed and fifteen people were hospitalised with gunshot wounds. Police were also 
injured in the riots. Seventy seven people, including children on the way home from 
school, were arrested during the day. Sixty seven o f these were ultimately released 
uncharged/'5 Many o f those detained were beaten severely by police. As the capacity o f 
detention facilities was limited, those arrested were held in temporary detention in Tasi 
Tolu on the outskirts o f Dili, interviews were conducted without representation, and a 
num ber o f people were held beyond the allowed seventy two hour period without being 
brought before a judge (JSMP 2002d; Amnesty International 2003; United Nations 2003c).
The Atsabe and Atabae attacks
In January and February 2003 two separate attacks by armed groups on the civilian 
population occurred in the villages o f Atsabe, in Ermera District and Atabae, in Bobonaro 
District. Five people were killed in Atsabe66 and two in Atabae. It is unclear who was 
involved in the attacks. After the attacks in Atsabe residents o f the local area requested 
UNM ISET to deploy F-FD TL and this was agreed to without any process. F-FDTL 
conducted a sweeping operation, arresting over ninety men, including a num ber o f 
juveniles. Although detainees were subsequently handed over to the PNTL, they were held 
in overcrowded prison conditions beyond the seventy two hour period allowed by law. F-
61 A different account of events is contained in the memo entitled “Executive summary of investigations of 
police response to the riots of December 2002” from UNPOL Commissioner Sandi Peisley to SRSG 
Kamalesh Sharma, dated 14 November 2003. In the memo she claimed that eighty eight people were arrested 
who had been involved in burning and looting.
66 According to La’o Hamutuk seven people were killed (La'o Hamutuk 2003).
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FD TL remained in the area, together with the Portuguese PK F, from 6 January to 14 
February. The incident occasioned considerable interest after the local N G O , the Judicial 
System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), criticised the deployment o f F-FDTL, noting that 
the F-FDTL did not have powers o f arrest under the Constitution and the Transitional 
Rules o f Criminal Procedure. JSMP also noted that the m en’s detentions were not reviewed 
by a judge within the required seventy two hour period (JSMP 2003b, 2003c). East 
Timorese political leaders including Xanana Gusrnao, M an Alkatiri and Brigadier-General 
Taur Matan Ruak and members o f Parliament were outraged by JSMP’s analysis, and 
vociferously supported the decision to deploy F-FDTL, thereby contributing to public 
confusion about the respective roles o f the police and military (United Nations 2003c: 8; 
Wilson 2008).
The case highlighted the lack o f legislative and policy framework for enlisting the domestic 
use o f the military,07 as well as illustrating the lack o f confidence in the PN TL and a 
widespread belief that it was only the F-FDTL who could really provide internal security. 
The case also highlighted the problem o f an army, with grassroots provenance, in search o f 
a role. Similarly, following the incident in Atabae it was the PK F that searched the area and 
arrested suspects. The local population requested that PK F be involved rather than the 
PN TL (JSMP 2003b, 2003c; La'o Hamutuk 2003: 7; United Nations 2003a).
Unhappy with the Atabae and Atsabe cases being handled by F-FD TL and the PKF, 
Minister Rogerio Lobato responded by expanding the role o f the police. He established the 
paramilitary Unidade de Reserva da Policia or Police Reserve Unit (URP) and the UPF to 
handle border control, cross-border militia attacks and rural counter insurgency. For F- 
FD TL the handing over o f border issues to the police was very unwelcome. Tensions 
between the two forces regarding resource issues were once again inflamed by the arrival o f 
large consignments o f semi-automatic and automatic weapons for the police, commencing 
the day that the U N ’s executive authority for security was handed over to the East 
Timorese government (United Nations 2006a: 19).
The increase in civil disturbances from the end o f 2002, coupled with suggestions o f 
former militias and armed groups forming bases in East Tim or, led the UN to revise its 
approach to security (United Nations 2003d: 4-8). Additionally, the UN had been heavily 
criticised for its poor management o f the security incidents described above (Joint
07 The deployment of the military in domestic circumstances to bolster the strength of the police raises critical 
legal, political and constitutional questions (Whelan 1985: 264). In countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Canada, or the United States this will be legislated for under the rubric o f terms such as ‘Military Aid to the 
Civil Power’ or ‘Military Aid to the Civil Community’.
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Statement of Civil Society Organizations in Timor Lorosa’e 2002). Both the UN military 
strategy and configuration and the policing strategy were revised. This occurred because the 
UN no longer considered the East Timorese police capable of addressing anticipated 
security threats. This judgement was emphasised with some of the more volatile districts 
that had not yet been handed over, such as Baucau, Yiqueque and Dili. The revised strategy 
adjusted the size, composition and downsizing schedule ot UNPOL and noted the need for 
further training of PNTL — in particular the Unidade Intervensaun Rapide or Rapid Response 
Unit (UIR).68 The monitoring and advisory presence of UNPOL in the districts that had 
already been handed over to PNTL control was increased; and the remaining handover 
schedule was adjusted. A UN Formed Police Unit was deployed to manage civil 
disturbances while the UIR was being retrained (La'o Hamutuk 2003: 7-8; United Nations 
2003d: 6-8).
3.4 East T im orese assum e executive policing
Although the UN progressively handed over the security institutions to the East Timorese 
government, the institutions were operationally and institutionally weak, their roles were ill 
defined and their governance and accountability framework was poor. Similarly, other 
judicial system institutions were weak, affecting the ability of the police to carry out their 
role. This is discussed further in chapter 4. Reports expressing concern about the PNTL 
escalated following the final handover on 20 May 2004.
PNTL were poorly equipped, undertrained and reluctant to investigate cases, yet primary 
concerns focussed on their human rights abuses and abuses of power and an associated 
developing culture of impunity. Each year the U.S Department of State expressed these 
concerns in great detail, as did Human Rights Watch and Caritas Australia.. Concerns 
raised included criminal conduct of police, professional misconduct, arrest without warrant, 
using public office for a private purpose, excessive use of force, arbitrary detention, 
incidents of torture and other cruel and degrading treatment by police officers, sexual 
abuse and illegal pre-trial detention and unlawful killing. An institution-wide failure to take 
action against police accused of such matters was also noted (Graydon 2004; U.S. 
Department of State 2005, 2006, 2007; Human Rights Watch 2006).
68 The UIR is a special unit of the PNTL, (formerly known as the Special Police Unit, SPU) that has received 
special mention in a range of reports. They were initially trained by Portugal, then Malaysia and Australia. 
Following the 4 December 2002 riots in Dill they received further training from Malaysia in the use of force 
and crowd control (La'o Hamutuk 2003: 7). The Amnesty report noted that the UIR was already developing a 
reputation as being the same as ‘Brimob’, the paramilitary wing of the Indonesian police with an atrocious 
human rights record (Amnesty International 2003: 56).
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During this period four different bodies were responsible for oversight o f police discipline 
matters in East Tim or.69 There was considerable ambiguity regarding competence for 
disciplinary" procedures between the three internal bodies. The Disciplinary Regulation o f 
the National Police o f Timor-Leste,7" which replaced the U N TA ET Code o f Conduct, was 
promulgated soon after East Timorese authorities assumed responsibility for policing. It 
was not initially available in a language accessible to PN TL personnel and consequently the 
previous U N TA ET Code o f Conduct continued to be used. An examination o f the 
Disciplinary Regulation finds complex mathematical formulae for determining disciplinary 
proceedings. These would be extremely difficult for many PN TL to understand or apply, 
given the limited educational backgrounds o f many members.
The PED U  received a large num ber but had insufficient resources and experience to deal 
with them. Consequently Hum an Rights Watch criticised PED U  for failing to take cases o f 
police abuse seriously or follow through with investigations and disciplinary action (Human 
Rights Watch 2006: 5). The U.S. D epartm ent o f State (2004) characterised the office as 
lacking in morale due to frequent overruling o f its recommendations by the Police 
Commissioner, claiming that personal connections within the police force were a factor in 
determining whether the Commissioner took action on disciplinary matters. The Provedor 
for Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ) (2006: 20)71 reported that for the year 2004-5 more 
than one third o f all cases received relate to the PNTL. In a June 2007 interview the 
Deputy Provedor for Human Rights said that the great majority o f cases dealt with by his 
Division continue to relate to the PNTL.72
69 The first body is the Professional Ethics and Deontology Office (PEDU), formerly known as the 
Professional Ethics Office, created by Decree Law 8/2004 Organic Law o f the National Police o f Timor- 
Leste, and is” in charge o f inquiries, investigations and disciplinary procedures as determined by the PNTL 
General Comm ander”(Art. 13).The second body is the Superior Police Council (SPC) which is established by 
the same law (Art 27). SPC responsibilities include issuing opinions on “any other matters o f importance 
within the disciplinary scope of, or relating to, the PNTL, as requested by the Minister o f  the Interior” . The 
third body is the Office o f Inspection within the Ministry of Interior, created by Decree 3/2004 Organic 
Structure o f the Ministry o f the Interior. It is the “organ with disciplinary competence over all structures and 
institutions subordinate to the Ministry o f the Interior” (A rt.ll). This includes the PN TL (Art42). The final 
oversight body, and the only external one, is the Provedor, established by Law 7/2004 Approving the Statute 
o f the Office o f the Ombudsm an for Human Rights and Justice which empowers the Ombudsm an “to 
exercise his or her functions within the scope o f public entities, notably the Government, the PNTL, the 
Prison Service and the F-FDTL”(Art 3.1).
70 Decree Law 13/2004.
71 The Office o f the Provedor is similar to the institution o f an Ombudsm an in other jurisdictions. Section 27 
o f  the Constitution provides for the Provedor for Human Rights and Justice. The powers o f the Office o f  the 
Provedor are outlined in Law 7/2004. The Office can investigate and report on complaints against 
governm ent officials and institutions, including the police but does not have the power to make enforceable 
decisions.
72 Interview with Deputy Provedor 22 June 2007, Dili.
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The role of the former Minister o f  the Interior, Rogerio Lobato, has been pivotal in a 
number of periods in East Tim orese history, none more than in the early development o f 
the PN TL covered in this chapter. In chapter 2 I described Lobato’s historical role as a 
conflict entrepreneur. Rees (2004b) describes how upon Lobato’s return from exile in 2000 
he was unhappy that he was not chosen to be Minister of Defence. This was a position 
Lobato felt ‘entitled’ to, having previously served as Minister o f Defence in 1975 and as 
Commander o f Falintil before being sent overseas to enlist international support for the 
resistance struggle. Upon his return he embarked upon organising former combatants to 
conjure up a threat o f violence and dem onstrate his personal potential for inciting 
disruption. This resulted in his being allocated a formal role as Minister o f the Interior, 
with responsibility" for the police. Allegedly, the government o f Man Alkatiri believed he 
would be less disruptive on the inside than the outside (Rees 2004b). In this position he 
neglected the developm ent o f the Ministry, in particular those functions such as civil 
security and disaster management, and devised special police forces that were personally 
loyal to him rather than the state (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 296). In Lobato’s role as 
Minister he set up parallel chains o f com m and and involved himself intimately in 
operational matters. He harnessed anger against the former POLRI he had inherited and 
was also instrumental in prom oting officers from the west rather than the east. This in turn 
secured a particular kind o f personal loyalty from parts o f  the police force opposed to the 
inclusion o f  former PO LRI (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 296). Lobato’s part in the unfolding 
crisis o f 2006 is discussed further in chapter 6.
The performance o f  the East Tim orese government in the development o f the PN TL after 
restoration o f independence in 2002 is almost impossible to separate from the struggles 
that went on among the leadership regarding control over the police and military, and 
associated access to power and resources. These historical divisions, outlined in chapter 2, 
continued to influence the way in which the PN TL and the F-FD TL were developed. The 
subsequent poor relationship between the two organisations and the way this dynamic has 
become part o f  the security sector context is discussed further in chapter 5. It is arguable 
that the structural weaknesses o f  the PN TL (and the F-FDTL) made the politicisation o f 
these institutions easier.
3.5 Resonances with the Indonesian police and military
The historical experience o f the state, and more particularly policing in East Tim or during 
the 500 years o f Portuguese colonisation and twenty7 four years o f Indonesian military 
occupation, influenced not only the political elite but the entire population. These 
experiences have had a profound impact on people’s expectations o f the role and
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legitimacy o f the state and its institutions, including the police. This in turn affects the 
reception o f externally-led state-building, and in this particular case police-building.
In this section I refer to analysis developed in chapter 2 to argue that the Indonesian model 
o f police and military security continues to influence expectations o f the role o f the police 
(and military) in East Tim or and hence the way in which those forces developed, despite 
application o f the Indonesian model being widely discredited for its destructive influence 
there and in other parts o f Indonesia.71 It is arguable that some o f the ways in which the 
relationships have developed between the PN TL and F-FDTL in post-independence East 
Tim or can be seen as echoes o f issues that arose in relation to the police and military in 
Indonesia.
After Indonesian independence in 1945 the Indonesian police force, which preceded the 
Indonesian army, comprised generalist police as well as mobile brigades (Brimob) which 
were charged with maintaining internal security. Following the developm ent o f an 
Indonesian armed forces, competition arose between the army and the police as to who 
could ‘claim’ Brimob (Lowry 1996: 109). This presents interesting parallels with the 
political manoeuvring and competition that occurred between the police and the military in 
independent East Timor, in particular over which institution would fulfil the requirement 
for ‘riot police’. This competition became evident when F-FD TL were deployed during the 
attacks in Atsabe discussed above, leading to the disgruntled Minister o f the Interior 
embarking on the creation o f specialist police forces. The dem eanour o f these special 
forces was characterised by East Timorese observers as the same as the former occupiers’ 
Brimob (Amnesty International 2003: 56). Like Brimob, the UIR specialised in policing 
public order situations.
As East Tim or assumed executive policing and external defence responsibility in 2004 the 
government began procuring new weapons, many o f them military-style weapons, for the 
special police forces.74 It has been reported that these purchases greatly displeased the F- 
FDTL (Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment 2008: 6). Although it had been claimed 
that the F-2000s would be used for patrolling the border they were soon seen being carried 
by ministerial bodyguards and the UIR (McDonald 2006).
73 It is o f note that in May 2008 the Secretary o f State for Defence and the Prime Minister 
visited Indonesia and announced that Indonesia would take on a role training East T im or’s 
police and military'.
74 These included 180 HK33 semi-automatic assault rifles for the URP, 200 Steyr semi-automatic assault rifles 
for the UPF and 66 FNC semi-automatic assault rifles and 7 F2000 automatic machine guns for the UIR 
(Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment 2008: 6).
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Competition between the Indonesian police and military under President Sukarno “was 
driven by the status attained by the Army during the revolution and by the colonial heritage 
o f the police” (Lowry 1996: 109). Similarly, in East Tim or competition between the F- 
FDTL and PNTL, in particular over the control o f internal security, was underwritten by 
the resistance antecedents (and consequently elevated status) o f F-FDTL, as opposed to 
the lesser status o f PNTL. PN T L ’s diminished status was in part due to the incorporation 
o f a num ber o f East Timorese citizens who had previously worked for the Indonesian 
police (POLRI) and whose resistance credentials were thus considered questionable.
President Sukarno actively “promote[d] rivalry between the sendees in order to sustain his 
authority'” (Lowry 1996: 109). In the same way Rogerio Lobato fuelled rivalry between the 
two sendees to extend his own authority. O ther members o f the Timorese leadership 
battled to maintain control over one or other o f the sendees. Usually this control was 
exercised through personal and charismatic power rather than through institutional 
authority'.
In Indonesia Sukarno subordinated the police to the military, a situation which became 
more entrenched during the New O rder with disputes arising when one sendee tried to 
investigate the other or impose its authority in some other way (Lowry 1996: 109). This has 
also been apparent in East Timor, where the police and military' have clashed seriously on a 
number o f occasions. This is discussed further in chapter 5. T he theme o f conflict and 
competition between F-FD TL and PN TL in relation to the 2006 crisis is discussed in 
chapter 6. The decision in February 2008 to place the PNTL under the F-FD TL in a joint 
com m and is discussed in chapter 7.
3.6 T he peripheries o f the state
Most o f this chapter has examined how the development o f a state-based police force in 
East Timor, under both international and national auspices, produced an institution that 
was both weak in institutional integrity7 and effeedveness, and excessively strong in its 
resort to the use o f force. Expectadons about the nature o f policing developed during the 
Portuguese and Indonesian eras, together with divisions carried over from the resistance 
era, saw the development o f a facdonalised, politicised and unaccountable force. All o f 
these factors affected the legitimacy o f the police. However, in addition, the limited 
effective reach o f the police and justice institutions beyond the edges o f  the capital meant 
that older torms o f dispute resolution and order maintenance continued to prevail.
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There exists a dedicated body o f work on the underpinnings and extent o f customary law 
and how it interacts with the formal legal system in East Tim or.7" Much o f the literature 
depicts a choice between the courts and ‘traditional dispute resolution systems’. There is 
little appreciation that determining who people choose to do their policing is also an 
important question.
A survey by TAP in 2004 on Citizen Awareness and Attitudes Regarding Law and Justice 
in East Tim or found a preference for resolving disputes at the lowest level possible either 
within the family or within the traditional adat system and only involving the formal legal 
system for ‘serious’ crimes. Additionally adat law tends to be the law o f choice for conflicts 
within family or village, whereas formal law is used for conflicts involving outsiders, 
business or government (The Asia Foundation 2004: 2,5). TA F argues that “ the formal 
legal system is perceived to be less fair, less accessible, more complex and a greater 
financial risk” (The Asia Foundation 2004: 2). In keeping with these findings, eight out o f 
ten respondents believed that community leaders and not the police are responsible for 
maintaining law and order (The Asia Foundation 2004: 5).
In 2008 TAF followed up its 2004 survey with a Survey on Community Police Perceptions 
in East Timor. The survey is im portant in updating information about choice o f law in 
relation to provision o f security. TAF found that “ the national public is four times more 
likely to identify community leaders, rather than the PNTL, as the individual or institution 
which has primary responsibilities for maintaining security in their locality” (Chinn and 
Everett 2008: 8). Unexpectedly, this is also borne out in the capital, where it has been 
widely held that ‘modernity’ has more sway. In Dili only sixteen percent o f  the general 
public say the PN TL has primary responsibility for maintaining security (Chinn and Everett 
2008: 24). The survey fails to find consensus on whether it is suco chiefs, elders, or 
community leaders in general who have primary responsibility for maintaining security in 
their locality. The study concludes that it is likely this can be explained by there being a 
multiplicity o f actors, in fact even a multiplicity o f ‘community leader’ actors, involved in 
the maintenance o f security and that this will be highly specific to a locality (Chinn and 
Everett 2008: 23).
O f  equal importance are the TAF survey findings on ‘what the police do’. Eighty six 
percent o f PN TL say they are involved in informal dispute resolution. This is roughly 
corroborated bv community leaders and to a lesser extent by the general public. In the
°  See e.g., Soares (1999), Berlie (2000), JSMP (2002a), Mearns (2002), Hohe and Nixon (2003), Ranheim 
(2005), Grenfell (2006), Meitzner Yoder (2007). McWilliam (2008).
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survey PN TL members cite involvement in the following disputes: “domestic violence 
(39%), traditional mediation on dowry (36%), land d ispute/theft o f property (26%), local 
fighting (13%) and other minor cases (13%)” (Chinn and Everett 2008). Informal dispute 
resolution although not explicitly part o f the PN TL mandate clearly finds a cultural 
resonance that makes it acceptable to PN TL and community leaders alike.
It is clear that during the period covered by this chapter, East Timorese were utilising a 
variety o f non-state mechanisms for accessing justice and ‘policing’ service. However, the 
absence o f fully functioning state-based police systems also led to a variety o f hybrid 
innovations in policing and justice that were initiated variously by the community as well as 
U N PO L, U N TA ET District Administrations and PN TL oificers themselves. In the East 
Timorese context this can in part be explained by the fact that in such a numerically small 
society police officers deployed in their districts o f origin are not primarily the impartial 
and disembodied actors imagined in the Western version o f a police force. Rather, everyone 
in the community knows who that police officers’ family is, what that family’s social capital 
and standing is, and what other resources, if any, that person can bring to bear on any law 
or order situation.
During my fieldwork in Oecussi in Novem ber 2007 a num ber o f police and legal 
respondents confirmed that police often refer cases, including sexual assault, to community 
leaders for resolution. I was also informed that often the police would be invited by 
community' leaders to attend these meetings, although there were differing opinions as to 
whether their role was to provide security or participate in conflict resolution efforts. I 
queried the U N PO L Commander on the practice o f referring sexual assault cases to 
community' leaders and he stated that “ the ends justify the means” . When I mentioned the 
practice to a senior U N PO L on my return to Dili he put his hands over his ears and said 
“please don’t tell me that”, as it both contravened UN guidelines and is not part o f the 
‘imagined’ work o f building a modern police institution. O n the same fieldwork trip I 
witnessed what occurred when a woman wanted to report domestic violence to the PNTL. 
What appeared to be the entire on-duty contingent o f the Oecussi PN TL crowded into the 
public reception area o f the police station, seeking to give their opinion to on how best to 
resolve the issue. Although she was persisting in wanting to lay charges, the majority o f 
PN TL thought things could be resolved in better wavs.
In late 2004 I witnessed a similarly ‘com munitarian’ phenom enon in the Dili police station 
as police tried to resolve an incident between two young people, an East Timorese woman 
and a Sudanese man. The two people lived in the same neighbourhood in Dili and the
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young man was under the impression that the young woman was his girlfriend. After the 
two had sex the woman demanded payment. When the young man refused on the basis 
that they were girlfriend/boyfriend she proceeded to smash up his house and he called the 
police. The police promptly arrested both o f them. The process at the police station was 
notable for the police displaying no particular hierarchy amongst themselves in deciding 
how the matter should best be resolved; in fact every police officer on duty was crammed 
into the room  and had an opinion on how it should proceed. The diversity o f opinions 
appeared to be informed by widely varying interpretations and misinterpretations o f the 
law. The police were willing to involve the many friends o f the young man, including 
myself, who had been summoned by SMS, in coming up with solutions to the problem. 
They thought that our suggestion o f giving the woman the money she asked for and every 
one going home was o f merit but were hindered by the fact that their printer didn’t work 
and they couldn’t type up a report. After we helped fix the printer, PN TL typed up the 
report. It was during this process we became aware that the girl was only fifteen years old. 
The police remained oblivious to the legal consequences o f the girl being ‘underage’; 
allowing everyone to go home once the report was completed.
What is not clear either from the TAF survey results or from my own observations is 
whether the use o f informal dispute resolution, either carried out by the police or by 
community leaders (sometimes referred by the police and sometimes with the police in 
attendance), is a response to a non-functioning or non-accessible formal justice system, 
whether it corresponds to a more culturally resonant way o f achieving security an d /o r 
justice, or an amalgam o f the two dependent on circumstances and locality.
Few o f these hybrid policing ventures have been documented in any detail. This is 
unfortunate, as there is utility in distinguishing between innovations that resonate with 
existing mechanisms and could be shown to provide improved access to justice and 
security, and innovations more along the lines o f “ this works in my country — can’t see why 
it wouldn’t work here” .
According to West (2007: 321), the TLPS Policy and Planning Unit experimented with 
models o f community policing that would coordinate the work o f police enforcement with 
pre-existing local customary practices. This included ‘the Koban Model for Community 
Policing’76 drawing on a Japanese model o f policing that had been adapted by the
76 The Koban model, which involves small staffed police boxes through out neighbourhoods for rapid police 
response and visibility, appears to make intermittent but repeated appearances as a proposed model in East 
Timor. The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) sent PNTL officers to Singapore and Japan in 
2005 to learn about the Koban system. JICA also noted in 2007 and 2009 that it had been working closely
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Singaporean police. There were also Law and O rder Committees that comprised 
community policing officers and local leaders. West contends that often these operated as 
“one CIVPOL or TLPS officer solving local problems through the good offices o f a local 
leader” .
O ne o f the m ost significant attempts to docum ent hybrid policing innovation is found in a 
memo compiled in 2001 by Adrian Norwell, CIVPOL Districts Coordinator. The memo 
details research on the great variety o f ways in which ‘traditional justice mechanisms’ were 
used by CIVPOL District Commanders and Community Policing Officers in ten districts 
in East Timor. Norwell’s research appears to have been inspired by his observation that the 
criminal justice system in East Tim or was “overloaded and confused”. He concluded
all agree that there could be a formal connection between their justice 
system and the “ civpol” or criminal justice system, all agree that they would 
like more input into the way in which they are policed and all agree that 
they wish to help in forming the bonds necessary to achieve these aims 
(Norwell 2001).
It is o f note that apart from those academics who have obtained copies o f the memo 
directly the research appears unknown among U N PO L in East Timor, highlighting the 
limited transfer o f institutional knowledge within the UN.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the executive policing role o f the UN from 1999 and the 
development o f the PN T L  from 2000. The circumstances that confronted the UN on their 
arrival in 1999 were extreme and there was considerable difficulty experienced in deploying 
sulficient UNPOL. Many o f those that did arrive were lacking in basic policing skills, let 
alone the specialised skills required for training and mentoring. Lack o f appreciation o f 
local contextual factors was exacerbated by rapid rotations, diverse national contingents 
and limited ability to communicate with East Timorese. The limited capacitv o f the UN to 
carry out their development task was made worse by a misapprehension that what they 
were engaged in was ‘training’, not appreciating that the development o f a public sendee 
institution is a significantly larger undertaking. The fallacy o f assuming that a thousand 
international police can be flown into a post-conflict situation to carry out the building o f a 
new institution first became apparent during this time.
with the PN TL on the Koban system (JICA 2005, 2007, 2009). Dili has many Kuban boxes. These boxes 
were all repainted in 2009 with the image o f U N PO L and PN TL holding hands but have remained 
unoccupied, except for providing protection from the sun for wandering goats.
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The poor technical development o f the PN TL has seriously affected both the real and 
perceived capacity and integrity o f the police. Emerging concerns about lack o f 
accountability, development o f a culture o f impunity and increasing abuses o f  power 
further diminished the perception o f the institution. The notion that the police, in great 
part through the actions o f the Minister, had become a politicised force made a claim to be 
impartial very difficult.
The historical experience o f the state during the Portuguese colonial era and the 
Indonesian occupation conditioned contemporary expectations o f the role and behaviour 
o f police. This influences both the conduct and perform ance o f the PN TL themselves as 
well as how the broader population and leadership perceive the legitimacy o f the PNTL.
Arguably the development o f the PN TL could have been greatly improved by broader 
consultation with and involvement of, East Timorese citizens in determining what kind o f 
security forces were required and how they would be established. It is clear from examining 
documents associated with the early development o f the PN TL that the local ownership 
discourse was yet to enter the vocabulary in any significant way. The limitations o f applying 
a local ownership approach however need to be understood in the context o f the limited 
experience o f any model o f democratic policing by Timorese interlocutors.
The UN was slow to acknowledge the extent o f the police developmental problems. This 
meant that the opportunity provided by executive authority and a relatively benign political 
situation were squandered. Although the UN continued to have an executive policing role 
and responsibility for police development, the running o f the PN TL on an every day basis 
was largely out o f their hands and significant public as well as subterranean battles over the 
future and control o f the security forces were well underway.
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C h ap te r  4
T h e  rule o f  law con tex t
4.1 Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to explore the way that rule o f law context affects the 
practice and development o f policing in East Timor. In chapter 2 I considered the 
importance o f East Tim or’s history for understanding the way in which the security sector, 
including the police, has developed. In this chapter I situate the development o f the PN TL 
in a further layer o f context by discussing the establishment o f the formal legal institutions 
o f East Tim or since 1999. I examine these developments as part o f an international rule o f 
law ‘project’ as well as analysing the way that ‘the law’ and the ‘rule o f law project’ is 
perceived and responded to in East Timor. In this thesis I refer to the law, the project and 
the socio-political responses to law together as ‘the rule o f law context’.
I commence this chapter by examining the discourse regarding the rule o f law ‘project’ as 
conceived and implemented in programmes under international auspices. I then survey the 
development o f formal rule o f law institutions and programmes in East Tim or and discuss 
the ongoing limitations o f the rule o f law ‘project’ in this context. In the next three sections 
o f the chapter I examine broader rule o f law context in East Tim or through discussing 
‘choice o f law’ and access to justice issues as well as the ambivalence o f successive East 
Tim or governments to the rule of law framework. 1 illustrate this ambivalence in four ways: 
documenting the undermining o f the judiciary over an extended period o f time, examining 
‘failures to respond’ to critical recom m endations for investigation and prosecution, 
surveying examples o f the personal exercise o f power by senior East Tim or political 
leadership in contravention o f the rule o f law, and finally discussing the repeated pattern o f 
foreshadowing and granting o f amnesties and pardons. I argue that the combination o f 
these factors contributes to a culture o f impunity and undermines the rule ot law project. I 
follow this with a discussion o f the practical consequences o f the rule o f law context for 
police development in East Tim or
In the next chapter, chapter 5, I examine police development and the security sector 
reform context in East Timor. Chapters 4 and 5, together, acknowledge that the police, 
more than any other state-based entity, sit at the intersection o f both the rule o f law and 
the security sector context.
4.2 The rule of law project
There is no universally accepted definition o f the rule o f law. This has not prevented the 
rule o f law from being widely, though not universally, acclaimed across the political
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Spectrum with E.P. Thompson referring to it as an “unqualified human good” (Thompson 
1975: 266). In fact the rule of law is held to be essential for any number of developmental, 
economic, legal, political and moral outcomes. However, Chesterman (2008: 332) argues 
that the wide acclaim for the virtues of the rule of law is possible only because of the 
greatly diverse meanings attached to it. Nonetheless, he attempts a definition that includes 
the following elements:
First, the power of the State may not be exercised arbitrarily. This 
incorporates the rejection of "rule of man," but does not require that State 
power be exercised for any particular purpose. It does, however, require 
that laws be prospective, accessible, and clear. Secondly, the law must apply 
also to the sovereign and instruments of the State, with an independent 
institution such as a judiciary to apply the law to specific cases. This implies 
a distinction from "rule by law." Thirdly, the law must apply to all persons 
equally, offering equal protection without prejudicial discrimination. The 
law should be of general application and consistent implementation; it 
should be capable of being obeyed. This presumes that the rule of law is 
more than simply "law in the books" and that these principles also apply to 
"law in action” (Chesterman 2008: 342).
Krygier argues that “universal, institution-based” agreement on what the rule of law 
constitutes is in fact not possible and that seeking such an answer can in fact confound the 
state of affairs one is seeking:
For the rule of law to exist, still more to flourish and be secure, many things 
beside the law matter, and since societies differ in many ways so will those 
things (Krygier 2009: 47).
The promotion of the rule of law by both bilateral and multilateral donors in post-conflict 
situations has become ubiquitous, with Krygier (2009: 50) estimating that “in the past 20 
years, over a billion dollars has been spent internationally to bring the rule of law to 
benighted countries thought to need it”. Carothers (1998: 95) contends that “one cannot 
get through a foreign policy debate these days without someone proposing the rule of law 
as a solution to the world’s troubles”.
Rule of law programming has evolved from earlier ‘law and development’ initiatives carried 
out during the 1960’s and early 1970’s.77 Contemporary rule of law programming is
77 Law and development initiatives relied heavily on US academics and sought to reform judicial and legal 
systems along US lines in the furtherance of economic development. The ‘law and development’ movement’s 
demise is attributed to the lack of nuance in attempting to introduce a foreign legal system into a developing 
country, lack of evidence of its development benefits and a failure to understand and engage with the local 
context. See e.g. Samuels (2006).
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frequently integrated into peacekeeping missions,78 often has a focus on institutional 
development and coincides with other programme approaches that include ‘good 
governance’ and ‘nation- and state-building’. An assortment of activities is carried out 
under the rubric of ‘rule of law’, including judicial and legislative development, police 
reform, and establishing human rights, transitional justice and anti-corruption mechanisms.
Following the end of the Cold War the idea that the rule of law is a precondition for 
successful and sustainable development emerged from discourse regarding the nexus 
between security and development. Both security sector reform activities and rule of law 
activities started to appear as central approaches in post-conflict enterprises under 
international auspices (DFID 2002: 8; OECD 2007a: 20; McFate 2008: 3). It was also 
recognised that security sector and justice sector activities and outcomes are interconnected 
and mutually reinforcing (Call 2007; Scheye 2008). This insight began to be applied to 
transitional justice activities (Mobekk 2006; Mayer-Rieckh and Greiff 2007). This has 
resulted in the emergence of development programmes under the rubric of ‘jusdee and 
security sector reform’ QSSR). A number of benefits of taking an integrated approach to 
the development of legal institutions are claimed. If development of institutions occurs in 
isolation there is little chance that other components will be able to ‘keep up’. There is little 
purpose in police carrying out arrests if the legislative framework is not clear, the 
prosecution sendee and courts are not functioning or the prisons are not yet built or have 
inadequate capacity. There are attempts to recognise this connection in design of UN 
missions, for example, UNMIT includes a position of Deputy Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Security Sector Support and Rule of Law.79
The centrality of the rule of law to the work of the UN has been emphasised by the UNSG 
(United Nations 2004a, 2006f), the President of the Security Council (United Nations 
2004c: 1) and in the UN Resolution adopting the World Summit Outcome (United Nations 
2005g). In his 2004 report the UNSG articulates “a common language of justice for the 
United Nations”, defining the rule of law as follows:
The rule of law is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission.
It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws
78 The UN Security Council first used the words ‘rule o f law’ in 1996 in relation to supporting the UNSG’s 
efforts in Burundi and it has subsequently become part o f a significant number o f mandates (United Nations 
1996).
79 Having such a position does not, however, guarantee coherence o f efforts in practice. Peake argues that 
although much policy guidance talks about the importance o f integrating security, justice and policing issues, 
the management and coordination is often fragmented in both bilateral and multilateral programming. He 
makes particular mention o f this phenomenon in relation to UNMIT (Peake forthcoming).
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that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to 
the principles o f supremacy o f law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness in the application o f the law, separation o f powers, 
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance o f arbitrariness 
and procedural and legal transparency (United Nations 2004a: 4).
It is not only the UN that places such im port on developing the rule o f law in post-conflict 
countries. O ther multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, bilateral and N G O  
programs similarly make the rule o f law central to their international development vision. 
Large amounts o f foreign resources have been allocated to the rule o f law venture in 
transitional or (ostensibly) post-authoritarian countries, yet the successes can only be 
regarded as modest. Carothers argues
the primary obstacles to such reform  are not technical or financial, but 
political and human. Rule-of-law reform will succeed only if it gets at the 
fundamental problem  o f leaders who refuse to be ruled by the law. Respect 
for the law will not easily take root in systems rife with corruption and 
cynicism, since entrenched elites cede their traditional impunity and vested 
interests only under great pressure. Even the new generation o f politicians 
arising out o f the political transitions o f recent years are reluctant to 
support reforms that create competing centers o f authority beyond their 
control (Carothers 1998: 96).
A num ber o f criticisms o f the rule o f  law project are prominent. These focus variously on 
the (neo) imperial underpinnings associated with the rule of law; assumptions regarding the 
nexus between law and social order, and the value-free, culture-free, politics-free technical 
approach to the transplantation o f rule o f law. In relation to both ‘empire’ and the 
‘technical approach’ Chandler argues that
rule o f law prom otion imposes an external agenda o f regulation at the same 
time as denying political responsibility through presenting the legislative 
framework as strengthening the institution o f the state being capacity built. 
External regulation is legitimised independently o f the political process o f 
the domestic state but is presented in the depoliticised terms o f technical 
and administrative expertise (Chandler 2006: 166).
Brooks invites us to look closer at the assumption that the rule o f law has a necessary 
correlation with the reproduction o f social order or a diminution o f violence, arguing that 
there is little evidence o f this (Brooks 2002-2003: 2289). This theme is also taken up by 
authors who point to the wide range o f  authorities responsible for social order and the 
management o f conflict and violence in various stateless societies, ‘new subsistence 
societies’ and some ‘post-conflict’ societies, with the state being just one actor among many 
(Dinnen 2000; Baker and Scheye 2007; Nixon 2008). Nonetheless, it appears that the rule
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of law has become part of the ritual language that countries are required to recite as part of 
being considered a functioning sovereign state.
Carothers expresses his concern that a belief in technical and legal solutions to complex 
problems is misplaced. This is echoed by Rajagopal, who sees this technical approach as “a 
desire to escape from politics” (Rajagopal 2007-2008: 1349). Though he supports use of 
the law Rajagopal contends that the way in which the rule of law is invoked, with its 
apparently self-evident desirability, serves to obfuscate disparate agendas present in the 
design and implementation of security, development and human rights agendas.
As I suggested in chapter 1, there is a consensus among many practitioners seeking greater 
‘traction’ in rule of law and security sector programs that it is essential to pay attention to 
the local context and to local ownership. However, in chapter 1 I noted Belloni’s critique 
of the way local ownership is used by international actors to absolve themselves of 
responsibility for their own failures to achieve nation-building outcomes. Tondini (2008: 
237) makes a similar case that the concept is used as a ‘political umbrella’ to obviate 
responsibility in relation to restoring justice systems.
In this chapter I examine a case of an institution-based rule of law ‘project’ introduced in to 
a location with little historical experience of Western notions of the rule of law. The story, 
however, is not solely a ‘tradition meets modernity’ narrative. As I will argue later in 
relation to police development, the extent of technical failure and mismanagement in the 
rule of law ‘project’ in East Timor has become part of the political context. The technical 
and socio-political aspects are of course, hard to separate. A system of law that suffers 
from extensive delays and poor function will be shunned not only for its lack of ‘fit’ but 
also for its technical incompetence, and the two things will operate together rather than 
separately.
4.3 Rule of law development in East Timor 
4.3.1 The initial scope o f  the task
The extent of destruction faced by UNTAET on its arrival in East Timor in 1999 has 
already been noted in chapter 3. The judicial system had to contend with an absence of 
physical infrastructure including court and prison buildings, an absence of legal personnel, 
the near total destruction of all records, and an absence of legal materials. Not only did 
UNTAET need to establish a domestic legal system from the bottom up, it also needed to 
develop transitional justice mechanisms for dealing with the legacies of the Indonesian 
occupation, in particular the atrocities occurring in the context ot the 1999 referendum.
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Initially UNTAET believed that only ten qualified lawyers remained in East Timor.*" 
Ultimately sixty East Timorese, all with Indonesian legal training, were located. Finding 
these lawyers was not a straightforward matter and was achieved by a combination of word 
of mouth and the dropping of leaflets from UN planes. However, very few of the lawyers 
located had practical experience (Strohmeyer 2000: 263-264). Although in other parts of 
the UNTAET administration international staffs were installed in high level positions as 
required, a decision was made to appoint East Timorese as judges, prosecutors and public 
defenders from the outset. This decision placed the inexperienced judicial personnel in an 
invidious position, meanwhile hobbling the development of the judicial system (Bowles 
and Chopra 2008: 287). The lack of experience of the new judicial personnel was 
exacerbated by the decision to use the largely unfamiliar Portuguese language for all judicial 
matters, and the requirement to immediately adjudicate highly complex cases coming 
before the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 287, 289).
A decision had to be made on the applicable law for East Timor. Section 3 of UNTAET 
Regulation 1/1999 stated that the law which applied before 25 October 1999 in East Timor 
would continue to operate in so far as it was not inconsistent with international human 
rights standards or with later legislation passed by the administration.*1 This was 
understood to mean Indonesian law;82 however, it was ten months after the start of the 
mission before a full set of Indonesian legislation was available, resources were never 
sufficient to enable comprehensive translation, and few international personnel in the 
UNTAET mission had Indonesian language skills. A large amount of discretion had to be 
exercised by individual police officers to determine what aspects of the Indonesian 
Criminal Code applied (Devereux 2005: 302). In the post-independence period problems 
still occurred with judges applying arguably non-applicable parts of the Indonesian 
Criminal Code (Sections 106 and 107) to sentence people for the crime of “makcn:’ or 
subversion (JSMP 2005a).
4.3.2 Responsibilities
Since 1999 successive UN missions and agencies in East Timor have had primary 
responsibility' for justice sector and legal development activities (Freedom House, American
80 All Indonesian lawyers had left East Timor by this time.
81 Certain Indonesian laws were declared immediately inapplicable.
82 Although the intention of the drafters was that Indonesian law would apply, a period of uncertainty 
occurred when the Court o f Appeal declared, in the Case of Armando dos Santos in 2003, that Portuguese 
law was the applicable subsidiary law. See JSMP (2003a). The National Parliament realised the legal chaos that 
would ensue and passed Law No 10/2003 (Interpretation of Section 1 of Law No. 2/2002, of 7 August, and 
Sources of Law). This reinstated Indonesian law as the applicable law.
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Bar Association Rule o f Law Initiative, and USAID 2007: 16).83 Most assistance is provided 
to the East Timorese government: the Ministry o f  Justice, the Office o f the Prosecutor- 
General, the Public Defender’s Office, the Office o f the Provedor, Office o f the Inspector 
General, the courts, the Land and Property office, the parliamentary committees and the 
Prison Sendees. Assistance to development o f the justice sector is also provided to various 
local and international organisations including N G O s, religious institutions, academic 
groups, professional associations and media organisations (Freedom House, American Bar 
Association Rule o f Law Initiative, and USAID 2007: 47-49).
Commencing with the establishment o f the Transitional Judicial Sendee Commission 
(TJSC) in 1999,84 East Timorese have been involved in the development o f their judicial 
system. The purpose o f the TJSC was
to recommend to the Transitional Administrator candidates for provisional 
judicial or prosecutorial office, provide advice on the removal o f judges or 
prosecutors, and prepare a Code o f Ethics for judges and prosecutors.83
The TJSC was chaired by an East Timorese86 and com prised five individuals, three o f 
whom  were East Timorese.87 From  May 2002 the East Tim orese government took formal 
control o f the development o f the judicial system through the Ministry o f Justice and the 
relevant statutory bodies such as the Superior Council o f  the Judiciary (SCJ). This was 
supported by continuing financial and programmatic contribution from multilateral and 
bilateral donors as well as by provision o f international personnel.
4.3.3 Transitional ju s tice  m ech an ism s
Transitional justice is defined as “ the full range o f processes and mechanisms associated 
with a society’s attem pt to come to terms with a legacy o f  large-scale past abuses, in order 
to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (United Nations 2004a: 
4). The UN has provided support for international and mixed tribunals to address past 
crimes, truth commissions and reparations programmes as well as support for domestic 
justice sector development.
83 There has also been significant bilateral programming from AusAID, USAID, NZAID, Royal Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portuguese Development Cooperation, Community of Portuguese Language 
Countries (CPLP); and assistance from universities (University of San Francisco) and international NGOs 
(International Commission of Jurists, International Development Law Organisation, National Democratic 
Institute).
84 UNTAET Regulation 3/1999.
83 Article 1, UNTAET Regulation 3/1999.
86 Article 2.2 UNTAET Regulation 3/1999.
87 Article 2.1 UNTAET Regulation 3/1999.
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In 1999 the UN established the International Commission o f Inquiry in order to carry out a 
comprehensive investigation on the atrocities that occurred in East Tim or in 1999. The 
Inquiry found “a pattern ot serious violations in East Tim or o f fundamental human rights 
and humanitarian law” and recommended the establishment o f an international Tribunal 
under UN auspices (OHCIdR 2000). The KPP-HAM  (Komisi Penjelidik Pelanggarati / lak 
Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur) investigation by the Indonesian Human Rights Commission 
(KOMNASHAM) came to similar conclusions regarding violations o f human rights and 
also recom m ended establishing a Fundamental Court o f  Human Rights “with the authority 
to try cases o f hum an rights violations as defined in national and international human rights 
and humanitarian law” (KPP-HAM  2000: 58).
The Indonesian governm ent responded quickly to these recommendations, establishing the 
Ad-Hoc Human Rights Tribunal in Jakarta. This resulted in the UN putting on hold 
recommendations for an International Tribunal. The work o f the Ad-Hoc Human Rights 
Tribunal suffered from a myriad o f deficiencies and was widely regarded as an attem pt to 
avoid the establishment o f an International Tribunal.88
In the mean time U N TA ET established the SPSC as a hybrid tribunal within the Dili 
District Court and the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) within the Office o f the Prosecutor- 
General o f East T im or.89 Although the regulation provided the SPSC with ‘universal 
jurisdiction’,9" the SPSC suffered from major jurisdictional problems, as m ost o f those 
indicted were in Indonesia and the court had no powers o f extradition. This meant that in 
the main those convicted by the court were low-ranking East Timorese militia, while higher 
ranking officials and architects o f the crimes against humanity escaped prosecution.
Perhaps the m ost comprehensive evaluation o f the serious crimes process is to be found in 
David C ohen’s (2006) report “ Indifference and Accountability: The United Nations and 
the Politics o f International Justice” . The report was written following the UN decision to 
wind up the Serious Crimes process before its task was finished, in order that the process
88 Accounts o f  the flawed Ad-Hoc Tribunal process can be found in Cohen (2003) and Amnesty 
International andJSMP (2004).
89 The SPSC were given exclusive jurisdiction for serious crimes committed between 1 January 1999 and 25 
October 1999 including (a) Genocide, (b) War Crimes, (c) Crimes against Humanity, (d) Murder, (e) Sexual 
Offences, and (f) Torture. UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 On the Establishment o f Panels with Exclusive 
Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences.
90 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, Section 2.2 states that for the purposes o f  the present regulation, "universal 
jurisdiction" means jurisdiction irrespective o f whether: (a) the serious criminal offence at issue was 
committed within the territory o f  East Timor; (b) the serious criminal offence was committed by an East 
Timorese citizen; or (c) the victim o f the serious criminal offence was an East Timorese citizen.
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would end at the same time as the UNM ISET mission. In the report Cohen (2006: 4) 
argues that the problems o f the serious crimes process could be summarised as “lack of 
commitment, resources, management, and accountability” on the part o f  both the UN and 
the government o f East Timor. He concluded that
the process was so deeply flawed from the beginning that, despite the 
im portant and successful efforts o f key individuals to make structural 
improvements, egregious problems remained until the very end. These 
problems are serious enough to at least call into question whether 
important aspects o f the process as a whole met international standards.
Further an analysis o f the impact o f these problems upon trial and appellate 
proceedings and judgements provides substantive grounds for questioning 
the basic fairness o f a significant num ber o f  the Serious Crimes Trials, the 
adequacy o f the appeals process, and, hence, the legitimacy o f some o f the 
ensuing convictions (Cohen 2006: 1).
In addition to the serious crimes process U N T A E T  established the Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR).91 The Commission reported in 2006. The 
Chega! Report is a comprehensive account o f the history o f  the occupation o f East Tim or 
by Indonesia, covering self-determination, killings and disappearances, forced displacement 
and famine, detention and torture, violations o f the laws o f war, political trials, sexual 
violence, violations o f the rights o f the child, and violations o f economic and social rights. 
The report makes extensive recommendations on the way the East T im or government can 
support human rights and accountability and prom ote prosecutions, reparations and 
recognise the attendant responsibility o f the international community (CAVR 2005: Section 
11) .
In 2005 Indonesia and East Tim or established the T ruth and Friendship Commission 
(CTF) with the following objective: “To establish the conclusive truth in regard to the 
events prior to and immediately after the popular consultation in 1999, with a view to 
turther prom oting reconciliation and friendship, and ensuring the non-recurrence o f similar 
events” (Republic o f Indonesia and Democratic Republic o f Timor-Leste 2005). 
International and East Timorese civil society organisations were highly critical o f the CTF,
91 Section 3.1 o f UNTAET Regulation 10/2001 defines the objectives o f the CAVR.The objectives o f the 
Commission shall include:(a) inquiring into human rights violations that have taken place in the contextof the 
political conflicts in East Timor; (b) establishing the truth regarding past human rights violations; (c) 
reporting the nature o f the human rights violations that have occurred and identifying the factors that may 
have led to such violations; (d) identifying practices and policies, whether o f State or non-State actors which 
need to be addressed to prevent future recurrences o f human rights violations, (e) the referral o f human 
rights violations to the Office o f the General-Prosecutor with recommendations for the prosecution of 
offences where appropriate; (f) assisting in restoring the human dignity o f  victims; (g) promoting 
reconciliation; (h) supporting the reception and reintegration o f  individuals who have caused harm to their 
communities through the commission o f minor criminal offences and other harmful acts through the 
facilitation o f community based mechanisms for reconciliation; and (i) the promotion o f human rights.
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in particular o f its power to recom m end amnesty, and the UN refused to participate in the 
process. The CTF presented its final report in July 2008. Much to the surprise o f many o f 
CTF’s critics the report found, like the many reports before it, that Indonesian military, 
police and civilians had committed crimes against humanity during 1999. An analysis o f the 
report conducted by the ICTJ concluded that many o f the findings o f the report were 
positive, but that a num ber o f significant weaknesses were evident, and that the question o f 
institutional responsibility had not been adequately dealt with (Hirst 2009: 6-7).
4.3.4 D o m estic  ju s tic e  system
East T im or’s domestic courts were established by U N T A E T  Regulation 11/2000, which 
envisaged eight courts o f first instance and a Court o f Appeal. The num ber o f first instance 
courts was reduced to four by U N T A E T  Regulation 25/2001. As at early 2009 only one o f 
these courts functions regularly (T)ili), one mostly regularly (Baucau), and the Suai and 
Oecussi courts function rarely. The Court o f Appeal functions regularly, although there 
was a period in 2002 and 2003 when it did not function for over 18 months (Human Rights 
Watch 2005). Initially it had been hoped that the presence o f the hybrid SPSC, under 
international auspices, would provide positive modelling for the establishment o f the 
domestic judicial system, but this proved not to be the case as all courts struggled to 
establish and function.
4.3 .5  O u tc o m e s
After ten years o f international and national efforts the formal justice system remains 
weak.92 Many technical issues still beset the functioning o f the judicial system, including a 
lack o f trained Tim orese legal personnel, delays in appointing or renewing the contracts o f 
international legal personnel, multi-sourced law that is not always translated and is often 
inconsistently applied, the interm ittent functioning o f the district courts outside Dili, and 
increasingly well docum ented examples o f political interference with judicial function. The
92 There are a plethora of reports that come to this conclusion. See e.g. Kings College (2003), UNDP (2007), 
Freedom House, American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, and USAID (2007). For a 2009 
assessment of the challenges still faced in developing the justice system see Independent Comprehensive 
Needs Assessment Team (2009).
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tendency for political interference is exacerbated by poor appreciation o f the requirement 
for separation o f powers.93
The Review o f Peace Operations conducted by King’s College in 2003 criticised U N TA ET 
for its piecemeal approach and for failing to carry out detailed planning that would have 
enabled a coordinated approach to developing the justice system, as well as for carrying out 
what they termed ill conceived training and neglecting the area o f legal policy development. 
The Review concluded that “ the resultant lack o f clarity and consistency cast doubt on 
U N T A E T ’s own commitment to the rule o f law” (King's College 2003: Para x.).
The fundamental contradictions in the executive authority embodied in the establishment 
o f the U N TA ET mission and its mandate to prepare East Tim or for democratic self- 
governance have been noted by a num ber o f authors. It has been argued that U N T A E T ’s 
obsession with maintaining control led to policies that: “consistently have
underemphasized local participation and capacity-building with the effect o f compromising 
the strategic objectives o f democracy, effective administration, and rule o f law” (Beauvais 
2001: 1106). A former senior administrator within U N TA ET also noted that their style o f 
governance replicated Indonesian authoritarian models, and that the unfettered control o f 
the Transitional Administrator was more akin to that o f a “pre-constitutional monarch in a 
sovereign kingdom” (Chopra 2000: 29).94 It is clear that the history o f the personal exercise 
of power in East Timor, which was reinforced both by the Portuguese colonisation and the
93 The capacity of then Prosecutor-General, Longuinhos Monteiro, to carry out investigations and 
prosecutions impartially and without political interference was raised as a matter of concern by two UN 
reports. The Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights (the 
2005 report) noted that the Prosecutor-General believed that his accountability to the President under the 
Constitution required him to follow the policy of the latter in relation to prosecutions and concluded “that 
there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the Office of the General Prosecutor does not at present 
function independently from the State of Timor-Leste” (United Nations 2005 f: 25).
The Col report into the violence of April/May 2006 also noted that they had received reports regarding 
political interference with investigations and prosecutions into these events, as well as a selectivity of 
approach brought about through political pressure. In reference to the 2005 report the Commissioners were 
of the opinion that the situation in relation to the Prosecutor-General remained unchanged (United Nations 
2006a: 67-68).
It is of note that Longuinhos Monteiro was appointed General Commander of the PNTL, a matter that has 
caused some concern as further questions have been raised regarding the integrity of the Prosecutor-General. 
On 25 August 2005 Francisco Lui complained in the newspaper Diario Tempo about corruption of three 
prosecutors, including Longuinhos Monteiro receiving money amounting to USS8,600. Lui was subsequently 
sued for defamation by Monteiro but on 21 January 2009 the Dili District Court ruled on the defamation 
case, clearing the defendant Francisco Lui of the charges.
94 De Mello was also aware of the contradictions of his power, noting that “the Administrator is authorized to 
impose directives and policies as well as to use force more or less at will. There is no separation of the 
legislative or judicial from the executive authority. There are no positive models on how to exercise such 
broad powers . . . the question remains open how the UN can exercise fair governance with absolute powers 
in societies recovering from war and oppression” (de Mello in 2000 quoted in Beauvais 2001).
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Indonesian occupation, was then further bolstered by the U N TA ET administration, with 
resonances evident in the oligarchic style o f government now present in East Timor.
In addition to bequeathing a specitic governance style, examples o f UN ambivalence about 
the rule o f law can also be found. This was evident in 2004 when the UN absolved itself 
from responsibility for the Wiranto warrant, discussed above, once it became clear how 
contentious it was with the East Timorese government (de Bertodano 2004: 913-916). 
Similarly the U N ’s commitment to pursuing the rule o f law was brought into question in 
2008 when U N D P hired former Minister o f Defence, Roque Rodrigues, as a Presidential 
Security Adviser. Rodrigues had been recom m ended for prosecution by the Commission o f 
Inquiry in 2006 for illegally arming civilians, but it became clear early on that the 
government did not intend to pursue the matter (United Nations 2006a: 51). Rodrigues’ 
appointm ent reportedly occurred on the recommendation o f President Ramos-Horta, 
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmäo and former FRETILIN  Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri 
(Fitzpatrick 2008). The UN SRSG in East Timor, Atul Khare, was placed under 
considerable pressure from UN Headquarters to sack Rodrigues, but ultimately allowed 
him to save face by resigning in June 2008 (Fitzpatrick 2008). However, as at February 
2009, Rodrigues was still attending meetings o f the President’s Coordinating Committee 
for the Reform and Development o f the Security Sector in his role as part o f the 
Committee (Office o f the President o f the Republic 2009).
In chapter 7 I discuss the U N ’s acquiescence to the East Tim or government’s placing o f 
East T im or’s police under control o f the military at a time when the UN was supposed to 
have supervisory authority over PNTL, and the ‘covering’ for the Joint Com m and’s 
breaches o f the legal rights o f arrestees to representation during the states o f exception. In 
early 2009 when East T im or’s Court o f Appeal found that the Supplementary Agreement 
between the East Tim or government and U NM IT was unconstitutional as it had not been 
ratified by the Parliament, it produced legal uncertainty for the entire police screening and 
certification process (Wilson 2009). U NM IT decided first to ignore the decision o f the 
Court o f Appeal and subsequently play down its importance. In a climate where the East 
Timorese government frequently proclaims the irrelevance o f the courts and questions the 
authority and decisions o f judges, the (in)action o f the UN in this regard gives further 
support to that practice.
In September 2007, an independent evaluation was carried out o f U N D P ’s Strengthening 
the justice System Program, the largest justice assistance project for East Timor. It 
concluded that despite some notable contributions the programme has not made a
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significant impact on access to justice in East Timor, and that the goal of having district 
courts fully operational, efficiently managed and delivering judicial sendees had not been 
achieved. In fact, they considered two of the four courts (Suai and Oecussi) non- 
operational. Revealingly, the evaluation discovered that the Suai District Administrator was 
unaware that there had been a court in his district since Indonesian times (UNDP 2007: 
53).«
Decisions undertaken by East Timorese authorities in relation to judicial system 
development after independence have also frequently been the subject of criticism. It is 
significant that many of these decisions and processes were supported by the UN missions 
and UNDP, as will be detailed below. On 27 February 2004 the SCJ announced that the 
language of the courts would be exclusively Portuguese, although the Constitution 
mandated both Tetum and Portuguese as official languages. At the time it was estimated 
that only five percent of the population spoke Portuguese. The decision was widely 
criticised, with local NGO JSMP arguing that the directive might be unconstitutional and 
was certainly outside of the mandated competency of the SCJ (JSMP 2004a). The decision 
had many far reaching and cascading consequences, hobbling both access to justice and the 
development and functioning of the nascent judicial system. The language policy causes 
difficulties in notifying parties to legal proceedings, in completing criminal investigations, in 
consulting on draft legislation, it provides barriers to those wishing to enter the legal 
profession, and hinders trial processes and functions of the courts more broadly. It has 
been reported that there are waiting times of up to nine months for translation and 
interpretation sendees (UNDP 2007: 11, 40).
By early 2009 some positive developments had taken place in the judicial system, including 
improved facilities and equipment at both Dili and Baucau District Courts. However 
problems remain, including inadequate facilities at Suai District Court, a high number of 
cases pending, the slow progress of cases, inadequate number of judges, prosecutors and 
public defenders for the case load, the inadequate number of new trainee judicial
9:1 The evaluation looked at some o f the reasons for these failures and found that the programme had not 
provided the necessary framework to facilitate long term strategic planning and that justice sector 
coordination remained weak; that the programme had not facilitated an effective long term process o f human 
resource (HR) planning and that the current HR plan prepared with UNDP support was inadequate to ensure 
eventual self reliance; that the establishment o f  streamlined case management systems had not been achieved; 
that neither the UNDP programme nor the justice sector institutions had considered the interface between 
access to justice, the formal justice system and traditional justice sector institutions; and that legislative 
drafting remained reliant on international advisers. It also found that promotion o f legal awareness and the 
provision o f public information is one o f  the weakest components o f the programme, noting that little 
progress had been made on implementing the communications strategy devised in 2006 and that the public 
information officer focussed only on dissemination o f English language information about UNDP activities 
(UNDP 2007).
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personnel, uncertainty regarding contractual arrangements for international judges, 
difficulty in obtaining information such as statistics from the Dili Court (JSMP 2009). 
Interviews with judicial personnel conducted in July 2008 indicated that East Tim or suffers 
from a large backlog o f both criminal and civil cases, with great uncertainty on how many 
thousands o f cases are sitting in the Office o f the Prosecutor-General. Incomplete 
legislative development has contributed to a mosaic o f legislation that is difficult for court 
actors to com prehend and apply. The use o f the Indonesian Criminal Code in conjunction 
with the East Tim orese Criminal Procedures Code was necessary due to the lag o f several 
years before the East Timorese Penal Code would enter into force. This caused 
considerable confusion, with widely differing interpretations by court actors about what 
legislation should be applied (JSMP 2006a). Although the Indonesian Civil Procedure 
Code, the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code and the Indonesian Criminal Code have all 
now been replaced by new East Timorese legislation,90 in fieldwork in July 2009 I 
encountered both U N PO L and PN TL members continuing to use the Indonesian 
legislation.
In considering the development o f the rule o f law in East Tim or it is im portant to discuss 
not only the formal institutional framework but also the culture and attitude surrounding 
the rule o f law. This is done in the following three subsections o f this chapter.
4.4 C hoice o f la w  and leg a l pluralism
Neither the UN nor the first East Timorese government, consisting mainly o f returning 
members o f the diaspora, were familiar with the array o f existing institutions and processes 
that could have been built on in developing the rule o f law institutions (Bowles and Chopra 
2008: 277). These institutions were to be found in local ‘legal’ and dispute resolution 
processes and resistance structures as well as in familiar Indonesian administration systems. 
Building everything from the beginning with unfamiliar institutions meant an opportunity 
was lost to engage East Timorese with the broader state-building project, with a long- 
lasting failure to establish the legitimacy and function o f those institutions.
As discussed in chapter 3, East Tim or continues to be characterised by significant legal 
pluralism. People decide to approach either the formal legal system or an aspect o f non- 
tormal legal systems, based on considerations o f availability, cost, fairness, level o f 
understanding o f how  the system works, and com fort with the underlying operating 
principles o f the system. Sometimes one system is approached and, if the response or
96 Decree Law 13/2005 Approving the Criminal Procedure Code, Decree Law 1/2006 Approving the Civil 
Procedure Code Decree and Law 19/2009 Approves the Penal Code.
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outcome o f the initial approach is considered unsatisfactory, then another will be 
approached.
In the districts and subdistricts o f  East Tim or access to a functioning court will tend to be 
the exception rather than the rule. This is because courts do not sit for long periods o f 
time; key personnel including judges, prosecutors and defenders are often absent, and there 
are lengthy delays in schedules. For the police and the public, the ability to get to court 
depends on availability o f transport and the conditions o f the roads. In some districts, like 
Oecussi, there are no detention facilities, making arrest problematic or more often 
temporary. In other districts police will have no money to feed detainees, so that either 
they must be released or their families must provide for them in detention. Even in the 
larger towns o f Dili and Baucau the variable functionality o f the formal legal system 
coupled with poor understanding o f how it operates will see people opt for more accessible 
means o f resolving problems.
4.5 Ambivalence and reticence
A com mitment to the rule o f law is cited in the Constitution o f East Tim or,97 in planning 
documents such as the National Development Plan,98 and in subsequent legislation 
including the Law on Internal Security (Law 8/2003), Law Approving the Statute o f the 
Office o f the Om budsm an for Hum an Rights and Justice (Law 7/2004) and in the Law 
Authorizing the President of the Republic to Declare a State of Siege (Law X /2008).99
The IV Constitutional G overnm ent Program 2007-2012 makes extensive reference to the 
rule o f law. This is manifest not only in generic commitments to the rule o f law but is also 
explicitly referred to as a way o f enhancing the State’s authority and dealing with a 
perceived general sense o f impunity:
the guarantee o f full compliance with the courts’ decisions is also a 
fundamental element o f the principle o f Rule o f  law and o f the citizens’ 
freedom. In fact, by battling the sense o f impunity o f offenders and the 
society in general, the authority o f the State and o f the Institutions is 
emphasized (Democratic Republic O f East Tim or and Presidency o f the 
Minister's Office [sic] 2007: 65).
97 Section 1 (1) of the Constitution states “the Democratic Republic of East Timor is a democratic, sovereign, 
independent and unitary State based on the rule of law, the will of the people and the respect for the dignity 
of the human person”.
98 The National Development Plan includes rule of law as part of its vision: “The state will be based on the 
rule of law. Government, private sector, civil society and community leaders will be fully responsible to those 
by whom they were chosen or elected (Planning Commission Dili 2002: xviii).
99 Although this law was passed and promulgated it does not appear to have a number.
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The difficulties in establishing rule o f law in East Tim or occur due to constraints in the 
formal apparatus and institutions o f the law, as well as the pluralistic nature o f law in East 
Timor. However, these more tangible difficulties are accentuated by a lack of commitment 
o f the political leadership to a culture o f rule o f law. An analysis o f statements and actions 
o f members o f successive governments o f East Tim or indicates a deep reticence and 
ambivalence towards this process. This ambivalence manifests in highly contradictory, and 
sometimes alternating, positions about the rule o f law and the function o f the courts. The 
lack o f sustained com m itm ent is also evident in the extensive failures to give suitable 
support to probationary judicial actors and sustained undermining o f court actors.
This ambivalence is manifest in lack o f support for the prosecution o f serious crimes cases 
from 1999 and failure to respond adequately to the recommendations o f prosecution from 
the Independent Special Commission o f Inquiry in relation to the violence associated with 
the crisis o f April/M ay 2006. It is also evident in deep reluctance on the part o f the 
political elite to debate the recommendations o f the CAVR and the CTF in parliament. 
From a different perspective it is evident in the way that the political leadership sees 
exercising arbitrary personal, rather than institutional, power as a (more) legitimate problem 
solving approach. Further evidence o f this arbitrary exercise o f power is seen in the 
approach to amnesties and pardons in East Timor.
4.5.1 S p ea k in g  ill  o f  the ju d ic ia ry  a n d  p o lit ic a l in terferen ce
The judicial system in East T im or is undeniably weak; however, this is com pounded by the 
political leadership regularly undermining the judiciary for political expedience. This takes 
the form o f public denouncem ents o f judicial personnel and decisions and ignoring 
decisions o f the courts. This in turn further undermines development o f rule o f law.
In order to illustrate my contention I commence this section with an account o f the 
assessment o f already serving East Timorese judges to determine their suitability for 
permanent appointm ent prepared by David Cohen, director o f the Berkeley War Crimes 
Studies Center (Cohen 2006: 93-105). Cohen details how all twenty-two probationary 
judges, including the four who had been serving in serious crimes cases, underwent an 
examination o f ‘basic competency’ in mid-2004. The announcem ent that all judges had 
failed was not made till the end o f January 2005.""' International judges serving on the 
SPSC were deeply shocked by what they saw as the dissonance between the East Timorese 
judges’ positive performance and the outcomes o f the exams. Cohen reports many
A similar process occurred for probationary prosecutors and defenders. In that process the exam was 
administered in November 2004 but the announcement of universal failure was not made till June 2005.
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extraordinary aspects o f this process which was devised by Judge Claudio Ximenes, a 
Portuguese Timorese judge appointed by U N D P.1"' The basic competency exam covered 
Indonesian law and U N TA ET regulation, but Judge Ximenes had no knowledge o f 
Indonesian law, the examination paper was “rife with translation errors, typographical
errors, and serious editorial mistakes__many o f them serious enough to interfere with the
ability o f the examinee to answer correctly”; and although the exam could be completed in 
either Portuguese or Tetum, it was graded by people who only spoke Portuguese. In an 
interview with Cohen Judge Ximenes stated “ that he knew with absolute certainty that 
every one o f them would fail because they were all incapable and incom petent” (Cohen 
2006: 96). Judge Ximenes did not explain how this was consistent with the fact that prior to 
the exam he had appointed and reappointed the judges and had been responsible for their 
mentoring, as well as reviewing their decisions.
The story at this stage becomes even stranger. Following their failure and the SCJ 
realisation that the country no longer had any working judges, the probationary judges were 
required to simultaneously work full-time as judges and attend morning and afternoon 
classes at the Judicial Training Center (JTC), with serious consequences for missing classes. 
Here they were trained in Portuguese (not Timorese) law by Portuguese judges (with no 
experience in training) in Portuguese language without translation (although translation had 
been offered). Most East Timorese judges, like the rest o f the population, did not have 
proficiency in Portuguese language. Reportedly the trainers disparaged the probationary 
judges as “stupid” , “ignorant” , “ incapable o f learning”, and as “savage misfits” . The 
program at the JTC was developed, financed and administered by UND P. C ohen’s 
interview with U N D P ’s Coordinator o f the training programme, Ana Graca, is revealing:
She stated that the U N D P not only recognized but also fully approved and 
supported that failing the judges on the examination was a tool used to 
force the trainees to exclusively use Portuguese (Cohen 2006: 102).
This story regarding certification o f East Tim or’s judges illustrates not only the damage 
done by the language directive itself but also the damage done by the governm ent’s 
ideological com mitment to all things Portuguese. Cohen argues that the UN is implicated 
in this disaster through their failure to m onitor and evaluate the work o f their staff and the 
nature o f their programs. This position was supported by the Independent Evaluation o f 
the U N D P Access to Justice Program conducted by external evaluators in 2007, who
101 At this time Judge Ximenes was President of the SCJ, Chairman of the Evaluation Committee of the 
National Trainee Prosecutors, Chairman of the Evaluation Committee of the National Trainee Public 
Defenders, Member of the Council of Coordination for the Justice Sector, and Member of the Executive 
Board of the Judicial Training Center and a member of its Executive Committee (Cohen 2006: 95).
I l l
expressed concern regarding monitoring, evaluation and accountability o f the UND P 
program (UN DP 2007: 14).
It was June 2007 before twenty-seven national judges, prosecutors and public defenders 
were appointed following two and a half years o f training (UNDP 2007: 43). However, this 
did not mark the beginning o f a greater placement o f trust in the judicial system by the 
political leadership, as indicated in a 2009 report from ETAN:
The President, Prime Minister, and President o f Parliament made 
comments intended to discredit the authority and competence o f the 
judicial system. Prom inent officials also regularly made comments during 
the year intended to influence who should and should not be prosecuted 
for, among other incidents, the attack on the President in 2008 and the 
events o f 2006 (ETAN and W PAT 2009).
A number o f decisions o f the courts, including constitutional validity, have been ignored by 
successive governments in East Timor. These include the adoption o f the Immigration and 
Asylum Law in 2003 by East Tim or’s Parliament, disregarding the decision o f the Court o f 
Appeal that parts o f the Law were unconstitutional (JSMP 2003e). Another decision that 
has received much publicity relates to the N ovem ber 2008 decision o f the Court o f Appeal 
in relation to the 2008 State Budget. In the case brought by sixteen members o f Parliament 
the Court o f Appeal unanimously ruled that some aspects o f the Budget were 
unconstitutional. The Court found that
the $240 million dollar Econom ic Support Fund violates Tim or-Leste’s 
Constitutional prohibition against secret budgets (Article 145.2) and 
Parliament’s power to oversee budgetary operations (Articles 95.2(q) and 
115(d)).
The Budget’s withdrawal o f $290.7 million more than the Estimated 
Sustainable Income (ESI, $396.1 million) from the Petroleum Fund is illegal 
because it violates the 2005 Petroleum Fund Law’s requirements that 
petroleum resources must be managed for the benefit o f current and future 
generations. The government failed to meet the requirements o f Articles 8 
and 9 o f that law to provide a detailed explanation o f why it’s in Timor- 
Leste’s long-term interests to spend more than the ESI (La'o Hamutuk 
2008).
The decision o f the Court o f Appeal was widely reported as having been ‘rejected’ and 
‘questioned’ variously by the President, the President o f the Parliament and the Prime 
Minister.1"2 The Prime Minister stated that he would continue to use the money from the
102 Also of significance is that on the same day that the National Parliament received notification of the ruling 
by the Court of Appeal the SCJ immediately took a decision not to renew the contract of the principal author 
of the Court of Appeal decision, Portuguese Judge Ivo Rosa. This SCJ decision was overturned by the Court 
of Appeal (Court of Appeal Proc No. 01/P. Cautelar/2008) upholding an appeal by Judge Rosa, who argued
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petroleum fund regardless o f the Court o f  Appeal’s decision on the unconstitutionality o f 
the Supplementary Budget (Tchailoro and Gemcy 2008).
4.5.2 Failures to respond
The undermining o f the judicial system by the political leadership is also evident in a 
pattern o f what I call ‘failing to respond’. In ‘failing to respond’ I include ignoring decisions 
made by the Court o f  Appeal on constitutional validity, as discussed above, as well as 
failing to initiate recommended investigations and prosecutions and ‘going slow’ on those 
cases that have been initiated. This will be discussed briefly in relation to the operation o f 
the SPSC, the findings o f the CAVR (the Chega! Report) and the findings o f the CTF. The 
same phenom enon is identifiable in responses to the recommendations o f the 2006 
Independent Special Commission o f Inquiry.
The CAVR and CTF reports
CAVR delivered its final report to President Xanana Gusrnao on 31 O ctober 2005. The 
President delivered the report to the East Timorese Parliament and Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri on 28 Novem ber 2005. At the time o f the release o f the final report o f CAVR it 
was reported that
The Presidents o f East Tim or and Indonesia [Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] 
agreed yesterday to publicly ignore the conclusions o f a damning UN- 
sanctioned report that found that )akarta com m itted war crimes during its 
24-year occupation o f the former Portuguese colony (Powell 2006: 13).
In the same article it was reported that then East Tim or Foreign Minister Jose Ramos- 
Horta
criticised the report’s recommendations as ‘outlandish’; with no connection 
to reality. Both the respective Presidents reiterated that the Truth and 
Friendship Commission was their preferred method o f moving 
forward(Powell 2006: 13).
This contributed to the already widespread impression that impunity was the goal o f the 
CTF.
that the SCJ unlawfully and unconstitutionally decided not to renew his contract o f service in East Timor. 
The Court o f Appeal was critical o f Judge Rosa’s removal: “The decision made is clearly an arbitrary one and 
is contrary to the law”, noting that “The circumstances and the manner in which the decision was made 
allowed it to appear in the eyes o f the media, and to be conveyed by the latter, as a decision that was 
motivated by political reasons, linked to the decision made earlier on by the applicant, a situation that affects 
the good image o f  the Superior Council for the Judiciary itself in its capacity as an organ that has the 
obligation to ensure that the judges are not penalized by their decisions so that they can exercise their 
functions with independence and impartiality”.
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It is useful at this point to draw attention to the words o f Aniceto Guterres Lopes, Chair o f 
CAVR, in the Preface o f Chega!, regarding the provenance o f the report:
Because the result o f this labour is a Report that touches on many difficult 
issues and sensitivities, it is im portant to remind ourselves that the CAVR 
was officially commissioned to do this work. The Com mission’s tasks were 
defined in law, written into the Constitution, endorsed by the current 
Parliament on more than one occasion and were supported by the United 
Nations and the international community (CAVR 2005).
O n 5 June 2008 Committee A o f the National Parliament unanimously approved a 
resolution that the Chega! Report be tabled in the next plenary session o f Parliament for 
consideration and debate. The report went on to describe the delays in debating the report 
as “a matter o f increasing concern” . In Novem ber 2008 Parliament postponed debating the 
report again to an undetermined future date (OHCHR and U N M IT 2008: 14). By 
Novem ber 2009 the report had still not been debated, over four years after it was received 
by Parliament.
O n 9 October 2008 the report o f  the Truth and Friendship Commission (CTF) was 
presented to Parliament by President Ramos-Horta. The debate o f this report has similarly 
been delayed.
The 2006 crisis
In April and May 2006 East T im or experienced a major security crisis which saw fighting 
between and within the police and the military, the displacement o f 150 000 people, and 
the calling in o f foreign forces to restore order. This is detailed in Chapter 6. Following the 
crisis Senior Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation o f East Timor, 
Jose Ramos-Horta, wrote to the UNSG inviting him to “establish an independent special 
inquiry commission” to “ review the incidents on 28 and 29 April and on 23, 24 and 25 
May, and other related events or issues which contributed to the crisis” (United Nations 
2006a: 10).
The Report recommended the prosecutions o f sixty-eight people and the further 
investigation o f seventy others (Wilson 2008). These people included the Minister o f the 
Interior, Rogerio Lobato; the Minister for Defence, Roque Rodrigues; and the Chief o f the 
Armed Forces, Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak. The General Com mander o f the 
PNTL, Paulo Martins, was also named in the report for distributing weapons in 2006 and 
abandoning his command but was not specifically recommended for prosecution.
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Both the Chief o f the Armed Forces, Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak, and former Defence 
Minister, Roque Rodrigues, although recommended for prosecution by the Commission o f 
Inquiry, enjoy immunity from prosecution as members o f the East Timorese Superior 
Council o f D efence.1"1 This immunity can be lifted by the President. However, in an 
interview with Radio Australia in O ctober 2008, President Ramos-Horta stated that he 
thought there were other priorities facing the Prosecutor-General (ABC Asia Pacific 2008). 
Following the release o f the Commission o f Inquiry report, it was quickly made clear that 
the Chief o f  the Armed Forces, Taur Matan Ruak, had the confidence o f the leadership and 
no prosecution o f him would be entertained. The former Minister for Defence, Roque 
Rodrigues, is currently serving on the Presidential Security Sector Working Group. Former 
General Com mander PNTL, Paulo Martins, who was found to have distributed weapons 
to civilians during 2006, now serves as a Member o f Parliament within Xanana G usm ao’s 
AMP coalition government.
The former Minister o f the Interior was sentenced for the crime o f murder, in violation o f 
Article 338 o f the Indonesian Penal Code, as well as 4 years im prisonment for crimes in 
violation o f Section 4.7 o f U N TA ET Regulation 5/2001 on Firearms, Ammunition and 
Explosives. However, after applying the principle o f subsidiarity, his sentence amounted to 
seven and a half years (JSMP 2007a). After serving five m onths o f his sentence Lobato was 
released to enable him to undertake medical treatment in Malaysia on condition that he 
return once treatment was completed, which did not happen. While in Malaysia Lobato was 
one o f ninety-four people pardoned by the President upon arriving back in East Tim or 
from Australia, where he had been recovering from gunshot wounds sustained in the attack 
o f 11 February 2008.104
As at August 2009 some limited progress had been made on the recommendations o f the 
Commission o f Inquiry. Cases appear to have progressed following O H C H R  funding an 
international prosecutor to work specifically on those cases. Yet enforcement o f sentences 
remains problematic. The four F-FD TL members convicted o f manslaughter and 
attempted manslaughter o f eight PN TL members are held at an ad hoc military facility in 
Tasi Tolu rather than a prison."11 Although the court has ordered restitution to the widows
103 Law on the Superior Council for Defence and Security Law 2/2005. Article 7(2) states: “Members of the 
Superior Council for Defence and Security may not be arrested or detained without authorization from the 
Council, except in the case of flagrante delicto in connection with the commission of an offence punishable 
by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years”.
"i4 Presidential decree 53/2008 dated 19 May 2008. Presidential Pardon o f 20 May.
"b In an interview with an East Timorese security analyst in Dili in July 2009 he noted that the sentenced F- 
FDTL members are not actually ‘held’ at the facility. They are frequently seen around Dili and are telephoned 
to return to Tasi Tolu if an official visit is impending.
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o f the victims, this has not been paid. The perpetrators, however, continue to receive their 
salaries from the F-FDTL while in detention (United Nations 2009a: 9).
4.5.3 U tterances o f  p o w e r
There are many examples o f the political leadership in East Tim or opting for inappropriate 
exercise o f  personal power in contravention o f the rule o f law. This has occurred across the 
political spectrum and under both FRETILIN  and AMP governments. The examples 
below relate to senior members o f the East Timorese political leadership; former Prime 
Minister Mari Alkatiri, former Minister o f the Interior Rogerio Lobato and Prime Minister 
Xanana Gusmäo, although the phenom enon is much more widely spread.
Mari Alkatiri and the case o f W ong Kee fin
In April 2003 a Malaysian business man, W ong Kee fin, was arrested by East Timorese 
police on the order o f Prime Minister, Man Alkatiri. This followed a reported altercation at 
W ong’s scrap yard after Secretary o f State for Commerce and Industry, Arlindo Rangel, 
and Mari Alkatiri arrived after hours demanding to see W ong’s business licence. Wong 
claims he was kicked and abused by Alkatiri’s bodyguard. At this point in time there was no 
mechanism to obtain the licence from the East Timorese government that was being 
demanded, although Wong held a current licence that had been issued by the U N TA ET 
administration. It was widely held that Alkatiri regarded W ong as a com petitor in the scrap 
metal business. N o warrant was issued for W ong’s arrest and UN police later ordered East 
Timorese officers to free him for lack o f evidence. The government subsequently closed 
his business.
The District Court found that W ong’s arrest and detention by police was unlawful. 
However, on the same day the same court issued a warrant authorising the re-arrest o f 
Wong on suspicion o f the alleged illegal export o f goods and breach o f East T im or's 
border control laws. In a detention review hearing on 2 june 2003 Investigating fudge, Joao 
Henrique de Carvalho, issued a preventive detention order. A successful habeas coipus 
application was ultimately made by Wong (folliffe 2003b; }SMP 2003d).
Rogerio Lobato and the traffic accident
The former Minister o f the Interior has previously been noted as someone who has form 
on exercising his power personally, rather than institutionally. Lobato’s sense o f his own 
power was dem onstrated on 7 N ovem ber 2005 in Dili when he was involved in a traffic 
incident with a truck carrying two men. Allegedly his response was to pistol-whip one man 
in the truck and then smash both m en’s heads into the road (Hyland 2006).
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Rogerio Lobato gives permission to kill demonstrators
Several months after the traffic incident mentioned above the Minister o f Interior told the 
media in a press conference that although he had given the sacked ‘petitioners’ from the F- 
FD TL permission to have a demonstration, he added that “if the protesters commit a 
crime, police will shoot” . He was also reported as having asked everyone, w ithout any hint 
o f irony, to maintain law and order (U N O TIL 2006).
Xanana Gusm ao claims to have extraordinary powers
In January 2008 Prime Minister Xanana Gusm ao threatened to arrest local journalists, 
claiming that inaccurate news reporting was contributing to national instability (Dodd 
2008). He is reported to have made similar threats in on 28 September 2008 in Ainaro in 
relation to a planned FRETILIN peace march: “ I heard that you are preparing for a Peace 
March in Dili. I am waiting for you there. I will put you all behind bars!” (FRETILIN 
2008d). The Prime Minister repeated similar claims during October 2008.
In 2009 the East Timorese government announced a general clean-up program, the lirnpega 
geral, in Dili which required all public servants to be involved in a general clean up. A 
num ber o f reports were made about the PN TL dragging people, rarely public servants, out 
o f taxis and forcing them to take part in the clean up. Initially there was no legal basis to 
the clean up. This did not stop the Prime Minister from threatening the staff o f a num ber 
of international N G O s and private companies including ARD, Peace Dividend T rust and 
GRM  that if they did not take part in the clean up he would shut down their offices."'6 
Ultimately a government Resolution was passed to authorise the process, but only in 
relation to public servants."'7
All o f  these examples illustrate the way that members o f the political leadership feel 
unconstrained in using, or threatening to use, powers that according to law they do not 
have. This provides further illustration o f the enduring phenom ena o f what Gunn refers to 
as liurai-ism as previously discussed in chapter 2.
106 Interviews with NGO workers in East Timor 4 July 2009. A further hmpe^a was announced for 23 
December 2009. TVTL television footage of that event shows a track-suit clad Prime Minister, Xanana 
Gusmao, forcing a woman to take part in the clean up bv pulling her off her bicycle.
1(17 Government Resolution No. 7/2009.
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4.5.4 A m n esties an d  pardon s
Amnesties and pardons, both forms o f clemency, have formed part o f the standard 
repertoire o f transitional justice tools available for many decades.108 The use o f clemency 
has been controversial, with debate focusing on a choice to be made between truth and 
justice. Proponents o f amnesties argue that clemency measures can foster what may be a 
fragile peace, and that to achieve this it may be necessary to set aside an imperative for 
justice through prosecution. However, it has increasingly been argued that amnesties 
should not be used unless the amnesties conform to legal norm s and should not be used in 
the case o f war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is the position taken by the 
UNSG (United Nations 2004a: 21). Laplante (2009) has argued that recent developments in 
both international criminal law and human rights law cast a much wider doubt on the 
lawfulness o f amnesties.
The East Timorese Constitution contains provision for both amnesties and pardons.109 In 
East Tim or many iterations o f amnesty laws have been tabled, approved by the Council o f 
Ministers or even passed by Parliament, but none has ever been promulgated. A significant 
num ber o f pardons, however, have been granted. Many versions o f proposed amnesty and 
pardons legislation have displayed a politicised disregard for technical compliance with the 
Constitution and have contained poorly-drafted ambiguities that do nothing for 
furtherance o f rule o f law. I argue that although none o f these laws have been promulgated, 
by having clemency laws and proposals for pardons perpetually ‘on the table’ the political 
leadership has contributed to a belief that justice is something to be enacted at their whim, 
rather than through compliance with the rule o f law. When read together with real failures 
to deliver justice for serious crimes, the considerable shortcomings in the domestic judicial 
system and the consternation and debate that each occasion o f proposed or real clemency 
causes among victims, I contend this leads to a sense o f hopelessness about the possibilitv 
o f ever establishing a justice system that is bound by institutional rather than personal 
regulation.
Even before independence the East Timorese leadership had been preoccupied with the 
issue o f amnesty for past crimes. It is believed that a concern about facilitating the return
108 Teitel (2000: 54) notes that “‘Clemency’ has a broad meaning, which includes amnesty and pardon. 
Though some distinguish these terms because o f their impact or occurrence pre-or post-conviction, they are 
often used interchangeably”.
109 Article 95 (3) (g) o f the Constitution makes it incumbent on the National Parliament to grant amnesties. 
Article 85 (i) makes it incumbent upon the President o f the Republic “to grant pardons and commute 
sentences after consultation with the government”. As no other detail is provided it appears that the 
Parliament and the President have extensive powers to grant amnesties and pardons respectively.
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o f refugees from West Timor was behind this preoccupation.110 In early May 2002 Xanana 
Gusmäo prepared a draft law on amnesty and pardons, which was presented to the 
Constituent Assembly, a precursor o f the National Parliament. The Constituent Assembly 
declined to debate the draft law so close to independence and sent it for redrafting (JSMP 
2002c). Five days after independence it reappeared as the first legislative initiative o f the 
East Timorese government. Although the law was passed by the Council o f  Ministers on 
25 May 2002, it was promptly withdrawn.* 111 In two separate reports on the (once again) 
redrafted law, JSMP commented on the practical implications o f the law (JSMP 2002b) as 
well as on the law’s constitutionality and consistency with principles o f international law 
(JSMP 2002c). JSMP expressed concerns about the lack o f definitions o f critical terms, the 
lack o f procedures, unclear timeframes o f applicability, lack o f clarity on which crimes 
would be subject to the CAVR and which to the Amnesty law, the apparent amnesty for all 
kinds o f property crimes for a period o f three years since the arrival o f  the UN, the 
apparent amnesty for all crimes (with the exception o f certain serious crimes specified in 
Article 160 o f the Constitution) by members o f the resistance (itself undefined), and an 
assumption inherent in the law that everyone who joined militias prior to 30 September 
1999 did so under duress (JSMP 2002b, 2002c). JSM P also argued that the law was 
unconstitutional in a num ber o f respects.112 Attem pts to get other iterations o f the law 
through Parliament in 2001 and 2003 were also unsuccessful.
In 2004, as the anniversary o f independence approached, D raft Law NR. 2 4 /I /2 a  “On 
Amnesty and O ther Clemency Measures” was passed in generality by Parliament. This 
produced adverse com m ent from a range o f civil society organisations and opposition 
parliamentarians, who were concerned that the law would produce judicial chaos and 
undermine the serious crimes process (JSMP 2004b; LUSA 2004, 2008).m The preamble o f 
this law stressed the importance o f forgiving even those “who have committed so-called 
‘serious crimes’”, a phrase which arguably signals a deliberate distancing on the part o f the
1,11 Pers. Comm. Aderito de Jesus Soares April 2009.
111 National Parliament Law 1/2002 as passed but not promulgated. Unofficial English translation from 
Portuguese at http://www.jsmp.mimhub.org/English/webpage/reso/reso.htm . Accessed 1 April 2009.
112 They argued that the law violates the following articles o f  the Constitution: Article 16 (on discrimination 
and equality before the law), as it differentiates between members o f  the Resistance and other East Timorese; 
Article 160 (on prosecution o f crimes against humanity), as the law purports to be able to make crimes 
against humanity, genocide or war crimes not liable to criminal proceedings; Article 85 (i), as the law purports 
parliamentary power to commute sentences which is an exclusive competency o f the President; Article 118 
(1) (on the courts as bodies responsible for administering justice) and Article 69 (on separation o f powers), as 
the law purports to reduce sentences, for cases that had not been instituted, heard or finalised, which would 
contravene principles o f separation o f  powers and non-interference with the judiciary (JSMP 2002c: 5-9).
111 It is unclear whether this law foundered on the second reading in Parliament or at the promulgation stage.
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East T im orese  g ove rnm en t fro m  the U N -sp o n so re d  re tr ib u tive  justice processes. T h e  law, 
how ever, does n o t address the question o i  reconc ilia tion .
A  num ber o f  s ign ifican t, and arguably in flu e n tia l, events were o ccu rr in g  at the same tim e as 
this law  was being debated. These inc luded  the issuing o f  an arrest w a rran t fo r  General 
W ira n to  by the SPSC on 10 M ay 2004, som eth ing  that East T im o r ’s gove rnm en t 
strenuously distanced themselves fro m ; the A p r i l  2004 endorsem ent o f  G enera l W ira n to  as 
the G o lka r candidate fo r  the Indonesian  Presidency in elections scheduled fo r  5 July 2004, 
and an im pend ing  s ign ing o f  a bo rde r agreem ent between Indonesia  and East T im o r.
In  respond ing  to the W ira n to  arrest P rosecu to r-G enera l L o n g u inhos  M o n te iro  declared “ I 
regret that arrest w arran t, m y men have opened fire  w ith o u t an o rd e r fro m  m e” (Pow ell 
2004). P resident Xanana G usm äo m et at sho rt no tice  w ith  Indones ian  President M egaw ati 
S uka rnopu tri, w here “ b o th  leaders agreed tha t they d id  n o t w a n t the issue o f  past hum an 
rights v io la tions  to  d is tu rb  the ir b ila tera l re la tions” . G usm äo w e n t on to  state “  the 
gove rnm en t does n o t always fo llo w  o r recognise S C U ’s decisions”  (P ow ell 2004). T h e  local 
paper, T im o r  Post, repo rted  the Fore ign  M in is te r R am os-H o rta  as saying, in  re la tion  to  the 
serious crimes process m ore  generally, tha t a so lu tio n  “ acceptable to  all”  had to  be fo u n d  
w h ich  w o u ld  n o t “ weaken the strong ties between T im o r  and Indones ia ” . O n  20 M ay 2004, 
the second anniversary o f  the res to ra tion  o f  independence, Xanana G usm äo cu t nearly n ine  
years fro m  the sentences o f  three E ast T im orese  (p ro -Indones ian ) m ilit ia  m em bers w h o  
had been conv ic ted  by the SPSC o f  k ill in g  a g roup  o f  nuns and clergym en in  1999 
(Associated Press 2004), describ ing  the clem ency as a “ sym bo lic  act o f  fo rg iveness”  
(Agenzia Fides 2004).
O n  4 June 2007 the East Timorese P arliam ent passed the Law  on  “ T ru th  and Measures o f  
C lem ency fo r  D ive rse  O ffenses” . A n  earlier d ra ft had been approved  by the P arliam ent 
b o th  in com m ittee  and in  p lenary in  M arch  2007, b u t negative p u b lic  reaction  resulted in  a 
red ra fting  process (La 'o  H a m u tu k  2007b). T h e  June 2007 L a w  inc luded  p ro v is io n  fo r 
amnesties fo r  crim es co m m itte d  between A p r i l  2006 and A p r i l  2007. T he  law  was 
in troduced  on ly  m onths be fo re  the 2007 e lection. I t  was w ide ly  regarded as an a ttem p t by 
the F R E T IL IN  gove rnm en t to ensure that various m em bers o f  the p o lit ica l e lite w o u ld  
e ither be pardoned o r the ir cases abandoned. I t  was speculated tha t the law  was p a rticu la rly  
fo r  the bene fit o f  the fo rm e r M in is te r o f  the In te r io r, recom m ended fo r  p rosecu tion  
(In te rna tiona l Crisis G ro u p  2007: 8). T h is  co n te n tio n  can be supported , as w ith in  days o f  
the law  being passed by Parliam ent L o b a to ’s lawyers had approached the P rosecu to r- 
G eneral to  request am nesty fo r  h im  (La 'o  H a m u tu k  2007a). O the rs  have c la im ed tha t the
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impetus for the law came from Ramos-Horta (March 2008), and it would certainly have 
been in keeping with his well documented ‘forgive and forget’ approach . A further impetus 
for the law, as with the 2004 draft, appeared to be another attem pt to ‘clean up’ the 
unmanageable case load in the court system (La'o Hamutuk 2007a). Ramos-Horta appears 
to have succumbed to significant pressure regarding the law, which resulted in him 
referring it to the Court o f Appeal for review ahead o f deciding whether to promulgate it. 
In August 2007 the court ruled that provisions relating to the time period covered by the 
law were unconstitutional but allowed other amnesty provisions to stand. There had been 
concern that, once promulgated, the law would not only prevent new prosecutions but 
might lead to the release o f those already convicted. In any event the law joined a long list 
o f amnesty laws that never entered the books.
Although a num ber o f pardons had already been granted in East Timor, the granting o f full 
and partial pardons to ninety-four convicted men on 20 May 2008 by President Ramos- 
Horta resulted in significant consternation from civil society organisations. Ramos-Horta 
started to foreshadow the granting o f these pardons at the same time as Gastäo Salsinha 
and others believed to have been involved in the near fatal February 2008 attack on 
Ram os-Horta’s life were preparing to surrender to authorities. This led to speculation that 
the pardons had been designed to lure Salsinha and his group into surrendering, with the 
implicit message that the men would never really face justice. Those ‘released’ as a result o f 
the 20 May Presidential Decree included Rogerio Lobato 114 and Jhoni Marques, who had 
been convicted o f crimes against humanity. Nine prisoners serving sentences for 
committing crimes against humanity in 1999 also received commuted sentences, with four 
released in June 2008. Contrary to requirement, the pardons and commutations were 
granted without any formal evaluation o f the beneficiaries’ conduct in prison or ability to 
reintegrate into society. This resulted in an unsuccessful legal challenge in the Court o f 
Appeal by a group o f eleven politicians and N G O s (U.S. Departm ent o f State 2009).
In March 2009 when twenty-five former military personnel and three civilians were finally 
indicted for the February 2008 attacks on the President and Prime Minister, President 
Ramos-Horta welcomed the forthcoming trial process, but once again immediately started 
to speculate that he would pardon those convicted (ABC News 2009). The previous m onth 
it was reported that Ramos-Horta had met Salsinha, Susar and Caetano at the office o f the 
Prosecutor-General to request that they reveal who it was that shot him. It was also 
reported that he said, “ I met Mr Salsinha and some o f his friends'and I don’t want them to
114 In fact Lobato had been out of prison for some time as he had been allowed to go to Malaysia for medical 
treatment and, contrary to his agreement with the government, had never returned.
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be held responsible for the crisis that occurred because they weren’t the leaders” (Ramos- 
H orta suspects to stand trial 2009), raising serious concern about political interference with 
the judicial system, pre-empting the outcom e o f the trials and possibly paving the way for a 
mistrial.
In the next section I detail the practical consequences o f these manifestations o f 
ambivalence and reticence about the rule o f law for the development o f the East Timorese 
police institution.
4.6 Practical consequences for police developm ent and function
Those who commit violations know that they can do so without being 
punished. The local population’s lack o f confidence in state institutions to 
provide justice and accountability, in particular in the military, the police, 
and the judiciary, is central to the country’s most pressing current 
challenges. (Amnesty International 2008).
It has become commonplace for commentators to declare that a culture o f impunity11'’ 
exists in East Tim or or that a certain action will serve to widen a pre-existing culture o f 
impunity. (Kent 2004; Amnesty International 2008; Timor-Leste National Alliance for an 
International Tribunal (ANTI) 2008; O H C H R  and U N M IT 2009). Concerns about 
impunity are often conflated with concerns about the generally low capacity o f the formal 
legal system.
The negative consequences o f the rule o f law context for police development and function 
are threefold and can be seen to act in a cascading and reinforcing manner. Firstly, lack o f 
function and geographical reach o f the formal legal system (and its advisers) in East Tim or 
works synergistically with the lack o f function and reach ot the formal policing system to 
further debilitate the function o f the police. This is discussed in Section 4.6.1. The process 
is o f  course mutual: the lack o f police function also impacts on the formal legal system, in 
particular the function o f the courts.
The second consequence relates to the culture o f impunity that has developed in East 
T im or as a result o f the ambivalence and reticence o f both the governments o f East Tim or 
and the UN in their com m itm ent to the rule o f law. In the case o f the East Timorese 
governm ent this is underwritten by the personal, rather than institutional, exercise o f 
power. This not only affects the judicial system but also has a more pervasive societal
,,s Impunity has been defined as the impossibility, de jure or de facto, o f  bringing the perpetrators o f 
violations to account — whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings -since they are 
not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced 
to appropriate penalties, and to makinv reparations to their victims (United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights 2005: 6).
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influence. In the case o f the PN T L  this is evident in the widespread lack o f accountability 
o f the police when they act beyond their legal mandate. This factor is further accentuated 
by the failure to hold the F-FD TL accountable to the law. This is discussed in Section 
4.6.2.
It might be expected that the combination o f lack o f function and a widespread culture o f 
impunity7 would serve to undermine the perceived legitimacy o f the police by East Tim or’s 
citizens. Constant references to the incapacity o f the police by the political leadership 
would support this contention. However, the 2008 TAF Survey on Community Police 
Perceptions in East Tim or contains findings that would bring this into question. TAF 
found that:
By overwhelming margins, citizens (85%) and community leaders (84%) 
believe that the relationship between the PN TL and members o f their 
community is good. A small percentage o f citizens (11%) and community 
leaders (15%) feel that the relationship between citizens and the PN TL is 
neither good nor bad, and a negligible proportion o f citizens (2%) and 
community leaders (1%) view the relationship as poor. Perceptions o f 
police-community relations vary little along gender lines or across age 
groups (Chinn and Everett 2008: 51).
However the report notes that such a positive endorsem ent o f the police needs to be read 
against other survey data that indicates that
only one in ten o f the national public said that either they or a m ember o f 
their family has had contact with the police in the last year . With such 
relatively infrequent contact, ‘community-police relations’ in practice may 
be a m oot point. In other words, the high level o f reported confidence in 
the PN TL may better be described as an aspiration or desire for the police 
as an institution to provide security in the respondents community, than as 
confidence deriving from the actual presence o f the PN TL or direct 
experience o f PN TL’s performance (Chinn and Everett 2008: 10).
4.6.1 C ontextual constrain ts on P N T L
The interaction o f a weak police force with a weak judicial system during the period 
covered by this thesis led to difficulties for both PN TL and UNPOL. It has also resulted in 
a range o f innovations by both international and national police that often involve hybrid 
state/non-state mechanisms for dealing with policing and justice issues in the absence o f an 
adequately functioning state. These innovations are discussed briefly in chapters 3 and 6. 
From the beginning o f UN TA ET, CIVPOL officers had to rely on their own initiative in 
the absence o f a clear legal framework and functioning judicial organisations. Devereux 
(2005: 302) has noted that the lack o f any comprehensive review o f Indonesian law during 
the U N TA ET period meant that individual CIVPOL officers had to decide what
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provisions of the Indonesian criminal code remained valid, or even subjectively 
appropriate, citing the difficult provisions such as adultery and premarital sexual relations.
The failure of courts to function for long periods has made it difficult to abide by the 
requirement to bring an arrestee before a judge within seventy two hours, 116 a difficulty 
often exacerbated by the logistical and transport situation of police in remote districts and 
subdistricts. On some occasions this resulted in people being held for considerably longer 
than allowed, on other occasions it results in people being released without charge (JSMP 
2006b: 16) or released conditionally, something for which there is no legal basis (Amnesty 
International 2003: 75). It appears that police on occasion believed that it was a 
requirement to hold anyone arrested for seventy two hours before you could let them go, 
something that a number of PNTL explained to me in the Dili District police station in late 
2004. Concerns about the emergence of arbitrary arrest arise when the police administer 
punishment, without charges being laid (Amnesty International 2003: 69; Human Rights 
Watch 2006).
Knowing the limitations of the courts, police will often try to manage cases themselves. 
This is accentuated by young police being posted to their home districts upon graduation 
where they must fit in with far more entrenched systems of social order (Mearns 2002: 36- 
37). In an interview in July 2007, a former student leader, originally from Viqueque, said he 
had seen a police officer tell an offender that if he didn’t stop what he was doing that the 
police would tell the chefe de suco, indicating that the police officer knew real power did not 
lie with his office but rather with the chefe.
In relation to sending new graduates back to their home district Mearns (2002: 36) notes 
that
the logic of using people familiar with the social and cultural ways of the 
population seems at first glance quite sensible. It is also probable that 
people from an area will know the people and their reputations in a way 
that could assist intelligence gathering and crime detection. However a real 
risk is inherent in this practice. The mainly young men and women, often 
unmarried and therefore still ‘children’ culturally will be returning to a very 
hierarchical system of authority in which they will be very junior in many 
cases. Moreover given the strength of family ties and collective sentiment in 
this context, the ability to remain and be seen to remain neutral may be 
extremely difficult. There will be real conflict between one’s obligations to 
one’s kin and one’s obligations to the law. Reliance on food and shelter 
from iamily resources will also add to these tensions.
1,6 UNTAET Regulation 2000/30 Section 20.1.
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My interviews in the district o f  Oecussi in N ovem ber 2007, confirmed by research 
conducted by JSMP, found that in cases o f domestic violence police will tend to refer 
‘lesser’ cases to the traditional justice system rather than put it through the formal justice 
system. In cases where an arrest has been made, JSMP found that police would use the 
seventy-two hour detention period not to investigate the offence but rather to give the 
woman time to decide whether she wanted the prosecution to proceed (JSMP 2005b: 12).
As o f early 2009 the U.S. Departm ent o f State was reporting that “ the extreme shortage o f 
prosecutors and judges outside o f  the capital contributed to police inability to obtain 
warrants” (U.S. D epartm ent o f State 2009). They also noted that “ the countrywide shortage 
o f magistrates means that police often made decisions without legal authority as to whether 
persons arrested should be released or detained after seventy-two hours in custody. This 
contributed to an atmosphere o f lawlessness and impunity” . Trials often fail to proceed 
because witnesses are not there because they have not been notified or have not been able 
to get transport (U.S. Departm ent o f State 2009).
When staff are not adequately trained and the law is unclear and not translated into an 
accessible language, police and courts find it difficult to co-operate. The National 
Democratic Institute noted that
the police continue to exhibit a fundamental lack o f knowledge and 
understanding o f the law they are enforcing. Charges are often unclear or 
illegal, and when cases come before the courts they are often dismissed 
through a lack o f evidence or acceptable evidence-gathering practices and 
through a failure to observe process (National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs 2004b: 5).
It is apparent that in practice the weaknesses o f both the police and judicial system act to 
limit each other’s functions.
4.6.2 Impunity foe the police and military
Apart from the generically poor functioning o f the judicial system, a num ber o f more 
specific factors support the current impunity o f members o f the police and military in East 
Timor. This impunity can be considered a limiting factor in the prom otion o f police 
development and function.
In 2003 Amnesty International warned that the lack o f accountability and transparency in 
dealing with complaints against members o f U N PO L  could reinforce the U N ’s failure to 
establish suitable oversight mechanisms for PNTL. They anticipated that this would set 
precedents for the way in which complaints regarding the police would be handled by the
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East Timorese government following resumption o f policing responsibilities (Amnesty 
International 2003: 34). In the same report they raised concerns about use o f non-formal 
legal processes for ‘resolving’ issues o f violent and arbitrary police behaviour, noting the 
inequitable position that women and children are put in by these processes. I would argue 
that the potential o f  the use o f armed force by the police puts all citizens in this position 
when there is a dispute involving a member o f the police force. The report cites the case o f 
rape o f a 15 year old girl by a PN TL member, where all formal investigations loundered 
but a traditional adat process resulted in compensation to the family o f the girl including 
US$500 and a buffalo (Amnesty International 2003: 37-38).
Concerns about police violence, torture and attendant impunity in East Tim or have been 
the subject o f a special report by Human Rights Watch (2006). Concerns raised in the 
report include a ‘failure to respond’ appropriately on the part o f  the police and other 
government institutions, with a tendency to resolve things internally rather than also 
engaging the criminal justice system. Ongoing impunity for the police and military is 
discussed further in chapters 6 and 7.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that in East Tim or the broader rule o f law context, including 
the formal rule o f law institutions, attendant informal institutions and socio-cultural 
attitudes to law and justice has been affected by the history narrated in chapter 2. The rule 
o f law context has a significant impact on the development and function o f the PNTL, the 
institutional weaknesses o f which reinforce and are reinforced by the weakness o f other 
rule o f law institutions. Deep ambivalence about rule o f law displayed by the East Timorese 
political leadership, successive UN missions and U N PO L  confounds attempts to establish 
the police institution, and has led to a culture o f impunity' characterised by personal rather 
than institutional exercise o f power that impacts on all rule o f law institutions, including the 
PNTL.
Reasons for a culture o f impunity in East Tim or include the failure o f both Indonesia and 
East Tim or to prosecute the great majority o f those responsible for serious violations o f 
human rights between 1974 and 1999 and the reluctance o f the international community to 
establish an international tribunal to address these violations. Impunity is also evident in 
the failure o f the East Timorese Parliament to debate the recommendations o f CAVR and 
the CTF. It is conspicuous in failures to prosecute, and slow progress made on 
recommendations for prosecution, or further investigation, by the UN Commission o f 
Inquiry in relation to the events ot April/M ay 2006, and the slow progress o f investigations
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of the attacks on the President and Prime Minister in February 2008. Similarly there are the 
failures to prosecute police and military involved in violence during the operation of the 
Joint Command in 2008. Each failure underpins subsequent failures. The culture of 
impunity is held to have contributed to the assassination attempts on the President and 
Prime Minister in February 2008.
The root causes of the emerging culture of impunity are complex, with poor technical 
functioning of the judicial system a symptom as much as a cause of a culture of impunity. 
Arguably, long-standing historical impunity for political figures and high-ranking military 
officers in Indonesia, particularly in the case of human rights violations (International Crisis 
Group 2001b), informs current practices in East Timor, in particular expanding police and 
military impunity.
The penchant of most of the political elite, including Ramos-Horta and Gusrnao, for 
‘reconciliation’ over prosecution is influenced by fears of ‘accountability’ re-igniting the 
brutal divisions of the 1974-75 civil war. These fears inform the culture of impunity. 
Similarly, there is widespread frustration that it is low-level East Timorese militia, rather 
than high-ranking Indonesian architects of the events of 1999, who have been tried and 
sentenced for their crimes, and an attendant sadness that many Timorese were coerced into 
joining the militias. Previously I have discussed a preference for personal rather than 
institutional exercise of power in East Timor. That the cascade of problems detailed above 
is as much societal as legal contributes to the belief of the political leadership that such 
problems can, and should, be solved personally by influential and powerful people.
UN ambivalence about the rule of law has also contributed to East Timor’s culture of 
impunity. Despite repeated mandates to assist in the development of the justice sector and 
the appointment of a Deputy Special Representative for Security Sector Reform and the 
Rule of Law the UN has given little sustainable support to the East Timorese government 
in establishing the rule of law.
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C h ap te r  5
T h e  security  sec tor con tex t
5.1 Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to explore the way that security sector context affects the 
practice and development o f policing in East Timor. The chapter begins with an overview 
o f SSR, and the global SSR 'project’, and reviews debates concerning current policy 
prescriptions for SSR in post-conflict states. I then situate the PN T L  in the broader East 
Timorese security sector context and examine the principal purveyors o f security and 
insecurity. I look at the overlapping memberships o f state and non-state security 
organisations, the mobile nature o f the conflicts in which they involve themselves and the 
implications for police development.
I conclude that there has been inadequate acknowledgement o f the legacies o f East T im or’s 
history in the contradictor)- visions espoused by international and national actors alike in 
developing the security sector. There has also been inadequate acknowledgement o f the 
fractured and mobile nature and form o f security provision and security actors in East 
Timor. This is particularly apparent in the dissonance between programmes as designed 
and programmes as implemented. Appreciating the security sector context in East Timor 
remains, however, fundamental to the trajectory o f police development in East Timor, 
illuminating as it does the questions of ‘who does policing?’ and ‘what do the police do?’.
In chapter 4 I highlighted how legacies o f East Timorese history discussed in chapter 2 
condition contemporary attempts to establish the rule o f law in East Timor. Similarly, these 
largely unacknowledged historical factors continue to affect the development o f the 
security sector, including the PNTL. Security sector reform, like rule o f  law, is widely 
regarded as one o f the pillars o f post-conflict state-building, with wrong-sized, 
unaccountable and illiberal security forces seen as a major reservoir o f insecurity. Like the 
rule o f law context, the dynamics between the police and other actors in the security sector 
are pivotal to understanding police development in East Timor.
In this thesis I use the term ‘security sector context’ to refer to the international and East 
Timorese actors involved in security related matters, the relationships between those actors, 
and the international and East Timorese programmes focused on the security sector. In 
this chapter I do not consider the various threats to individuals and groups that come 
under the rubric o f ‘human security’, such as food security, environmental security and
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trafficking in persons, although they are important elements in a security agenda (Hänggi 
2007: 5).117
5.2 The SSR Project
Although security sector reform (SSR) is a new term, most of the component parts of SSR 
— such as military and police reform or development of civilian oversight capacity, were 
already part of development donor programmes before the term SSR was first used in 1998 
(Brzoska 2003: 3-4). The concept of SSR was initially deployed as a way of facilitating the 
entry of former Soviet states into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation. Following the end of the Cold War an SSR policy agenda has developed in 
response to changes in understanding about the nature of security threats. These changes in 
understanding include the recognition that particular states may not be able to provide 
basic security for their citizens, that the apparatus of those states may be the cause of that 
insecurity, and that both the welfare and human rights of a state’s citizens are integral parts 
of a consideration of security (GFN-SSR 2007: 3).
Defining SSR has proved elusive, although a number of authors outline what its aims, 
objectives, or principles should be. A range of benefits are claimed as resulting from SSR, 
including that it facilitates holistic thinking about a set of interrelated issues and enables 
coordination of reform efforts both within country and with external donors. It is also 
claimed to be a necessary prerequisite for achieving both development and stability in post­
conflict states (See e.g. McFate 2008; Hänggi and Scherrer 2008). However, many of the 
claimed benefits are indistinguishable from those claimed for rule of law. The Global 
Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform describes the aims of SSR as being:
to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty 
reduction, good governance and, in particular, the growth of democratic 
states and institutions based on the rule of law. This relies on the ability of 
the state to mitigate its people’s vulnerabilities through development, and to 
use a range of policy instruments to prevent or address security threats that 
affect society’s well-being. This includes establishing appropriate civilian 
oversight of security actors (GFN-SSR 2007).
1,7 Whereas security at a governmental and supra-governmental level was previously focused on the security 
o f the state and the state system, increasingly the notion o f security has been expanded to include security as a 
‘public good’ with the safety and wellbeing o f individuals seen as having (at least) equal importance with that 
o f regime maintenance. Consequently the significant but previously separate literature available on ‘human 
security’ has increasingly become mainstreamed into security studies. There are both narrower and broader 
definitions o f  human security. A narrow definition o f human security encompasses addressing violence to 
individuals in association with poverty, lack o f state capacity, and socio-economic and political inequity, 
whereas a broader definition encompasses the above but also includes hunger, disease and natural disasters 
(World Bank and Human Security Report Project 2008).
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There are both broader and narrower definitions of which actors are encompassed by the 
security sector. A minimal definition will usually include the police, the army and the 
intelligence sendees. A slightly wider definition will include their oversight agencies, such as 
the executive and the legislature. A broader definition will also include civil society and 
nonstate security providers, including ex-combatants. The broadest definitions recognise 
the closely interdependent nature of justice and security and include the institutions of the 
judicial system, such as courts, prosecutors, defenders and the prison sendee as well as 
traditional justice systems.
Increasingly SSR is seen as part of the work of the UN system, with twelve peacekeeping118 
and four special political and/or peacebuilding missions that are, or have been, involved 
explicitly or implicitly in SSR activities (Hänggi and Scherrer 2008: 9-10). Although SSR has 
only recently entered UN mandates, the UN has for a long time engaged in some of the 
component activities that involve the establishment, reform, and training of parts of the 
security sector. A range of bilateral and multilateral agencies, regional and sub-regional 
organisations, and NGOs are also increasingly involved in aspects of SSR.
Ultimately SSR is about engineering change and rearranging power relationships within the 
most sensitive areas of governance. SSR in its original and subsequent formulations is a 
‘modernising’ project informed by Western liberal values, seeking to introduce ideas of 
security organisations subject to democratic civilian control. This carries with it an 
assumption that reforming the security sector will produce broader cultural, governance 
and societal change (Scheye and Peake 2005: 297-299). The SSR project also carries other 
assumptions about the way change is effected in institutional settings. SSR programmes 
tend to be rationalist in nature, having an outcome that implementers want to achieve and a 
series of activities planned in advance for achieving that outcome. Programmes assume a 
high degree of influence of implementing agencies and personnel. Characteristically, 
however, they underestimate what will happen to those programmes when introduced into 
the particularly unpredictable context of a post-conflict environment (Piotukh and Wilson 
2009: 4-5). One of the purported benefits of SSR programming is its holistic nature but in 
practice this can often translate to programming that is overstretched and overambitious, in 
circumstances frequently constrained by inadequate local human and financial resources 
(Scheye and Peake 2005: 305-306; Rauch and van der Spuy 2006: 16).
118 This includes eleven UN Missions (past and present) and the hybrid UNAM ID mission (African 
U nion/U N  Hybrid operation in Darfur). For details o f the eleven missions see Hänggi and Scherrer (2008) 
For UNAMID mandate see h ttp ://w w w .un.org /D epts/dpko/m issions/unam id /m andate .h tm l
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Many SSR programmes are premised on an idealised Weberian state. This does not 
conform to any kind o f reality in post-conflict and fragile states, making the ideal difficult 
to construct and sustain (Stepputat, Andersen, and Möller 2007:11-12). Whereas in 
Western states security’ provision has developed in an iterative, responsive and contested 
way over very extended periods o f  time, this is usually not considered in programming that 
is time-delimited and externallv determined (Martin and Wilson 2008: 102; Donais 2008b: 
13).
In situations where the reach o f the state is (and may always have been) incomplete, 
human, logistical and financial capacity is limited, and the legitimacy o f state security 
institutions is compromised, it will also often be the case that m ost security (and justice) 
sendees will be provided by non-state actors (Stepputat, Andersen, and Möller 2007:8-9). 
In these circumstances focusing primarily on strengthening state-based institutions will not 
deliver security outcomes to m ost o f the population (Stepputat, Andersen, and Möller 
2007:4-5; O E C D  2007b:6-8). N o t only will these misunderstandings o f context lead to 
poor allocation o f resources for ‘security’, but the dangers o f making mistakes and 
miscalculations in dealing with weapons, armed groups and those with military training and 
orientation are significantly greater than other developmental mistakes that might be made 
(Muggah 2009:3).
Although the requirement for local ownership is now a standard part o f SSR programming 
documentation, it can prove very difficult to achieve for many o f  the reasons outlined in 
chapter 1. In particular, there may be major disjunctions between the desired outcomes for 
SSR implementers and recipients. Although donor agendas commonly revolve around 
governance and accountability issues, this mav be very different to the agendas o f ordinary 
people for whom tangible improvements in everyday security may be far more pressing. It 
is often overlooked that very different programming will be required to achieve these 
disparate outcomes, and that one can not assume that security will ‘trickle dow n’ from 
‘good governance’ (Scheye and Peake 2005: 300-301).
Laurie Nathan takes a definitive position on ownership:
the reform o f security policies, institutions and activities in a given country 
must be designed, managed and implemented by domestic actors rather 
than external actors. The principle is misconstrued if it is understood to 
mean that there must be a high level o l domestic support for donor 
activities. What is required is not local support for donor programmes and 
projects but rather donor support for the programmes and projects 
supported by local actors (Nathan 2008:21)
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There is a conundrum evident, however, in Nathan’s position. Me argues compellingly for 
SSR that is entirely recipient-driven. SSR, though, is by definition a part of a normative 
democratising and accountability project that requires the rearrangement of existing power 
relationships. This may in all likelihood not sit comfortably with the political elite in a post­
conflict country, who have already been, quite possibly, and more than likely, engaged in 
significant power struggles over who will control the uniformed and other security forces. 
Such struggles are not characteristically carried out in a way that is transparent, democratic 
or accountable to the population at large.
Many commentators note the complexity of SSR undertakings and that achieving 
consistency and coordination within a multifaceted SSR program is difficult. It is also an 
expensive and human-resource-intensive process, and maintaining donor interest and 
commitment over the long time frames required is challenging (GFN-SSR 2007). In 
addition to these practical considerations SSR is often criticised for being an ad hoc 
process, lacking in coherent strategy, manifesting as a ‘grab-bag’ of previously separate 
activities repackaged as an SSR program (Egnell and Halden 2009). Clearly, coordinating an 
undefined reform task amongst the many actors that may, or may not, comprise the 
security sector is a daunting task.
SSR has also suffered from a shortage of institutions and personnel familiar with the 
complexity of the undertaking. A small number of commentators raise concerns about the 
capacity of international actors who carry out SSR:
The organisations charged with implementing reform usually lack 
appropriate structures and capacity, while many of the international 
personnel engaging in field-based activities — the link between policy goals 
and policy achievement — do not possess the necessary skills (Peake,
Scheye, and Hills 2006: 251).
Although the UNSG has noted that “a holistic and coherent United Nations approach to 
security sector reform is vital” (United Nations 2008b: 2), not all parts of the UN have 
embraced the concept. Ad hoc approaches and a failure to develop an integrated security 
sector reform framework across the UN have been identified as a major constraint on the 
quality and effectiveness of UN efforts in the SSR field (United Nations 2008b: 12). For 
example, the failure of UNPOL to adopt the concept has meant the idea has limited 
currency in UN missions, evidenced by a lack of integration of security sector activities. 
The incorporation of the slow ‘developmental’ work of SSR into peace operations is often 
in conflict with the limited timeframes of UN missions, who more often than not would 
like to effect quick handover and exit. On those rare occasions when the UN is granted the
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broad powers associated with executive authority (such as was the case with UNTAET) the 
mandate may be too short to realistically achieve outcomes, or the mission’s legitimacy at a 
local level may be compromised. O n the other hand where there is a requirement to ‘co­
operate w ith’ or ‘assist’ a sovereign government (as is the case with UNMIT) the UN 
mission may well have its effectiveness curtailed as the sovereign government, or parts o f 
it, seeks to maintain control of, or subvert, the process (Rees 2006:10).
5.3 Security Sector Actors
There are a great variety o f state and non-state actors who provide security or implement 
security-related programmes in East Timor. However, all international programmes are 
focused on state institutions. There is often an assumption that it is state-based security 
providers that are, by definition, providers o f order and stability, whereas non-state agents 
are seen as purveyors o f instability and insecurity. N ot only may this be an erroneous 
assumption, but it may in fact contribute to greater forms o f insecurity (Stepputat, 
Andersen, and Möller 2007: 11). It is recognised that dealing with non-state actors will take 
donors (and on some occasions post-conflict governments) beyond that with which they 
have customarily felt comfortable. Yet the kind o f concerns raised in relation to non-state 
providers — that they are not accountable, that they often do not serve the needs and 
interests o f marginalised segments o f society, in particular women and children, that they 
may have partisan political or ethnic affiliations, and that their practices do not accord with 
human rights — are usually concerns that apply equally to state-based security providers 
(O ECD  2007b: 6).
Stepputat, Andersen and Möller (2007: 12-13) also stress the importance o f understanding 
that those who provide security, whether state or non-state, can, in slightly changed 
circumstances, become purvevors o f violence and insecurity. Conversely, those who have 
been regarded as contributing to insecurity and violence may, with the right incentives, 
become protectors. This has been described in the case o f the fragmentation and 
‘repackaging’ o f (in)security groups in post N ew -O rder Indonesia (Wilson 2006: 265- 
293). "•>
Baker and Scheye note that although the ‘order’ that is being ‘supervised’ by state and non­
state actors differs, the line between state and non-state security and justice is ‘ragged’:
119 This takes on particular relevance in Indonesia where it has been estimated that up to seventy percent of 
police funds and resources come from extra-budgetary sources, leaving the door open for non-state security 
groups, not only to step into the security gap themselves, but also to bankroll aspects of POLRI (Nordic 
Consulting Group 2004: 11).
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For instance, non-state security and justice can be undertaken officially or 
unofficially by state functionaries; or state police may outsource their dirty 
work, which they are not entitled to perform. Non-state security and justice 
often turns out not to be wholly autonomous. There are degrees o f escape 
from the state’s gravitational pull. There are different levels at which the 
state may shape and influence non-state security and justice agencies: 
sponsorship, regulation/criminalization, networking/exclusion,
collaboration, incorporation and training. In many fragile countries, it is 
impossible to distinguish sharply between state and non-state justice and 
security systems (Baker and Scheye 2007: 512-513).
This kind o f fluidity is also evident in East Timor. It dovetails with the phenom enon o f the 
personal rather than institutional exercise o f power and is evident in the mobile nature o f 
specific security and insecurity actors and the shifting pattern o f alliances between 
institutions and groups. This will be discussed further in Section 5.3.3 and 5.3.4.
Similarly to the need to ensure local ownership stated in the broader state-building 
literature, much o f the policy literature contains exhortations not to use a ‘cookie-cutter’ 
approach to SSR and to pay attention to the local context. Although the security sector is 
often described in the broadest terms, the majority o f  programs still focus on ‘rightsizing’ 
and democratising state security forces. This indicates that insufficient understanding o f 
history and culture and attendant legacies are apprehended by policy makers and 
implementers. Alternatively one could surmise that the context is apprehended but not 
heeded, possibly due to the pre-existing constraints o f  donor organisations.
5.3.1 In ternational Security Sector A ctors
UN civilian police were mandated for a variety o f executive policing, institutional 
development and advisory roles in the UN TA ET, U N M ISET and U N O TIL  missions, as 
outlined in chapter 3. UN military peacekeepers were a feature o f U N TA ET and 
UNM ISET. International military and police peacekeepers returned to East Timor amidst 
the chaos o f the 2006 crisis. This was requested by the East Tim orese government, who 
sought peacekeeping assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal. 
Australia and New Zealand provided military forces and Malaysia and Portugal provided 
Formed Police Units (FPU). The rationale for inviting in individual countries was based on 
the urgency o f restoring law and order and the slowness that characterises UN deployment.
Upon commencement o f the U NM IT mission these FPUs came under the auspices o f 
UNPOL. U N PO L became responsible for the mandate to restore and maintain public 
security until such time as the PN TL is reconstituted. U N PO L were also required to assist 
with the further training, institutional development and strengthening o t the PN TL and the 
Ministry o f the Interior. In addition U NM IT was mandated to assist the East Timorese
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government to conduct a comprehensive review o f the security sector including the F- 
FDTL, the PNTL, the Ministry o f Interior and the Ministry o f Defence. This is the 
responsibility o f the UN M IT Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU). The reconstruction o f 
the PNTL and the security sector review will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.
It had initially been anticipated that the military peacekeepers would also transfer to UN 
mission control. However, two m onths after the com mencement o f UNM IT the Security 
Council reaffirmed that the Australian-led Joint Task Force would remain outside o f UN 
command structures, becoming known as the International Stabilisation Force (ISF).12" 
This decision caused considerable controversy.
More than three years after the com m encem ent o f the U NM IT mission the continued 
presence o f international security actors is a matter that the East Timorese political 
leadership is not entirely positive about. The PN TL and F-FDTL took over responsibility 
for security from the UN in 2004 and there is considerable resentment and a widespread 
unease about ceding the responsibility for policing to foreigners. Similarly the continued 
deployment o f the ISF represents a challenge to the sovereign role o f the F-FDTL.
With the wisdom o f hindsight some o f the decisions made by the U N TA ET 
administration, particularly in relation to the way that the police and military were 
established, might have been undertaken differently. These decisions have cast long 
shadows that were influential in the crisis o f  2006. Consequently suspicions have been 
expressed by members o f the Tim orese political elite about the motives- approach and 
political neutrality o f both U N PO L  and the ISF. Given the substantial role o f foreign 
forces, the tensions surrounding their continued deployment, and on occasion the armed 
battles between international and national forces, it is im portant to include them in any 
analysis o f the East Timorese security sector.
120 When the UNMIT mission was first mandated the Security Council delayed a decision about how the 
military command would operate. Australia insisted on keeping its soldiers under Australian command, 
something that was supported by the U.S. and U.K. This position was opposed by the UN Secretary-General, 
the governments of East Timor, Portugal, Malaysia, and a significant number of Timorese civil society 
representatives, who believed that a unified military force under UN command was preferable. Initial Status 
of Forces Agreements (SOFA) were concluded between East Timor and the four countries above. The 
SOFA Agreements were replaced by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Foreign Minister 
of East Timor, the Ambassador of Australia, and the SRSG of UNMIT. The MOU establishes a Trilateral 
Coordination to be chaired by the Prime Minister o f East Timor to discuss and coordinate security 
arrangements (Democratic Republic of Timor Leste, United Nations, and Embassy of Australia 2007; La'o 
Hamutuk n.d.).
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5.3.2 The PNTL and the F-FDTL
In chapter 2 I discussed some o f the historical background to the problems between the 
PN TL and the F-FDTL in East Timor. In this section I elaborate the divisions within 
PN TL and F-FD TL and the relationship between the two institutions.
PN TL and its divisions
In chapter 3 I discussed the executive policing and institutional development role o f 
UNPOL. There were significant pressures on U N PO L  in carrying out executive policing, 
brought about by understaffing, inappropriate staffing, lack o f planning and inadequate 
understanding o f local geography, language and culture. This led to the creation o f the 
Police Assistance G roup (PAG), comprising former Indonesian era police (POLRI) in 
1999. When recruitment o f the East Tim or Police Sendee commenced in 2000 many 
members o f the PAG were recruited to the new police force. The remaining recruits had 
no policing experience. Many o f the Indonesian-era police had greater experience, were 
fast-tracked through police training and ended up in senior positions, including the first 
East Timorese Police Commander, Paulo Martins (Flood 2006b: 64). These recruitment 
decisions proved to be unpopular. Many people identified former POLRI members with 
the brutal Indonesian occupation, even though some former POLRI who were part o f the 
new police force had played active roles in the resistance movement. Although there had 
been a process o f vetting o f former POLRI members by U N T A E T  and CNRT, parts o f 
FRETILIN  and veterans groups remained deeply unhappy with the decision (Flood 2006b: 
64).
The role o f historical legacies became evident as PN TL became factionalised and 
politicised, with groups in PN TL based on previous identities as former POLRI, former 
resistance members and former Indonesian university students. The pattern o f personal 
rather than institutional power bases became conspicuous, with loyalties coalescing around 
senior commanders (United Nations 2006a: 57). It was also possible to identify a group 
handpicked by the Minister o f Interior who formed the special police units that were 
considered personally beholden to the Minister. A nother faction, reportedly the largest, had 
primary loyalties to the President. The existence o f these factions and the political 
weakness o f the Commissioner were both destabilising forces within the police (Graydon 
2004: 11). The Minister regularly interfered in operational matters and was selective in the
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handling of disciplinary processes. This undermined the command structure and lead to a 
more fractured force (United Nations 2006a: 57).121
A division between PNTL members originating from the eastern and western districts also 
became evident trom 2004. A group calling itself ‘Policia Nationalista' comprising PNTL 
members mainly from eastern districts was publicly critical of the institution of PNTL and 
the PNTL General Commander (International Crisis Group 2008: 16). Subsequently 
twenty one nationalista officers were disciplined, and the Deputy Commander 
(Administration) was removed trom his position, although he had not been subject to a 
disciplinary process (United Nations 2006a: 57-58).
F-FDTL and its divisions
In the lead-up to the August 1999 referendum, Falintil, under directions from Xanana 
Gusmäo, agreed to placement in cantonments throughout East Timor. Despite increasingly 
violent attacks on the civilian population during this time Falintil did not engage the 
Indonesian army or the Indonesian-backed militia. The motivation for this restraint was the 
foresight that if the Indonesian government was able to cast the violence in East Timor as 
a civil war, as primitive people fighting amongst themselves, the critical support required 
from the international community would not be forthcoming (Barry and Barry 2001: 10; 
McCarthy 2002). Following the post-consultation violence Falintil’s display of discipline 
was rewarded by international support firstly in the form of INTERFET, followed shortly 
after by the UNTAET mission.
After the arrival of LINTAET, Falintil High Command agreed to a single cantonment of 
approximately 1 200 men in Aileu (Rees 2004a: 12, n 32). Many personnel in UNTAET did 
not appreciate the historical and nationalist significance of Falintil, and apart from a 
generalised mandate to disarm armed groups, had no particular plan as to what should be 
done with them (King's College 2000: 7-8). The men stayed in cantonment in increasingly 
poverty-stricken and desultory conditions for fourteen months, while morale steadily 
declined. The lack of anything to do and the failure of UNTAET to envisage any future 
role for Falintil caused distinct unease, and threats of revolt began to emerge (Rees 2004a: 
3, 32; King's College 2000: 7).
Initially it had been envisaged by the resistance that an independent East Timor would 
follow ‘the Costa Rica model’, which envisaged a paramilitary force but precluded the
121 See also Rede Monitonzasaun Direitus Humanus (RMDH) (2006) for extensive allegations of how the 
Minister of Interior used the PNTL for personal purposes.
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formation o f an army. However, the extent o f destruction by the Indonesian army and 
their militias following the popular consultation, coupled with growing irritation at being in 
cantonm ent, led to calls for the formation o f a defence force drawn from the ranks o f 
Falintil. During consultations on the future o f Falintil an U N TA ET official noted that “ for 
any army ‘idleness and privation’ are a combustible com bination” (King's College 2000:16).
A study by King’s College on Force Options proposed three options for future defence 
force development (King's College 2000: 12, 49-52). U N TA ET and CNRT accepted the 
third o f the Kings College options, for the creation o f a 3 000 strong force, comprising 
1500 regulars with the balance made up o f reservists. Deciding who would become a 
member o f the new defence force and who would be demobilised through the Falintil 
Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP)122 or excluded from it was left entirely up to the 
Falintil High Command, who were loyal to Xanana Gusmäo. This laid the foundation for 
the perception by FRETILIN that the military could never be controlled by them in 
government and that it would always be beholden to the man who would become 
President. Ultimately only 650 former Falintil were selected to form the first battalion, and 
the remaining 1 300 were demobilised under the FRAP program.
The transition from a guerrilla force to an impartial state force was always going to be 
difficult given the historical relationships between Gusmäo and the Falintil commanders 
who became FD TL commanders. Gusmäo had been Commander in Chief o f Falintil and 
later, in line with the Constitution, as President automatically became Commander in Chief 
o f the Defence Force. O ne o f the former Falintil Commanders was Taur Matan Ruak, who 
from 1998 was Operational Commander o f Falintil and in 2001 became Brigadier-General 
and Chief o f the Defence Force. (McCarthy 2002: 10, 14; Rees 2004a: 48-50). Another 
former Falintil Commander, Lere Anan, although subordinate to Taur Matan Ruak 
following the formation o f F-FDTL, remained more influential with Gusmäo. This led to 
claims by Ruak that he was being undermined in the new structure, and he made threats to 
resign.
The failure o f many former Falintil members to become members o f the defence force, the 
perceived inadequacy o f recognition or reintegration benefits and the poor economic 
situation in East Tim or led to growing disquiet amongst veterans o f the resistance. This 
disquiet coincided with disquiet amongst many members o f FRETILIN , who did not
122 FRAP was designed to assist the social and economic reintegration o f the members from Falintil not 
selected to join the newly established East Timorese Defense Forces (ETDF). FRAP was implemented by 
IOM and financed by the World Bank and USAID (McCarthy 2002: 9).
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regard the new armed forces as legitimate, due to their perceived control by Gusrnao. The 
establishment o f a variety o f disgruntled veterans groups began to form a powerful 
constituency in the lead-up to the 2001 election (Rees 2004a: 50-51).
Concern about living conditions also fuelled disquiet among F-FD TL members over a long 
period o f time. In March 2003 the National Democratic Institute (NDI) facilitated visits 
for Parliamentary Committee B on Foreign Affairs, Defense and National Security to 
police and military installations throughout the country. After visiting the F-FDTL base in 
Los Palos N D I noted that “m ost o f the soldiers, all former FALINTIL guerrillas, live at 
this base in overcrowded, disintegrating tents that leak water dangerously close to 
haphazardly hung electricity cables” (National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs 2003: 8). Similarly, after visiting the F-FDTL base in Baucau they discovered that:
The living quarters at the base are tin-roofed sheds with plywood floors and 
walls. Each shed houses ten soldiers. There is no electricity at the base, and 
the only power source is a small generator used to charge batteries for 
communications equipment. There are also no cooking facilities; food is 
brought to the base from the Special Police Unit base in Baucau (National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs 2003: 9).
The first battalion o f F-FD TL comprised mainly former combatants from the three eastern 
districts o f East Timor, and this caused complaint amongst people from the central and 
western areas o f the country. More people from the west were recruited for the second 
battalion. These were generally younger members, who found that compared with their 
eastern colleagues it was time consuming and expensive to get to their hom e villages when 
they had leave. This resulted, upon their return, in disciplinary action, and in some cases 
dismissal,123 for unauthorised absence. Complaints were made to President Xanana 
Gusrnao, as Supreme Com m ander ot the Armed Forces, in February 2005 alleging 
discrimination in prom otions. In January 2006, 159 soldiers petitioned the President 
alleging discrimination by soldiers trom  the east against soldiers from the west. Responses 
to this event led to the crisis covered in chapter 6 (International Crisis G roup 2006).
Relationship between PN TL and F-FDTL
From  the beginning there has been conflict between the East Timorese police and army. 
The way each institution recruited its members contributed to the perception that F-FDTL 
carried the mantle o f the armed resistance, whereas PN TL were associated with the 
Indonesian occupation. The predominance o f easterners in the first F-FDTL battalion and 
a perception that westerners were dominant in the PNTL accentuated this division. Rees
123 Forty-two soldiers, mainly from the western districts were dismissed in 2003.
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(2006: 6) recounts a conversation with a senior Officer of the F-FD TL High Command, 
who was also a veteran o f the twenty four year guerrilla resistance, where the officer 
nominated the police as the greatest threat to East T im or’s security.
Initially PN TL were much better resourced than the F-FDTL, causing tensions that were 
exacerbated by an unclear division o f responsibilities between the police and the military. 
Although the Constitution is clear on the dilferent responsibilities o f the PN T L  and the F- 
FDTL, there is an absence o f legislative and policy guidance on how the two organisations 
should work together. At a formal level this has been most apparent in the failure to devise 
a national security policy. At a practical level it is evident in the failure o f  the political elite 
to decide in what circumstances it is appropriate for police and military to be deployed 
separately or together and what procedures should be followed in the event o f joint 
deployment.
These tensions were apparent in 2003 in the attacks in Atabae and Atsabe, described in 
chapter 3. The deployment o f F-FDTL rather than the police in response to the attacks in 
Atabae and the deployment o f the PK F after the attack in Atsabe were matters o f great 
concern to the Minster o f the Interior. He responded by creating the URP and the UPF, 
which further inflamed tensions with the F-FDTL.
Since the formation o f PN TL and F-FD TL there have been attempts by F-FD TL officers 
to interfere in police investigations involving their members and serious assaults by F- 
FDTL officers on PN TL officers (United Nations 2003c: 4). In January 2004, following a 
dispute between an F-FDTL soldier and civilians, F-FDTL stormed a police station and a 
hospital, fired shots, destroyed property and took ten PNTL officers hostage, detaining 
them at an F-FDTL base (United Nations 2005a: 7). Three separate enquiries were 
established to investigate this event, including an Independent Commission o f Inquiry 
headed by President Gusrnao, a criminal invesdgation by the Prosecutor-General and an 
internal inquiry (United Nations 2004b: 2). In discussing the findings o f the Independent 
Commission o f Inquiry President Gusrnao highlighted some of the grievances o f F-FDTL 
against PNTL:
members o f the Police notoriously enjoy the best conditions in terms o f 
equipment, uniform and salary. At the top o f the hierarchy is a Ministry that 
formulates, co-ordinates and implements internal security policy. Its 
organization and strength has benefited from continuous advancements.
On the contrary, the F-FD TL only has a Secretariat o f the State as its 
political and budgetary interlocutor, which is divested o f support sendees.
The Superior Council ot Detence and Security has still not been created by 
law (Presidencia da Repiiblica 2004).
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O ther actions that serve to undermine the police force are the different way in which the 
East Timorese governm ent has responded to recommendations o f the 2006 Commission 
o f Inquiry (Col), depending on whether it is police or military that is being examined. The 
Col recommended prosecution o f sixty-eight individuals, including the Minister o f the 
Interior (who had responsibility for police), the Minister o f Defence, and the Chief o f the 
Armed Forces, as well as the further investigation o f seventy more people. The Minister o f 
Interior was prosecuted and sentenced, although subsequently pardoned. However it was 
always clear that both the Minister o f  Defence and the Chief o f the Armed Forces would 
not face prosecution (United Nations 2006a).
In addition to the events in Atabae there are a number o f occasions when F-FDTL has 
been deployed for inappropriate purposes. For example F-FD TL have been given 
responsibility for guarding key institutions, providing New Year’s Eve security in 2007, and 
in 2009 supendsing the eviction o f  the proprietors o f the well-known City Cafe who were 
engaged in a civil dispute regarding the property. Following the attacks on the President 
and Prime Minister on 11 February 2008, a Joint military police Com mand was formed, 
with the PN TL placed under the F-FDTL. This is a further example o f failure to 
distinguish between the two institutions and is discussed in chapter 7.
During U N T A E T  there had been an Office o f the National Security Adviser and a national 
security council to ensure security coordination and as a mechanism for civilian oversight 
o f both the East T im or and international security forces. From O ctober 2001 the National 
Security Adviser was an East T im or citizen. U N T A E T ’s intention was that this body would 
ensure continuity o f  civilian-led coordination, consultation and decision-making following 
independence, but this did not occur. The failure to develop a national security policy and 
supporting legislation to adequately define the respective roles o f the police and military, 
contributed to the poor functioning o f the East Timorese police. This framework on its 
own could not have addressed the enmities that were developing between the militarv and 
the police. However, a lack o f definition regarding the roles o f  the respective organisations 
inflamed matters around several critical incidents and contributed to escalating tensions.
This was also one o f  the key findings o f the UN Independent Special Commission of 
Inquiry for East T im or that investigated the events and issues contributing to the 2006 
crisis:
the Commission Finds that: the Governm ent was insufficiently proactive in 
addressing the lack o f a national security policy and problems evident 
within and between PN TL and F-FD TL (United Nations 2006a: 75)
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In the preparations for the transition from a peacekeeping mission to a sustainable 
development assistance framework and as part o f  preparing an exit strategy, the 
U N M ISET SRSG convened eight transition working groups in August 2004 “ to assess 
progress made in institutional capacity-building, identify East T im or’s remaining assistance 
requirements and propose how best to meet them ” (United Nations 2005b: 1, 4). The 
Working G roup responsible for examining the Roles and Working Relationships o f 
National Security Agencies reported that there was no national security policy or 
framework and that
as a consequence, for some time now, a num ber o f  key decisions about the 
formation o f special police units, legislation and other matters, have been 
made on an ad hoc basis. The State needs to develop a national security 
framework from which the roles and functions o f the F-FD TL and PNTL 
could be more clearly defined and explained to the m embers o f the 
institutions and to the public (UNM ISET n.d.: 3-4)
The report also noted that
the lack o f a clearly articulated publicly expressed security policy contributes 
to a lack o f accountability o f the agencies and to a strong tendency for 
institutions to become personalised and politicised. W ithout strong civilian 
democratic control o f the security forces, the F-FDTL an d /o r PN TL 
themselves could end up posing a security threat to the State sometime in 
the future (UNM ISET n.d.: 4).
The East Timorese government docum ent “Security, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation: 
Priorities and Proposed Sector Investm ent Program (April 2005)” ,2-t cites “an increasingly 
urgent” need to develop a national security policy noting that
Such a policy framework would set out the vision and strategy for national 
security, and articulate clearly the specific roles o f all security organs o f the 
state, and clarify G overnm ent’s objectives for structuring, coordinating and 
managing national security, including its defence needs, in a prioritised and 
affordable manner (Republica Democratica Tim or Leste 2005: vii).
Given that no national security policy has emerged by N ovem ber 2009, it would appear 
that it is not as much a priority to the government as it appeared in 2005.
Although these tensions between the two forces came to the fore in the post-independence 
period, the problems are underlined by the decades-old differences between members o f 
the elite, including Xanana Gusrnao, Mari Alkatin, Rogerio Lobato, Roque Rodrigues and 
Taur Matan Ruak, as discussed in chapter 2. All these actors continue to influence security
124 The report has a number o f  hallmarks o f having been written bv advisers to the government. Nonetheless, 
it states that the report reflects policies and programs for the sector as at the time o f publication.
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sector context in East Timor. It is necessary to understand both what was happening 
amongst these players in East Timor as well as what was happening at an earlier time 
amongst the elite diaspora in their places of exile, such as Angola, Mozambique and 
Portugal (Rees 2004a: 6-7; 2004b; International Crisis Group 2006: 2-5).
The internal security situation was also confused by the continued existence of security and 
intelligence groups associated with CNRT and Falintil. Although the King’s College study 
on Force Options believed that Falintil had tried to disassociate itself from security and 
intelligence groups associated with the former clandestine network, it noted that it was 
difficult to differentiate Falintil from the actions of some of its members. These groups 
were notable not only as ‘security’ groups but also as being linked to smuggling, theft and 
extortion. The report was one of the first sources to note the connection between these 
groups and the gangs in Dili (King's College 2000:16).
Arguably the one activity which would have been legitimate for F-FDTL to be involved in, 
according to their mandate, was border protection. However, a decision was made early on 
that having F-FDTL so close to the border would provide an unnecessary antagonism to 
the Indonesian military (TNI) forces on the other side of the border. Consequently this 
role was given to the newly created PNTL unit — the Border Police Unit — Policia Unidade 
Yronteira (Human Rights Watch 2006:13).
5.3.3 Veterans
The critical role that ex-combatants play in any post-conflict SSR process is recognised in a 
variety7 of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Like SSR, it 
has been questioned whether the high levels of expectation about what DDR can achieve 
in post-conflict situations is realistic. Although there are doubts that these programs on 
their own can address the criminal and political violence that appears to take over from the 
violence of the original conflict, the political importance of ex-combatants is less contested 
(Muggah 2009: 1-2). Rees has argued that
As the roles and responsibilities of combatants and ex-combatants develop 
within the post conflict securitv sector they will invariably seek to politically 
and/or otherwise profit from the political process. They will seek to benefit 
from the development and reform of emerging security sector 
institutions.. .Ex-combatants should therefore be viewed as key players in 
SSR as they consistently seek to manipulate or dominate indigenous security 
sector institutions. Without their consent, or participation in, will fail [sic]
(Rees 2006: 9)
Rees (2006: 9) also outlines the importance of not limiting one’s field of view solely to ex­
combatants, encouraging inclusion of “their political leadership as well as those civilians
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(including women and children) who both supported the ex-combatants, as well as were 
their victims during the conflict”.
Much of the DDR literature claims that ex-combatants suffer economic, social and political 
marginalisation or ‘remarginalisation’, and that this in itself provides an explanation for 
frequent re-engagement in organised violence. However Nilsson, in his work on ex­
combatants in Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, argues that whereas these factors will 
provide conditions conducive to violence they are insufficiently explanatory on their own. 
Instead Nilsson (2008: 16) argues that
as former fighters often lack resources and leadership skills, they are likely 
to be dependent on the presence of some type of remobilisers — individuals 
who have the will, capacity and ability to coordinate organized violence in a 
post-conflict setting — to help them take the step from passivity to armed 
action. More specifically, this may necessitate the involvement of domestic 
or regional elites, as well as second-tier actors — such as local politicians, 
communal leaders or former mid-level commanders — that can act as 
intermediaries between elites and ex-combatant communities.
Nilsson’s argument regarding ‘remobilisers’ is similar to the idea of ‘entrepreneurs in 
violence’ discussed in chapter 2. I would argue that such remobilisers or violence 
entrepreneurs are present in East Timor and are more able to effectively carry out their 
objectives in situations where actors, organisations and parts of organisation have multiple 
and shifting alliances and where the Weberian ideal of a monopoly on the (legitimate) 
control of violence does not apply. This will be discussed further in Section 5.3.4.
The role that former veterans play in the development of East Timor’s security sector and 
the popular imagination is of great importance. Veterans are accorded great, almost 
religious, status in East Timorese political culture. Yet deciding who is a veteran is not a 
straight-forward matter. Large numbers of people registered as veterans for the FRAP 
process (outlined below), including a vast number of non-veterans — including former 
militia, former soldiers in the Indonesian army, and spies for the Indonesian intelligence.12S 
Determining who had served with Falintil was also not straight-forward as people were 
involved at different times, and there was an extensive network of clandestinos, usually not 
known to each other, who supported the work of Falintil (Scambary 2009c: 268) The 
civilian cadres and clandestinos
were responsible for internal political organisation and intelligence; they 
facilitated communication and supported the armed resistance with 
supplies, logistics and intelligence. Many suffered similar consequences to
121 Pers. Comm. James Scambary 18 November 2009.
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those in the armed resistance, including torture, rape, arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment, and killings (Kent 2006: 1).
Four disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes have been carried 
out in East Timor, two under international auspices and two by the East Timorese 
government. These are the Falintil Reinsertion Programme (FRAP) and the RESPECT 
programme, which were implemented by IOM  and U N D P respectively. The Presidential 
Commissions126 and the establishment o f a Departm ent o f Veterans’ Affairs were initiatives 
o f the East Timorese government, funded bv international donors. An assessment o f these 
veteran’s initiatives, carried out by Peake (2009) concludes that some o f these programs 
were o f limited success but that longer term socio-economic advancement o f veterans has 
not occurred. In fact many ol the veterans interviewed could no longer remember if they 
had received any benefit from the programmes. Peake has pointed out that from the 
beginning veterans were considered a problem to be ‘solved’, and in a limited way they 
were solved, enabling the establishment o f the police and military without initial adverse 
security consequences. However, it appears that many veterans feel they have not received 
a proportionate dividend from independence, on the contrary' they feel they are poorer and 
more marginalised than many other members o f society (Peake 2009: 168, 175). Only 
veterans with sendee o f fifteen or more years are currently eligible for the pension; those 
who senred between eight and fourteen years become eligible once they turn fifty five. This 
leaves a group o f ineligible and disaffected younger veterans (Sousa-Santos 2009: 4).
Many o f  the martials arts and ritual arts groups involved in the crisis o f 2006 and violence 
o f 2007 have origins in clandestine and guerrilla organisations as well as close links to 
PNTL, F-FDTL, political parties and economic elites (Sousa-Santos 2009: 4-5). Their 
vulnerability to remobilisers and conflict entrepreneurs is substantial, captured in a quote in 
Sousa-Santos (2009: 1): “Are we forgotten heroes or bandidos? And if they continue to call 
us bandidos, we will show them bandidos”.
5.3.4 O ther providers o f  secu rity  an d  insecu rity
For a long time in East Tim or security has been provided by a variety o f state and non­
state actors, with an unclear delineation between them. As noted in chapter 3, everyday 
security continues to be substantially provided by an assortment o f community leaders
126 Three Presidential Commissions were formed in order to compile registers of veterans with view to 
providing both recognition and financial compensation. The Comissao para os Assuntos dos Antigos 
Combatentes/Commission for Matters of Ex-Combatants (CAAC) registered ex-combatants who served 
between 1975 and 1979; the Comissao para os Assuntos dos \ eteranos das falintil/Commission for Matters of 
Veterans of Falintil (CAVF) identified cadres involved in the armed resistance in subsequent years. The 
Comissao para os Assuntos dos Oadros da Kesistencia/Commission on Cadres o f the Resistance (CAQR) registered 
civilian cadres and clandestinos (Peake 2009: 177; Kent 2006: 1).
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including suco chiefs, aldeia chiefs, and elders, with only five percent of East Timorese 
believing the police are primarily responsible for law and order (Everett 2009: 20). In 
addition there are a significant number of private security guards working in East Timor, 
providing security for the UN, international NGOs, embassies, and the private sector, with 
employees of the three main companies outnumbering the PNTL. Private security guards 
are not currently licensed to carry firearms, although they do use batons and tasers (Parker 
2009: 4). There is concern that this could change with consideration of legislation providing 
for private citizens to carry firearms.127
In chapter 2 I argued that there is a long history of the use of auxiliaries by members of the 
political elite and the state security forces in East Timor. The prevalence of these auxiliaries 
is underpinned by a martial heritage and a history of shifting alliances. This can be traced 
from pre-colonial contact and was bolstered and developed through foreign support during 
the Portuguese colonial period and the Indonesian occupation. All of these factors are still 
evident in 2009 in the form of multiple and overlapping providers of security and 
insecurity.
Establishment and support of martial arts groups and youth groups by Indonesian military 
and intelligence agencies was widespread in Indonesia, with groups such as Pemuda 
Pancasila comprising preman, or standover men, being both legitimised and used when 
needed by the state. The practice extended to East Timor, with groups being established at 
the time of invasion and again in the 1980s and 1990s. These groups were trained by 
Kopassus and used as part of the counterinsurgency strategy of the Indonesian occupation 
(Brown and Wilson 2007: 373-374; Nixon 2008: 166; Scambary 2009b). Similarly the 1999 
militias were creations of the Indonesian military, with their organisation and mode of 
operation drawing on identifiable models from both colonial and pre-colonial history in 
East Timor as well as similarly recognisable models in Indonesia (Robinson 2006: 274-276). 
Not only were militia groups established and supported by the Indonesian military, but 
Indonesian military officers were also sometimes members of militia groups. For example, 
the Saka militia group was entirely made up of TNI soldiers from Baucau Kodim (CAVR 
2005: Section VII, 100).
A number of new ‘security groups’ emerged when Falintil was demobilised, although it 
appears that few were actually ex-Falintil. These included the Association of Former 
Combatants of 1975 (AFC ’75), Council for the Popular Defence of the Democratic
127 For commentary on the Draft Arms Law see Parker (2008).
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Republic o f East Tim or (CPD-RDTL), Sagrada Familia, and Colimau 2000, with a variety 
o f agendas that included political and military participation, non-recognition o f the state 
an d /o r F-FDTL, as well as economic prom otion through extortion, smuggling and other 
criminal activity. Many o f the groups are millenarian in character, promising to bring back 
to life dead guerrilla leaders from  the jungles Qollitfe 2004). These groups caused alarm 
among many internationals, including CIVPOL and other UN staff, and East Timorese, 
including members o f F-FDTL, ETPS and veterans, because they engaged in military 
training and had access to traditional and modern weapons (McCarthy 2002: 97-101). In 
turn the groups experienced heavy-handed treatment at the hands o f the East Timorese 
police (Jolliffe 2004). When I drove past one o f these military drills in the Dili suburb o f 
Matadouro in 2002 with my East Timorese colleague, a m ember o f the clandestine 
movement, he was highly dismissive o f the group’s claim to be veterans, noting that most 
o f the group were far too young to have been veterans. These groups were readily 
vulnerable to the actions o f a conflict entrepreneur such as Rogerio Lobato.
The contemporary diversity and extent o f martial arts groups (MAG), gangs and other 
armed groups in East Tim or is nothing short o f extraordinary. Contrary to the stereotype 
o f such organisations as comprising mainly young unemployed men, GTZ-IS found that
MAG members and practitioners are found in all strata o f society', from 
educated professionals (often the leadership) to uneducated and unskilled, 
from wealthy to poor citizens, from political moderates to radicals. Groups 
are ethnically diverse and some have women members (GTZ 2007: 5).
Scambary has produced a typology o f gangs and other armed groups, showing that they 
differ in geographic range, territorial control, origins, composition and number, levels o f 
formal control over members, as well as in their political allegiances, grievances, modes o f 
operation, and use o f syncretic magic ritual. He broadly classifies the groups into 
disaffected groups, such as CPD -RDTL, Colimau 2000, and Sagrada Familia; clandestine 
groups such as 7-7, 5-5, and Bua Malus; Martial Arts Groups (MAG), such as PSHT, 
KORK, Kera Sakti and Kung Fu Master; Political Front Groups, such as MUNJ; Gangs 
such as Ameu Van Damme, Com m ando Com oro Market Gang and many others that have 
no name; Youth G roups, such as Slebor and Predator; and various informal security groups 
such as those made up o f ‘petitioners’ and the ‘isolados’ (Scambary 2009b, 2006, 2009a, 
2009c).
Reasons for the emergence o f a range o f non-state providers o f security include inability to 
reach or dissatisfaction with state-provided security, feelings o f disenfranchisement, and 
high youth unemployment. There are also various historical and continuing conflicts over
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land and other resources, such as markets or the proceeds from border smuggling, which 
continue to influence the activities, allegiances and enmities, and prominence o f many 
security groups. Some inter-village tensions have long antecedents, with actors in 2002 
resource conflicts in Viqueque citing divisions from the anti-colonial rebellion o f 1959 as 
influential. This had m orphed into a later pro- and anti- Indonesian integration split, and 
was subsequently claimed to be behind contemporary buffalo thefts (Gunter 2007: 37).
Scambary suggests that the common feature o f otherwise diverse contemporary armed 
groups is that the groups tend to be organised around a charismatic leader an d /o r on the 
basis o f  extended family grouping. In such groups the leader is the source o f welfare and 
credit, and small items like cigarettes and alcohol. Members in turn provide loyalty, mutual 
protection and are available to be mobilised (Scambary 2009a). This kind o f neo- 
patrimonial relationship is consistent with the phenom enon o f liurai-ism discussed in 
chapter 2. Such groups are also mobile, fluid and hard to pin down. This is in keeping with 
the character o f  T im or’s martial heritage and practice o f shifting alliances, also described in 
chapter 2. It is evident in the mobile and opportunistic alignments with political leaders, 
political parties, criminal figures, current and former members o f state security 
organisations, and with other groups. Individual members o f groups, and conflicts 
associated with groups, have a tendency to move back and forth between Dili and districts 
o f origin - changing in nature and intensity as they do so. From Scambary’s descriptions 
one can conclude that conflicts can both ‘m orph’ and be cryptic. The morphing o f conflict 
can occur when a conflict commences around one issue and as other actors get involved 
changes into being about other things. Conflicts can be cryptic in that they may appear to 
be about, for example, political differences, but may actually relate to longstanding 
problems related to land tenure or between extended family groups. Groups can disband 
and reform. Both individuals and groups ‘repackage’ themselves. Non-state security actors 
can be either providers o f security or insecurity, depending on whose perspective is being 
taken, who the group is currently aligned with or in some cases on a ‘repackaging’ o f extant 
groups. It has been noted that the line between formal and informal providers o f security 
in Indonesia has always been politically and legally ambiguous (Robison, Wilson, and 
Meliala 2008: 2). The same can be said about East Timor.
Quantifying the extent to which members o f the PN TL or F-FDTL are also members o f 
other security groups is difficult, for obvious reasons, and relies on often unveriflable 
allegations. Myrttinen (2007: 16) notes that “ relatively high num ber ot members o f the 
Timorese police force are involved with major gangs such as PSHT, Colimau 2000 and 7-
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7”. Separately he recounts that “ the Baucau PN TL district com m ander128 is allegedly a 
member o f the Kera Sakti martial arts group which is battling PSH T (who, on the other 
hand, apparently count a local PN TL sub-district com m ander as a m ember in their ranks) 
for dominance in the city” (Myrttinen 2008).129 Reportedly, the next PN TL District 
Commander, Aderito Neto, was also a gang member, though his successor is not.130
Form er PN TL Baucau District Commander, Pedro Belo, is now the Dili District 
Commander. The Dili PN TL Task Force, established in late 2007, is sometimes seen as 
little more than a gang, with one U N M IT inform ant telling me that the Task Force is 
‘owned’ by Belo.
The case o f former PN TL Dili District Deputy Com mander Abilio “M ausoko” Mesquita is 
also illustrative o f a high ranking PN TL m em ber who doubled as a senior member o f the 
PSHT gang (Scambary 2009a:5). In this role he is reputed to ‘control’ the Audian area o f 
Dili. Dili is broken into areas o f control, with different groups running protection rackets 
and controlling gambling.131 While still a m em ber o f the PNTL, Mesquita also led ten 
PN TL officers in an armed attack on the house o f  F -FD TL’s Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak 
on 24 and 25 May 2006 (United Nations 2006a: 32, 49). He was recom m ended for 
prosecution by the Commission o f Inquiry and sentenced to three years and three months 
jail on 6 August 2007, for theft and using a firearm with intent to disrupt public order. This 
was overturned on appeal, as the Court o f Appeal found that the panel of judges had not 
been properly constituted. Mesquita was acquitted o f manslaughter on 13 March 2008 in 
relation to the attacks (O H CH R and U N M IT 2008: 5), pending what seems to be an 
elusive retrial. Mesquita never registered for the PN TL screening process discussed in 
chapter 6, continuing to work for some time unregistered, but was finally dismissed by the 
Minister for Defence and Security in June 2009.132
As well as the problem o f ‘multiple m em berships’ discussed above there appears to be an 
increasing tendency for people with security sector context in East Tim or to ‘repackage’ 
themselves. A historical perspective on such ‘repackaging’ has previously been noted in 
Indonesia by Brown and Wilson (2007), with a particular focus on the repackaging o f
128 At the time this was Pedro Belo. Pers Com m  Henri Myrttinen 30 April 2009.
129 One o f the members o f the Joint Field Assessment Team assessing PN T L ’s readiness 
tor handover in 2009 estimates that 80% o f Bacau PN TL are members o f gangs, evidenced 
by their gang tattoos. Pers. Comm. May 2009.
130 Pers. Comm JFAT member May 2009.
131 Pers. Comm. James Scambary 1 May 2009.
132 Pers. Comm LJNMIT HRTJS staff member, 26 August 2009.
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Jakarta-based gangs such as the Betawi Brotherhood Forum to utilise a ‘gap’ in security 
provision following the demise of the New Order.
In relation to East Timor militia leader Eurico Guterres is a good example of someone 
who has engaged in constant opportunistic repackaging of himself in a variety of different 
(in) security guises.113 In Dili he was involved in minor criminal activities, reputedly 
prostitution and gambling including cockfighting. He was detained in 1988 by military 
intelligence for alleged involvement in a plot to kill President Suharto and subsequently 
'turned’ to become an informer for Kopassus. He was recruited by Prabowo into 
Gardapaksi [Garda Pemuda Penegak Integrasi — Youth Guard for Upholding Integration) in 
1994, but some time later the organisation went into abeyance. In early 1999 he was given 
Rp 50 million by Maj. Gen Adam Damiri to revive Gardapaksi, and the organisation was 
recast as ‘Aitarak\ which was to become a leading pro-Indonesian militia organisation in 
the lead up to the referendum. During 1999 Guterres engaged in many acts of violence, 
incitement and intimidation, in constant contact with his very senior Indonesian police and 
military sponsors. These included attacks on the house of Manuel Carrascalao (McDonald 
et al. 2002: 164-167). Guterres was indicted for crimes against humanity' by the SPSC in 
Dili and convicted of crimes against humanity by the Ad Hoc Court of Human Rights in 
Jakarta, though subsequently his conviction was overturned by the Indonesian Supreme 
Court in 2008 (JSMP 2008). Subsequent to his activity in East Timor his repackaging, with 
the sponsorship of a wide and various range of Indonesian political and military leaders, 
really took off. Having been a parliamentary candidate for political party Golkar in 1999, he 
later was made head of a PDI-P (another political party) security organisation by Megawati 
and most recently was a candidate for PAN, a moderate Islamic party, in the 2009 
Indonesian elections. At other times he was the head of an Anti Communist Alliance 
(AAK), allegedly supported by Golkar, which intimidated bookshops and established and 
trained militia in West Papua to counter separatist movements in the province (McDonald 
et al. 2002:164-167; Kearney 2003; ABC The World Today 2009).
Another figure still resident in East Timor who illustrates the process of repackaging is 
Vicente da Conceicäo (alias Railos, or ‘true land’). Railos had been a member of Falintil 
who was integrated into the F-FDTL at the time of its formation. He was sacked from F- 
FDTL for misappropriation of funds in 2003. The Report of the Special Commission of 
Inquiry in October 2006 details how during the crisis Railos, together with thirty-one
,13Guterres, originally from Viqueque, initially claimed that his parents had been killed by 
the TNI, due to their pro FRETILIN views, at the time of the Indonesian invasion. He 
later changed this story to their having been killed by FRETILIN (McDonald et al. 2002).
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members of a civilian militia called the ‘Railos group’, were supplied with arms and 
uniforms and travelled to Tibar (on the outskirts of Dili) on the instruction of then 
Minister of the Interior, Rogerio Lobato. According to the Col, Railos and his group, 
apparently disguised in police uniforms (International Crisis Group 2009a), together with 
PNTL officers from Liquica and civilians, were reasonably suspected of involvement in the 
killing of as many as nine people and seriously injuring a further three people on 24 and 25 
May. As a result the Col recommended that Railos and named members of his group be 
prosecuted for crimes against life and the person, and for illegal possession, movement and 
use of PNTL weapons (United Nations 2006a). Railos was pivotal in the resignation of 
Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri in 2006, having alleged the Prime Minister ordered Rogerio 
Lobato to supply Railos and his groups with high powered weapons, including assault 
rifles, and 6 000 rounds of ammunition, together with a hit list of those hostile to the 
government. This was always denied by Alkatiri. Following investigation no charges were 
laid by the Prosecutor-General (ABC PM Program 2007). Subsequently there has been a 
perception that Railos is allied with Xanana Gusmäo. Although in November 2006 Jose 
Ramos-Horta was publicly demanding that Railos surrender his weapons or suffer dire 
consequences (Adnkronos International 2006), five months later he appointed Railos as his 
principal campaigner in Liquica and Ermera districts during the first and second round of 
the 2007 presidential elections. During this time it was reported both by FRETILIN and 
the EU Election Observer mission that Railos and his men were involved in a number of 
incidents of violence and intimidation against FRETILIN members and supporters 
throughout Liquica and Ermera districts. Railos also fulfilled the role of Liquica district 
coordinator for CNRT in the parliamentary elections and was present at the FRETILIN 
Mudansa ( a breakaway group from FRETILIN) convention on 28 May 2007 (International 
Crisis Group 2007: 8). Railos was arrested in late 2007 for the 2006 offences and charged 
with manslaughter, threatening violence, unlawful deprivation of liberty, and the illegal use 
of firearms in connection with the armed confrontation in Tibar. He was jailed pending 
trial but after eight months was allowed to go to Surabaya for medical treatment but did 
not go back to prison upon his return to East Timor. Railos’ trial was rescheduled in 
October 2008 for January 2009 (Radio Timor Leste 2008b), then adjourned until April 
2009 (OHCHR and UNMIT 2009: 12), being delayed once again in October 2009 (Radio 
Timor Leste 2009).
While I do not maintain that there is any particular similarity between Guterres and Railos 
as people, both examples illustrate the phenomenon of ‘repackaging’ of security actors in 
accord with a history oi mobile conflicts and shifting alliances. This kind of repackaging is
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not something one can undertake alone but relies on the support o f  one or more political 
elite patrons who continue to provide ‘employment’ and assist by providing impunity when 
security actors break the law.
Further ‘repackaging’ or ‘rehabilitation’ o f Indonesian military figures (and their associates) 
as business investors in East Timor is arguably a similar phenom ena that relies both on the 
patronage o f the East Timorese political elite and a prevailing culture o f impunity in order 
to be successful. Figures such as Hercules Rosario Marcal — who was born in East Tim or 
but is now a high profile Jakarta gangster and previously worked as an ‘enforcer’ for 
Suharto era generals, intimidating dissidents and East Timorese independence supporters — 
has made a reappearance as a businessman in Dili (Murdoch 2008). In Jakarta Hercules at 
one time lived with Major General Zacky Anwar Mackarim, who had been the m ost senior 
military officer in Tim or during the Indonesian occupation. Zacky Anwar was indicted by 
the SPSC in Dili for murder, deportation and persecution as crimes against humanity 
(McDonald et al. 2002:173 ; Murdoch 2008). In January 2008 Hercules visited Dili and met 
with Prime Minister Xanana Gusmäo, and visited as part o f a high level Indonesian 
business delegation in February 2008. He was subsequently granted permission by the 
government to develop a refugee camp site as a supermarket and swimming pool and has 
made it known that he is looking for other investment opportunities. A garden 
commemorating the 5 May agreement was opened, on 5 May 2009, sans supermarket and 
swimming pool. Many international ambassadors attended the event.1’4 Reportedly PN TL 
General Commander Longuinhos M onteiro has close links with Hercules who organises 
his hotels and other arrangements when Monteiro is in Jakarta (UNM IT 2009). Two men 
accused o f the February 2008 attacks on the President and Prime Minister were arrested at 
Hercules’ house in Jakarta (Murdoch 2008). Similarly, Tom m y Winata, an Indonesian 
businessman, regarded as a ‘banker’ for the Indonesian military, has been given approval by 
the East Timorese government to build a shopping complex and hotel on government land 
without any tendering process taking place (Murdoch and Hyland 2009).
5.4 Conclusion
The (in) security groups, their members and supporters, raise a num ber o f im portant issues 
in relation to the development o f the PNTL. Firstly, the widespread use o f groups and 
individuals other than PN TL members for the maintenance o f law and order and internal 
security by ordinary members o f the communitv clearly indicates that the state does not 
maintain a monopoly on the use o f violence as envisaged in the Weberian model. This
1,4 Pers. Comm. Bilateral security adviser May 2009.
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raises the question o f how successful the implementation o f this state-centric model by 
international police-builders can be, if they overlook the current importance o f non-state 
security providers. It also raises the related question o f whether scarce resources are being 
appropriately allocated if the desired end result is an improvement in security for ‘end- 
users’.
The utilisation o f these groups and individuals within them by a great num ber o f members 
o f the political elite indicates that the political leadership in East Tim or is as ambivalent 
about the Weberian model o f state monopoly on the legitimate control o f violence as they 
are about the rule o f law project. While the political elite continue to variously support, arm 
and protect the criminal activities o f these actors, a culture o f impunity is entrenched. This 
lack o f ‘local ownership’ o f the Weberian project ensures that it will not be successful.
The reportedly widespread overlap between members o f the PNTL, and to a much lesser 
extent the F-FD TL and a variety o f disaffected groups, martial arts groups, gangs and 
informal security groups means that members o f the security forces have distinctly 
compromised loyalties and identities. This makes it difficult for their respective institutions 
to establish unified command structures and integrity o f purpose. It becomes unclear 
which institution or institutions PN TL members are working for at any given time. In 
addition, PN TL members may also be operating from personal or familial loyalties or in 
deference to a part o f the PN TL personally controlled by a powerful individual. Myrttinen 
has argued that the minimal wage paid to PN TL also serves as in incentive to increase their 
earnings through other such activities.
Because group alliances shift, conflicts are concealed or transformed and individuals 
‘repackage themselves, it becomes difficult for international police-builders and those 
assisting the East Timorese government with SSR to understand the context o f their work.
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C h ap te r 6
C risis an d  reco n stru c tio n
6.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the (re)construction o f the PN TL through an examination o f two 
U N M IT mandated processes: the reform, reconstruction and rebuilding (RRR) o f the 
PNTL, and the review o f the security sector. This analysis is an opportunity to interrogate 
the responsiveness o f the UN to their country specific and global experiences in police­
building since their first attempts to build the PNTL. In chapter 3 I examined the 
construction o f the PN TL under international and national direction from the inception o f 
the organisation until early 2006. Chapters 4 and 5 placed this process in a rule o f law and 
security sector context respectively.
I commence with a brief description o f the ‘crisis’ o f 2006 which saw the Headquarters and 
Dili-based parts o f PN TL cease to function and the Minister o f the Interior, the Minister o f 
Defence and the Prime Minister forced to resign. I give an account o f the immediate 
bilateral interventions and the subsequent com m encem ent o f the United Nations 
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), its accompanying mandate and mechanisms 
designed to reconstruct the PNTL. This is followed by an analysis o f the reform, 
reconstruction and rebuilding o f PN TL process as designed and implemented. I continue 
with an analysis o f the Security Sector Review process.
I focus on the difficulties o f establishing working relationships between UNM IT and 
successive East Timorese governments and between U N PO L and PNTL. I also 
concentrate on the respective shortcomings and capacity problems o f these institutions in 
fulfilling their mandates. I argue that these issues o f relationship, contested sovereignty and 
capacity" are interacting to institutionalise fragility in the PNTL, with many o f the problems 
identified in the first attem pt to build the PN TL still in evidence. Similarly, I contend that 
both the UN and the East Timorese government have been more focused on form than 
substance, engaging in forms o f ritualism designed to give a sense that progress is being 
made. This regulatory ritualism serves to obscure the gulf in understanding and culture 
between the UN and the East Timorese political leadership.
6.2 Crisis and intervention
The proximate cause o f the crisis was the sacking o f 591 members (or approximately one 
third) o f the F-FD TL in March 2006, a group that came to be known as ‘the petitioners’. 
The petitioners were almost exclusively from western districts, and they alleged 
discrimination towards members o f F-FDTL from the west o f the country by members
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from the east.135 The majority o f higher ranking F-FDTL members are drawn from the east 
o f the country. The ‘crisis’ o f April and May 2006 continues to influence and inform 
political developments in East Timor. During the crisis itself East Tim or saw widespread 
fighting between and within the uniform ed security forces, the almost complete cessation 
o f government functionality,136 the resignation o f multiple governm ent Ministers, 
widespread violence, the displacement o f approximately 150 000 people, extensive 
destruction o f housing stock and the deaths o f at least 38 people (United Nations 2006a:
3)-
In response to the crisis the East Timorese political leadership requested military and police 
intervention from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia. Initially 2 200 personnel 
were deployed.137 Subsequently the government requested the establishment o f a new UN 
mission.138 Australian police peacekeepers from this early deployment, named Operation 
Serene, have recounted the sense o f disorientation they experienced upon arrival in Dili. 
The policing skills required o f them were very different to those used at hom e and they did 
not have a good understanding o f  the cultural, political and geographic terrain. They detail 
the volatile environment, fuelled by rum our and gossip, the difficulty in getting East 
Timorese to believe they were non-partisan and the limited impact that they felt they were 
having on constantly shifting conflicts (Goldsmith 2009a).
The most authoritative and comprehensive account of the crisis is contained in the Report 
o f the UN Special Commission o f  Inquiry (the Col) conducted by the UN Office o f the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The Col was requested o f the UNSG 
by Minister for Foreign Affairs Jose Ramos-Horta. The resulting Col was mandated
(a) To establish the facts and circumstances relevant to incidents on 28 and 
29 April, 23, 24 and 25 May and related events or issues that contributed to 
the crisis, including issues related to the functioning o f the security sector;
131 The group of disgruntled F-FDTL officers had outlined their grievances in a petition to Brigadier-General 
Taur Matan Ruak and President Gusmao in early January 2006. Unsatisfied with a lack of response by early 
Februar)-, they abandoned their barracks, leaving their weapons behind. They sought an interview with the 
President. A Commission of Inquiry to examine the petitioner’s allegations was formed but failed to resolve 
the problems between the petitioners and the F-FDTL High Command. The petitioners then took leave and 
did not return. They were subsequently sacked by Brigadier-General Ruak in March, a move supported by 
then Prime Minister Alkatin but opposed by then President Gusmao.
136 The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour and Solidarity continued to function during this time.
137 ICG has noted that arrangements between deploying countries were fraught with Portugal unwilling to 
operate under Australian command (International Crisis Group 2009b: 4).
138 Following the crisis of 2006 the UN initially extended the UNOTIL mission which had been due to close. 
The President, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister sent a request to the UNSG 
on 11 June for a UN police presence until such time as the PNTL had been reformed. This was followed by a 
statement from the Minister of Foreign Affairs two days later that also stressed the importance of a UN 
police force and a multinational military presence.
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(b) To clarify responsibility for the above-mentioned events;
(c) To recommend measures to ensure accountability for crimes and serious 
violations of human rights allegedly committed during the above- 
mentioned period, taking into account that the East Timor government 
considers that the domestic justice system, which has the participation of 
international judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers, should be the 
primary avenue of accountability for these alleged crimes and violations;
(d) To report its findings within three months of its establishment through 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 
Secretary-General and the National Parliament of East Timor (United 
Nations 2006a: 11-12).
The causes of the crisis were complex and multiple, and reflected deep-seated and 
longstanding divisions within East Timorese society. These divisions have in turn been 
overlaid with conflicts of more recent origin. The Col report stated that the causes of the 
crisis
can be explained largely by the frailty of State institutions and the weakness 
of the rule of law. However, this explanation can only be understood fully 
in the historical and cultural context of the country. Both the Portuguese 
and Indonesian eras created and subsumed internal divisions within Timor- 
Leste. Political competition within Timor-Leste has been historically settled 
through violence. Accordingly, many Timorese view the events of April and 
May 2006 as a continuum starting from the decolonization process in 
1974/75 and encompassing the violence and factionalism of the Indonesian 
occupation and the violence that accompanied the United Nations- 
sponsored Popular Consultation in 1999 (United Nations 2006a: 16).
Many other organisations and individuals have conducted analyses of the causes and 
development of the crisis (Brady and D.G. Timberman 2006; International Crisis Group 
2006; Myrttinen 2007; Trindade and Castro 2007; Kämmen and S.W. Hayati 2007; 
Dewhurst 2008; Priiller 2008; Reckinger and Devant 2008; Scambary 2009c). They 
proposed complexes of underlying factors, which variously include the matter of who was 
excluded and included in creating both the PNTL and the F-FDTL, the difficulties of 
transforming former guerrilla fighters to a regular armed force in post-conflict situations, 
longstanding divisions between the political elite, communal tensions between easterners 
and westerners,139 manipulation by elite actors14" and conflict entrepreneurs, lack of
139 The division between easterners (firaku or loros’ae) and westerners (kaladi or loromonu) engendered 
considerable scholarly and popular debate during and after the crisis. I would argue much of the debate 
centred on whether these were ‘genuine’ historical divisions or, to use Hobsbawm and Ranger’s (1983) term, 
an ‘invention of tradition’. For an extensive discussion of this matter see Priiller (2008). McWilliam (2006) 
summarises some of the key points described in Dionisio Babo Soares thesis (2003) regarding the division 
between ‘talkative and excitable firaku’(easterners) and ‘taciturn and closed kaladi’ (westerners). Although the 
origins are unclear, it is thought this idea may have “originated during the Second World War, when Macassae 
people from Baucau (easterners) and Bunak people from the western highlands settled in Dili and 
commenced trading in a local market. Over time commercial rivalries arose around this distinction, which
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regulator}' frameworks, legacies o f trauma, violence and displacement that had lead to a 
‘culture o f violence’, and high levels o f fear and distrust o f those deemed to be ‘others’. 
These tactors were com pounded by very high rates o f unemployment and poverty in East 
Timor, a sense that the ‘dividend’ o f independence had not been realised, economic 
territonalism, cycles o f personal payback, and a worsening food security situation. For the 
purposes o f this thesis I focus on those aspects o f the crisis that had direct bearing on the 
institutional character o f  the PNTL, its relationships with other organisations and key 
political figures, and the security situation that surrounded the reconstruction process o f 
the PNTL.
On 28 April 2006 the PN TL lost control o f what had started as a petitioner’s 
dem onstration five days earlier. Vehicles were burnt outside the government palace, offices 
were ransacked and police fired into the crowd. Two civilians were killed and four civilians 
and two PN TL officers were injured. Violence spread outward from the government 
palace. The F-FD TL were authorised to deploy in unclear circumstances. By this stage 
chains o f com m and in both the PN T L  and F-FDTL were becoming fragmented and there 
was a sense that the security forces were unravelling. Peake describes the sense o f disarray 
and mobile fealties:
The majority o f the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) in the capital,
Dili, dissolved into separate and competing factions. Some parts o f the 
PN T L  fought each other, others fought members o f the defence force, 
others donned the uniform  o f the defence force to fight fellow police 
officers, others still went home. Paulo Martins, commissioner o f the PN TL
continued and evolved over the decades into a kind of default cultural division that is now being evoked in 
the current struggles”. Me William also suggests these divisions were accentuated after 1999 when there was 
significant inward (and chain) migration into Dili. At this time different ethno-linguistic groups became 
associated with different parts of the city, manifesting as fighting between different areas and associated 
gangs. A further aspect of the story relates to antagonism between westerners and easterners, centred on the 
contested allegations of easterners that westerners were more aligned with the occupying Indonesian forces 
and contributed less to the resistance. Similarly, it has been noted that the most destructive of the Indonesian- 
sponsored militia operated in the west, rather than the east of the country, further reinforcing the contention 
of Easterners that Westerners were pro-Indonesian, received the greater benefit of the occupation and made 
the fewest sacrifices during this time (MeWilliam 2006). Those who argued that the east/west division is a 
recent phenomenon cite the fact that no one makes reference to it in any of the testimony collected by the 
CAVR. During four years living in East Timor I was aware of the purported difference in personality, but it 
was generally the subject of office banter and amounted to nothing serious. On one occasion, though, in 2003 
the organisation of which I was Director received a visit from a staff member of another local NGO who was 
concerned that we were developing a reputation for preferential employment of people from the east of the 
country. I pointed out that we had just employed someone from Oecussi and was informed that that did not 
really count as it was outside of the east/west schema. Following the crisis many NGOs were seriously 
hampered in their work by division between officers from the east and west.
140 Criticism has been leveled at then President Xanana Gusmäo for a speech on 23 March 2006 in which he 
referred to the east/west division. The Col found that the speech was “perceived as divisive and the 
President should have shown more restraint and respect for institutional channels by exhausting available 
mechanisms before giving the speech (United Nations 2006a: 75-76).
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took, quite literally, to the hills around the capital, Dili. He never came back 
(Peake forthcoming).
By early May 2006 the security situation in East Tim or was deteriorating rapidly. O n 3 May 
Major Alfredo Reinado141 abandoned the Military Police o f F-FDTL, taking with him other 
military police officers, PN TL officers and weapons. Later this group ambushed both 
PN TL and F-FDTL officers and lives were lost. From 8 May the Minister o f Interior 
started arming civilian groups with weapons taken from the UPF, and also provided URP 
uniforms to one group. Subsequently one o f the civilian groups, the Rai Los Group, 
attacked F-FDTL and five people were killed. Attacks occurred on the houses o f the Chief 
o f  the Armed Forces on 24 May and on a house belonging to relatives o f the Minister o f 
Interior on 25 May, with people killed on both occasions. By 24 May, the same day that the 
F-FDTL started arming civilians, the internal security situation had become so dire that the 
East Timorese government felt compelled to request urgent international military and 
security assistance. O n the same day the President, Prime Minister and President o f the 
Parliament o f East Tim or communicated to the U N SG  that they had undertaken this 
action, explaining that they had done so “in a bilateral framework taking into account the 
delay that a decision under the mandate o f the United Nations would imply”; the letter, 
however, continued with a request that the action be endorsed by the Security Council. The 
following day, 25 May, nine unarmed PN TL were killed and 27 persons suffered serious 
gunshot injuries (United Nations 2006g-. 2).
Many people claimed that the PN TL had collapsed during this period, although the 
collapse was largely confined to Dili and two other districts. In the remaining ten districts 
PN TL members continued to go to work. Following the collapse o f the Dili-based PNTL, 
the instability in Dili entered another stage, characterised by widespread gang warfare 
centred on former clandestine resistance figures. This resulted in an escalation o f regional 
divisions, the burning o f 2 000 houses over a period o f six m onths and widespread 
displacement, primarily o f easterners, into internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and 
back to villages o f origin. This stage o f the conflict also featured turf wars over control o f 
major commercial centres, markets, bus routes and gambling rackets, and clearly- 
orchestrated attacks on IDP camps. Life for those from the east became increasingly
l4i Major Alfredo Reinado was the head of the military police of F-FDTL. Following orders to hunt down 
the deserting petitioners headed by Gastäo Salsinha during the crisis o f 2006, Reinado deserted and joined the 
petitioners. He was subsequently involved in fatal clashes with F-FDTL and PNTL on 23 May, captured by 
Portuguese and Australian troops in July, and led a prison breakout in August 2006. The government, and 
more particularly individuals within the government, conducted an ‘on again, off again’ process of alternately 
pursuing and negotiating with Reinado over the following almost two years. Alfredo Reinado continued to 
play a major role in the events of the next two years before being killed in an attack on the President’s house 
on 11 February 2008.For an insightful account of the life and death of Alfredo Reinado see Niner (2008).
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difficult. Although international peacekeepers had some effect on this violence, it 
continued throughout most of 2006 (Scambary 2009c: 276). In 2007 new alliances and 
antagonisms emerged. Conflict between two martial arts groups, PSHT and Colimau 2000, 
spread through the western highlands and finally to Dili, drawing in other groups and 
escalating violence as it spread (Scambary 2009c: 278). One of the explanations for this 
particular conflict is that it is a reproduction of an old conflict that has been ‘on the back 
burner’ since Portuguese times, with even earlier antecedents being clashes between two 
ancient kingdoms in the region of Atsabe. These divisions are evidenced in modern 
economic struggles, in which access to scarce resources falls to those who can trace their 
origins to the Tiar Lelo ruling house. Those with this connection are strongly represented 
in the district administration, the local PNTL, and as owners of the largest and most 
productive tracts of land and the biggest coffee plantations (Molnar 2006: 348).
The events of the crisis are complex; and who did what (and why) can be difficult to 
follow. However, it is clear that the events are infused with a number of the legacies of 
history first identified in chapter 2. Many senior political and security figures operated 
outside their institutional mandates and the law, relying instead on networks of 
personalised power and patronage that had more to do with relationships formed during 
the resistance and others based on regional alliances. Although senior actors in the crisis 
relied extensively on exercise of personal power, this personal power was significantly 
augmented by their formal positions (e.g. as Minister ot the Interior, General-Commander 
of PNTL, or Commander in Chief F-FDTL) and the access to weapons and other 
resources that these positions provided. The crisis was also characterised by patterns of 
shifting and opportunistic alliances. Within these shifting alliances there was a tendency for 
membership of the uniformed forces to have greater loyalty to other powerful individuals, 
networks and organisations than to the formal institutions of state to which they also 
belonged. This was also evident in the high numbers of members of both the PNTL and 
the F-FDTL who abandoned their post to form alliances with other groupings. The 
conflicts were cryptic: contemporary conflicts between, for example, martial arts groups 
could also be referenced back to longstanding conflicts about access to land, housing or 
other economic resources. The conflicts were labile: what was able to be characterised 
initially as an east/west conflict later transformed into rivalries between martial arts groups. 
The conflicts were mobile, they were either transported back and forth between members 
of ethno-linguistic groups travelling between residences based in Dili and their places of 
origin, or, as described above, spread through the Western highlands before turning up in
Dili.
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Failures o f the security institutions are central to the crisis o f April/M ay 2006. Problems 
within PN TL and the Ministry o f Interior had been apparent for some time, but the crisis 
served to bring to international attention major developmental, legitimacy and performance 
issues. It also highlighted the divisions within and between PN TL and F-FDTL. Members 
o f both PN TL and F-FD TL and their respective oversight Ministries, the Ministry o f the 
Interior and the Ministry o f Defence, were directly involved in the violence o f April and 
May 2006.142 Many PN TL officers and the Minister o f the Interior were recommended for 
prosecution or further investigation by the Col. The PN TL General-Commander was not 
recommended for prosecution, but the Col found that he had bypassed institutional 
procedures by irregularly transferring weapons and had committed a serious dereliction o f 
duty by deserting his post on 24 May 2006 (United Nations 2006a: 75).143
The failures o f PN TL and F-FDTL were inextricably connected. This was recognised in 
the report o f Special Envoy Ian M artin,144 who had been sent by the UNSG to East Timor 
from 26 june to July 2006 to report back on the scope o f tasks that could be carried out by 
a mission to follow on from UNO TIL. Martin recommended a comprehensive review, 
which would include a threat assessment and options for development o f the sector that 
would address the tensions between the PN TL and F-FDTL and options for addressing 
the relationship between the two institutions (United Nations 2006d).
In June 2006 an Australian Scoping and Advisory Mission assessed the requirements for 
the reinstatement o f civilian policing sendees in East Tim or (International Police in Timor- 
Leste 2006: 2). A num ber o f people I interviewed told how Australian police commenced 
work on a reintegration plan for the PN TL that they presented to the East Timorese 
Council o f  Ministers, on which they believed they had achieved consensus, only to find that
142 PNTL involvement included the firing o f  shots at a demonstration o f petitioners at the Palacio Governo 
on 28 April 2006, and later the same day the UIR fired on petitioners at Comoro market. It also included 
confrontation between 10 URP officers and F-FDTL at Fatu Ahi on 23 May, an attack on the house of  
Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak on 24 May and later the same day an attack on F-FDTL in Taci 
Tolu/Tibar, as well as irregular distribution o f weapons to civilians and to PNTL officers outside o f  
procedures by both the Minister o f Interior and the General-Commander o f PNTL (United Nations 2006a).
143 Members o f the F-FDTL, including Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak, Chief of Staff Colonel Lere 
Anan Timor, Colonel Rate Lack Falur, and Major Mau Buti, and the then Minister for Defence Roque 
Rodrigues, were recommended for prosecution by the Col for illegal weapons transfer. Seven other F-FDTL 
officer were recommended for prosecution for murder, six o f them for the murder o f unarmed PNTL 
officers. It was also made clear that the government had no interest in proceeding with prosecutions against 
senior F-FDTL accused o f illegal weapons transfer. Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta immediately defended 
Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak following the release o f the Col report (da Fonseca 2006). The defence was 
reiterated by the Secretary o f State for Defence Julio Tomas Pinto two years later when defending the actions 
o f those involved (Ramos-Horta suspects to stand trial 2009).
144 Ian Martin fulfilled the role o f  SRSG during the UNAMET mission in 1999 and is well liked and respected 
by East Timorese across the political spectrum.
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the consensus had evaporated by the following day.,4S Similar findings were noted by 
Goldsmith in his study o f the Australian Federal Police’s Operation Serene:146
We spent quite a deal o f time and negotiated with all the key stakeholders in 
a reintegration plan, did a presentation to what would be the equivalent o f 
our Cabinet, They all nodded their heads, yes, yes, yes, and the next day 
there’s a totally different plan (respondent quoted in Goldsmith 2009a:
129).
The fact that the presentation was in English without translation no doubt made 
communication problems worse.147 When the UN reassumed the role o f international 
police-builders similar relationship and communication issues dogged the process.
At the heart o f both the A FP’s reintegration plan and the eventual U N M IT plan for 
reconstruction o f the police was a process for vetting PN T L  members. There are many 
complex reasons for carrying out a vetting process. A common reason is a desire for a new 
beginning after serious conflict, in the hope o f developing Vertical trust’ or trust between 
individuals and regulatory institutions o f state. Vetting is most frequently used in security 
and justice sector institutions where human rights abuses have diminished the legitimacy o f 
state institutions (Duthie 2007: 21). Im proved legitimacy o f these institutions will only 
occur, however, if there is a sustained structural and cultural com m itm ent to preventing, 
and responding to, future abuses (Mayer-Rieckh 2007: 483). If vetting is not done well, it 
can undermine or unnecessarily complicate other transitional justice processes (De G reiff 
2007: 527-528). In this chapter I will argue that reconstruction o f the PN TL was carried 
out in such a way as to lay the foundations o f future institutional instability.
6.3 Reconstruction M echanism s
6.3.1 M andates and supplem ental arrangement
The U NM IT mission was established by Security Council Resolution 1704 on 25 August 
2006. U N M IT was mandated to restore and maintain o f public security, provide assistance 
to further develop the PNTL, and support carrying out a security sector review.148 A 
Deputy Special Representative o f the Secretary-General for Security Sector Support and 
Rule o f Law was appointed with responsibility for the security sector support unit, the
14:1 Interviews with bilateral advisers June 2007.
146 Operation Serene is the Australian Federal Police (AFP) deployment that commenced in East Timor in 
May 2006 and continues to the present.
147 Pers. Comm, bilateral adviser May 2009.
148 The F-FDTL, on the other hand, barely features in the UNMIT mandate. It quickly became clear that no 
screening of the F-FDTL would be entertained by East Timorese authorities, despite knowledge of the 
significant role F-FDTL played in the 2006 violence. This violence is detailed in the Col report.
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human rights and transitional justice unit, the administration o f justice support unit, the 
civilian police com ponent, the military com ponent, the UN security section and the 
administrative support section.
An U N PO L presence, which was essential to fulfilling this mandate was, however, slow to 
commence. U N PO L  did not arrive till N ovem ber 2006 and were not properly functioning 
until the following year. It took almost a year to reach eighty per cent o f authorised 
strength (United Nations 2008e: 8). Although the crisis only involved PN TL in Dili and 
two other districts, U N PO L was deployed to all thirteen districts. It is o f note that Ian 
Martin’s assessment team had argued for UN executive policing to be confined to Dili, that 
the period o f international command should be limited and followed quickly by an advisory 
and mentoring role, believing a heavier international engagement would stymie police 
development. However the perceived need o f UN H Q  to redeem their previous failures 
with a large deployment took precedence (International Crisis G roup 2009b: 4).
The nature o f such a mission was always going to be a sensitive matter. It would be 
intimately involved with the police and military as organs mandated to use force in the 
aftermath o f a major crisis o f governance. Consequently the UNSG was at pains to stress 
the pre-eminent nature o f East Tim or’s sovereignty in such an intervention:
An enhanced international role in the security sector and elsewhere must 
fully respect the national sovereignty o f Timor-Leste, and the process of 
nation-building, which now intensifies, must be Timorese-owned and led 
(United Nations 2006d: 42).
The greater detail o f how the public security and reform, restructuring and rebuilding tasks 
were to be carried out is contained in a Supplemental Arrangement (SA) which was signed 
between UNM IT and the East Timorese government on 1 December 2006 (UNM IT and 
Democratic Republic o f Timor-Leste 2006). The SA outlines the phased approach to the 
conduct and eventual handover o f executive policing from U N PO L to PN TL and outlines 
the co-operative arrangements o f UNM IT and the East Timorese government in relation 
to the rebuilding o f PNTL.
The SA provides for executive policing to be carried out by U N PO L until such time as the 
PN TL are reconstituted through a process o f screening, mentoring and certification. The 
SA also gives the U N PO L Police Commissioner, in consultation with the SRSG and in 
close collaboration with the East Timorese government, the power to decide when the 
phased handover o f Units and Districts from U N PO L  to PNTL can occur, when the 
PN TL attains benchmarks that would make such a handover possible.
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The SA contains considerable ambiguity, and accordingly the implementation o f the SA has 
been even less clear.149 Some o f the ambiguities reside in powers conferred on the Minister 
o f  the In terior^" He is empowered to establish policy and exercise power and authority 
regarding the management and administration o f the PNTL, and at the same time he is 
denied any powers in relation to the conduct o f operational matters. Similarly, both 
provisional and final certification o f PN TL officers is the responsibility o f UNM IT, but “all 
decisions regarding the appointment, retention and prom otion o f PN TL personnel shall 
rest with and be taken by the Minister” (UNM IT and Democratic Republic o f Timor-Leste 
2006: 10). However this is subject to the requirement that “no prom otion o f any PN TL 
personnel [may take] place unless the individual PN TL police officer concerned has first 
been certified” (UNM IT and Democratic Republic o f Timor-Leste 2006: 10).
The SA anticipates a three-stage process commencing with an initial phase where policing 
is carried out by U N PO L and certified PNTL, a consolidation phase where primary 
operational responsibility would be handed over to PN TL on a unit-by-unit and district-by­
district basis, and a full reconstitution phase where the command and control o f all police 
operations would be handed over to the PN T L .'51 This would occur through registration o f 
each existing national police officer; provisional certification for six m onths (renewable); 
and final certification upon completion o f the training, satisfactory performance o f duties 
and proven respect tor human rights. These processes o f certification would be interrupted 
in the event o f reasonable grounds to suspect that a PN TL officer has been involved in 
human rights violations or criminal conduct (UNM IT and Democratic Republic o f Timor- 
Leste 2006: 14-17). Although the SA anticipates reform o f the Ministry o f the Interior 
(UNM IT and Democratic Republic o f Timor-Leste 2006: 11-12) this has not occurred.
In reality it has not been possible to follow the SA in any great detail because a num ber o f 
early pre-conditions have never been met. The SA anticipated that benchmarks for the
149 Ambiguity is also present in the individual Status of Forces Agreements between the respective 
contributing countries and the government of East Timor. These outline the roles, responsibilities, and legal 
status of respective forces. Aspects o f the Trilateral Agreement are also ambiguous. This agreement is an 
MOU between the Government of East Timor, the UN and the Government of Australia signed on 26 
January 2007 establishing a Trilateral Coordination Forum to coordinate and discuss security issues relevant 
to the management and stabilisation of the security environment in East Timor.
11(1 The government elected in 2007 has consolidated the Ministries of Interior and Defence directly under the 
Minister of Security and Defence (also Prime Minister) Xanana Gusmäo. Two Secretaries of State have been 
appointed, Secretary of State for Defence Julio Tomas Pinto and Secretary of State for Security Francisco da 
Costa Guterres.
1,1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1867 of 26 February 2009 reiterated the need to fully 
implement the Supplemental Policing Arrangement. The Resolution also supported “the gradual resumption 
of policing responsibilities by the PNTL beginning in 2009 through a phased approach, while emphasizing 
that the PNTL must meet the criteria mutually agreed between the Government of Timor-Leste and 
UNMIT”.
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consolidation phase and the full reconstitution phase would be determined by the Reform, 
Restructuring and Rebuilding plan, which was supposed to be completed within ninety 
days o f the arrangement’s commencement As the government never approved any versions 
o f the plan there was a long period in 2007-2008 where it was not clear how the 
consolidation phase would be achieved, and no alternative to determining whether full 
reconstitution has been achieved has yet been identified.
The legitimacy o f the SA was also called into question by members o f the AMP 
government for a variety o f reasons, including that it had been signed by the previous 
government, and concerns regarding its legality were raised.152 The Provedor had previously 
raised concerns about the constitutionality o f any vetting process, recommending that the 
process needed to be codified and suggesting that international police forces should 
provide assistance in this matter (Provedoria dos Direitos Humanos e Justica 2006).153 This 
recommendation was however disregarded. As discussed below, in late 2008 it was 
ultimately determined by the Court o f Appeal that the SA was in fact not applicable as it 
had not been ratified by Parliament and published in the Jomal de Kepublica.
There was no sense o f any ‘local ownership’ o f the SA, even by an attenuated definition. It 
took considerable pressure from local advocacy N G O  La’o Hamutuk to get the 
arrangement made public. The lack o f ownership was exacerbated by the time taken for the 
arrangement to be translated into Tetum. A bilateral adviser reported that in 2007 Minister 
o f the Interior, Alcino Barris, “went ballistic” when he realised what it contained.'54
6.3.2 The RRRD Plans
In January 2007 U N PO L completed an assessment o f the technical and administrative 
competencies o f the PNTL, including internal accountability mechanisms (United Nations 
2008e). This formed the basis for preparing an Organizational Strategic Plan for Reform, 
Restructuring and Rebuilding the PN TL (hereafter the RRRD plan). U N PO L  completed 
several versions o f the RRRD with little or no input from the PN T L .155 N one o f the 
versions was translated into any language that would have made it accessible for East
112 Interview with UNMIT staff, Dili November 2007
The Provedor’s position on this issue was expressed in response to plans that preceded the Supplemental 
Arrangement. These were the Recovery Sub-Plan (version 0.5), Reinstatement Plan (version 0.1) and the 
Concept Paper provided to the Provedor by the Australian Federal Police Commander on 14 July 2006.
1l4 Interview with bilateral adviser, Dili 20 June 2007.
1:0 In this thesis I have relied on a June 2007 draft, referred to as Version 4 and the January 11 2008 version, 
which appears to have undergone substantial revision. The expert policing mission refers to “various 
drafts...yet to be finalized” (United Nations 2008e: 9).
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Timorese recipients.1'6 N one o f the versions was ever agreed to by the government. Rather, 
Minister o f  Interior, Alcino Bärris, in a letter to U N PO L  Commissioner Rodolfo Tor dated 
24 April 2007, extensively criticised the plan. Minister Barris noted, among other things, 
that the plan lacked costings, had considerable duplications, inconsistencies and weaknesses 
and was not oriented to the local context. Perhaps most damningly he alleged extensive 
plagiarism in the plan. He dem onstrated that parts o f the plan are taken, w ithout 
acknowledgement, from sources as diverse as Wikipedia and documents o f the Feinberg 
School o f Medicine, Northwestern University in the USA (Minister o f Interior 2007).
The quality o f the June 2007 version o f the RRRD was particularly poor. The plan appears 
to have been written by committee and includes quite unusual contributions, such as the 
excerpt below (complete with multiple typographical and grammatical errors) in the section 
on Hum an Resources, which is clearly not relevant to the task o f police reform:
For instance, during the exodus o f Israelis from Egypt in search o f the 
‘Promise Land’, Moses was confronted with a problem on hoe to manage 
the huge num ber o f Israelites with him. His leadership style based on the 
following proverbial; phrase has been duplicated and applied successfully by 
any organization this date ‘For this things is too heavy for thee, thou art not 
to perform  it thyself alone. I give thee counsel. T hou shall provide out o f 
the people able men and place such over them, to be rulers o f thousands 
and rulers o f fifties and rulers o f  ten. And let them judge people at all 
seasons, and it shall be that great matter they shall bring unto thee, but 
every small matter that shall judge so that it shall be easier for thyself and 
they shall bear the burden with thee (UNM IT 2007a: 123)
An interesting perspective on local ownership is evident in the comments o f the former 
Deputy Special Representative o f the Secretary-General (DSRSG), Eric Tan, on the RRRD 
plan in an interview with ICG in September 2007. He stated that although the UN police 
wrote the RRR plan, the PN T L  “became co-authors” following presentation to the 
governm ent (International Crisis G roup 2008: 7). This corresponds to both Nathan and 
Arnstein’s contention, discussed in chapter 1, that local ownership (or participation) is 
frequently misconstrued as meaning to gain agreement to a predetermined outcom e 
(Arnstein 1969; Nathan 2007b).
The RRRD was criticised extensively by a UN expert policing mission which noted that the 
plan did not reflect the SA. The mission also expressed concern regarding “national 
ownership o f  the plan, since it had not been prepared with the active participation o f local 
stakeholders” and concluded that “ the docum ent cannot be used as a basis for the reform, 
restructuring and rebuilding o f the national police in its current format and will require
0 6  pers Comm, bilateral adviser May 2009.
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substantive changes” (United Nations 2008e:9). It is o f note that U N PO L Commissioner 
Luis Carillho claimed that the RRRD was being used as the basis for the handover o f 
policing responsibilities from U N PO L to PN TL in July 2009. This will be discussed further 
in section 6.8.
6.3.3 R egistration , vetting, certifying
From  the outset there was considerable confusion about who was carrying out the 
registration and screening process o f the PNTL. Poor communication between the 
government and U N M IT was highlighted when it became apparent that serving PN TL 
members were required to register with both U N PO L  and the Ministry o f the Interior. For 
quite some time senior UN officials would not believe their own staff who told them that 
the government was running their own process, although it was known that the Provedor 
was receiving lists o f registered PN TL for com m ent from both organisations.157 From  June 
2007 the UN was claiming the two processes had been consolidated (UNM IT 2007b). 
However, different people continued to tell me different things about who owned the 
process. In June 2007 I was told by the UN RRRD Coordinator that it was a UN process, 
no longer anything to do with the government, and that the government evaluation panel 
had been disbanded.158 I rang the Minister o f the Interior’s office, who told me it was news 
to them that their panel had been disbanded. Attem pts to merge the two processes have 
never been entirely successful.
In interviews conducted in 2007 and 2009, I found that UN officials were frustrated by 
successive East Timorese governm ent’s lack o f interest in carrying out the evaluation 
process, with delays o f six months to a year between meetings o f the government- 
controlled Evaluation Panel.159 In many ways the PN TL were disengaged from the process. 
An U N M IT official reported that police he had visited in Baucau were “ just waiting for the 
screening process to blow over” .16" Another researcher who visited Viqueque police station
157 Interview with UNMIT HRTJS staff, 12 June 2007.
158 Interview with RRRD Coordinator, 21 June 2007.
1,9 ICG notes that Timorese investigation teams did not work after 2007, with UN police continuing 
investigations (International Crisis Group 2009b: 7). On coming to power the AMP government {AUattfapara 
Maioria Parlamentär — Alliance o f the Parliamentary Majority) also expressed frustrations with the process, 
establishing a Commission for the Evaluation of the PNTL119 which replaced the one o f  the same name 
established by the previous government. In January 2008 the Commission was tasked with developing and 
presenting to the Secretary o f State for Security within fifteen days a detailed report on the development and 
actual state o f the Evaluation Process (Repubüea Democrätica de Timor-Leste, Secretana de Estado da 
Seguran^a, and Secretariado da Triagem da PNTL 2008), although it appears the report was never produced.
160 Pers. Comm. UNMIT PAO staff January 2008. Although there was a lack of interest in the process at 
the senior levels, individual PNTL members wanting information on the status o f their certification have 
found it hard to obtain. A senior PNTL officer responsible for Human Resources reported in July 2009 that 
he had been asked the same questions over and over by different UNPOL officers in relation to certification
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in January 2008 found that none o f the police there, including the Commander, knew that 
they had been screened.161
The limitations on U N M IT’s effective power in the screening and certification process also 
became evident. In 2007 two uncertified PN TL officers were prom oted to senior positions 
by the Minister o f the Interior. Jorge M onteiro was prom oted to be Deputy Com mander o f 
O perations162 and Inspector Delfim da Silva was prom oted to be Deputy Com mander o f 
Dili District. UN M IT had recommended M onteiro be dismissed for integrity' reasons and 
da Silva had been cited for a missing firearm. In an internal memo the SRSG, Atul Khare, 
warned that “ the tireless efforts o f many who strived hard over the last several m onths to 
ensure no PN TL officers with disciplinary or criminal cases against them are allowed back 
into the force may now have been negated” (Dodd 2007). This continued to be an 
embarrassment and frustration for the UN when in April 2007 the PN TL Police Academy 
held its anniversary celebrations when the two deputies m entioned above took a prom inent 
position on the dignitaries’ dais.163
In interviews conducted in July 2009 respondents were asked to reflect on how the 
screening could have been done differently or better. M ost international actors who have 
been involved in either the certification process or the handover assessments felt that an 
intrinsic failure o f the screening process stemmed from its hybrid nature and the 
government’s lack o f courage or will to dismiss anyone. Some argued that the process 
should have been either a purely international one, providing East Timorese actors with 
some distance from difficult decisions, or a purely East Timorese process with only 
technical assistance provided by international actors. Instead, the hybrid process became 
subject to subterranean battles over who would ‘really’ control whether a PN T L  member 
stayed or went — a battle that is not yet over. Many international actors felt that the value o f 
the screening process was limited, although they hoped that the process may yet weed out 
“ the worst o f  the w orst” . However, this has not yet happened. O ne international advisor 
was critical o f the process for falsely promising that the process would deliver a ‘squeaky 
clean’ police force — something it could never achieve; he argued that it would have been 
more useful to focus on issues o f reconciliation. PN TL officers were generallv not positive
processes. This highlighted the absence of a mechanism for UNPOL who were handling certification cases to 
provide handover information to arriving UNPOL before leaving the mission. As a result, incoming UNPOL 
have no information to proceed and need to start again (Wilson and Belo 2009).
161 Pers. Comm. International researcher February 2008.
162 In December 2009 ICG reported that Jorge Monteiro, who remains uncertified, had recently been 
appointed as head of the Interpol office in East Timor (International Crisis Group 2009b: 7).
163 Interview with bilateral adviser, Dili June 2007.
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about the screening process, some also noting that it had not furthered the continued 
perceived need for reconciliation. The need to balance accountability and reconciliation is a 
com m on post-conflict dilemma, never more so than in East Timor. Members o f 
government and PN TL leaned toward a greater emphasis on reconciliation. Most UN staff 
continued to express the importance o f accountability. The Secretary o f State for Security, 
Francisco Guterres, reflected that if he had been in government in 2006 he would have 
focused on Dili rather than the districts which (with some exceptions) continued to work 
as normal. He felt that the screening had demoralised the PN TL for two reasons. He 
argued that the districts had continued to do good work but were penalised as a result o f  a 
primarily Dili-based crisis He also complained that the UN had wanted to “roll everything 
back to 2002” rather than just consider the events o f 2006. This had led to a situation 
where those who had been punished for previous disciplinary issues were then punished 
again when those issues were raised in screening.164
Throughout the process there was pressure on the UN from the East Timorese authorities 
for the redeployment o f PNTL, regardless o f whether they had been certified or passed 
their firearms certification. The U N SG ’s report o f  28 August 2007 noted that “ there is 
frustration among some national police officers who question the need for UNM IT police, 
as the national force did not disintegrate in the districts as it did in Dili” (United Nations 
2007a: 7). The U N SG ’s Report from January 2008 notes that
a num ber o f Timorese leaders, including the Prime Minister, the Secretary 
o f State for Security and the General Com mander Designate o f the national 
police, have publicly raised concerns regarding the pace o f the certification 
process and have appealed for increased operational tasks to be given to 
national police officers as well as accelerated handover o f policing 
responsibilities in the districts. In addition, some concerns have been raised 
regarding the inadequate number o f U N M IT police with appropriate 
training skill sets (United Nations 2008a: 7).
A final problem to be noted with the certification process is that the processes used and 
the capacities required o f PN TL were highly changeable over time and consequently there 
is a question mark over the integrity o f the certification process. The expert policing 
mission noted that the process was “relatively unsystematic” and “also lacked a defined 
certification policy outlining the certification process as well as detailed certification criteria 
and decision-making modalities” (United Nations 2008e: 11).
164 Interview with Secretary of State for Security, Francisco Guterres, 9 July 2009.
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It would have been much better to wait till the process was complete and then assess 
everyone for final certification. However, pressure on the UN from the government meant 
that final certification was brought forward, with attendant doubtful meaning.
6.3.4 Training and Mentoring
The capacity o f the UN to carry out the training o f police once they had been screened and 
then to follow on with six months mentoring before final certification were both stretched 
to the limit. The requirement to carry out executive policing drained capacity to do police­
building, particularly during periodic spikes in violence as happened in February 2007 due 
to rice shortages or in March 2007 when international security forces attem pted to 
apprehend Alfredo Reinado.
Although training was subcontracted to the A FP/A usA ID  Timor-Leste Police 
Development Program (TLPDP) delays continued as the TLPD P program was not 
prepared to go outside Dili to provide training for security reasons. In Dili the Police 
Academy was still being used as an ID P camp. This meant there was no capacity to provide 
accommodation to police from outside Dili.
There was initial difficulty in getting PN TL to attend the course and absenteeism was high. 
Ambivalence about the screening and certification process from Minister o f Interior Alcino 
Barns contributed to the difficulty o f getting PN TL members to attend training. Although 
I did not have the opportunity to assess the training, serious limitations are inevitable in 
any course that is limited to five days.
The m entoring program also suffered from problems. The development o f m entoring 
guidelines remained a work in progress and the competencies required o f PN TL were 
scaled down from ten to four (one o f which was punctuality!).161 In 2008 m entoring was 
reduced from six m onths to eight weeks, guidelines were further relaxed, and PN TL 
mentored each other when U N PO L could not. This sped up certification but further 
diminished its integrity (International Crisis G roup 2009b: 7). In 2007 the praedee o f 
mentoring was described by UN officials and bilateral advisers variously as “not mentoring 
as we perceive it” , “ the weak link in the chain”, “a bit dysfunctional” and “hit and miss” . 
UN officials interviewed in 2008 and 2009 have subsequently argued that “we are not set 
up for it” and stated that “we are not going to do it anymore as we’re no good at it” .
161 Interviews with UNMIT and UNPOL staff, November 2007.
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Mentoring also suffered as U N PO L Formed Police Units (FPUs)166 refused to go on patrol 
claiming it was not in their mandate.16
Reports o f the UNSG began to be unusually frank about the problems the UN was 
experiencing with mentoring, noting PN T L  resistance to m entoring and supervision and 
citing low numbers o f UNPOL, the high turnover o f personnel, the operational rather than 
capacity-building experience o f m ost U N PO L  and the inadequate num ber o f U N PO L with 
experience in dealing with gender-based violence — a problem that makes up a major 
portion o f crime in East Tim or (United Nations 2008a). Although these issues were 
starting to be acknowledged at headquarters level, in East Tim or the UN continued to put 
a brave face on the matter. The U N PO L Commissioner, )uan Carlos Arevalo, informed me 
that every PN TL member is m entored every day and a report written on it, a manifestly 
fabulous claim. When I pushed him on this, saying PNTL in Oecussi were not being 
mentored, he replied that it might be necessary to change the definition o f mentoring!168
The U N PO L Com mander in Oecussi explained to me that in any case it was not really 
going to be possible to do any substantial m entoring in the subdistricts as the facilities were 
not o f a sufficient standard o f habitability for U N PO L, with no availability o f water or 
toilets, and that it was further complicated by bad roads and language barriers.'69 Instead 
PNTL were essentially being left to run the district themselves while U N PO L  remained 
disengaged from the process. O ne U N PO L  member that 1 interviewed, who had been in 
Oecussi for four m onths, did not know who the PN TL District Com mander was.17" 
Another U N PO L member informed me (incorrectly) that U N PO L  have no powers o f 
arrest and that consequently they just watch the PN TL do it. He also explained that part o f 
his role was to visit the middle and upper schools and explain the dangers o f “ falling in 
with the wrong crowd”.171
6.3.5 R esu m ption
Sustained pressure from the East Timorese governm ent for the handover to commence 
culminated in a letter from the Secretary o f State for Security to the Deputy SRSG dated 16 
December 2008 (Secretary o f State for Security 2008). The letter outlined a proposal for
166 The UN is increasingly using Formed Police Units (FPUs) which arrive in mission as a contingent rather 
than as individual police officers and are more paramilitary in nature (Greener 2008).
167 Interview with UNMIT staff, Dili November 2007.
168 Interview with UNPOL Commissioner, Dili 12 November 2007.
169 Interview with UNPOL Oecussi District Commander 31 October 2007.
170 Interview with UNPOL member Oecussi 3 November 2007.
171 Interview with UNPOL officer Oecussi 2 November 2007.
advancing a full resumption o f responsibility by the PNTL commencing on 27 March 
2009. The central elements o f  the proposal were an entry into the consolidation phase, 
followed by a comprehensive independent assessment to gauge the administrative, 
institutional and operational readiness o f the PNTL. The independent assessment would 
then be used to determine whether the PN TL was ‘fully reconstituted’. The Secretary o f 
State’s proposal for an independent commission was predicated on an acknowledgement 
that “ the United Nations and Timorese authorities have both been deeply involved in the 
reform process, which means that neither enjoys the necessary remove to look at the 
readiness o f the PN TL in a dispassionate manner” .
The Secretary o f State’s proposal generated significant anxiety within UNM IT. The 
DSRSG’s reply on 5 January 2009 (UNM IT DSRSG 2009) displayed no interest in the 
proposal as outlined and reiterated their preferred model oi joint U N M IT /P N T L  
assessments, albeit under a rubric o f ‘joint assessment’. The Secretary o f State in his 
response o f 9 February 2009 (Secretary o f State for Security 2009) acceded to the DSRSG’s 
counter-proposal while emphasising the need for further discussion regarding the 
independent com m ission.'72
In 2008 joint technical teams (JTT), supported by joint field assessment teams (JFAT), 
were established to determine in which districts the PNTL would begin to resume full 
responsibility, with an expectation that all districts would do so by the end o f 2009.173 All 
teams comprise equal num ber o f members from U N M IT /U N P O L , Office o f the Secretary 
o f State for Security (SoSS) and PNTL. Four assessment criteria are being applied: (a) the 
ability o f the PN TL to respond appropriately to the security environment in a given 
district; (b) hnal certification o f at least 80 per cent ot eligible PN TL officers in a given 
district/unit to be handed over; (c) the availability ol initial operational logistical 
requirements; and d) institutional stability (United Nations 2009a: 6-7). The process 
suffered from a num ber o f weaknesses as the assessment tool did not comprehensively 
assess the required criteria, JFAT members were unclear o f expectations placed upon them
172 The handover and associated monitoring arrangements were subsequendy agreed on 13 May 2009 in an 
exchange of letters and attached Annex between the Prime Minister and the SRSG. Associated monitoring 
arrangements were described in a joint memo (dated 28 April 2009) from the UNPOL Police Commissioner 
and PNTL Commander General outlining the responsibilities of UNPOL in the consolidation phase. A Joint 
Directive from the Secretary of State for Security and the UNPOL Police Commissioner (dated 14 May 2009) 
agreed to the Resumption of the Primary Responsibility for the Conduct of Police Operations by the Policia 
Nacional de Timor-Leste within the District of Lautem.
173 However, as at the end of November 2009 only three districts and the Police Academy have been handed 
over.
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and were not given adequate training,174 there were clear scoring anomalies (Murray 2009) 
and there was an overemphasis on assessing district headquarters rather than the 
subdistricts.
O n 14 May 2009 the process o f ‘handing over’ policing responsibility from U N PO L to 
PN TL in East Tim or commenced with the eastern-most district o f Lautem.175 This is 
formally referred to as the ‘resumption’ o f PN TL responsibility'. This handover occurred a 
little more than six years since Lautem was handed over to PN TL after the first attempt by 
the UN to build a police force for East Timor. The 2009 Lautem handover was followed 
by handovers in the districts o f  Manatuto and Oecussi and a handover o f the Police 
Academy, in what is anticipated to be a district-by-district and unit-by-unit handover. 
Meanwhile overall executive policing is maintained by U N PO L .176 The handover represents 
a penultimate ‘consolidation’ phase, to be followed (at a yet to be determined time) by the 
resumption by PN TL o f full executive policing responsibility'. This is referred to as the ‘full 
reconstitution’ phase.
6.4 The UNMIT Security Sector Review
In addition to the reform, restructuring and rebuilding o f  the PNTL, U NM IT was also 
mandated to provide assistance to the East Timorese government to carry out a Security 
Sector Review. A Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU) was established with responsibility 
for the review. U N M IT’s difficulty in recruiting and deploying sufficient numbers and 
calibre o f U N PO L also affected civilian deployments. It took two years for the SSSU to fill 
their identified positions. This made the work o f setting a direction for the unit and 
establishing critical relationships with government interlocutors very difficult.
When I met with SSSU staff more than a year after com m encem ent o f the mission, in 
Novem ber 2007, it was clear that the staff felt excluded from any real processes to do with 
the security sector. Staff were approaching the review with some trepidation and sense o f
174 Interviews with JFAT members July 2009
17:1 On 4 February 2008, under pressure from the East Timorese government, three police posts in Dili had a 
a ‘transfer of authority’ to the PNTL (Bairro Pite, Bidau and Mercado Lama). It appears there was no process 
for this handover, and this early handover does not feature in the United Nations or East Timorese 
Government narrative regarding the contemporary handover. The UN expert policing mission visited these 
police posts in 2008 and found that “those posts were inadequately prepared for the transition, including in 
respect of basic logistical support, raising many questions about possible future larger-scale handovers” 
(United Nations 2008e: 7).
176 In December 2009 ICG noted that initially it had been hoped to hand over one district or unit every five 
weeks but following the handover of the Police Academy no handovers occurred in the following three 
months (International Crisis Group 2009b: 13).
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pointlessness, as they felt that the government was acting independently, pre-empting the 
review and not informing them of what was being done.
SSSU advisers responded by refocusing their role on sourcing advisers to be placed within 
the F-FDTL and Ministries o f Interior and Defence, something that had been previously 
requested by Jose Ram os-Horta.177 Flowever, this represented a serious ‘sequencing’ 
problem — sourcing advisers when there was no clear process or policy framework to 
establish what they should be advising upon or what skills they should have. Com m on to 
many advisers in East Timor, those I spoke to had not ventured far outside the capital, 
Dili. After I had travelled to Oecussi it became apparent that much o f what I had been told 
about the situation in the districts by the staff o f the SSSU did not reflect the realities on 
the ground.178 This underlined a further problem, that management o f the security sector 
review and police reform was not connected within the U N M IT structure.
Given that the SSSU staff seemed to be so lacking in confidence about their role, it was 
interesting that they described themselves as being involved in a process o f ‘confidence 
building’ for the government, which included the convening o f educational seminars. In 
2007 three o f these seminars were convened on the topic o f SSR. During these seminars 
East Timorese leaders expressed scepticism about the U N ’s capacity to assist with reform, 
given its track record on building security institutions to date (International Crisis Group 
2008: 'll) . '79 Meanwhile the UN reported back positively on the outcomes of the seminars 
(United Nations 2007a: 9).
It was not until June 2008, almost two years after the beginning o f the UNM IT mission, 
that the Prime Minister signed a project docum ent worth USD 1 223 226 in support o f  a 
review o f the security sector. 180 Until this stage the project docum ent had been through at 
least three iterations. The Security Sector Review Project is a joint U N M IT /U N D P  project 
which includes the following activities: a) a functional analysis o f governance institutions 
and state and non-state security institutions, b) a gap analysis o f institutional and regulator}'
,77Pers. comm.UNMIT staff April 2008.
178 As an example the Dili-based SSSU policing advisor told me that under no circumstances were uncertified 
PNTL allowed to ‘work’ (Interview with SSSU policing adviser 28 October 2007), yet when I got to Oecussi I 
was informed by the UNPOL District Commander that the PNTL do all the work and UNPOL just monitor 
(Interview with UNPOL Oecussi District Commander 31 October 2007).
179 The ICG also recounts how a high-level East Timorese official, in a subsequent interview, was “explicit in 
his distaste” about the utility o f the UN in relation to the security sector review. In an interview-with ICG, 
Roque Rodrigues, Presidential Adviser on SSR, was critical o f UNMIT, claiming it was displaying arrogance 
in the way that it was allocating its security sector advisors to East Timorese bodies (International Crisis 
Group 2008: 11).
180 At the time of the signing of the document S223 226 of the budget was unfunded.
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gaps relevant to the security sector, c) a threat analysis and d) a strategic environment 
review. As o f Novem ber 2009, almost a year and a half later, none o f these activities has 
occurred. In fact in interviews in )uly 2009 both the head o f the SSSU and the UND P 
Project Manager for the review agreed that the review, as such, would not happen.181 Given 
the difficulties staff o f the SSSU had in establishing relationships with the East Timorese 
government, it is possible that even if the process had proceeded it might have had no 
correspondence to the likely considerable and significant decision-making by structures o f 
power and networks not visible to international actors.
Following the release o f the U N SG ’s report on U N M IT in February 2009 (United Nations 
2009a), Della-Giacoma argued that
even after setting this modest task, two and a half years later we are still 
waiting for substantive progress on the review. Last week, in two brief 
paragraphs, the Secretary-General reported the mission's 'security sector 
review project' had resulted in the formation o f a project board that had . 
met three times to approve a 'training-of-trainers course' for unarmed civil 
security, funded a seminar, planned future seminars, had given in-principle 
approval for a public opinion survey on security issues, conducted some 
radio maintenance, and was planning to hire a few 'experts' for the 
M oD [Ministry o f Defence] and parliament.
These projects hardly constitute a comprehensive review and are more like 
the bread and butter o f a U N D P country team than a core function o f a 
Security Council-mandated peace operation (Della-Giacoma 2009).
The failures o f the review process are also captured in the Minutes o f the ‘Partners’ 
Meeting on the Seminars on the Reform and Developm ent o f the Security Sector’ held on 
11 February 2009. Large numbers o f senior level participants attended, yet both the topic 
and conduct o f the meeting were strangely anemic.182 The agenda included only two items, 
the publication o f the previous SSR seminar proceedings and the topic for the next 
seminar. Discussion entailed minutiae about how many copies o f the previous proceedings 
should be published and the novel idea that they should be published in three languages 
(English, Tetum  and Portuguese). A decision was taken that the publication plan should be 
approved at the following m onth’s meeting. A seminar on National Security Policy was 
proposed, with the suggestion that participants take this back to their organisations for
181 Interview with Chief, SSSU, UNMIT 6 July 2009, interview with UNDP Project Manager 7 July 2009.
182 Thirteen people were present, including the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Security Matters, a 
representative from Parliamentary Committee B on Defence and Security, the Chief o f Staff o f the Secretary 
o f State o f Defence, an Advisor to the Secretary o f  State for Security, two representatives from the SSSU and 
five representatives from the Coordinating Committee for the Reform and Development o f the Security 
Sector (CCRDSS) — two o f these representatives were the former Minister o f Interior and the former Minister 
o f Defence.
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discussion. It was also suggested that having an interpreter there would facilitate the next 
meeting; a date for the meeting was to be set ‘later’. One o f the members o f the CCRDSS 
commented, apparently randomly, that SSR “should be based on the past, the present and 
the future” . It is disturbing that such an apparently high level meeting (yet without an 
interpreter) was convened to discuss things so trivial, and yet apparently without the 
authority to make any decisions. It raises the question o f where the real decisions regarding 
the security sector are made and who the decision-makers are.
O ne o f the difficulties facing the SSSU in relation to the review was that it had always been 
clear that the review itself was the responsibility o f the East Timorese government and that 
the role o f  the UN mission was to ‘assist’. As long as the government was unwilling to 
commit to the process o f a review and to involve the UN, the ‘assistance’ framework was 
always going to encounter obstacles. The crisis further sensitized the political elite to 
security issues, and they became very reluctant to engage in the review. However, several 
factors made the government want to seem to be committed to security reform, despite 
evidence to the contrary. O ne o f these factors was the severity o f the crisis, which included 
the unravelling o f the security forces and security in general and led to the necessity to 
invite international forces to restore order and to ask the UN to re-establish a mission. 
That the government o f East Tim or needed help and needed it quickly in May 2006 is 
something upon which all parties would probably agree.
W hether they were quite as enthusiastic about a SSR process that was unfamiliar and 
implied a further loss o f control is more doubtful. However, the government was in no 
position to reject the package o f measures that was being offered. The agreement, however, 
has proved to be particularly unstable, arguably superficial, and the gap between design and 
implementation is substantial.
O n the international side UNM IT generally, and the SSSU more specifically, were unsure 
how to proceed, how to establish the difficult relationship with a sovereign government 
that was going to be fundamental for the review to commence, and did not have enough 
people with the right skills to actually carry out the work (Della-Giacoma 2009). In 
addition, the SSSU had no money in its 2007-2008 budget to support the review.'83 Further 
reasons for difficulties in getting the Security Sector Review to ‘take hold’ in East Timor 
have been highlighted by Peake:
183 Pers. Comm. Bilateral adviser May 2009
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the phrase ‘SSR’ has little traction within Timor-Leste. Profound 
uncertainty remains as to what the phrase actually means. The phrase may 
be intimately familiar to headquarters-based policymakers, but it is still 
somewhat alien to those on the ground actually engaging in reform (Peake 
2008b: 2).
Previous UN failures in Tim or in the area o f security development has similarly made 
U N M IT feel a need to seem to be getting on with the job o f carrying out/supporting a 
security sector review in the same way that the East Timorese government feels compelled 
to appear to be doing so. It is clear that a review that is any more than a ‘ritual’ document 
will not happen; something admitted by both U N D P and SSSU staff. A range o f parallel 
security sector reform structures established by the East Timorese government have also 
produced little.
6.5 Political context
Successive East Timorese governments have had no experience in constructing state-based 
security systems or in carrying out processes o f formal institutional change and 
accompanying policy and legislative development. In addition they are suspicious o f the 
motives and capacities o f internationals charged with assisting with police-building and 
security sector reform, and are nervous about the incursions into sovereignty that 
international assistance represents. The East Timorese political leadership across the 
political spectrum has been reluctant to work with the UN. However, there is also a bigger 
pattern o f resistance to any kind o f oversight mechanisms or scrutiny o f security sector 
developments and legislation. As the ICG has noted:
Most security sector legislation since independence has been passed by 
decree, by-passing Parliament and consequently missing out on an 
im portant source o f scrutiny, transparency and legitimacy (International 
Crisis G roup 2008:9).
Successive governm ent’s have also been reluctant to engage members o f civil society on 
discussions on the security forces, including what is really wanted or required in a police 
force. To judge from accounts o f meetings o f the Presidential Security Sector Working 
Group, some members o f that group fear that attem pts to involve civilians in achieving a 
consensus about the roles o f the security forces might re-open previous conflicts between 
and within the forces and society more broadly.
In addition, during the time period covered by this chapter, many important, but 
distracting, events occurred, including Presidential and Parliamentary elections that resulted 
in a (disputed) change o f government. There was also a poorly-managed pursuit o f Alfredo 
Reinado, which involved extraordinary numbers o f people acting within and beyond their
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formal mandate — sometimes simultaneously and at odds with each other. Enorm ous 
efforts were required to solve the problem o f  the petitioners and to begin to solve the 
problem o f the IDPs. From  February 2008 the government had to manage the attacks on 
the President and Prime Minister and the subsequent hunting down o f those responsible. 
Substantial focus on SSR appears to have been difficult. However, even when headway had 
been made on these issues, enthusiasm for police-building and SSR under international 
auspices had, if anything, waned even further.
Political leaders have made conflicting statements about the trustworthiness and 
competence o f the PNTL. There have been many statements dem onstrating a lack o f faith 
in the PN T L .184 However, undermining o f the police force is complicated by a sovereignty 
discourse best understood as “ they [the PNTL] might be incom petent bastards but they are 
our incom petent bastards” . Because o f disquiet with the slow pace o f UN process on 
reforming the police, concern that hard won sovereignty might slip away, and the need to 
normalise an unstable situation there was no shortage o f statements about the importance 
o f getting the Timorese police back on the streets as quickly as possible even if they had 
not been registered, screened or certified (United Nations 2008e: 7; International Crisis 
G roup 2009b: 22).
Tension has existed from the beginning o f the process between successive East Timorese 
governments’ purported support o f a police reconstruction process and a desire to 
demonstrate sovereignty7 and independence on such a flagship issue. Consequently, 
reconstruction o f the PN TL has not run smoothly, with both technical and political 
challenges evident. It is now clear that the East Timorese government has tired o f the 
international security presence. Many leaders in East Timor, as a result, have criticised the 
presence o f international military and police. These criticisms have come from the Prime 
Minister, the Secretary o f  State for Security, the Secretary o f State for Defence, the Chief o f 
Staff o f the F-FDTL, and the current and former PNTL Com mander General.185 These 
sentiments are also echoed by opposition parties. Secretary o f State for Defence Julio Pinto 
recently stated that “what we do know is that if we compare the character, self-confidence 
and performance o f some PN TL members with some U N PO L members, ours are much 
better” (Pinto 2009). Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak made his position clear in a 
newspaper interview when he stated that “ foreign forces should have left Timor-Leste by 
now” (As forcas estrangeiras "ja deviam ter saido" de Tim or Leste 2009).
184 See e.g. Timor Post 4, 5, 7, and 8 June 2007, and Suara Timor Lorosa’e 7 and 8 June 2007.
18:> Paradoxically these statements often alternate with media comments from the same people about hoping 
that UNPOL will stay till 2012.
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Both UN Headquarters and the East Timorese government have expressed concerns about 
the reform  process, including the methods and the integrity o f  the reconstruction process. 
This led to two important visits from New York-based UN officials to assess the realities 
on the ground. A Security Council mission visited East Tim or from 24 to 30 Novem ber 
2007 and expressed disquiet about the effectiveness o f UNPOL. Subsequently the expert 
police mission noted in relation to PNTL that “ tremendous institutional gaps persist, 
including weak management and command and control, lack o f core capacities (e.g., 
investigations), and an almost total absence o f logistics and systems maintenance capacity” 
(United Nations 2008e: 2). Although many problems with the international police 
reconstruction process were identified by both UN headquarters and the East Timorese 
government it appeared to occasion little change to the trajectory that the poorly conceived 
and executed project was taking.
6.6 Regulatory ritualism
In preceding sections I have argued that issues o f relationship and capacity and contests 
over sovereignty have affected the processes o f police reconstruction and SSR. In this 
section I argue that the paralysis that has gripped the process can be understood in terms 
o f regulatory ritualism. This ritualism serves to obscure a vast gulf between the parties. The 
UN has a stated commitment to importing a Weberian model o f state security, although it 
has a manifest incapacity to carry out such a venture even if the East Timorese leadership 
were willing partners. The East Timorese leadership is committed to the personalised 
exercise o f power and is suspicious o f models o f impartial security' forces. This impasse 
leads to both sides pretending to carry out police and broader security sector reform.
The phenom enon o f pretending to do something rather than actually doing it has been 
discussed by Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite (2007) in relation to nursing home 
regulation. The authors provide extensive examples from the aged care environment such 
as when emphasis is placed on the setting up o f residents committees rather than making 
sure that the committees do anything. The authors refer to this process as regulatory 
ritualism.
In developing their analysis o f regulatory ritualism the authors use M erton’s typology o f 
individual adaptation to a normative order — conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism 
and rebellion (Merton 1968). Rather than carrying out a process o f security sector 
review/reform  and police reconstruction, both the East Timorese government and the UN 
have been engaged in a mutually reinforcing process o f regulatory ritualism. It is not only in 
East Tim or that post-conflict governments say what they think donors want to hear. They
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do this in order to be accorded the status ot ‘functioning’ rather than ‘tailed’ state, which in 
turn ensures continued diplomatic and financial support. Hills has noted in relation to 
Rwanda that
the regime consistently used the language donors wanted to hear ...and  
providfed] training courses on subjects such as stress management, trauma 
counselling and gender-based violence, while tolerating extrajudicial killings 
by government soldiers, the deaths o f thousands o f unarmed civilians (Hills 
2009a: 145).
Evidence o f this form o f regulatory ritualism in relation to police reconstruction and SSR 
in East Tim or is found in an increasing failure to distinguish the role o f the police and the 
military, in the decision to begin the hand-back o f executive policing responsibility from 
the UN to an unreconstituted PN T L  in March 2009, and in the failure to produce a review 
o f the security sector for over three years — despite the allocation o f at least USD 1 223 226 
to support the process (Repüblica Democratica de Timor-Leste, UNM IT, and U N D P 
2008):186 The partners meeting detailed in section 6.4 leaves the distinct impression that a 
ritual committee is having a ritual meeting.
The alternating use o f ritualism and rebellion by the East Timorese government, and 
ritualism and retreatism by the UN, has served to obscure the ambivalence o f all parties for 
a security reform agenda in East Timor. The East Timorese government has gone through 
the ritualism o f publicly expressing support for the SSR process, setting up various securitv 
related bodies such as the ‘three tiered m echanism ’, participating in seminars and signing 
the U N D P project document. It has also participated, albeit tepidly, in the evaluation o f 
PNTL as part o f the RRR process. The ritualism o f the UN follows the same path.
Where the organisations diverge is in the ‘rebellion’ or hostility towards the UN presence 
and role that is intermittently displayed by figures such as the Prime Minister, the Secretary 
o f State for Security, the Secretary o f State for Defence, and the former and current 
Commander-General o f the PNTL. This hostility will sometimes manifest in decisions 
taken, and decisions thwarted by, the East Timorese government. This is described in this 
chapter in relation to the screening process for the PN TL and is further detailed in chapter 
7 in the decisions surrounding the Joint Com m and and states o f exception. It also 
manifests in the steady stream o f negative statements about foreign forces, including 
U N PO L and the ISF.
186 This figure should, how ever, be viewed in the con tex t o f  the larger expenditure on  U N M IT , w ith one o f  
its central m andated activities being the security sector review.
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For the UN, in addition to the ritualism of appearing to be carrying out a support role to 
the security sector review and police reconstruction, it can be argued they are also engaging 
in retreatism. The UN’s invocation of local ownership allows them to avoid responsibility 
for failing to advance outcomes, and behave passively when the East Timorese government 
behaves in ways contrary to the mandates of the mission and the ideals of the UN. This 
retreatism manifests when the UN fails to insist on seeing through the disciplinary and legal 
processes that should be visited on errant PNTL — theoretically under their control, or 
when they defer to local ownership in expressing approval for the establishment and 
conduct of the Joint Command, although its establishment contravened the terms of the 
SA. More recently it was evident in the failure of the UNMIT mission to speak out on the 
release by East Timorese authorities of indicted war criminal, Martenus Bere, in August 
2009. His extra-judicial release violated international law and undermines the rule of law 
and the Constitution of East Timor, all things that should be at the forefront of UNMTT’s 
agenda (La'o Hamutuk 2009).
Barnett and Zürcher (2009) propose the idea of a ‘peacebuilder’s contract’ which is like 
Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite’s regulatory ritualism framework. The model they 
propose uses gaming theory to explain how peacebuilders, state elites and rural or 
subnational elites form a ‘contract’ with a number of possible outcomes — peacebuilding 
that may be cooperative, compromised, captured, or confrontational. The model is based 
on the authors’ experiences in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Although it has some limits to 
its general applicability", in particular in relation to the role of subnational elites, its 
explanation of why ‘compromised peacebuilding’ is the most likely outcome is compelling 
and resonant with the regulatory ritualism analysis above:
Peacekeepers agree to provide international resources and legitimacy for 
state elites in return for stability and acknowledgement by state elites of the 
legitimacy of peacebuilding reforms. Consequently, this contract reinforces 
the status quo even as it leaves open the possibility for reform. In other 
words, the reforms that do take place will unfold in a way that protects the 
interests of local elites. This outcome can also be seen as symbolic 
peacebuilding. In this way it resembles what sociological institutionalists call 
“ceremonial conformity”. The actor, or organization, wants to maintain the 
stream of material and normative benefits required for its legitimacy and 
survival, but fears that full compliance will be too costly (Meyer and Rowan 
1977:50). Consequentlv it adopts the myths and ceremonies of the 
organizational form, but maintains its existing practices (and in this way 
organizational form and practices become decoupled). It is symbolic or 
ceremonial peacebuilding in that the symbols of reform have been 
transferred and thus there is the surface appearance that there has been a 
transformation of the kind ot state, that is, toward a liberal democracy, even
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though the existing power relations have largely emerged unscathed 
(Barnett and Zürcher 2009: 35)
In the next section I focus on the early stages o f the 2009 U N PO L to PN T L  handover. I 
argue that the enactment o f regulatory ritualism, by both the UN and the East Timorese 
government, in relation to the socially valued goal o f  security, has ensured that the police 
handover is, at many levels, a fiction. U N TA ET’s initial development o f the PN TL was 
hailed as a success; supported by considerable media coverage o f newly-minted, smartly 
uniformed, East Timorese police undergoing rituals o f  com fort such as training, and on 
parade. This provided considerable legitimacy to the international effort. These illusions 
were shattered by the events o f 2006. Once the fires o f the crisis were extinguished, a new 
round o f police-building commenced under U N M IT’s direction but it was equally lacking 
in substance. This time efforts became concentrated on creating an appearance, in fact a 
smoke-screen, that the rituals o f com fort were actually delivering results. In other words, 
what was required was an apt set o f fictions that connected rituals o f security sector 
presence, like parades, to the substance o f security. To take the first fiction below, for a 
handover from U N PO L to PN TL to be a ritual o f com fort for a fearful citizenry or 
anxious UN personnel, it is best grounded in either a reality or a believable fiction that 
U N PO L has an executive policing authority to hand over. The smoke in the title o f this 
thesis takes the form o f a set o f believable fictions. These fictions enable institutionalised 
means for reforming the security sector to generate the appearance that they connect to the 
substance o f security. They legitimate ritualism.
6.7 T he handover: what exactly is being handed over?
O n the face o f it, East Tim or in late 2009 is relatively calm and the handover is progressing 
without notable incident. Three districts and the police academy have been ‘handed back’. 
Below I articulate the many layers o f fiction involved in the handover to dem onstrate that 
although UNM IT and the East Timorese government have different interests, these 
interests are congruent and are manifest in both sides ‘playing along’ with the handover.
The first fiction is that U N POL have an executive policing mandate, articulated in 
the Supplem ental Arrangement, b y  which they are ‘legally’ able to hand over the 
PN TL.
The executive policing mandate o f U N PO L is repeated in many o f the documents 
pertaining to the handover. O n 9 December 2008, however, a little publicised Court o f 
Appeal decision187 in East Tim or threw into grave doubt this assumption o f executive
187 The Court of Appeal in East Timor is currently the highest court in the country. Although there is 
provision for a Supreme Court and a Constitutional Court, these roles are currently filled by the Court of 
Appeal. Case no. 95/CO/2008/TR
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policing. A decision against defendant Aderito da Costa Ximenes Neto, Interim  PN TL 
Commander Baucau, in the District Court was overturned on appeal. N eto had been 
suspended on the order o f UNPOL Commissioner juan Carlos Arevalo on 27 August 
2008, following completion o f a disciplinary process which found that N eto had carried out 
practices that violated human rights. As N eto continued to work while under suspension, 
he was arrested and subsequently convicted, on 14 O ctober 2008, o f committing a false 
identity crime punishable pursuant to article 228 o f the Indonesian Penal Code.188 He was 
sentenced to six months imprisonment, suspended for a period o f twelve months.
The Court o f Appeal decision, however, found that as the SA was not ratified by 
Parliament and promulgated by subsequent publication in the Official gazette, Jornal da 
Republica, as required by the East Timorese Constitution, it did not have the force o f law. It 
also found that the U N PO L Commissioner did not have the legal power to carry out that 
suspension. The implication o f the decision is that the SA has no legal standing under East 
Timorese law, and thus all powers flowing from it have no legal basis either. I f  the U N PO L  
Commissioner does not have the power to suspend he also does not have the power to 
carry out any other executive policing tasks.189
Curiously, it appears to have suited both the East Tim orese government and the UN to 
ignore the decision and disregard the legal limbo that it created. How this squares with the 
UNM1T mandate to prom ote the rule of law, or with Article 1(1) and 6(d) o f the East 
Timorese Constitution that determines that East Tim or is a rule o f law state, is unclear.
The seco n d  fiction is that U N P O L  have, or have had, an effective ‘p ra c tica l’ 
co m m a n d  a n d  con tro l o f  the P N T L .
This would be a pre-requisite for being able to give com m and and control to someone else. 
However, on a day-to-day basis U N PO L exerts little effective control. The PN TL operate 
fairly autonomously, particularly within the ‘special units’ such as the UIR, URP and UPF, 
where there is no collocation o f U N PO L.190
188 Article 228 of the Indonesian Penal Code states that “Any person who with deliberate intent wears 
distinguishing marks or performs an act belonging to an office he does not hold or from which he has been 
suspended, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment o f two years or a maximum fine of three hundred 
rupiah”. The Indonesian Penal Code has subsequently been replaced by the East Timorese Penal Code.
189 A more comprehensive account of the circumstances surrounding the Neto episode can be found at 
Wilson (2009).
190 Under Decree Law 9/2009 Organic Law of Timor-Leste’s National Police (PNTL) the URP has been 
transformed to become the Special Police Unit and the UIR has been transformed to be the Public Order 
Battalion. Although this law was promulgated in February 2009, the original special units were still in 
evidence in July 2009.
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The UIR, URP and UPF were all significantly involved in different ways in the unravelling 
of the security forces and associated violence in 2006.191 However, rather than prioritising 
reforming these units, they have received a ‘hands off treatment from UNMIT, with no 
UNPOL co-located with any of them. The reasons for this decision are unclear but may be 
illuminated by the comment of an UNPOL officer in Oecussi in 2007 who informed me 
there were no UNPOL co-located with the UPF because “they are like soldiers”.192
UNPOL’s lack of effective command and control is also evidenced in the many critical 
decisions that have been taken by PNTL since 2006 without the agreement, or sometimes 
even the knowledge, of UNPOL. This includes the development of the Dili Task Force in 
2007. More critically it includes the creation of the Joint military police Command in 
February 2008, placing PNTL under the command of F-FDTL at a time when they were 
ostensibly under the control of UNPOL. The joint command will be discussed in chapter 
7.
UNPOL’s organisation has exacerbated this lack of effective command and control, as has 
the PNTL’s reluctance to submit to UNPOL control. Shortcomings of UNPOL in East 
Timor in their first attempt to build the PNTL were detailed in chapter 3. More recently 
the UN expert police mission that visited East Timor in early 2008 expressed extensive and 
serious concerns, including the “lack of qualified UNMIT police personnel at all levels”, 
noting that their “operational effectiveness was impeded by... an often partial 
understanding of the applicable law and human rights standards” (United Nations 2008e: 
8,10).191 Given that the shortcomings of UNPOL’s performance were identified eighteen 
months before I conducted my July 2009 interviews, the question should be asked why so 
little has been done to rectify the situation. Despite changes that have occurred in the (still 
under-resourced) UN Police Division at DPKO I IQ,194 little of this is apprehended at 
mission level and even less beyond the edges of Dili.
Some other shortcomings bear repeating. UNPOL continues to have difficulty recruiting 
officers of adequate calibre, in sufficient numbers and in a timely fashion. The ‘national
191 The Col recommended both named and unnamed UIR and URP officers for prosecution and further 
investigation. The Col also notes that members o f  the UIR and URP deserted with Alfredo Reinado, 
members o f the URP were involved in supporting east-west confrontations and subsequent attacks in Fatu 
Ahi, members o f the UIR were involved in the attack at the Comoro market and that significant irregular 
distributions o f UIR weapons occurred.
192 Interview with UNPOL officer Oecussi 2 November 2007.
193 For a more expansive account o f the shortcomings o f U NPO L in East Timor, as detailed by the expert 
policing mission, see Section II Key concerns and issues, and Section III Observations and recommendations 
(United Nations 2008e).
194 For details of recent changes within the UN Police Division see Greener (2009).
184
balance’ model o f deploying forty or more different nationalities o f police to supervise an 
already weak and poorly structured police institution does not work. It is a mistake to 
believe that ‘cops on the beat’ alone have the capacities to establish a public sendee 
organisation.195 An examination o f the changing profile o f police-deploying countries over 
time indicates that an increasing num ber o f police are being deployed from countries with 
poor human rights records.
During interviews in July 2009, conducted in Dili, Baucau, Lautem and Liquica, many 
U N PO L members expressed frustration with the quality and capacity o f their fellow 
UNPOL. They repeatedly questioned why the UN continues to deploy those who are not 
actually police,196 those who are from ‘failed states’ and those who have not passed mission 
requirements related to driving and (English) language. U N PO L members made 
unsolicited complaints about other U N PO L members, accusing them o f extreme lack o f 
interest and laziness. PN T L  members interviewed similarly felt that there were many 
U N PO L o f poor calibre, emphasising that many had little interest in East Timorese culture 
or language. Once deployed, the ability o f U N PO L  to supervise PN TL has been 
undermined by factors including: a failure to co-locate U N PO L and PNTL, resulting in 
parallel commands, the variable — and sometimes high — turnover o f U N PO L ,197 language 
and other communication difficulties, and failure to deploy U N PO L to most subdistricts 
due to harsh living conditions. In the district o f  Manufahi, U N PO L and PN TL were 
located in separate stations at different sides o f town.19* Even in stations in which they were 
co-located, there was little mixing.
It was clear from interviews I conducted in both 2007 and 2009 that many U N PO L were 
unaware o f what was happening in their districts199. This eroded U N PO L legitimacy and
191 In an interview on 9 November 2007 with Edward Rees made the astute observation that no-one would 
consider putting over a thousand doctors on planes to East Timor to establish the health service; they would 
send project managers and administrators with experience in running a health service and a much smaller 
number o f doctors and nurses. Yet for some inexplicable reason the UN continues to send large numbers of 
UNPOL to establish a police institution.
196 As noted in chapter 3 both the UNTAET and UNMIT mission deployed UNPOL who were not actually 
police. This was highlighted again in interviews in July 2009 with various UNPOL officers who complained 
that the practice continued.One UNPOL made specific mention o f a fellow UNPOL who had been a police 
officer for a short period twenty years ago.
,97UNPOL are typically deployed for six to twelve month periods, though sometimes this may be extended. 
However, many UNPOL officers who sought to have their contracts extended were unable to get the wheels 
o f the UN bureaucracy to turn in time before they were sent home.
198 Pers. Comm. JFAT member August 2009.
199 A number o f UNPOL also gave fanciful accounts o f local history including accounts o f  Jose Ramos-Horta 
hiding in the east o f the country during the resistance (when in reality he left the country in 1975) and 
accounts o f the problems o f FRETILIN trying to impose ‘communism’ after the restoration o f independence 
in 2002.
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made establishing com m and and control very difficult. Two illustrative cases from ]uly 
2009 interviews follow. The first occurred on Atauro Island, a subdistrict o f  Dili. A group 
o f musicians, who had played in several previous years’ restoration o f independence (20 
May) celebrations, decided that on this occasion they wanted to be paid. The subdistrict 
administrator said he would kill the musicians if they refused to play. He then asked 
U N PO L to go and pick them up in the U N PO L  vehicle and bring them to the venue. The 
U N PO L officer obliged, as he was unaware o f the background to the story, only becoming 
aware o f it when informed later by other visiting U N M IT personnel.20,1 With no common 
language and no language assistant on the island the possibility o f U N PO L and PNTL 
counterparts being able to communicate, let alone U N PO L assume a command and 
control role, is difficult to imagine.
The second case occurred in Maubisse, a subdistrict o f  Ainaro. A mentally disabled man 
had been caught throwing stones. After PN T L  detained him for the seventy-two hours 
allowed by law he was released but was kept handcuffed as he was considered dangerous. It 
was not until many (reports vary) days later that U N PO L  members in Maubisse realised 
what had happened and freed the man.201 It is clear from these examples that although 
language assistants have been deployed, there are not enough o f them, and this is 
hampering communication between international and national police, a point also made by 
the UN expert policing mission.
The th ird  fiction is  th a t the screen in g  an d  certification  p ro cess  w ou ld  ensure that 
P N T L  m em b ers g u ilty  o f  carrying o u t crim es a n d  abu ses o f  hum an rights, in 
particu lar during  the crisis o f 2006, w ou ld  be  rem o ved  from the force.
In Novem ber 2009 the process o f evaluating PN T L  staff for certification is still not
completed and has experienced extraordinary delays, with the government-controlled
evaluation panel often not meeting for long periods o f time.2"2 Three years after the
commencement o f the U N M IT mandate there is no agreement between U NM IT and the
East Timorese government on a mechanism for removing PN TL who are found to be
unsuitable. To the frustration o f the UN, a num ber o f officers recom m ended by the UN
for suspension or dismissal continue to work as PN TL members. O thers are on the PNTL
payroll but do not report for duty. In }uly 2009 in three districts there were PN TL Police
2"" Interview with UNMIT HRTJS staff 5 July 2009.
2,11 Interview with UNMIT IIRTJS staff 5 )uly 2009, interview with Deputy UNPOL Commander Lautem 14 
July 2009.
202 In October 2009 the Report of the Secretary-General noted 259 officers still facing pending criminal 
and/or disciplinary proceedings, with sixty four of theses still requiring adjudication by the Timorese led 
evaluation panel (United Nations 2009b: 6).
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Commanders who were not yet fully certified. N o one has been removed from the PN TL 
as part o f the screening process.203
A case o f note relates to the PN TL Manufahi District Com mander who was recommended 
for suspension by the evaluation panel. The Minister o f Defence and Security ignored the 
recommendation and decided instead that he should not be certified. This is o f course not 
the same as suspension as he is still active within the PNTL, having recently been 
transferred to the Office o f Operations. It is clear that the East Timorese government has 
never had the political will to carry out a process which would dismiss members o f the 
PNTL. This has resulted in a general lack o f interest in the process and ‘go slows’ on the 
part o f successive Ministers. Although it was always unlikely that such a political process 
would produce a ‘squeaky clean’ institution, the results are a great disappointment, having 
failed to remove even “ the worst o f the worst” .
Despite F-FD TL’s extensive involvement in the violence o f 2006, screening F-FDTL 
members in the same way proposed for the PN TL was never seriously contemplated either 
by the UN or by the East Timorese government. When the issue was raised, “national 
media reported that Prime-Minister Ramos-Horta would reject any possible 
recommendations by UNM IT to conduct evaluation o f F-FDTL soldiers in the same 
manner as the PN TL screening. PM Ramos-Horta was further quoted as saying that the F- 
FD TL was highly disciplined and that an evaluation had already been conducted before the 
crisis o f 2006” (UNM IT 2007d).
The fourth fiction: U N M IT  h a d  the capac ity  to ‘rec o n s tru c t the P N T L .
The failure to deploy sufficient U N PO L with the right skills for the task o f reconstruction 
was evident in 2007 and continued to be a problem through 2008 and 2009. This was 
exacerbated by a lack o f interest on the part o f the government and the PN TL in PN TL 
reconstruction according to an unclear U N PO L formula.
Training and mentoring both suffered from serious problems, and there is every indication 
that it ultimately amounted to a ‘box ticking’ exercise. In 2008 the East Timorese 
government, exasperated by the unclear international approach, arranged for all future 
basic recruit training for the PN TL to be carried out by the Portuguese G N R  (International 
Crisis Group 2009b: 9).
203 Former Dili District Deputy Commander, Abilio Mesquita, was dismissed, but this occurred outside the 
screening process as he did not register. Similarly some of those PNTL who deserted with Alfredo Reinado 
were dismissed outside of the screening process.
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It was evident from descriptions provided by U N PO L o f how m entoring actually occurred 
that it was on an ad hoc basis and would be ‘dropped’ if something else requiring their 
attention came up. The intention to provide mentoring on a one-to-one basis was 
impossible to implement. During July 2009 interviews one senior U N PO L commented on 
the lack o f guidance provided on mentoring, saying it was largely necessary to rely on one’s 
own initiative.2"4 Another U N PO L stationed in Baucau noted there was only one U N PO L 
designated as ‘mentoring officer’ and he was “not productive” .2"5
The fifth fiction is tha t handover decision s w ill be m ade in accordance w ith the four 
m utually agreed  criteria.
The districts o f Lautem, Manatuto and Oecussi have already been handed over. However 
independent logistical requirements do not exist and a heavy dependence on U N PO L for 
resources persists.
In Lautem, Manatuto and Oecussi, PN TL transport is very limited. Vital resources o f the 
PN TL such as 4WD vehicles tend to be concentrated in Dili, reflecting that they are ‘status 
items’, rather than being deployed to the districts and subdistricts where they are needed. 
Radio communications in all handed-over districts are either totally absent, in short supply 
or broken, and staff are not adequately trained. Frequently it is not possible to get complete 
radio coverage throughout the district. PN TL in all three handed-over districts often need 
to use their own mobile phones for communication and usually buy credit for their phones 
out o f their own funds. This is not reimbursed. Mobile phone coverage is incomplete and 
patchy in many parts o f the districts.2"6
The com mencement o f the handover has come about not because the PN TL have been 
reconstructed or because they fully meet the criteria, but because the government has tired 
o f the relationship with U NM IT and has been pressing for over a year for handover to 
commence. The districts that have been handed over are relatively ‘unproblematic’ 
,although still dependent on U N PO L resources to function. The handover process will 
become increasingly difficult for the UN as more problematic and dyslunctional districts, 
such as Liquica, Manufahi and Baucau, and the special units are considered.
2,14 Interview with Deputy UNPOL Commander Lautem 14 July 2009.
21):> Interview with Acting UNPOL Police Commander Baucau 15 July 2009.
206 A serious example highlighted by ICG in December 2009 concerns Citrana, in Oecussi district on the 
border with Indonesia, where there have been recent border incursions by the TNI. The radio repeater 
station has been out of order since 2005 and there are no other forms of communication (International Crisis 
Group 2009b: 13).
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The situation found in districts that the J IT' concluded could not be handed over serves as 
an indictment o f U N PO L ’s capacity to reconstruct the PNTL. For example, in the district 
o f Ainaro2"7 serious shortcomings were found. Communications equipment was sub- 
optimal, transport was inadequate and broken down, weapons and vehicles were not 
maintained and there was a lack o f storage facilities for gasoline and investigation 
equipment. Staff did not understand human rights concepts, were not familiar with 
disciplinary proceedings and did not know whether Rules o f Organisation Procedure/ 
Normal Operating Procedures (R O Ps/N O Ps) applied. Community members also 
expressed concern about the police using excessive force (Joint Field Assessment Team 
2009) .
The sixth  fiction: the handover is a ‘jo in t’ exerc ise9 accord in g  to a un ified  plan  
betw een  U N M IT  an d  the E a st T im orese governm en t.
Most o f those international and national staff involved in the handover interviewed felt 
that an assessment o f the current situation o f the PN TL across all districts needed to be 
carried out. However tensions were apparent in how senior UN and government personnel 
describe the process and their understanding o f the basis upon which the process is 
proceeding. The UN Police Commissioner Luis Carillho said the handover was being 
carried out according to the RRRD plan ,2"8 a plan described by the expert policing mission 
as not being able to be used as a basis for reform  o f the national police in its current 
format. The Secretary o f State for Security (SoSS), Francisco Guterres, expressed a contrary 
view. He said the handover was not being carried out according to the RRRD plan but 
according to the governm ent’s Five Year Plan . 2"9 He added that if they followed the RRRD 
plan “what would be the point o f having independence?”21" Empirically, however, the 
handover is not proceeding according to either plan. The SoSS was explicit about his 
keenness for the handover to proceed. The Com mander-General o f PNTL, Longuinhos 
Monteiro, however, did not want to meet, claiming that the handover had nothing to do 
with him.
There is also disagreement between the UN and the government on how PN TL readiness 
for the final stage o f ‘reconstitution’ will be determined, and the SA provides little guidance 
on this phase. As noted previously, the governm ent’s proposal is for a comprehensive
207 Ainaro was evaluated by a JFAT 9-14 March 2009.
2(18 Interview with UNPOL Police Commissioner Luis Carillho 9 July 2009
2119 The ICG notes that a month after the release of the Government’s Five Year Plan in multiple languages 
including English senior UN officials admitted they had not read it (International Crisis Group 2009b: 6).
210 Interview with Secretary of State for Security, Francisco Guterres 9 July 2009
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independent assessment which would gauge the administrative, institutional and 
operational readiness o f the PN T L  to conduct executive policing without international 
assistance. However, the Secretary o f State for Security, in his letter to DSRSG Takahisa 
Kawakami on 9 February 2009 agreeing to the UN resumption proposal, noted that
I believe that we still need to discuss the centerpiece o f my proposal — that 
an international commission be appointed to assess the PN TL during the 
consolidation phase and provide recommendations to the government and 
PN TL (Secretary o f State for Security 2009).
The UN is uneasy about this proposal because o f  the ‘independent’ element: they are 
currently bureaucratically controlling the process, and this proposal would introduce a new 
variable the UN can not control, with the danger that something might be said or revealed 
that they were not comfortable with.
In interviews with members o f the JFAT it was frequently noted that the process was never 
really about whether districts were going to be handed over; that decision had already been 
made. In many ways the process has been skewed to an international perspective with the 
Assessment Matrix being designed by international staff, produced only in English and all 
assessment meetings conducted in English. UN M IT also wrote all the notes o f the 
meetings and drafted the ‘joint letters’ for the parties to sign.211
The seven th  fiction is tha t on ce a d istric t is h a n d ed  over the role o f  U N P O L  w ill be  
to m on itor the perform an ce o f  P N T L .
For all the same reasons that U N P O L  found it difficult to carry out mentoring, they will 
find it difficult to carry out monitoring. In Lautem a senior U N PO L  told me that what they 
do, post-handover, is to conduct a “veneer o f monitoring” .212 He felt that he had to force 
other U N PO L  to do their monitoring and that the quality and depth o f reports produced 
were woefully inadequate. For example, he noted that in the course o f monitoring no one 
ever looked in the filing cabinets, which were such a mess that if a case ever came up on 
appeal they would be hard pressed to find a file. He attributed the poor m onitoring in part 
to the low education levels o f  some UNPOL. He also criticised the “veneer o f m entoring” 
that had previously been conducted. He attributed this to the reluctance o f the previous 
U N PO L Com m ander to ‘make waves’ with the result he would never write or allow 
adverse reports on PNTL. The collective perception o f PN TL interviewed is that the 
principal assistance provided by U N PO L  is as glorified taxi drivers, and a source o f
211 Pers. Comm. JFAT member August 2009
212 Interview with UNPOL Deputy District Commander Lautem 14 July 2009
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generators, fuel, paper, phone cards and com puter maintenance. N o mention was ever 
made o f imparting policing skills.
The eigh th  fiction is that the P N T L  have been  ‘reco n stru cted ’ a n d  is a unified an d  
coh eren t corps.
A significant num ber o f weaknesses were identified with the PN TL institution following 
the 2006 crisis. The PN TL suffered from legitimacy problem s due to the manner o f the 
institution’s creation. It was characterised by politicisation and factionalisation, there was 
an absence o f adequate regulatory frameworks, what institutional mechanisms did exist 
were regularly bypassed, there were poor accountability mechanisms, lack o f technical 
skills, lack o f discipline and a tendency to use excessive force (United Nations 2006a; 
O H C H R  and UNM IT 2009) The limited effective reach o f the police force, due to both 
logistical and legitimacy constraints, com pounded all the difficulties.
Additionally, the need to differentiate the roles o f PN TL and F-FD TL and to legislate for 
the modalities o f how the two institutions will work together in exceptional circumstances 
has been identified as ‘urgent’ for many years now. While the respective roles o f the police 
and army are frequently and increasingly blurred, a variety o f other providers o f both 
security and insecurity in East Tim or make the notion o f  a control on the monopoly o f 
force a fiction. Both senior leadership and the rank and file members engage in 
extracurricular activities unsuitable to those employed in the state security sector. As 
discussed in chapter 5, this includes PNTL members who are also members o f martial arts 
groups, gangs and other armed groups. In these other roles they are involved in controlling 
illegal activities such as gambling and prostitution, and reportedly, trafficking in women.
The screening and certification process, which focused on individual officers rather than 
the institution as a whole, has been o f minimal benefit in addressing the institutional issues 
m entioned above. The integrity o f the certification process is weakened by the continuing 
lack o f accountability that PN TL enjoy concerning human rights violations and abuses o f 
authority.
At an individual level, concern for ‘local ownership’, inherent in both the U NM IT mandate 
and the SA, placed the power to dismiss PN TL members in the hands o f East Timorese 
authorities. As a result no effective vetting took place. It became apparent that the power 
o f U N PO L to ‘not certify’ someone was essentially meaningless, as a num ber o f uncertified 
officers continued to work and be prom oted by East Timorese authorities and PNTL who 
never registered for the screening process remain on the PN TL payroll.
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There is not yet a sense that the PN TL is a unified organization, with PN TL olten 
identifying with their unit — for example being a m ember o f Baucau UIR rather than being 
a member o f  the PNTL. In the last year standoffs have occurred between Baucau UIR and 
Dili UIR in what is essentially a territorial dispute over access to additional allowances.213
The recent appointm ent o f Longuinhos M onteiro as PN TL Commander General has been 
controversial. M onteiro was not a police officer, and was appointed by government decree 
contrary to the law requiring approval o f the Superior Police Council (F-FDTL — PN TL 
Hakarak Flamutuk no Lakohi Tane Liman. 2009 ). Upon appointm ent he cited his sendee 
in the Indonesian army as having prepared him for the job. During his former position as 
Prosecutor-General the backlog o f cases grew into the thousands, although no system 
seems to have existed to quantify exactly how many cases were outstanding. This does not 
auger well for PN TL — an organisation already suffering from serious administrative 
shortcomings. The relationship between the PN T L  Commander General and the Secretary 
o f State for Security is non existent.214 Although there appears to be some optimism that 
the new PN TL Commander-General has the ability to introduce an esprit de corps, many 
concerns remain that the PN TL will become further militarised during his command. It 
appears that the Com mander General is continuing a history o f personalised exercise o f 
power with the appointm ent o f uncertified officers with disciplinary and criminal history, 
albeit considered loyal to him, in a rearrangement o f posts in july 2009.
Although some people claimed that the various divisions present in the PN TL such as 
east/w est rivalries, ‘nationalista’/ ‘antinationalista’ have reduced or disappeared since 2006, 
others claim they are more dorm ant than dissipated. I was provided with a num ber ot 
accounts from both U N PO L  and PN TL o f PN T L  members continuing to ‘favour’ one or 
other martial arts group depending on their own allegiances.
PNTL District Commanders are essentially ‘stranded’ by a highly centralised, but non­
functioning, procurem ent process. There is no budget for maintenance o f movable and 
immovable property at the district level. There is no decentralised PN TL maintenance and 
repair capacity or systems for vehicles in any o f the districts. Similarly, there is no PNTL 
system for com puter and printer maintenance and virus protection or for maintenance and 
repair o f any o f the communications equipment. U N M IT has made it clear that, unlike the 
equipment handover that occurred at the end o f the U N T A E T  mission, they will not be 
handing over equipment at the end o f the U N M IT mission. However, there is no provision
213 Pers. comm. International security analyst 31 October 2008.
214 Interview with East Timorese security analyst July 2009.
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in the East Timorese budget for the additional requirements once U N PO L withdraws their 
resources.
The new East Timorese Penal Code was available in a num ber o f the police stations I 
visited but both U N PO L and PN TL admitted to continuing to use the old Indonesian 
Criminal Code or on some occasions continuing to use a mix o f both. This will 
undoubtedly cause problems once cases are brought to court. Training in the Penal Code 
will be necessary for both PN TL and UNPOL.
The disciplinary mechanisms within PN TL are still unsatisfactory and ad hoc in nature. 
The disciplinary regulation contains complex algebraic formulae far beyond the educational 
attainments o f PN TL members. Professional Standards and Discipline Office (PSDO) 
officers in each district are appointed by the District Commander; they are frequently low 
level agents who have little real authority and are beholden to the District Commander. 
During the course o f the handover assessments in Ainaro district the PSDO officer 
insisted that there were no disciplinary cases in the district, that no one was ever absent and 
that no one was ever late . 215 In Liquica district PSD O files had been stolen by PNTL 
members . 216
A credible and fair (but complex) career regime with transitional provisions has been 
legislated for, promulgated and ostensiblv ‘socialised’.217 However, rank and file PNTL are 
unaware o f its existence or it is poorly understood; information sessions are not delivered 
in an intelligible m anner .218 Considerable anxiety exists among PN TL members about 
forthcoming changes in relation to career structure, with concern expressed that the new 
arrangements “will make trouble in the future” . This reflects a broader problem within the 
institution, namely that in the absence o f regular, credible internal communications about 
what is going on within the PNTL, members are left to assume the worst. A positive aspect 
o f the career regime is it is designed to prevent those PN TL facing disciplinary or criminal 
proceedings from being prom oted, something that the certification regime has been unable 
to do.
21r> Interview with JFAT member, Dili, 5 July 2009.
216 Pers. comm. JFAT member, August 2009.
217 Decree Law 9/2009 Organic Law of the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), Decree Law 10/2009 
Salary Regime of the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), Decree Law 16/2009 Regime of Promotions 
of the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL).
218 Interviews with PNTL in Lautem, Baucau, and Dili July 2009, interview with East Timorese security 
analyst July 2009.
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6.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I describe the crisis o f 2006, the resultant international interventions and the 
mechanisms deployed for reconstruction o f the police and reform o f the security sector. I 
conclude that the PN TL have not been reconstructed in any meaningful way. U N PO L 
have now had two opportunities to (re)construct the PN TL and many o f the mistakes o f 
the first attempt have been repeated the second time. However, on this occasion UN effort 
has been focused on enacting rituals o f com fort to give an impression that security will be 
improved.
Many o f the im portant tasks, identified by the Special Envoy in 2006, necessary to reform 
and reconstruct the PNTL, have not been completed (or in some cases even commenced). 
Most o f the serious shortcomings o f both U N PO L  and PNTL, identified by the UN expert 
policing mission in 2008, have not been addressed. The question needs to be asked why 
these recommendations have not been heeded by the U NM IT mission. Although many o f 
these critical issues have begun to be apprehended at D PK O  headquarters level, little o f 
this is implemented in the mission environment. UN practice in the margins o f the East 
Timorese state appears to bear even less relation to headquarters, or Dili, policy. Police 
reform outcomes have been poor and relationships between U N M IT/governm ent o f East 
Tim or and U N P O L /P N T L  have remained weak. These factors, together with a range o f 
structural problems in UNPOL, mean it is unlikely that delaying handover would have 
improved PN TL reform prospects.
In this chapter I drew on the work o f Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite on regulatory 
ritualism. I described how rather than co-operating in a reform process both the East 
Timorese government and the UN have carried out a process o f mutually reinforcing 
ritualism designed to obscure a lack o f  engagement with, or capacity to carry out, police 
reform. I describe how three o f M erton’s identified responses to a normative order — 
ritualism, rebellion, and retreatism — are used in particular combination by actors in East 
Timorese police reform. Although the agendas o f  the government and the UN differ, they 
have congruent interests in an enactment o f a police reform ritual, sustained by believable 
fictions.
The East Timorese authorities are mostly keen for international forces to leave, as 
evidenced by numerous rebellious stances and criticisms o f an international presence. This 
is tempered however by needing continued access to the accompanying material resources 
and the importance ol being considered a successful rather than failed state. This is despite 
exhibiting great ambivalence towards the notion o f impartial and accountable state
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institutions, evidenced by the ongoing personalised exercise o f power in contravention o f 
East Tim or’s Constitution and laws.
The UN is mindful o f  the need to address their shortcomings in building the P N T L  the 
first time and is consequently highly focused on producing a police reform success story. 
By using the rhetoric o f local ownership and engaging in retreatism the UN seeks to 
absolve itself o f failure to reform the PNTL.
The consequences o f such an enactment o f regulatory ritualism are serious. All poorly 
executed reform attempts leave legacies o f suspicion and disengagement that are difficult to 
undo. The ritualism has served to further institutionalise fragility in a weak institution.
In chapter 7 I will focus on how the attacks on the President and the Prime Minister in 
February 2008 resulted in declarations o f states o f emergency and states o f siege and the 
creation o f a Joint military-police Command. This resulted in significantly rearranged 
relationships between international and national security actors; and between the F-FD TL 
and the PNTL. These events further highlight the consequences o f ritual engagement.
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C h ap te r 7
State o f em ergency , s ta te  o f siege or s ta te  o f m ind?
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter I analyse how the attacks on the President and Prime Minister o f East 
Tim or on 11 February 2008, and the subsequent implementation o f the states o f 
exception219 and associated activities o f the Joint Command, served not only to rearrange 
the power relationships between international and national security actors, but also to 
create a trajectory o f change regarding the respective responsibilities and roles o f the police 
and military in East Timor.
In chapter 6 I argued that both UN M IT and the East Timorese government have 
approached police reconstruction and security sector review ritualistically, with no 
substantive reform having taken place. These chimeric processes continue to be shaped by 
the resonances o f the colonial and resistance histories o f East Timor, discussed in chapter 
2, and informed by the first attempt to build a police institution in East Timor, as detailed 
in chapter 3. The processes have been influenced by sensitive issues o f relationship, 
capacity and sovereignty.
In this chapter I commence with an account o f the events o f 11 February" 2008. I then 
examine the implementation o f the states o f exception and the Joint Command and the 
immediate effects on human rights and the rule o f law in East Timor. I continue by 
describing the reluctance o f the political leadership to wind up the Joint Command and 
docum ent a num ber o f ways in which the ‘exception’ endured after it was formally 
concluded. Next I interrogate a suite o f recent defence, internal security and national 
security bills being considered by Committee B220 o f the East Timorese National Parliament 
that blur the areas o f Defence and Security. Finally, the longer term significance o f states o f 
exception is outlined. Drawing on the work o f theorists o f the ‘state o f exception’ such as 
Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, I argue that these events have served not only to 
rearrange the power relationships between international and national security actors, but 
also to create a trajectory o f change regarding the respective responsibilities and roles o f
219In this thesis I use the collective term “states o f exception” to include a variety o f  exceptions to the legal 
and constitutional norm such as “states o f emergency”, “states o f  siege” or “martial law” which may have 
specific legal meanings in particular national jurisdictions. State o f  exception is also a term employed in the 
theoretical work o f authors such as Schmitt, Benjamin and Agamben. See e.g. Schmitt (1985), Agamben 
(2005) and Benjamin (1969). Other authors such as Gross and Ni Aoläin (2006) use the term “emergency” as 
their collective term.
220 The East Timorese national parliament includes a committee system that considers legislation following 
approval by the Council o f  Ministers and before being considered in plenary session in Parliament. 
Committee B is responsible for the area o f defence and security.
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the national police and military in East Timor. In particular I argue that the draft security 
legislation is evidence o f ‘the exception having become the norm ’ in East Timor, with 
significant consequences for the development o f their security sector. I draw on the work 
o f contemporary analysts o f Asian exceptions and states o f emergency to dem onstrate that 
although the Schmitt’s theories o f exceptionalism were derived in very different 
circumstances, they have extraordinary resonances in broader application. I do not 
explicitly engage with the extensive debates concerning Schmitt as it is beyond the scope o f 
this thesis.
This chapter illustrates the difficulties associated with externally-led police-building and 
security sector reform. The often-stated ideal o f local ownership o f such processes does 
not always manifest in the manner anticipated by those external actors charged with 
constructing or reconstructing security forces and may in fact operate counter to stated 
aims such as clear separation o f the roles o f the police and military and democratic control 
o f security forces. The chapter also illustrates how an enactment o f ritualism can lead to an 
enduring exceptionalism.
7.2 The events of 11 February 2008 OR “Who’s in charge around here?”
On 11 February 2008 the President o f East Timor, Jose Ramos-Horta, was taking his 
customary early morning walk along the beach near his house in Areia Branca, a fairly 
sparsely populated area a couple o f kilometres to the east o f the capital Dili. He was 
accompanied by two F-FD TL soldiers, as he did not want to wake up the PN T L  officers 
allocated to his close protection (UNM IT 2008e: 7). A group o f armed men, led by Major 
Alfred Rcinado, arrived at the President’s house at approximately 6.15 am and attacked the 
house. All but four o f the thirteen F-FD TL on duty that day and guarding the perimeter o f 
the President’s com pound promptly abandoned their posts (UNM IT 2008e: 8). Around 7 
am Reinado was shot dead by a military police officer along with one o f his lieutenants, 
Leopoldino Exposto (LUSA 2008: 10; Toohey 2008b; U N M IT 2008e: 7).
Upon hearing gunfire Ram os-Horta hurried back to his house where he received shots to 
the stomach and chest critically injuring him. O ne o f his guards was killed. Ramos-Horta 
subsequently underwent surgery at an Australian military base and was then evacuated to 
Darwin for further surgery, where he remained for nine weeks (LUSA 2008; Toohey 
2008b: 12).
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About an hour and a half after the first attack another armed group, led by Lieutenant 
Gastäo Salsinha,221 attacked the convoy of the Prime Minister Xanana Gusmäo who was 
travelling into town from his home in Balibar in the hills outside Dili. The Prime Minister 
and his entourage managed to escape, but Salsinha and his men proceeded to the Prime 
Minister’s house, apparently searching for weapons (LUSA 2008). The terrified wife and 
children of the Prime Minister were forced to hide under the bed.
Later that day a state of siege was declared222 by the Acting President, Fernando de Araujo 
(“Lasama”)223, following authorisation from the Parliament. The state of siege was renewed 
four times.224 On the third occasion it was extended in seven Western districts but was 
downgraded to a state of emergency in five districts and one district was returned to 
normalcy. On the fourth and final occasion it was extended solely for the District of 
Ermera until expiring on 22 May 2008. The President ended the states of exception on 23 
April in all other districts.
Immediately following the 11 Februaiy 2008 attacks there was an eruption of finger­
pointing, claim and counterclaim regarding perceived shortcomings in security provision. It 
was alleged that UNPOL and the ISF refused to assist the wounded President and were 
generally unavailable for the protection of the Prime Minister (ABC News 2008a). The 
Commander of F-FDTL, Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak, called into question the 
capacity of ISF, UNPOL and the PNTL to prevent the attacks. The UN responded that 
the F-FDTL, and not the UN, was responsible for perimeter security of the leaders’ 
residences (Williamson 2008). Additionally, the UN claimed in a confidential report into 
the attacks that UNPOL had come to the aid of the President in minutes and fought off 
the Prime Minister’s attackers (UNMIT 2008e).
The confusion is instructive. It illustrates both the real and perceived lack of clarity 
inherent in the security arrangements that had been put in place between the UN Police, 
the ISF and the indigenous security forces. The language of the debate about responsibility 
for security provision not only illustrated the complex and ambiguous arrangements in 
place, noted in chapter 6, but also highlighted that the relationship between international 
and national security actors was under considerable strain.
221 Lieutenant Gastäo Salsinha lead the group o f 591 disaffected F-FDTL members known as the petitioners 
discussed in chapter 6.
222 Presidential Decree 43/2008.
223 de Araujo’s substantive position is President o f the East Timorese National Parliament.
224 Presidential Decrees 44/2008, 45/2008, 48/2008 and 49/2008.
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O n the day o f the attacks, the Prime Minister o f  East Timor, with support from the 
National Parliament, invited 120 additional ISF and seventy AFP from Australia (UNM IT 
2008e: 6). Unlike police already on the ground the new deployment o f police was 
specifically not required to serve under the UN. This added to existing confusion about 
security arrangements.
7.3 T he im plem entation o f the states o f exception and the Joint Comm and
The Joint Command was formally created on 17 February 2008 by a resolution o f the 
Council o f Ministers, although by this time it had already been in operation for several 
days. The formation o f the Joint Command caught UNM IT by surprise, but they quickly 
endorsed it, making note o f East Tim or’s status as a sovereign nation.22"
By late February 2008 the Joint Command claimed to have 1 305 P N T L /F-FD T L  
members involved in operations and that it could increase this num ber to 3 000 if required 
(Joint N G O  Safety Office 2008a). The period o f time covered by the states o f exception 
and the operation o f the Joint Command was notable for an escalation o f human rights 
abuses, abuses o f authority by security personnel and an increased disregard for the rule o f 
law. During this time the relationship between international and national security forces 
also deteriorated. Conversely, and somewhat unexpectedly, the previously poor relationship 
between the PN TL and the F-FDTL appeared to improve.
The modus operandi o f the Joint Command was not entirely new, recalling some o f the 
dubious methods employed by the Dili PN TL Task Force from its inception in December 
2007. This Task Force was established as a mobile police unit to respond to policing 
situations that required a specialised response. The Dili Task Force, like the Joint 
Command, had been formed without prior consultation with UNPOL, in contravention o f 
the Supplemental Arrangement between the UN and the East Timorese government. A lot 
o f people have noted that the Dili Task Force and the Indonesian Brimob are very similar in 
appearance and demeanor. Most o f the Task Force members joined the Joint Command 
once it was formed.
Allegations o f human rights abuses and abuses o f authority implicated members o f the 
Task Force, but were also specifically attributed to the Joint Command, the PN TL 
(including the UIR) and the F-FDTL (including military police). These allegations included 
ill-treatment o f civilians, pointing o f weapons and death threats, in addition to failure to
22" When interviewed in July 2009 UNPOL Police Commissioner Luis Carillho, who was not Commissioner 
at the time of the Joint Command, expressed both concern and mystification about how this could have 
occurred.
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comply with legal procedures when carrying out arrests and home searches (OH CH R and 
U N M IT 2008: 6). Research by the Provedor’s office found that approximately forty 
percent o f those arrested alleged they had suffered ill-treatment by the police at the time o f 
arrest (Provedoria dos Direitos Humanos e Justica 2008b). Quite quickly a sense that the 
uniformed forces could now do anything, including settling old scores and singling out 
people for political purposes, started to pervade Dili. Specific incidents included threats to 
shoot an MP and judges who were on the way back to Dili from a funeral in Bobonaro 
(UNM IT 2008f), the arrest o f FRETILIN  MP Jose Teixeira without warrant, apparently on 
the personal initiative o f the Deputy Police Com mander PN TL (FRETILIN 2008b) and 
the arrest and beating o f a layout editor from the Tim or Post newspaper (Mckenna 2008). 
The armed forces engaged in numerous displays o f authority and acts o f  intimidation 
unrelated to catching rebels. People were taken o ff buses or stopped on their m otor bikes 
and forced to do pushups in the street. Tinting was removed from the windows o f private 
cars and an F-FD TL unit met with the community in Zumalai in Covalima and demanded 
that men with long hair must cut if o ff (Joint N G O  Safety Office 2008b).
The economic effects o f the state o f siege were also significant, with the Provedor noting 
particular difficulties arising from the imposed curfew for people who undertook economic 
activities at night. The ability to take part in family rituals surrounding death and funerals 
was also affected. The district o f Erm era in particular felt the effects o f the state o f siege, 
with residents frequently targeted and accused o f having provided material support such as 
food to Salsinha and his supporters. There were reports that farmers were too scared to 
harvest their coffee for fear o f encountering a Joint Com mand patrol (Provedoria dos 
Direitos Humanos e Justica 2008b).
7.4 Further unravelling of the rule of law - parties, parades and pardons
It is often noted that he rule o f law in East Tim or suffers from a lack o f technical 
development. The inconsistent political will associated with the application o f the law and 
concerns about an increasing culture o f impunity in East Tim or were discussed in chapter 
4. During the period o f the states o f exception and the Joint Com mand there were 
significant deviations from the rule o f law, as well as an increase in impunity. This was 
evident in inadequate official responses to claims o f human rights violations and abuses o f 
authority, as well as the tendency to deal with abuses by security personnel in informal ways 
including ex gratia payments for affected individuals and communities. It was also manifest 
in the irregular, some would say bizarre, processes related to surrender, arrest and detention 
o f rebels involved in the attacks. Finally, it was apparent in the announcem ent by the East 
Timorese President of pardons for people convicted o f serious crimes o f violence that
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occurred in 1999 and 2006, right at the time that those accused o f trying to kill him on 11 
February were preparing to surrender. The culture o f impunity in East Tim or thus
provided a receptive environment for the conduct o f the Joint Com mand and also
facilitated the creation o f an enduring emergency.
As allegations arose concerning violations and abuses o f authority associated with the states 
o f exception, the respective authorities repeatedly stated their wish that those accused 
should be held accountable. These public statements were not followed by action. The
Commander o f F-FD TL appeared before Parliament on 24 April 2008 and stated that
twenty eight complaints o f human rights abuses by the Joint Com mand had been received, 
fourteen soldiers had been reprimanded and serious allegations would be referred to the 
Prosecutor-General for investigation (O H CH R and UN M IT 2008: 3). However as o f June 
2009 none o f those allegedly responsible for the violence had been brought to justice 
(OHCHR and UN M IT 2009: 10).
Although the Joint Com mand commenced investigation into some o f the cases submitted 
by U N M IT’s HRTJS, there were some cases the Joint Com mand determined to be ‘false’ 
when in reality they needed further information. Once the Joint Command was disbanded 
it appears most cases were not followed up.226 Similarly, the SRSG in his report o f  29 July 
2008 noted that
little progress has been evident in investigating or assigning accountability 
for the violations committed during the early phase o f the state o f  siege, 
and the team established by the Joint Com m and responsible for such 
investigations has been disbanded along with the Joint Command (United 
Nations 2008f: 2).
The SRSG went on to stress the risk that “ those incidents will further entrench 
inappropriate modes o f behaviour and the already widespread perception that the security 
and defence forces enjoy impunity” (United Nations 2008f: 2).
It appears that few cases came into any contact with the formal legal system. In the 
majority' o f  cases the authorities decided to resolve abuses ‘traditionally’, with 
compensation o f money or toodstuffs to individuals or affected families, including the case 
o f a mentally ill man shot dead. O ne o f the most disturbing examples o f this practice was 
in response to communities in Ermera who had alleged beatings and aggressive 
interrogations by military personnel. The East Timorese governm ent acknowledged that 
“inappropriate tactics” had been used and proceeded to allocate $US 600 to each o f 52
226 Interview with UNMIT HRTJS staff July 2008.
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communities that had complained for the purposes o f holding belated Easter parties, on 
the condition that military and police officials be invited (ABC News 2008b).
O n 2 March 2008 “Susar” (Amaro da Costa),2-7 one o f the chief suspects in the shooting of 
the President, surrendered and was brought by helicopter to Dili where he was immediately 
paraded before journalists and made potentially incriminating statements, before being 
presented to the Prime Minister and chief o f F-FDTL. A flyer was later distributed by the 
Joint Command, showing Susar hugging the chief o f the F-FDTL, Brigadier-General Taur 
Matan Ruak, and Interim PN TL Commander-General Afonso de Jesus, as well as being 
accompanied by attractive women. Reportedly, this kind o f orchestrated surrender, which 
was intended to imply a reintegration with the state, was a com m on practice during the 
Indonesian occupation, when it was referred to with the Indonesian term “sandiward’ or 
“play” (Jolliffe 2008).228
During this period there was an announcem ent o f a large num ber o f pardons by the 
President, without due process,22,) for people convicted o f violent crimes carried out in 1999 
and 2006. Bizarrely, these pardons were announced on 23 April at the same time that those 
accused o f trying to kill the President were on the point o f being apprehended, creating an 
impression that the accused, his attackers, were also unlikely to face justice. By 26 April 
Salsinha was formally negotiating his surrender with F-FDTL. At the time o f the 
announcem ent of the pardons International Crisis G roup South East Asia Project Director, 
John Virgoe, speculated that the pardon announcem ent could be a tactic to lure Salsinha to 
surrender, with an implicit promise o f a future pardon or amnesty (Michelmore 2008).
There were also significant irregularities related to the surrender and arrest o f those alleged 
to have been involved in the attacks o f 11 February. A H Q  for the Joint Command was 
established opposite the lighthouse in Memorial Hall in the beachside suburb o f Farol. This 
complex contained an ad-hoc detention and interrogation centre controlled by the Joint
227 Susar was a former Falintil leader who joined the PNTL in 2001, becoming a body guard for the former 
PNTL Police Commander Paulo Martins. He deserted from the PNTL in 2006 and joined Alfredo Reinado 
in Maubisse. Following Reindao’s incarceration he helped organise the jailbreak in which Reinado and others 
escaped and was involved in an incident in which border police were relieved o f  their weapons by Reinado’s 
group (To°hey 2008a).
228 Also Pers. Comm. Aderito de Jesus Soares 24 October 2008.
229 Presidential Decree 53/2008. Presidential Pardon o f  20 May. A group o f  eleven East Timorese citizens 
launched an unsuccessful legal challenge to the decision o f  President o f the Republic to grant executive 
clemency to ninety-four prisoners on 20 May 2008. On 27 June 2008, the citizens delivered a petition to the 
Provedor asking him to use his powers according to Section 150 o f  the Constitution to request that the Court 
of Appeals examine the constitutionality o f the law. Included in the list were Tim Alfa milida leader Jhoni 
Marques convicted o f  Crimes Against Humanity in 2001 and former Minister o f  the Interior, Rogerio Lobato, 
convicted in 2007 o f arming civilians during the 2006 crisis.
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Command and F-FDTL. N o legal authorisation o f this detention centre was ever made and 
F-FDTL, rather than prison officials, undertook guard duties. An unofficial detention 
center violates international human rights law and increases the danger o f ‘disappearances’. 
There are conflicting reports as to the procedures that were followed with those men who 
surrendered during April, but it is clear that these were not in accordance with the law. 
Several men were held for periods between eleven days and a month. Some o f these men 
were released without ever being brought before a judge whereas others were brought 
before a judge after a m onth, considerably longer than the seventy two hours allowed by 
law.230 In response to a question from journalist Jill Jolliffe, UN Police Commissioner, 
Rodolfo Tor, denied that suspects were being interrogated by the East Timorese army and 
police without the presence o f lawyers, stating that the UN has “ full confidence in PN TL 
and FD TL” . The same journalist, however, reported that a UN legal source had 
contradicted the statement, claiming that seven o f the twenty-three suspects were routinely 
questioned without the presence o f lawyers, in contravention o f the law (Jolliffe 2008).
When the largest group o f rebels surrendered on 29 April 2008 the theme that had 
commenced with the use o f the Easter parties continued. Gastäo Salsinha and his group 
were accompanied by a military and police convoy to Dili in order to surrender formally. A 
ceremony was held at the G overnm ent Palace. Following a press conference at the 
headquarters o f  the Joint Com mand a party was thrown with the rebels as guests o f 
honour. The men accused o f having tried to kill the President and Prime Minister less than 
three m onths previously danced the night awav, together with the police and military that 
had been pursuing them through the mountains. Apparently the issue o f arrest warrants 
was not attended to until the following day (AAP 2008).
7.5 T he continued role o f the Joint Com m and
Although the final state o f siege, upon which the Joint Com mand ostensibly relied for its 
legitimacy finished on 22 May 2008, there were no immediate moves to disband it. O n the 
contrary, the weeks leading up to this point had been characterised by a search among the 
political leadership for new things to do with the Joint Command.
On 29 April 2008 Gastäo Salsinha finally surrendered along with twelve o f his supporters. 
The previous two m onths had seen smaller numbers o f ‘rebels’ hand themselves in. From 
the time o f the surrender there was no suggestion that other rebels were still at large. It was 
at this point that President Ramos-Horta started to speculate on the future o f the Joint 
Command. In a Radio Australia interview on 30 April, the President stated that “The Joint
2311 Pers. comm. UNMIT I IRTJS staff 11 November 2008.
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Com mand will continue indefinitely until I decide, upon consultation with the PM, 
padiam ent and others, that conditions exist to finish the joint command activities. We are 
going to continue to search for weapons in Dili, we are going to get rid o f illegal weapons 
in the hands o f people”. In the same radio story it was announced that “The president also 
confirmed the state o f siege in Ermera district will remain in place until May 22, as the joint 
com m and take up their new mandate to search for illegal weapons” (ABC Connect Asia 
Programme 2008c). Several days later the new mandate o f the Joint Com mand was 
confirmed by the Secretary o f State for Security, Francisco Guterres, in the Timor Post 
newspaper: “If  there is information about weapons carried by people, then there will be an 
investigation into those weapons to know their serial numbers, regardless o f whether the 
weapons are those that are missing or no t” . Despite an ever-diminishing supply o f weapons 
being handed in, and no industrial weapons being found, a series o f extensions to the 
weapons collection program was announced, including on 15 August, 30 August, and 3 
September 2008. O n 6 May 2008 the Joint International N G O  (JINGO) Safety Advisor 
noted in his weekly report that “The Governm ent has sent mixed messages regarding the 
future o f the Joint Com m and”, going on to detail the varied and sometimes contradictory 
stories regarding the future o f the Joint Command (Joint N G O  Safety Office 2008c).
O n 8 May 2008 the President declared that the state o f siege in Ermera had finished but 
there was no move to wind up the Joint Command and the JIN G O  office noted that the 
declaration ending the state o f siege appeared not to have been implemented (Joint N G O  
Safety" Office 2008d). However, during May and June military and police elements o f the 
Joint Command remained stationed around the country, in particular in Ermera, Covalima 
and Bobonaro as well as in Dili which had twenty-two police posts and five check posts 
under the supervision o f the Joint Command (Joint N G O  Safety Office 2008d, 2008e, 
2008 f).
When the Joint Command was formally disbanded, the Council o f Ministers announced in 
the same decree that the Joint Command had been so successful in restoring 
“constitutional normalcy” that they had decided to create a “coordination structure within 
the Ministry o f Defence and Security which can plan and respond effectively in case o f 
natural disasters or political and social crises that threaten the national stability” , and that 
this new structure would be called the Centre for Integrated Management o f Crisis 
(Democratic Republic o f East Tim or 2008).
A parade and closing ceremony to mark the end o f the Joint Command was held on 19 
June 2008 at the Dili Stadium. The President congratulated the Joint Command on its
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work, but stated that the PN TL and F-FDTL would continue to work closely together. 
Observers o f the ceremony noted that there was actually no official declaration o f the 
closing o f the command during the ceremony (Joint N G O  Safety Office 2008g).
Notwithstanding the legal disbanding o f the Joint Command and the accompanying 
ceremonies, the Joint Com mand continued to operate, notably in Ermera where 100 troops 
were stationed, and house searches continued in Maliana and in Suai. Reports o f F-FDTL 
(rather than Joint Command) activity was also reported in Dili with the conduct o f  patrols 
around the western side o f Dili, purportedly because o f an increase in Martial Arts Group 
(MAG) activity, and the attendance o f F-FDTL (together with U N PO L and PNTL) to 
provide security at a student dem onstration outside the Parliament on 12 and 13 June 2008 
(Joint N G O  Safety Office 2008d, 2008h, 2008i).
The political leadership continued to invoke the Joint Command, m ost notably when 
opposing the ongoing presence o f  the ISF and UNPOL. O n 30 September the Prime 
Minister Xanana Gusrnao lamented that, whereas East Tim or is an independent country, 
the movement o f its Defense Force and its National Police is limited, while Australian 
soldiers carried weapons: “You cannot do it (carrying weapons around) while malaes 
(foreigners) can; what kind o f independence is this?” questioned Gusrnao. He went on to 
request the officers o f both F-FDTL and PN TL to keep the “spirit o f joint operation” to 
show that they are ready to take responsibility o f securing and defending the sovereignty o f 
East Timor.
7.6 The draft national security laws
This section details three draft laws that were admitted to the East Timorese Parliament on 
29 June 2009, and were subsequently considered by Committee B. They are Governm ent 
Bills n. 25/11 “Lei de Seguranca Interna” (Law on Internal Security), 26/11 “Lei de 
Seguranca Nacional” (Law on National Security) and 27/11 “Lei de Defesa Nacional” (Law 
on National Defense) (UN DP 2009a).231
The draft laws m entioned above create a confusing tapestry. They are collectively 
contradictory and have unnecessary overlaps. They refer to outdated governmental 
structures, create an extraordinary num ber o f new bodies for a small nation, which will be 
difficult to implement, and are unclear in many other respects. These aspects o f the laws 
will not be detailed here. The focus o f this section will be the explicit and implicit links to
231 The draft laws have all been approved by the Council o f Ministers. On 29 June 2009 they were admitted to 
Parliament and referred to Committee B for consideration. I have relied on unofficial English translations of 
the laws.
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the Joint Command that are made in the legislation. In the next section o f this paper these 
aspects o f the legislation will be analysed using theories on how states o f exception 
‘become the norm ’.
In chapter 5 I detailed the calls over many years, many o f them deemed ‘urgent’, for a 
national security policy and accompanying legislative framework that would describe how 
security is to be provided for the state and its citizens. However, although in 2009 national 
security policy and a national security law were both being drafted, no national security 
policy or Military Aid to a Civil Power legislation has been concluded. Rather than the 
drafting o f the law and the policy being carried out in a sequential and coordinated process, 
the national security policy was drafted by advisors in the Office o f the Secretary o f State 
for Security while the national security law was drafted in the Office o f the Secretary o f 
State for Defence. As described in chapter 5, the practice has been on many occasions that 
the F-FD TL are called in on an ad-hoc basis in addition to, or instead of, the PNTL, in 
contravention o f the roles delineated for the two organisations in the East Timorese 
Constitution. This was also detailed in relation to responses to attacks in Atabae and 
Atsabe in 2003 in chapter 3.
Although the new suite o f legislation recites the constitutionally separate roles o f F-FDTL 
and PNTL (to the point o f monotony), it does nothing to clarify the situation, as all 
attention is on the extraordinary rather than the everyday mechanisms of managing 
security. The National Security Law, instead o f comprehensively examining security 
provision at a national level, only regulates the joint deployment and operation o f the F- 
FD TL and PNTL. As well as explicitly valorising the model o f the Joint Command, it is 
made clear that this will form the model for national security and internal security in the 
future. It formalises the move o f F-FDTL into the realm o f  internal security, but does so in 
a way that remains opaque. Both the draft Law on National Security and the draft Law on 
Internal Security cite the Joint Command in their preamble or explanatory statement, with 
the Law on Internal Security noting that
There is a need to adopt a more comprehensive notion o f Internal Security.
Indeed, the traditional separation between Defence (External Security) and 
Internal Security is becoming increasingly blurred. The two areas are no 
longer hermetically sealed and that is why an effort should be made to get 
the most out o f the supplementarv and subsidiary nature o f the different 
actors in the Security System from an integrated and systemic perspective.
The Law on National Defence cites new challenges to the State as a result o f 11 September 
2001 and the events o f 11 February 2008. Similarlv the Law on Internal Security cites the
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necessity of providing “preventative measures in the realm ol internal security” as a result 
of the crisis of April 2006 and the events of 11 February 2008.
The dralt Law on National Security makes provision for an Integrated System of National 
Security (Article 18) which will be the only circumstances under which joint operational 
deployment can occur. However, the draft law on National Defence (Explanatory 
Statement) foreshadows an Integrated System for National Defence which “provides for 
the joint deployment of forces and services in these two realms, thus distancing itself from 
the traditional distinction between “National Defence” and “Internal Security””.
Article 29 of the draft Law on National Security creates the Integrated Centre for Crisis 
Management. The Centre was foreshadowed as a successor to the Joint Command at the 
time the joint command was disbanded, and was budgeted for as early as last year. One of 
the most interesting aspects of the Centre contained in the legislation is that the Director of 
the Centre will have a rank equivalent to that of Secretary of State for remuneration 
purposes. A position that is equal to the Secretary of State for Security and the Secretary of 
State for Defence implies that the ‘crisis management’ that is being anticipated is an 
everyday rather than an extraordinary event.
Another aspect of concern in the draft National Security Law is to be found in unclear 
provisions in Article 8(2-3) of the draft National Security Law which state that “besides 
their primary mission, the F-FDTL may be employed additionally in other missions in 
support of civilian authorities within the framework of the Integrated System of National 
Security.. .(Art. 2)”, and that “For the purposes stated in the paragraph above, F-FDTL 
shall develop civilian-military cooperation capabilities, with a special focus on the 
traditional social-cultural structure [emphasis added] of the country”. Previously I noted 
in chapter 2 the pervasive presence ot the Indonesian military during the period of 
occupation, arranged through a structure of territorial military command which shadowed 
Indonesian civilian officials all the way down to the village level (Robinson 2003: 212; 
Lindsey 1999). Although the intent of the legislative provisions is unclear, it does raise the 
rather important question of whether something akin to the Indonesian ‘dmjungsi (dual 
function) doctrine and accompanying territorial command structure is being anticipated. 
This aspect of the legislation is also interesting in light of subterranean battles in the lead- 
up to the October 2009 suco elections in East Timor. Both CNRT and FRETILIN
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expended effort trying to gain control o f  the old selcom or clandestine structures at village 
level ahead o f the election.1,2
The recent history o f legislative development in this area is also o f interest. On 17 March 
2008, a month after the creation o f the Joint Command, Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak sent a 
proposed Law on Defence and Security (hereafter “ the TM R law”) to the National 
Parliament. Submitting legislation to the Parliament is not within the Constitutional 
mandate o f the Chief o f  the F-FDTL, and the matter went no further. It does however 
provide a window into the thinking within the defence establishment at that time. The 
TMR law had originally been drafted in Novem ber 2006. Like the other laws discussed in 
this section this draft law is full o f poorly written aspirational statements and is difficult to 
follow. O ne o f its m ost unusual aspects is the footnotes that it contains to the Maharishi’s 
theories o f “Absolute Theory o f Defence, Sovereignty in Invincibility” and “Principles to 
create Invincibility for Every Nation and Lasting World Peace” . It foreshadows in a 
num ber o f ways the need to “integrate” and “conjugate” military and non-military 
com ponents o f security and defence policy. Although this legislation never saw the light o f 
day, many o f its aspects have now been incorporated into the new security legislation.
N ow  that the national security law has been approved by the Council o f Ministers, it is 
likely that the national security policy that was being drafted will be abandoned, in 
particular as the national security law is highly prescriptive about what the national security 
policy should contain. An adviser in the Secretary o f State for Security’s office subsequently 
described the national security policy as a “dead duck” .
7.7 The significance o f states o f exception
In this section I make five main arguments. First I argue that the declaration o f the states 
o f exception in East Tim or commencing in February 2008 served another function over 
and above responding to attacks on the President and Prime Minister, that o f ‘reclaiming’ 
sovereignty from international security actors. Secondly I contend that the veneer o f 
legalism associated with the declarations served to divert attention from the major legal and 
procedural irregularities occurring at the time, and that in fact a deepening culture o f 
impunity was spreading with little opposition from the UN. Thirdly I contend the Joint 
Command and its remnant traces have served as a proxy for a continuing state o f 
exception. In the fourth and fifth subsections I argue that the Joint Command can be 
understood as a critical juncture in redefining both the relationship between international 
and national security" actors, but also between the F-FDTL and the PNTL. Finally I argue
2,2 Pers. comm. East Timorese security analyst July 2009.
209
that the various draft security laws that are currently with Committee B o f the East 
Timorese Parliament represent a case o f “ the exception becoming the rule” .
7.7.1 Sovereign is he who declares the excep tion  (S ch m itt 1985)
On the face o f it the declarations o f states o f siege and states o f  emergency that occurred in 
East Tim or in 2008 are an entirely proportionate response to an attack on the organs o f 
state. They can be understood as a measured, understandable and constitutional response. 
However, I argue that the states o f exception are better understood as an assertion o f 
sovereignty by the East Timorese government over their armed forces, in particular the 
police, at a time when their sovereignty was contested.
A mechanism for dealing with unexpected events that threaten a sovereign nation, whether 
as a result o f natural disaster, insurrection, civil war or military invasion, is important. 
Although it is not possible to define the exact nature o f emergencies until such time as they 
happen - they are by definition unforeseen - there is a sense that we will know one when 
we see one. It is understood that emergencies are a crisis, something out o f the ordinary. It 
is, in fact, everyday normalcy that allows us to recognise an emergency.
Although the previous FRETILIN  government had invited foreign troops and police to 
assist as a result o f the 2006 crisis, and this was followed by requests for UN intervention, 
this encroachment on national sovereignty never sat comfortably with any o f the political 
elite in the newly-independent country. As described in chapter 6, by February 2008 
relations between international and national police and military were poor, and the 
leadership had tired o f the foreign presence. The confusion over who was responsible for 
security for the President, and who should have been watching Alfredo Reinado, was 
arguably the final straw that produced the decision not only to declare a state o f exception 
but also to pull the PN TL out from under U N PO L com m and and place it, instead, under 
the F-FDTL. The F-FD TL with their resistance antecedents have, after all, always been 
regarded as having much greater credibility, as opposed to the poorly regarded PNTL, 
when security is at stake.
Carl Schmitt (1985), a major theorist o f the state o f exception, argued that sovereignty is 
determined, not by the everyday workings o f the pillars o f  the state, but rather by the 
suspension o f all those things through the declaration o f an emergency. As Oren Gross 
argues:
for Schmitt, the exception not only confirms the rule but is the source o f 
the rule's very existence. In as much as crises represent the sphere o f the 
political (indeed, the apex o f politics) and given the primacy o f politics over
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all other spheres o f human endeavor (including law), Schmitt argues that it 
is the exception that defines the norm  and not vice versa—the exception is 
primary to the norm and defines and informs that norm. In short, “ [t]he 
rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything” (Gross 1998: 31, 
n i l ) .
Schmitt is m ost famous for his contention that “sovereign is he who declares the 
exception” (Schmitt 1985: 5). Schmitt’s concept is central to understanding the implications 
and consequences o f the declarations o f states o f exception in East Tim or in early 2008.
Although I argue that declaring o f the states o f exception was symptomatic o f the struggle 
for sovereignty over the security forces and was done in opposition to the authority o f the 
UN, there was little protest from the UN. In the next subsections I contend that, in the 
main, the UN was satisfied by the form o f the states o f exception, while being less 
concerned with its substance and consequences.
7.7.2 The veneer o f  legalism
In this section I argue that, while flawed, the effort that the East Timorese government 
expended on the legalistic aspects o f declaring the states o f exception and the Joint 
Command served to ensure that international criticism o f the process was kept to a 
minimum. The declarations o f states o f siege and states o f emergency were made in 
accordance with Section 25 (1-6) and Section 85(g) o f the East Timorese Constitution. 
Framework legislation (Law 3/2008) was passed on 22 February 2008, which for the first 
time provided definition of, and differentiation of, states o f siege and states o f emergency. 
It also placed a num ber o f limitations on the suspension o f normalcy and attendant rights. 
The legislation also contains a requirement for renewals o f states o f exception to be 
“strictly necessary”. These safeguards ensured UN M IT’s compliance, as it was keen to 
support the notion that it was respecting the wishes o f a sovereign nation, instantiating 
‘local ownership’. U N M IT’s support was arguably also conditioned by uneasiness about its 
own performance in relation to the attacks o f 11 February.
Declarations o f states o f exception almost universally involve the suspension o f civil and 
political rights. It has also been well-documented that even those exceptions that are 
declared in strict conformity with constitutional and other legal provisions nevertheless 
open the door to human rights abuses. As Rajagopal (2003: 177) has noted “These 
emergencies have become a standard coercive tool in the repertoire o f states to maintain 
law and order” .
It is recognised that postcolonial states such as Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Fiji, 
Indonesia and others have drawn on colonial legacies and experience in their enthusiastic
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suspension of civil and political rights. The mechanism of emergencies (both de jure and de 
facto) has been used to manage resistance and maintain ‘law and order’. This is elaborated 
on by authors such as Lev (1985), Jayasuriya (2001) and Rajagopal (2003). The case of East 
Timor is no different. As discussed in chapter 2 Timorese thinking about development of 
the security sector has been greatly influenced by the authoritarian resonances of both 
colonial and occupation history. The model of a police force under military command is a 
familiar feature of East Timorese history. When the Portuguese returned to East Timor 
after World War IT, the police came under military command. Similarly ABRI from its 
inception had a responsibility not only for external defence, but also for internal security, 
and until 1999 the police, similarly, came under military command.211
States of exception not only result in the suspension of normal political processes but also 
facilitate radical reorganisation of the apparatus of power, resulting in “extensive 
centralisation of power and increased reinforcement of the coercive powers of the state” 
(Jayasuriya 2001: 110). As exceptions become normalised, political elites no longer use 
states of exception or specialised legislation in order to curb the actions of oppositional 
political elements. In both Malaysia and Singapore the infamous Internal Security Acts are 
now little invoked but normal civil and criminal law is used instead to “intimidate and crush 
political opposition”. Examples include the treatment of Anwar Ibrahim and his defense 
lawyer in Malaysia and the routine use of defamation and contempt charges in the same 
country (Jayasuriya 2001: 110-11). Jayasuriya (2001: 113) proposes that the use of the 
everyday law, or legalism, in this way normalises and legitimises authoritarian and 
exceptional rule in a way that would not be so readily accepted if emergency powers 
themselves were being used. I would argue, however, that initial exceptional powers are the 
portals through which these changes take place.
The suspension of civil and political rights during states of exception is legitimised by 
Article 4 of the ICCPR, which allows for the rights mentioned in the covenant to be 
suspended, with the exception of certain ‘non-derogable’ rights. The insertion of Article 4 
in the ICCPR itself was not without controversy, providing as it does an opportunity for 
nations with authoritarian tendencies to exert constraints on their citizens. Article 4 has 
been described as “the Achilles heel of the human rights doctrinal corpus”(Rajagopal 2003: 
176). It was introduced during the drafting of the Covenant by Great Britain. While
211 Lowry (1996) notes that this focus on internal security in the late 1950s and 1960s was a major 
contributing factor to ABRI’s increasing involvement in domestic politics and the development o f the 
doctrine o f “dwifungsi (I)” or dual function. In 1957 through the mechanism of a state o f siege ABRLs 
involvement in government and the bureaucracy was formalised under the doctrine o f Guided Democracy.
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suspension o f rights had previously occurred, the particular character o f Article 4 was 
derived from Britain’s anti-colonial wars, commencing with Malaya in 1948. These Avars’ 
were recast as ‘emergencies’ in order to manage rising anti-colonial and nationalist 
sentiment more generally and ‘the masses’ more specifically. The intention was to find a 
way to exert control that could not be construed as being about maintaining the empire but 
more benignly as being about ‘law and order’ (Rajagopal 2003: 177-180).
In this chapter I am not arguing for a diminution o f constraints on states o f exception in 
relation to non-derogable rights found both in the ICCPR and reflected in other 
international human rights instruments and many national constitutional and legal 
provisions. Rather, the lack o f effectiveness o f these constraints214 both at a national and 
international level raises questions as to whether a resort to ‘legalism’, including declaring 
and notifying states o f exception, provides a veneer o f constitutional respectability which 
allows abuse to flourish. In East Tim or the UN was quick to make much o f the fact that 
states o f exception had been declared in conformity with the constitution (see e.g.UNM IT 
2008g) but was more muted in its criticisms o f the human rights problems that rapidly 
emerged.
7.7.3 The enduring sta te  o f  excep tion  as a p o r ta l for change
I have noted the reluctance o f the East Timorese political leadership to wind up the Joint 
Com mand once the final state of siege was over, and how it continued even after it was 
wound up. In fact the leadership was not only reluctant to wind it up but were engaged in 
active speculation on, and prom otion of, new activities that the Joint Com mand might be 
involved in. Continuing positive and nostalgic references to the Joint Com mand indicated 
that it may be considered a possible model for the future. Meanwhile, as described in 
chapter 5, it is now the norm  in East Tim or for the F-FD TL to be deployed alongside the 
PN TL for the purposes o f maintaining internal security.
One o f the arguments that is made about the nature o f states o f exception is that there is a 
danger that it is not always possible to determine what is an exception and what is not — 
they may be de jure or de facto, and in either case this can lead to an “enduring state o f 
exception” where the “exception becomes the norm ” (Agamben 2005).215 Authors such as 
Neal (2006) and Aradau and van M unster (2009) make a similar case. They differentiate 
between ‘the exception’ which refers to the events and situations that are designated as
214 A discussion of the lack of effectiveness of these constraints is contained in Gross (1998).
21:1 Extensive discussion about the different ways that emergencies have been conceived and categorised is 
outside the scope of this chapter, but further detail can be found in Gross and Ni Aoläin (2006).
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‘exceptional’, and ‘exceptionaüsm’ which refers to those policies and practices legitimated 
by claims about the necessity o f exception to the norm. Many such enduring states o f 
emergency or cases o f  exceptionalism have been documented. This has been noted by 
Jayasuriya (2001) in relation to Malaysia and Singapore and Fom bad (2004) in relation to 
Cameroon. The observation that emergencies have a capacity to become enduring suggests 
that, through the process o f their implementation, an enabling environment for subsequent 
constitutional, legal, political and cultural change is created. Thus an exception has an 
inherent tendency to replicate itself, whether it is legally declared or, alternatively, produced 
in circumstances that can be regarded as synonymous with an exception. O ne o f the ways 
that this occurs is through the phenom ena o f ‘shifting goal posts’. Gross and Ni Aolain 
contend that emergency powers and authorities create precedents not only for future 
exceptions but also for future normalcy:
Whereas in the “original” crisis the situation and powers o f reference were 
those o f normalcy and regularity, in any future crisis government will take 
as its starting point the experience o f extraordinary powers and authority 
granted and exercised during previous emergencies. What might have been 
seen as sufficient “emergency” measures in the past (judged against the 
ordinary situation) may not be deemed enough to deal with further crises as 
they arise (Gross and Ni Aolain 2006: 228).
Analysis o f the way in which states o f exception have a tendency to justify their own 
existence is often confounded by the premise that one can differentiate between a ‘norm al’ 
state o f exception, conforming to its constitutional and legal constraint, and on the other 
hand deviations from this model that are regarded as ‘exceptional’ states o f exception. That 
the great majority o f exceptions are not normal, but rather deviate from the model in their 
application, is a further im portant point in understanding the concept “ that the exception 
defines the norm ”. Gross and Ni Aolain argue that theorising o f exceptions has been 
constrained or circumscribed by a tendency to focus on normal exceptions with 
correspondingly little attention to exceptional exceptions, when few exceptions actually 
conform  to the normal model.2,6
At a purely formal level this concern is addressed by the ICCPR in the requirement that 
changes to the constitutional order should not occur during the state o f exception. 
However, this provides little protection against the cultural changes that are facilitated 
through the process. In this section I argue that the continuation o f the Joint Command 
after the end o f the tinal state o f siege, the failure o f the F-FD TL to return to barracks, the
236 See Gross and Ni Aolain (2006: 304-325) for an extensive critique of what they refer to as the “aberration 
hypothesis”.
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repeated extensions o f the period o f weapons searches and an alternating use o f a language 
o f both crisis and reconciliation has produced an enduring emergency that justifies the 
continued deployment o f the F-FD TL for the purposes o f internal security, something for 
which they are not constitutionally mandated.
The states o f exception in East Tim or provided an opportunity both for the sense o f 
'emergency’ to continue beyond its mandate and for the Joint Com mand to become a 
proxy o f that enduring exception. Gross and N i Aoläin (2006: 171-172) note that “ the 
belief in our ability' to separate emergency from normalcy focuses our attention on the 
immediate effects o f emergency measures and powers while hiding from view their long 
term costs”. Recognising that it is the ‘exceptional’ exception that is normal, I argue that it 
is also critical to acknowledge that emergencies not only have a possibility' or capacity to 
become slippery, but are by nature inherently slippery. It is this slipperiness that produces 
the high propensity to manufacture enduring changes in legal culture and people’s states o f 
mind.
7.7.4 R earranged relationships betw een  in ternational a n d  n ation al secu rity  actors  
In this section I argue that the states o f exception in East Tim or served another function 
over and above responding to attacks on the President and Prime Minister and reconciling 
two warring parties, that o f ‘reclaiming’ sovereignty from the international security actors.
By February 2008 the relationship between international and national security actors in 
East Tim or was strained. The relationship deteriorated further following the 
implementation o f the Joint Command. This was evidenced by the F-FDTL forcibly taking 
a suspect from U N PO L at gunpoint (OHCHR and UNM IT 2008: 7) and armed threats 
against U N PO L by the F-FDTL, military police and the Dili Task Force (OHCHR and 
UNM IT 2008). Off-duty incidents between internadonal and national security forces 
became increasingly common. By the end o f May 2008 the Joint International N G O  
security office started to warn on a weekly basis that
This office very strongly advises that N G O s to [sic] be cautious when 
dealing with security forces in the current environment. This particularly 
includes off-duty personnel who may be armed (Joint N G O  Safety Office 
2008e).
In a notable incident on 24 May 2008, F-FDTL members threatened G N R  members with 
weapons at a nightclub (Joint N G O  Safety Office 2008e). The following week off-duty 
PN TL and F-FDTL attempted to gain entry to another nightclub without paying. When 
U N PO L were unsuccessful in defusing the situation, nightclub staff decided that the
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prudent thing to do would be to close for the evening (Joint N G O  Safety Office 2008f). In 
yet another drunken fight in 2009 between G N R  and PN TL at a Dili nightclub, an off-duty 
PN TL officer shot out the tyres o f a G N R vehicle. Both the PN TL Commander-General 
and the Secretary o f State for Deience publicly defended the PN TL members, criticised the 
G N R  for being drunk, and ‘demanded answers’ from UNPOL. Neither o f them raised the 
im portant question o f why an off duty PN T L  was carrying a firearm, contrary to the law 
(Pinto 2009). A final incident that illustrates the waning o f U N PO L  influence occurred in 
June 2009 when both U N PO L  and PN TL intervened in a fight between youth gangs in 
Bobonaro market. U N M IT claims that the subsequent arrival and involvement o f F-FDTL 
hampered U N PO L in earn ing  out their executive policing responsibilities (United Nations 
2009b: 5). Once again the Secretary o f State for Defence was highly critical o f U N PO L and 
their account o f events (Pinto 2009).
The leadership o f the PN TL has become increasingly vocal regarding its disagreement with 
U N PO L ’s control over PN TL in matters such as suspension for disciplinary breaches. 
When U N PO L  arrested the Baucau District PN TL Commander, Inspector Aderito Neto, 
in O ctober 2008 for impersonating a police officer, as discussed in chapter 6, the PN TL 
Interim General Police Commander, Afonso de Jesus, “argued that there should be a 
profound investigation into the case and that the result o f the investigation should be made 
to the Timorese public before the U N PO L disciplined the PN TL officer” . He went on to 
state “his dissatisfaction with the supplementary agreement between the state o f Timor- 
Leste and the United Nations where U N PO L  has more powers while the PN TL has less 
power” (Radio Tim or Leste 2008a).
The East Timorese political leadership continues to invoke the Joint Command most 
notably when opposing the ongoing presence o f the ISF and UNPOL. O n 30 September 
2008 Prime Minister Gusrnao lamented that, whereas East Tim or is an independent 
country, the m ovem ent o f its Defense Force and its National Police is limited while 
Australian soldiers carried weapons: “You cannot do it ( i.e. carrying weapons around) 
while foreigners can; what kind o f independence is this?” questioned Gusrnao. He went on 
to request the officers o f both F-FDTL and PN TL to keep the “spirit o f joint operation” 
to show that they are ready to take responsibility o f securing and defending the sovereignty 
o f  East Tim or (Prove me you’re prolessional and I ’m ready send the FSI and UNPOL 
back, says PM. 2008). Continuing positive and nostalgic references to the Joint Command 
are juxtaposed with demands for ‘sovereignty’ and ‘independence’, supporting the 
contention that the Joint Com mand is the model ot the future.
7.7.5 Rearranged relationships betw een F-FDTL and PN T L
The problem o f East Timor having a military with little tangible to do was discussed in 
chapter 5. Similarly the phenom enon o f the F-FD TL encroaching on the area o f internal 
security constitutionally mandated for the police was discussed in chapters 3, 5 and 6. 
Consequently, it is not the intention o f this chapter to argue that something new started 
with the Joint Command. Rather, T argue that the states o f exception provided an 
opportunity to accelerate and institutionalise the involvement o f the military in internal 
security in such a way that it has become normalised. This was done in part through the 
manufacture o f ‘crises’, such as the weapons collection program, and in part by deploying a 
language o f reconciliation to prom ote the positive and harmonious image o f two previously 
warring institutions working together in cooperative fashion. At the same time the 
militarisation o f the PN TL which commenced with Minister Lobato has continued.
Many commentators predicted that the creation o f the Joint Com mand would prove a 
dangerous undertaking (Wilson 2008; Virgoe 2008). This was not only because o f the 
abuses anticipated, but also for fear o f the consequences o f placing PN TL and F-FD TL in 
such close working proximity. The institutions had a long history o f enmity: it was quite 
soon after members o f the respective institutions had been involved in killing each other in 
the streets o f Dili in 2006, and no significant reform o f either institution had taken place. 
Plenty o f human rights abuses occurred, but the predicted bloodbath did not eventuate. 
The reasons for the apparently good relationship that developed are complex, and any 
analysis must be tentative. Some insight, however, is gained into the governm ent’s rationale 
for the Joint Command from the 2008 Program o f the Secretary o f State for Security. 237In 
Section VI (“Achievements”) there is a subsection (e.) on Mending the Relationship 
between F-FDTL and PNTL:
Joint Command. The decision o f establishing joint command was to (1) 
neutralize the rebellions who carried attacks on President and Prime 
Minister; (2) to restore the authority o f the state in the villages; (3) reconcile 
the two forces (F-FDTL & PNTL) that where fighting against each other in 
2006 crisis; (4) bring back IDPs to home villages and: (5) collect weapons 
around the country.
Social activities. The aim o f these activities are to (1) build confidence 
between the two institutions; (2) mending their relationships after having 
bitter relationships during the crisis o f 2006.
Joint patrolling aims to (1) improve cooperation o f the two institutions (2) 
prevent and overcome crimes and violence and; (3) provide security to the 
people [quote inserted with original errors].
2,7 Parts of this were reproduced in the weekly newspaper Tempo Semanal no 8, 11 August 2008.
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Apart from apprehending rebels it is clear that achieving reconciliation between the two 
forces by working together was an im portant part o f the agenda for the Joint Command. It 
also provided the F-FD TL with something to do that drew on their training and allowed 
them to use weapons. It appears that having a com m on enemy served as a unifying point 
for the institutions. W hether that common enemy was the rebels being hunted or the 
threats to sovereignty embodied by the ISF and U N PO L is less clear.
A more complex reason for the ‘success’ o f the Joint Com mand involves a nostalgic state 
o f mind. This may be nostalgia for the resistance, inspired by once again being in the 
mountains together. It may also be nostalgia for the ‘strong state’ that is represented by the 
ABRI model. This is not to discount that Timorese were usually the victims o f the police 
and military during the Indonesian occupation, but it appears that at this time in East 
Tim or there is nostalgia for things such as subsidised rice and electricity, an enthusiasm on 
the part o f  government for doing business with Indonesians with military connections, and 
a favourable inclination to authoritarian modes o f policing, familiar from the Indonesian 
occupation as well as embodied by the G N R  in the contemporary context.
Jacqui Baker, who has written on police military relationships in Indonesia, provides a 
useful framework for thinking about nostalgia. She has noted that, apart from the often 
reported clashes between the police and the military in Indonesia, there is also a growing, 
but unregulated, cooperation between the T N I and POLRI in the area o f internal security. 
She questions why POLRI has invited the T N I back into the management o f day-to-day 
security when the organisations were so definitively separated in 1999. Her explanations 
revolve around a continued “belief in the kinship o f ABRI” often created by T N I and 
POLRI having trained together, but notes that “police affection for ABRI is also tinged 
with unease about the tenure o f  police authority over internal security” . She claims that 
historically the police have been “long discredited within the military family as a corrupt, 
bumbling institution” and that there is recognition on the part o f the police that their 
current autonomy and greater profile are at risk if the military once again achieves 
supremacy (Baker 2008).
The parallels with East Tim or are striking. N ot only is there nostalgia for a strong state 
model, as epitomised by ABRI, but arguably the PN T L  feel safer having the F-FDTL on- 
side as the future is uncertain. PN TL have similarly long been portrayed as the hopeless 
bumbling idiots while the F-FD TL is considered to be more credible in relation to internal 
security. Whereas in the Indonesian situation bonds were created between police and 
military during training, in East Tim or similar bonds were created during the resistance.
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Myrrtinen’s observations on institutional loyalties in East Tim or, discussed in chapter 5, are 
pertinent. He notes that members o f F-FD TL and PN T L  may have multiple loyalties 
which can often conflict. He argues that police and military in East Tim or may have greater 
fealty to regional areas, political parties, family and clan networks and martial and ritual arts 
groups (Myrttinen 2008). It has already been seen that these multiple loyalties can trigger 
clashes between and within PN TL and F-FDTL. However, arguably these more complex 
loyalties could mask institutional conflicts in the interests o f  a sense o f com m on history. A 
PN TL willingness to cooperate would be well received by the F-FDTL, long in search o f 
something to do.
The current suite o f security legislation formalises the use o f a joint command as a matter 
o f everyday rather than exceptional occurrence by focusing solely on the exception in the 
national security framework.238 By placing the separation o f the constitutionally mandated 
separation o f the role o f the F-FD TL and PN TL to the side, one sees an example o f 
Agamben’s idea o f the exception becoming the norm.
7.7.6 The national secu rity  law s as a case o f  “the excep tion  b eco m in g  the ru le”
Many authors have described how exceptionalism, referenced to the events o f 11 
September 2001, has been used to justify a range o f illiberal practices including 
Guantanamo Bay detention camp, ‘extraordinary' rendition’ o f terrorism suspects, 
‘criminalising’ of refugees, and a range of expanded police and immigration controls and 
powers (Neal 2006; Aradau and Munster 2009). Neal (2006: 35) has noted that “on 11 
September everything changed.. .The meaning and interpretation o f the event are now 
thoroughly incorporated into a regime o f legitimation for exceptional sovereign practices” .
By placing the events o f 11 September 2001 and the events o f 11 February 2008 alongside 
each other in the explanatory' statement o f the Law on National Defence, a legitimation o f 
exceptionalism flowing from 11 February is made. The East Timorese government is aware 
that there are parts o f the international community^ that are not enthusiastic about the 
“blurring” o f the roles o f the police and military anticipated in the draft National Security 
Law. The East Timorese Secretary o f State for Defence notes this in his August 2009 blog, 
which is highly critical o f  the role o f the UN in the area o f  security sector reform, promotes 
the new suite o f legislation and stresses the im portance o f genuine rather than token 
sovereignty for East Timor:
238 At a more practical level joint training between F-FDTL and PN TL was announced in November 2009 
(F-FDTL -  PN TL Hakarak Hamutuk no Lakohi Tane Liman. 2009 ).
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The National Security Law is also indispensible because it regulates 
cooperation between the F-FDTL, the PN TL and Civil Protection in 
emergency situations. In fact, the Organic Law o f the Ministry o f Defence 
and Security, which has already been approved, foresees an Integrated 
Crisis Management Centre. Therefore we must be organized to provide 
assistance to the population in emergency situations, e.g. caused by some 
natural disaster. Although I have received no such official information, 
rumours have it that the National Security Law is not appreciated by the 
UN, as they say it militarizes the police. I hope that this information is not 
accurate (Pinto 2009).
Thus it can be seen that the invoking o f 11 September alongside 11 February is speaking 
not only to a domestic audience but is seeking to re-legitimate, in the eyes o f an 
international audience, East Tim orese sovereign control o f their armed forces. It also seeks 
to institutionalise pre-emptive excepdonalism as the act o f a responsible nation-state.
7.8 Conclusion
The implementation o f the states o f exception and the Joint Com mand in East Tim or in 
response to the events o f 11 February 2008 produced a situation where rule o f law 
unraveled and the F-FD TL and the PN TL carried out abuses with apparent impunity. 
Rather than this being o f concern to the East Timorese government, it was seen as a 
successful way to resolve tensions between the two forces. In chapter 5 I discussed the 
development o f a culture o f legal and judicial impunity in East Tim or and how this affects 
the practice o f police work. This chapter further illustrates the comfortable fit between 
impunity and states o f exception.
At another level this chapter illustrates the difficulties encountered in the prom otion ot 
local ownership o f security sector reform. The creation o f the Joint Com mand with its 
associated legal, developmental and human rights problems was an assertion o f local 
ownership not entirely anticipated in the model imagined by international police builders.
The continued deployment o f F-FD TL in roles constitutionally mandated for the PNTL 
suggests that the Joint Com mand model is seen as a suitable way to keep the F-FDTL 
occupied, as well as minimising the role o f the PNTL, who are frequently perceived as 
having little political legitimacv or technical com petence to carry out their assigned role. At 
the same time the PN T L  have become increasingly militarised with disproportionate 
attention and resources allocated to special units, and all future basic recruit training to be 
carried out by the paramilitary GNR. This situation is now being formalised with the 
consideration o f draft legislation that both valorises the Joint Com mand and 
institutionalises the move ot the F-FDTL into internal security with legislation that ensures 
the exception has become the norm.
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I have argued that the use o f ‘crises’ manufactured a situation where the extraordinary use 
o f the military for internal security became the norm, both tangibly and in the collective 
imagination. There was a change in ‘the state o f m ind’ that occurred through the Joint 
Command, allowing the ‘retaking’ o f sovereignty from international actors, who are now 
only tolerated for the material resources and international confirmation o f successful rather 
than ‘failed’ statehood they provide. The UN was ultimately compromised and sidelined by 
the states o f exception and the Joint Command, and their ability make a significant 
contribution to security sector reform remains doubtful in the circumstances.
The failure o f the East Timorese government to consult with the UN before establishing 
the Joint Command, the limited mandate (and will) o f  the UN to exert any control over the 
human rights abuses committed by the Timorese security forces during the states o f 
exception and the continuing inability o f U N PO L to effectively command the PN TL all 
make it clear that this aspect o f the work o f U N M IT has certain fictive elements. The 
unsuccessful enactment o f a ritual o f police reform  and security sector review described in 
chapter 6 has paved the way for the unchecked development o f exceptionalism described 
in this chapter.
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C h ap te r 8 
C onclusions
8.1 Introduction
In this concluding chapter I provide a brief summary o f the thesis, identifying the main 
themes that emerged in each chapter. I describe the four main themes that underpin the 
thesis and my research questions outlined in chapter 1 — namely local context, local 
ownership, how relationships condition police-building outcomes, and what we can 
conclude about the capacity o f the UN to construct or reconstruct post-conflict police 
forces and the U N ’s attendant organisational responsiveness to things learnt along the way. 
Contributions made by the thesis, as well as its limitations, are outlined.
8.2 Summary of thesis
This thesis has examined the development o f a post-conflict police force, the Policia 
Nacional Timor-Leste (PNTL), under international and national auspices. I have covered 
the development o f the police force over a decade, from before the inauguration o f PNTL 
through two periods o f United Nations responsibility' for executive policing and 
development o f the national police force. Development o f PN TL by the sovereign 
government also occurred between periods o f UN control, as well as at the same time as 
the UN since 2006. I have primarily conducted this analysis at an ‘all-of-state’ level. I show 
how a variety of historical legacies and contemporary contexts influence the environment 
in which police-building occurs and examine institutional limitations to addressing these 
contexts. I also examine how the local ownership ‘trope’ both illuminates and influences 
outcomes.
Chapter 2 responds to the exhortation in the literature to ‘pay attention to the local 
context’ and is premised on a conviction that ‘history m atters’. I scrutinise features o f 
autochthonous East Timorese social organisation that were harnessed and reinforced by 
Portuguese and Indonesian occupying powers. These include an enduring partiality for 
local dispute resolution mechanisms, a martial heritage characterised by unstable alliance­
making, a preference for exercise o f personal rather than institutional power, and a related 
historical ambivalence about the rule o f law. Contemporary East Tim or is characterised by 
societal fault-lines imbued with legacies o f suspicion and violence. All these legacies have 
powerful influence on East Timorese state and nation-building and police development.
Chapter 3 examines the development o f the East Timorese police force under U N TA ET 
and subsequent sovereign government control up until the crisis o f 2006. UN assessments 
o f the process were initially very positive. International donors and human rights
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advocates, however, became increasingly alarmed, reporting the many shortcomings oi 
PN TL and expressing deep reservations about the institution’s readiness for independent 
existence. The way the UN organised its international deployments made the nascent East 
Timorese police institution less sustainable. It did not help that police were deployed from 
over forty different countries with different policing styles. N or did it help that deployment 
was slow, the police deployed were o f  poor quality and there was no coherent planning 
about what those police would do. A misapprehension by the UN about its task — believing 
it was confined to ‘training’ for the PNTL, coupled with their poor appreciation o f local 
contexts, laid the foundations for the development o f a fragile institution. Problems arose 
not only because o f attempts to transplant a model o f policing, albeit a largely implicit 
model, that had little resonance with Timorese expectations o f policing and order 
maintenance. It also arose because o f the manifest lack o f skills on the part o f the UN to 
attempt to coherently transfer a model o f any description. Additionally the inclusion o f 
Indonesian-era police in recruitment for PNTL, and their subsequent prioritisation for 
management positions laid down serious institutional fault lines.
From  the debut o f East Timorese control over PNTL, which saw the arrival o f a shipment 
o f high-powered military-style weapons, a fragile and divided organisation was exploited by 
the Minister o f the Interior. He proceeded to mould an over-armed, undertrained, 
personalised and factionalised police force. The modalities o f this development mirrored 
the historical legacies discussed in chapter 2, as he displayed his propensity for 
inappropriate and unaccountable exercise o f power and use o f force, the development o f 
paramilitary police units personally loyal to himself, the encouragement o f shifting alliances, 
and a disregard for the rule o f law. The nature o f the police increasingly reflected aspects o f 
the Indonesian police, in particular a notable symmetry between the Indonesian Brim ob and 
the new East Timorese special forces. While disorder was m ounting in the ‘centre’ a variety 
o f international and national actors ‘on the periphery’ were trying out new ways to 
accommodate justice and security needs not met by a weak police force and nascent formal 
justice system. These ‘making do’ localised experiments in policing and justice are under­
recognised for the potential they hold for thinking about policing in a more context 
specific way. They can be considered a form o f local ownership that corresponds more 
closely to local realities.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine two different kinds o f post-independence ‘context’ which, in 
concert with previously described historical legacies, influence the development and 
function o f the PNTL. Policing is considered an essential part o f the rule o f law 
environment and programming and central to any discussions on the security sector
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environment or its reform. Policing thus sits at the intersection o f these two important 
foundations o f state-building, and a chapter has been devoted to each. Chapter 4 examines 
the rule o f law project and the inchoate legal context in which it operates in East Timor. 
Through an examination of critical events and court cases I demonstrate the deep 
ambivalence o f the political leadership about the rule o f law. This is evidenced in public 
undermining o f the judiciary, political interference in cases, inappropriate exercise o f 
power, failure to act on recommendations for prosecution, a promiscuous use o f pardons, 
the conduct o f illegal acts and a very clear message that political considerations trump legal 
ones. Together with the limited reach o f the formal legal system this has profound 
implications for how the police do their work. It is apparent in four different ways — the 
police operate in a broader environm ent o f impunity, they take the law into their own 
hands, they are not able to abide by procedural requirements, and they very often refer 
matters to traditional authorities or carry out mediation themselves. The latter example o f 
referring matters to traditional authorities or police carrying out mediation themselves 
reflects the realities o f policing on the ground and does not have to be viewed as 
intrinsically negative. It is an example o f local ownership o f policing that has the potential 
to provide improved access to justice. Further research could illuminate the possibility o f 
re-allocating a proportion o f a policing budget to a form o f policing that may prove more 
sustainable, and potentially less dangerous than forms currently being promoted.
Chapter 5 asks how the security sector reform project and the diffuse security environment 
conditions the building o f a police institution. I note the importance o f overlapping and 
multiple providers o f security and insecurity The im ported policing model assumes a 
num ber o f things — that there is a Weberian monopoly on the use o f legitimate violence, 
that the respective roles o f police and military are clearly defined, and that there is a 
willingness and capacity on the part o f the government to provide civilian oversight and 
accountability o f the uniformed forces. O n the contrary, in East Tim or there are many 
overlaps between state and nonstate security actors, with police officers arguably 
identifying more with their nonstate roles and memberships. Members o f the government 
also utilise a range o f state and nonstate security sendees for their personal and official 
needs. The distinction between the role o f the police and military has become increasingly 
blurred and this is prom oted by the governm ent as a positive development. There are many 
examples o f how police and military are not subject to adequate oversight and 
accountability mechanisms, further reinforcing the impunity concerns identified in chapter 
4. Although this blurring o f the roles o f  the army and police, contrary to international 
dictates, is a further manifestation o f local ownership it is not one that I consider
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potentially desirable in the same way that a closer examination o f more localised policing 
may be. I take the position that blurring o f the police and the army does nothing to further 
access to justice and policing sendees (in the broadest sense). O n the contrary it has further 
extrended impunity and seen an increase in human rights violations.
Chapter 6 briefly describes the 2006 crisis and associated unravelling o f the PN TL and F- 
FDTL. It continues with an account o f the foreign intervention to restore order, and the 
mandate o f the subsequent U NM IT mission to assume executive policing and assist the 
government to rebuild police and review the broader security sector. The twin lenses o f 
local ownership and local context prove very suitable for examining the separate police 
reconstruction and security sector review processes. These processes unfolded fitfully, 
unevenly and with poor coordination even within the UN; as they did so the respective 
‘contexts’ o f international and national actors amplified their steadily deteriorating 
relationships. This was evidenced by continual condemnation o f international security 
personnel in very public forums by members o f the East Timorese political leadership. Yet 
on an everyday level the relationships were characterised most sharply by the absence o f 
actors from each other’s spheres. The concept o f  local ownership served a largely rhetorical 
function with scant evidence o f even an attenuated form o f local ownership present in the 
actions o f the UN.
Nonetheless, both sets o f actors had strong motivations to produce a successful ‘police 
reconstruction’. The East Timorese wanted their security forces back. They did not want to 
be considered a fragile - or even failed - state. The UN sought to redeem their tarnished 
reputation resulting from its first police-building efforts, and they wanted an exit strategy, 
all the more pressing because o f the increasingly disengaged stance o f their governmental 
counterparts. These estranged relations led to a slide into ritualistic processes in which they 
seemed to do things but did not actually do them. Although the driving forces o f the actor 
groups were congruent their bearing differed. Different postures were observed; the UN 
alternated ritualism with retreatism; a stance heavily influenced by a particular discourse o f 
local ownership. This is an invocation o f local ownership which actually does nothing to 
further the autonomy and sustainability o f East Timorese managed security institutions. Its 
purpose is to shield the UN from having to take responsibility' for failing to fulfil their 
mandate.
East Timorese actors alternated ritualism with rebellion, a position also powerfully partial 
to a discourse o f local ownership, albeit a divergent one. In turn this invocation is used to 
excuse and obscure a collection ot mismanagement and malevolent stances towards co-
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operating with international actors. Toward the end of 2009 it became apparent that 
despite a ‘handover’ of policing responsibility from UNPOL to PNTL having commenced, 
the PNTL had not been ‘reconstructed’. This manifested as a handover infused with fictive 
qualities. Similarly it became clear that the crucial security sector review would never 
happen. By October 2009 most of the funding for the multi-million dollar UNDP security 
sector review project had been squandered. The project was quietly ‘rebadged’ as a capacity 
building project; remaining funds were awkwardly allocated to a technical radio repair 
program. This situation was able to occur because the stances of international and national 
actors towards each other, and their respective perverse invocations of local ownership, 
acted in a mutually reinforcing way to produce agreed fictions about police reconstruction.
In Chapter 7 I examined the states of siege, states of emergency and Joint military police 
Command that were initiated as a result of attacks on the President and Prime Minister in 
February 2008. Carl Schmitt’s contention that ‘sovereign is he who declares the exception’ 
quickly became evident in the rearranged relationships between PNTL and F-FDTL and, 
significantly for this thesis, between international and national actors involved in police 
development. I argue a ‘state of mind’ had been reached which enabled East Timorese to 
resume sovereignty over their police, with all parties, national and international, ignoring 
the previously agreed fiction of UNPOL control over PNTL. It also marked the effective 
point of obsolescence, the downhill slide, for the UN police-building efforts. More 
frequent and insistent calls for police handover emanated from the political leadership and 
these calls were taken up by East Timorese citizens.
The states of exception concluded and the internationally preferred model of separation of 
the roles of the police and military gave way to an option quietly preferred by much of the 
East Timorese political elite. The military, enjoying greater political legitimacy than the 
police, became steadily more involved in internal security. This model is comfortably 
familiar from Portuguese, Indonesian, and arguably UN, periods of control. Carl Schmitt’s 
contention that ‘the exception becomes the rule’ clarified in 2009 when a suite of security 
legislation was presented to parliament valorising the Joint Command and explicitly using 
the word “blurred” to describe the evolving relationship between the police and the 
military.
I argue that the development of exceptionalism in East Timor was an assertion of 
sovereignty, steeped in a discourse of local ownership. This was not part of the repertoire 
of outcomes anticipated by the UN. The development of the joint command, best 
understood as a snub to the efforts of the UN, led to the UN taking uncomfortable refuge
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in the deployment o f local ownership discourse, albeit the local ownership that seeks to 
evade responsibility for failure. I conclude that one o f the risks inherent in the ritualism 
described in chapter 6 is that, when it fails, it prepares fertile ground for the emergence o f 
exceptionalism.
8.3 Four major themes
Four interrelated concepts, posed as questions, frame this case study — local context, local 
ownership, relationships between international and national police-building actors, and the 
capacity and responsiveness o f the UN in the conduct o f police-building.
C ontex t
In what ways does ‘local context' feature in the development and outcomes oj police-building under 
international auspices?
There is an extensive literature that seeks to elucidate ‘lessons learnt’ in the inchoate project 
o f  international police-building. Most commonly this literature emphasises that it is not 
possible to simply apply a foreign-derived template o f police development to a new 
situation and states the necessity o f ‘paying attention to the local context’. There is, 
however, scant evidence that this idea makes the transition from the policy literature to 
implementation in the field. The fact that many formal institutions and infrastructure were 
destroyed during the departure oi Indonesian administration in 1999 contributed to a 
mistaken belief on the part o f the UN that they were confronted with a tabula rasa. N ot 
immediately evident to the new administration was that there were many features o f 
Timorese autochthonous socio-political organisation and indigenous institutions at the 
village level that had continued to function.
I do not contend that ‘local context’ stopped developing with the arrival o f the United 
Nations in 1999. The experience o f the United Nations style o f administration, 
programming initiatives and the enorm ous influx o f foreign ideas, workers and businesses 
into F,ast Tim or contributed a lurther layer o f context to that already present. In this thesis 
I note particularly the introduction o f rule o f law and security sector programmes. In 
addition, the social and political dynamics and histories within East Timorese society 
continued to develop — once again another layer o f context.
In answering the research question about what ways ‘local context’ featured in the 
development and outcom es o f  internationally auspiced police-building, I note that at a 
most basic level little to no guidance is given to UN personnel on the history and culture o f 
East Timor, either before or after arriving in the mission environment. N o practical
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direction is provided on how to ‘pay attention’ to these factors in the conduct of their 
work. Critically UN police arrive for short rotations, without the benefit of language, 
unaware of local legislation, and rarely mix socially with their counterparts. The possibility 
of appreciating the local context let alone being able to do anything with it is rather 
attenuated. I will argue, below, however, that individual innovators amongst international 
police were instrumental in developing hybrid policing mechanisms that drew on traditional 
authority in a way that indicated a better apprehension of local context. Although local 
ownership is something that is usually seen to reside in the local population these initiatives 
responded to local realities, and were supportive of existing mechanisms used for the 
maintenance of order. However, at the level of mission leadership this apprehension of 
context or ability to innovate is missing, evidenced at the most basic level by all documents 
designed for communicating with either the PNTL or their civilian ministry being 
produced in English and all joint meetings being conducted in English. This evidences a 
lack of commitment to even the most attenuated form of local ownership
Local context is an amorphous concept and impossible to exhaustively catalogue. The 
thesis contends, however, that many identified features of East Timorese social and 
political organisation are at odds with the stated aims of international police development, 
as encapsulated primarily in UN documents. In particular, notions that a police force 
should be democratic, impartial, formally accountable, minimalist in the use of force, and 
constrained by the rule of law meet with a distinct ambivalence. There is support for these 
concepts but they appear difficult to reconcile with counter practice where personal power 
is paramount and martial heritage is both valorised and ubiquitous. Inchoate ideas about 
community policing are promoted by the UN, while primary development efforts on the 
part of PNTL are directed towards their paramilitary special forces. Similarly, the 
enthusiasm of international actors to ensure a separation of police and military function is 
met with East Timorese approval in theory, but this approval evaporates in practice. The 
international ideal of a unified police organisation with a pre-eminent role in the exercise of 
policing does not correspond to the reality of the PNTL. Surveys indicate that very limited 
numbers of people view PNTL as the principal organisation for ensuring law, order and 
security. Further, the institution is fragmented and anxious and does not command the 
principal loyalties ot its members. Such fealty is owed either to one’s police unit or more 
commonly to one of a host of martial arts or other armed organisations. A highly 
centralised policing institution has developed with little devolution of resources to the 
districts, thereby failing to provide substantive state-based policing to the rural locations 
where most people live. The difficulty of doing police work in East Timor, as conceived in
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the international model, is accentuated by weak, overloaded and poorly functioning judicial 
institutions.
One can conclude that although the UN has had plenty o f time to apprehend local context 
that an apparent lack o f  institutional suppleness and responsiveness prevents this being 
applied in a meaningful way. In particular, that so few people turn to East Timorese state- 
based police for their policing needs has not been factored into planning or allocation o f 
resources. It is likely that an opportunity to improve access to justice and policing sendees 
has been missed through believing that it is only through transferring a western model o f 
policing that policing can be improved.
Ownership
W h a t notions oj ‘local ownership’ are deployed by international and national actors in the development of a  
post-conflict police force, and  how do these notions m anifest?
A more recent addition to the policy literature is the idea that ‘local ownership’ is an 
essential determinant o f  police programming success. It is clear that the term local 
ownership carries with it a variety o f ill-defined meanings, and its popularity can be 
attributed not only to being a signifier o f good-hearted intent, but also to its ready value as 
a rhetorical device. The process o f thinking through what local ownership might mean over 
and above being an aspirational statement — whether it is something that international 
actors have the capacity to ‘bestow’, and whether local ownership was what international 
police-building actors really had in mind — has not been adequately developed. The term 
was not in use during the construction o f the police during U N TA ET, but I conclude there 
was little inkling by the UN o f the importance o f anything corresponding to local 
ownership. By the time that U N M IT commenced the term had well and truly entered the 
lexicon.
In the thesis I propose a variety o f understandings o f the term. I contend that local 
ownership can be conceived on a spectrum, not terribly distinct from earlier ideas such as 
Arnstein’s ‘ladder o f citizen participation’. By analysing policy documents and public 
statements about local ownership we can discern degrees o f intent and practice in a linear 
fashion. This is a useful and educative way to encourage participatory development, and in 
this construction it is easy to argue that ‘more is better’.
However, the inherent paradoxes o f the term require closer examination. Local ownership 
o f security can in some instances lead to bad outcomes, and that is when international 
intervention is required to address the shortcomings o f local actors. Additionally, the term
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is dishonest, as it implies that recipients can choose what aspects o f  the programme they 
like and don’t like; in reality the package is non-negotiable. A final paradox emerges as 
'local’ is usually shorthand for 'local political elite’. This is an oversimplified understanding 
o f the post-conflict condition when a great num ber o f actors vie for voice, power and the 
approval o f international actors. It also excludes the security needs and perspectives o f 
those less visible — including women, children, the poor and the vast majority7 o f non-urban 
dwellers. It is not possible to satisfactorily 'add local ownership and stir’ into a highly 
centralised, urban and elite oriented police prescription.
In addition to such paradoxical considerations, I advanced the idea that the term has some 
more perverse utility. I argue that the fraught relationship between international and 
national actors encourages use o f the term by national actors to justify inappropriate 
behaviour, malevolent conduct or any num ber o f varieties o f 'spoiling’. Similarly 
international actors can use the term to wash their hands of, or fail to take responsibility 
for, a deteriorating situation. Using the term in such perverse ways is facilitated, however, 
by the positive semantic connotations o f local ownership. Like m otherhood, or eating your 
vegetables, it is hard to disagree with. Yet, these differing invocations o f local ownership by 
both parties have produced an outcom e that is more than the sum o f its parts. Indeed, 
these stances act in tandem to mutually reinforce fictions associated with police 
construction and reform.
The thesis documents two previously un-noted but divergent invocations o f ‘local 
ownership’ that have not appeared in the literature before. First is the local ownership 
displayed by the East Timorese government in ordering, contrary to all agreements, the 
assumption o f Timorese military control over the police for the joint com m and in 2008. 
The UN responded to the humiliation o f having its authority sidelined by itself invoking 
local ownership, not because it approved o f the actions, but by way o f avoiding criticism 
for limited outcomes in reforming the security institutions. I argue this use o f the term 
hastened UN obsolescence in police-building.
Second, East Tim or has had a difficult and conflicted history under Portuguese colonial 
rule and Indonesian occupation that is still evident in a variety o f societal fault lines since 
independence. Further, these periods o f earlier East Timorese history reinforced a num ber 
o f pre-existing features o f East Timorese society. In part due to the exigencies ot 
geography and geomorphology much o f East Timorese existence is based on subsistence, 
or sometimes less than subsistence, agriculture. This conditions many settlements to be 
small and often isolated, with a high dependence on others in the clan group. This
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manifests in attendant localised identities and localised problem solving around traditional 
leaders, including in the domains of justice and security. Coupled with a history of 
centralised and authoritarian occupying states that have generally not provided justice and 
security in a form that is acceptable to the needs of predominantly rural dwelling people, 
there has been a continuation of localised mechanisms. After the restoration of 
independence state institutions, including the police, have continued to be fairly centralised 
with limited capacity and few devolved resources. Consequently PNTL stationed in the 
rather large margins of the state, like everyone else, remain dependent on the human capital 
and authority of traditional institutions. Arguably the hybrid mechanisms that have 
developed, through the initiative of a variety of international and national actors represent 
an under-documented, and possibly under-utilised, kind of local ownership. Given that 
local ownership is only ever conceived of in the literature as being at an all of state level, 
this highly geographically localised form of ownership deserves further attention.
R e la d o  ns h ips
In  what ways do relationships between international and national security actors condition the outcomes o f  
post-conflict police-building,?
One of the ways that a failure to pay attention to the local context is evidenced is in the 
implementation of police-building projects that are a series of technical and foreign-derived 
transplants. In more critical studies of police-building an attempt has been made to 
emphasise the deeply political nature oi police-building, with the exhortation that it must 
be realised that the task is a political and not a technical exercise. This thesis underlines the 
deeply political nature of police-building in East Timor, with long-enduring legacies from 
previous eras of foreign control. However, the failure of international police builders to 
arrive equipped with even the most basic technical policing competence has complicated 
the story. In fact, I contend that technical failures have been so manifest that they have 
become part of the political, and hence local, context.
These political difficulties are exacerbated by the lack of a common language of 
communication, East Timorese concerns to maintain sovereignty over their uniformed 
forces, and the structural constraints of the way that the UN organises its deployments. 
Failure to establish these relationships is reflected in poor development and reconstruction 
outcomes for the PNTL and in a failure to conduct a mandated security sector review.
Although differing in underlying motivations, both sets ot actors would like to produce a 
‘successful’ police reconstruction process and a handover to East Timorese authorities that
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would enable the UN to exit from their current role in East Timor. The poor relationships 
that have resulted in poor police development outcomes have produced motivations to 
appear that reconstruction has taken place. However, in order for handover to occur 
everyone must play along a little longer. The way that the charade o f  police reconstruction 
can be concluded most efficiently is for all actors to agree, in the face o f much evidence to 
the contrary, that the police have been reconstructed. This requires the enactment o f a 
ritual o f graduated and responsible ‘handover’ o f policing, infused with the language o f 
local ownership, from those that have no authority (UNPOL) to those that have no 
sustainability (PNTL). In addition to ritualism the UN invokes local ownership discourse to 
absolve itself for responsibility for the outcomes, a stance that can be characterised as 
‘retreatism’. The East Timorese political leadership, in addition to ritualism, engages in 
‘rebellion’, as a result o f frustration at the police development process, and as a way o f 
retaking sovereignty o f their uniformed forces.
The ritualism that has developed is most evident in the multi-layered fictive qualities o f the 
U N PO L to PN TL policing handover. These fictions relate to the legal and policy 
framework o f the handover, the relationship between those tasked with reform and the 
recipients o f the process, the capacity o f U N PO L  to reconstruct the PN T L  and monitor 
the handover, as well as the capacity o f PN TL to operate independently, demonstrating 
both capacity and integrity.
The failure to reconstruct the PN TL illustrates the dangers inherent in this kind o f 
ritualism. Although at the end o f 2009 East Tim or is considered calm, an unreconstructed 
police force presents great dangers for the future. The failure to develop a police force that 
is legitimate in the eyes o f the community and the political leadership leads to 
exceptionalism and a corresponding consolidation o f military involvement in internal 
security. The exceptionalism is evident in draft security legislation that references not only 
the East Timorese states o f exception, but also the events o f 11 September 2001 in the 
United States, to justify blurring the division between the police and military.
C apacity
W hat can we conclude about the capacity oj the U N  to construct or reconstruct post-conflict police forces?
Even when individual practitioners within the UN have a reasonable awareness o f the local 
context, there are a num ber o f reasons it is difficult to apply this knowledge. For a variety 
o f structural reasons the UN, as well as other bilateral police organisations, does not have a 
lot o f organisational suppleness or ‘wriggle room ’ to contemplate doing policing in another
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fashion. In developed countries it is now widely recognised by policy experts and 
academics that ‘policing’ will be carried out by a range o f actors broader than the police. 
Yet this understanding does not appear to make the transition to implementation o f police­
building programmes. East Tim or is no exception in having a plethora o f providers of 
security and insecurity. International programmes are clearly ‘police’ programmes rather 
than ‘policing’ programmes, with the intended ‘output’ being a police institution, with the 
‘outcom e’ o f improved order and security in a broader sense presumed to follow 
automatically. Although undoubtedly there is a place for the police in a country’ such as 
East Timor, particularly in more urban areas, there is an assumption that provision o f 
policing solely by the state is self-evidently preferable. This fails to apprehend that all o f the 
reasons that nonstate policing is considered dangerous and unreliable, including lack o f 
accountability, hidden power structures and lack o f adherence to human rights standards, 
all apply in equal measure to state-based policing in post-conflict situations. This policy 
blindness prevails in the face o f empirical research that demonstrates that most people 
continue to choose actors other than the police for their justice and security needs.
While it is unrealistic to expect to build credible state institutions in just ten years when it 
took other new states centuries to build through trial and error, what does get built is 
rendered less serviceable by the fact that the UN wants to be able to report, and is expected 
to report, that it has completed something tangible in a short period o f time.
Although the literature contains many critical assessments o f the performance o f U N PO L 
this thesis provides a more focused example o f UN police-building that failed, but where 
an opportunity was provided for the UN to rectify the mistakes made the first time. The 
organisational impermeability to many o f the lessons provided by the first experience, 
coupled with the unwieldy way in which the UN continues to work, leads to a conclusion 
that the organisation does not have sufficient capacity or suppleness to respond to lessons 
learned about post-conflict police-building. Consequently it can be argued that the UN is 
not the right organisation to lead such important work. "Phis is o f broader application than 
just East Tim or and may well apply, for many o f the same reasons, to many o f the post­
conflict situations in which the UN seeks to build or reform police organisations.
8.4 Contributions and lim itations of the research
The thesis is the first full length study o f the construction and reconstruction o f the East 
Timorese Police. It provides a case-study o f a post-conflict police force that has been 
(re)constructed under the same international auspices, in the same place, on two occasions.
234
This offers an opportunity to determine the responsiveness o f the UN to the things that 
have been, or should have been, learnt.
The UN has been afforded a number o f opportunities in East Tim or that should have 
augured well for state- and police-building. These included an unparalleled mandate in 
1999, a relatively benign security environment, an initially welcoming population and 
leadership, extended international support and the opportunity to rectify mistakes made in 
the first attem pt at police-building. That the organisation was unable to respond to these 
opportunities has far reaching consequences. This thesis has outlined the consequences for 
East Timor where there has been a failure to build a credible and functioning police 
institution. However, the thesis also points to the implications o f this for the broader UN 
role. If the UN is unable to undertake this task in East Tim or there is little chance o f 
success in more complex post-conflict environments. This demands a re-thinking by policy 
and decision makers o f the UN role in police-building. As the assumptions inherent in 
broader state-building are essentially congruent with those underpinning police-building it 
also demands a broader re-examination o f an institutionalist approach to state-building that 
does not adequately address the historical legacies and pre-existing social structures present 
in the receiving context. It also invites further questioning by the academy o f the 
implications o f these findings. Does the presumed self-evident desirability o f attempting to 
improve access to justice and policing through transfer o f W estern-based models o f 
centralised state police and justice institutions require an approach more genuinely attuned 
to local context, existing realities and people’s choices about their service providers? What 
happens more broadly, in places other than East Timor, when the legacies o f history in a 
particular context interact (in possibly perverse ways) with attempts at transmission o f 
models derived in placed with radically different histories and social organisation?
The literature on police-building does not address the importance o f relationships. This 
thesis makes an original contribution by providing a case study o f how relationships 
between international and national actors condition the outcomes o f an internationally 
managed police construction and reconstruction process. The thesis interrogates these 
relationships, demonstrating how discourse on local ownership, combined with failure to 
apprehend critically influential local context, moulds and conditions the outcomes o f the 
police-building exercise. The thesis shows, however, that the context as experienced by 
international actors means they are organisationally constrained in apprehending these 
issues. Further academic investigation o f how relationships condition outcomes in police­
building or state-building more broadly, and in specific locations should yield further 
important understandings o f this critical issue.
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The thesis contributes to the local ownership debate by showing that the debate as outlined 
in the literature is principally confined to a matter o f simple metrics regarding “how m uch” 
local ownership is allowed or appropriate on an essentially sliding scale. The thesis 
expands the current debate by providing some innovative ways o f understanding the use o f 
the local ownership trope by different actors. It shows how international actors invoke 
local ownership in an attem pt to avoid responsibility for their failures, and national actors 
invoke the concept to excuse sometimes inexcusable behaviour and 'spoiling’. The thesis 
goes on to show, furthermore, how these stances mutually reinforce each other to produce 
fictitious police (re)construcdon outcomes. I conclude that the complexities o f the term 
local ownership require much closer interrogation by both policy makers and the academy 
if the term is to be used in a healthy and empowering , as opposed to perverse, way-
inform ed by Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite’s regulator}' ritualism framework, 
previously applied to the aged care environment and other contexts, I apply this notion to 
the police reconstruction process in East Tim or to show how actors representing the two 
‘sides’ o f the process display particular responses to an untenable and dishonest 
compromise regarding ‘ownership’. Organisational limitations, combined with divergent 
discourses o f local ownership, encourage the multi-layered fictive nature evident in the 
police reconstruction exercise and obfuscation surrounding the security sector review. The 
failure o f international and national actors to relate is underscored by congruent agendas 
where all actors would for differing reasons like to ‘see the back o f ’ the police 
reconstruction process. In the thesis I contend that there is a critical connection between 
this ritualism and the exceptionalism that commenced following the events o f 11 February 
2008. This exceptionalism not only served to rearrange relationships between international 
and national actors, but also between the F-FD TL and the PNTL. The connection between 
regulatory ritualism and exceptionalism in broader circumstances would provide an exciting 
avenue o f academic enquiry, with particular potential to inform understandings o f how 
these phenom ena together influence police and justice development activities in post­
conflict situations.
The inquiries o f this thesis have been limited by the amount o f time that could be spent in 
the field. This in turn has meant that it has not been possible to carry out comprehensive 
interviews with as broad section o f the PN TL as I would have liked. It has also meant that 
little emphasis could be given to investigating the way that nonstate security actors ‘do 
policing’, or the mechanisms o f the hybrid forms o f policing that have evolved.
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